BERKELEY DIVINITY SCHOOL
LIBRARY

Released by
Bryn Mawr
College Library

Accession Number

38131

Shelf Number

BERKELEY DIVINITY SCHOOL
LIBRARY



Accession Number *Shelf Number*

BC.

AAF-FAC-412

02/25/2025 12:26-2 INCR

BT 220 .P75 1896
Powell, H. C. (Henry Clark)
The principle of the Incarnation : with especial reference to the relation between our Lord's divine omniscience

T

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/principleofincar0000hcpo_h6k8

THE PRINCIPLE

OF

THE INCARNATION

WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO

THE RELATION BETWEEN OUR LORD'S DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND HIS HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

H. C. POWELL, M.A.

OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD; RECTOR OF WYLYE, WILTS.
FORMERLY PROVOST OF INVERNESS CATHEDRAL

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY
1896

All rights reserved

Released by
Bryn Mawr
College Library

BT
220
.175
1896

Ἑπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν, ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦμεν Υἱὸν τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, καὶ συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν Θεότητι, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι . . . ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἰδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης.

"Following then the holy Fathers, we acknowledge, and all with one consent teach, One and the Same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in His Godhead, perfect in His Manhood, . . . recognized in Two Natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation: the difference of the Natures being *in no part* annulled by reason of the union, but on the contrary the property of each Nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and Subsistence."—*Definition of Faith of the General Council of Chalcedon*, A.D. 451.

"Fast alle modernen Irrthümer bezüglich der Incarnationslehre, haben theils in einem falschen Personlichkeitsbegriff, theils in dem Wahne ihren Grund, dass durch die alte Lehre von der Einen und göttlichen Personlichkeit Christi die Wahrheit und Integrität der Menscheit, insbesondere die Freiheit und Verdienstlichkeit der Acte Christi, beeinträchtigt werde."—HEINRICH, "Christus," Wetzer u. Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*, iii. 264.

REVERENDO ADMODUM IN CHRISTO PATRI

IOHANNI WORDSWORTH,

S. T. P.

EPISCOPO SARISBURIENSI

LITTERARUM PRAECIPUE SACRARUM

FAUTORI ERUDITISSIMO

HOC QUALECUNQUE ANIMI NON INGRATI MONUMENTUM

JUSSU EJUS INCEPTUM

DEDICAT

PIETATIS AMICITIAE OBEDIENTIAE ERGO

UNUS E PAROCHIS

DIOECESEOS SARUM.

PREFACE

The following Treatise was begun in the first instance in obedience to a desire expressed by the Lord Bishop of Salisbury. The agitation and perplexity which followed upon the publication in *Lux Mundi* of the Essay entitled "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration," centred round two points. One of these points was the Old Testament itself: the other was the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ. Respecting the first nothing need be said just now. Respecting the second, the suggestion which was made in the Essay that our Lord's perfection of knowledge as regards the spiritual contents of the Old Testament Scriptures might have been combined with a less complete acquaintance with matters relating to their composition and history, was felt to raise very serious and far-reaching issues, especially as it seemed to throw doubt upon His absolute infallibility. There was an obvious connection between the suspicions thus aroused and the difficulties associated with the interpretation of our Lord's Saying respecting the Day and Hour of the Final Judgment. In view of these perplexities the Bishop of Salisbury thought that a collection of the opinions of the Fathers upon that Saying, and, generally, upon the subject of our Lord's knowledge, would be of use; and he suggested to the present writer to make such a collection. But it soon became evident that more than this was needed. Especially when the Bampton Lectures for 1891 appeared, it was manifest that what had been brought to the surface was nothing less than the whole question of the relation between our Lord's Human Consciousness and His Omniscience, and, indeed, of

the true relation of His entire Humanity towards His Godhead under the conditions of the Incarnation.

To deal with a question like this was a serious matter. It is unnecessary to relate how the writer finally came to undertake such a task. He can only say that he has endeavoured to carry out, to the best of his power, what seemed to be given him to do, and that he trusts that, in spite of all shortcomings in execution, what he has written may be found to bear genuine, if imperfect, witness for the truth.

The writer's original plan was to treat the subject in four books from as many different points of view. The present volume contains the three first of these books. The design of the fourth was to exhibit the mind of the Church, according to the varying phases of thought and opinion respecting this subject which have appeared in successive ages. It was ultimately found that the volume would be swelled to an inconvenient size if this book, which was necessarily rather a large one, were to be included with the others. Accordingly, though a considerable portion of it has been written—and, indeed, the writing of this has, more than anything else, delayed the publication of what is now offered—it has been thought advisable that it should be reserved at any rate for a separate volume. In the second of the Dissertations contained in Canon Gore's recently published work (*Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*), the descriptions which the accomplished writer has given with so much literary ability of the changing courses of thought on this subject—though the present writer is not always able to agree with the views presented—have done much to render further treatment of the historical aspects of it less necessary now than when, as was the case not long ago, it presented, as regards these aspects, ground almost untrodden.

It is not unlikely that the somewhat lengthened analysis of the nature and limitations of human faculties of knowledge which is given in the first book of the treatise, may be thought to occupy, in a theological work, a disproportionate amount of space. And, indeed, it is very probable that a real master

of psychological science might have been able to compress this analysis into a smaller compass than the present writer has been able to do. But that the analysis should be given, and given with some fulness of detail, seemed to be absolutely indispensable. For it forms, in a manner, the pivot of the argument. This will be easily seen when attention is paid to the following particulars.

A little reflection will show that there are two suppositions, opposite and contrary to each other, upon one or the other of which whatever conception we form of the relation between our Lord's Human Consciousness and His Omniscience must be founded. We may suppose Human Consciousness and the human manner of knowing to be *homogeneous* with Omniscience and the Divine manner of knowing, or we may suppose them to be *not homogeneous* but unlike each other. Now, hitherto, it has been pretty well taken for granted that the first of these suppositions was correct, that at any rate there was much more of likeness than of unlikeness between Human Knowing and Divine Knowing. Indeed it hardly seems to have occurred to any one until quite recently that there was any other supposition to be considered. The view that was held to some extent anciently and much more largely in mediæval times—though it never received any authoritative sanction from the Church herself—the view that our Lord, even as Man, was practically Omniscient, was plainly founded upon this supposition. Nor is the case otherwise—and the fact is noteworthy—as regards the modern Kenotic theories. They are indeed the result of a reaction of thought against the consequences which the view just mentioned was seen to entail; and they differ greatly from it as regards the important feature of the relation between our Lord's Divine and Human Natures, and, in particular, between His Omniscience and His Human Consciousness. But, after all, they are based upon the self-same supposition as it is. Their authors also have taken for granted that Omniscience was to such an extent homogeneous with Human Consciousness that, unless a severance were made between them artificially, as it were, or by a

kind of violence, the former would inevitably flow over into and affect the latter, in which case our Lord would not have had, in respect of His Human Consciousness, that condition of freedom and independence which was requisite for the fulfilment of His work as the Second Adam. Their suggestion of an abandonment on His part—or, at any rate, suspension—of His Omniscience, is a device to obviate this which they conceive would be otherwise an unavoidable consequence. It is clear, therefore, that the very same supposition underlies the Kenotic theories as that which was the foundation of the view to which they are opposed.

Now the conception, to elucidate which is the object of the present treatise, is based upon the opposite supposition—that is to say, upon the supposition that Omniscience and Human Consciousness, so far from being homogeneous and like one another, are essentially, radically, and structurally—if this term may be for a moment used in reference to Omniscience—*unlike* each other. But how is a fair hearing to be obtained for this view? There is, as the past history of thought on the subject shows, and as every one may easily verify for himself in the way of experience, a very powerful natural obstacle in the way. This obstacle is the great difficulty of realizing how Omniscience can be altogether unlike Human Knowing, and the strong tendency which constantly besets us, and not least so in regard to this matter, to take our own experience as the measure even of things which lie beyond the sphere of our experience. Our first thoughts, aye and our second thoughts too, about Omniscience can hardly be other than that, however greatly it may rise in degree above human knowledge, it is still knowledge. Our habitual conceptions hang about us and haunt us continually, and will not easily be dismissed. We have no other terms in which to speak of Omniscience, we have no other conceptions which we can apply to it, than such as we employ in reference to our own faculties and our own manner of knowing. It is consequently inevitable that we should regard that of which we thus habitually and of necessity think and speak in this

manner, as being really and in its own nature such as we are accustomed to represent it to ourselves.

How is this very considerable difficulty to be overcome? How can we emancipate ourselves from the fetters of this very powerful prejudice? It would seem that there is absolutely no way of doing so except by a thoroughly searching and careful examination of our own faculties. We cannot analyse Omniscience, nor can we form any actual conception of it. We know indeed that it must be unique, because it is infinite and not finite Knowing. But we want something more than a negative conception like this. Can anything more satisfactory be obtained? It seems to be not impossible. By tracing out step by step what we find in ourselves we may hope to reach, not indeed a positive conception of Omniscience —which without being omniscient we could not have—but a real conviction that, the laws which we find in ourselves and the limitations which they involve being what they are, the difference between our Knowing and Divine Knowing or Omniscience *must* be at least as much a difference in kind as it clearly is in degree. It is for this reason, then, that so much space has been given to the psychological analysis of our faculties of knowledge. And this analysis has been placed at the opening of the treatise under the further belief that it is only through this gateway that we can pass to an impartial consideration of the subject from those other points of view in which it is requisite that we should place ourselves, and to an unprejudiced estimate of the various kinds of evidence which will have to be examined.

Thus much respecting the method of the Treatise and its relation to the general subject of it. Another point, respecting which something may fitly be said here, is this. Some criterion seems to be very necessary for testing whatever theories may be proposed to explain, or partially to explain, the great mystery of the Incarnation. Is there any such criterion? It seems to the writer that there is. There are, as it appears to him, five conditions which ought, singly and collectively, to find complete fulfilment in any theory

which should seriously claim to be regarded as representing the true principle of the Incarnation. They are the following:—

1. As regards the Godhead of our Incarnate Lord. There ought to be neither required nor admitted in It or in Its Attributes (which, except in thought, are not really separable from It), any change or modification of any kind which, prior to and apart from the Incarnation, would be regarded as an infringement of the principle of the Unchangeableness of God, and, therefore, impossible.

2. As regards the Humanity of our Lord and, especially, His Human Consciousness. There ought to be as free scope for the fulfilment of whatever, in action or in suffering, was to be fulfilled by our Lord as Man, as if the Human Consciousness were not conjoined, in the unity of His Person, with the Omniscience of His Godhead.

3. The relation in which the two conditions just mentioned should find place ought to be what may be called a *natural* one: that is to say, it should be one in which the Godhead *in toto* and the Manhood *in toto* would assume towards each other the attitude supposed of integrity and independence in union, just because the nature of each is what it is.

4. The theory ought to rest upon and harmonize with the entire body of evidence which the New Testament contains bearing on the subject. It ought heartily to welcome, as it were, *all* the evidence, and to find itself equally at home amongst the statements concerning the Godhead of our Lord and His Divine Attributes, as amongst those concerning His Humanity and the part fulfilled by it in the economy of Redemption. It ought to take up into itself and show itself capable of accounting for both the one class of statements and the other.

5. The relation of the theory towards whatever has been laid down by the Church *authoritatively* on the subject of the Incarnation ought in like manner to be one of entire and easy harmony. There ought to be no semblance of

contradiction between it and the Definitions of Faith put forth by General Councils. It ought also to be able to assimilate whatever truths (being in agreement with the Definitions of General Councils) have been variously insisted upon, though it would of course be unable to adopt features—with which history shows that such truths have at times been mixed up—which were not in true harmony with the authoritative Definitions. Such features it ought to be able to account for the presence of, whilst it was compelled to reject them.

We readily admit that a key which fits into all the wards of a lock, and turns easily in them, can hardly be other than the right key. In like manner a theory which should fulfil completely and easily each and all of the conditions now specified, must, it would seem, go very far towards justifying its claim to represent correctly, as far as human thought and language can do so, the true principle of the Incarnation. It is, at any rate, because the writer has found that the more closely the subject is studied the more entirely does it appear that the theory which it is the object of this Treatise to examine really satisfies these conditions singly and collectively, that his own conviction of its truth has continually grown stronger. And, if he has at all succeeded in showing clearly its relation to the evidence, he cannot but believe that his conviction will come to be shared by others also.

The pleasant duty remains of thanking those many friends to whose help he has been in various ways indebted, in some instances more considerably than can be easily expressed. He has been especially both guided and stimulated by the counsel and encouragement given him at different times by the Lord Bishop of Salisbury, the Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, and the Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford, Dr. Bright. To the latter more particularly he desires to offer his very grateful thanks. It must not, however, be understood that these great authorities are in any way responsible for the views presented in this volume; the responsibility is solely the writer's own.

To a writer also who is personally unknown to him he

desires to express his obligations. The article in the *Church Quarterly Review* for October, 1891, on "Our Lord's Knowledge as Man," exhibits with much force and clearness the relation between our Lord's Omniscience and Human Consciousness in the light of the supposition which the present writer believes to be the true one, viz., that there was between them such essential unlikeness that the sphere of the one was by the very facts of the case severed from the sphere of the other. The present writer cannot say that he derived this idea, which in the following pages he has himself endeavoured to illustrate and establish, from the article, for his own work had made considerable progress before he happened to see that article. But he is quite sure that he derived much benefit from seeing what was in his own thoughts presented with so much lucidity and directness by another mind; and for this he gladly takes this opportunity of thanking the writer of the article. This way of regarding the mystery of the Incarnation had not, as far as the present writer is aware, been described, until this article appeared, in any published work.[1]

Last, but not least, to Dr. J. B. Mayor the writer has to offer his hearty thanks for most kindly undertaking the laborious work of reading over and correcting the proof-sheets, and for making many helpful suggestions by which these pages have not a little profited.

The image of the burning bush which Moses was drawn to contemplate beside the Mount of God, has always been regarded as a peculiarly expressive symbol of "the great mystery of Godliness," the Incarnation. It is certainly not less strikingly expressive when we have before our thoughts more particularly this feature of the Incarnation, viz., that by it a Human Consciousness was brought within the circle of the Uncreated Light of the Divine Omniscience of Him Who was "manifest in the flesh," and yet was not thereby

[1] In this connection it may not be improper to refer to Dr. Bright, *Waymarks in Church History* (1894), Appendix G.

consumed or (essentially) changed. Many thoughts rise here before one's mind. One cannot forget Who was present in the bush, and what Moses felt when he became conscious of that Presence. Whilst most thoughts here are fittest for quiet pondering, there is one thing which it may be right to say. It is this. In that Presence it seems peculiarly obligatory that the voice of controversy—as distinguished from the honest endeavour to ascertain and to express that which is true—should be hushed into silence. The writer cannot hope that nothing in word or spirit which is contrary to this, or otherwise unbefitting that Presence, will be found in what he has written; but whatever such there may be, he heartily wishes it blotted out: and, in like manner, if anything shall be found which, in the judgment of those who are qualified to judge, is not "for the truth" but "against the truth," he hopes that he may have, in regard to it, the privilege of *retractatio* which some of old so highly valued. For the rest, having in mind how great is the responsibility of writing about such a subject as the Incarnation, he cannot send these pages forth without saying—ΧΡΙΣΤΕ ΈΛΕΗΣΟΝ.

WYLYE,
Ascensiontide, 1896.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

ON SOME PRESENT ASPECTS OF THOUGHT ON THE CONTINENT AND IN ENGLAND, CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INCARNATION.

PAGE

I. Influences behind *Lux Mundi*: Professor Godet's writings . . . 1
1. Professor Godet's views—
(*a*) of the κένωσις 3
(*b*) of Christology 5
2. Principles underlying the formation of these views 7
II. Canon Gore's *Bampton Lectures* 16
1. Theory of the κένωσις 17
2. Conception of our Lord—
(*a*) as God 21
(*b*) as Man 27
3. Position assigned to our Lord as regards knowledge is limited
(*a*) on the Divine side 30
(*b*) on the Human side 32
III. Pre-supposition underlying all these views: Omniscience, if retained in integrity, must have neutralized the freedom of our Lord's thought and conduct as Man 33
IV. Arrangement of the Treatise 34

BOOK I.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRIMARY LAW OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. Neglect of Psychology until recent times 36
Interest in it enlarged since time of Kant 40
II. Importance of investigating the ground of difference between Divine Knowing and Human Knowing: the character and limits of Human Knowing are determined by the primary law of consciousness: from this may be ascertained something of the difference between it and Divine Knowing 41

PAGE
III. The Law of Successive Attention: its essential features 43
Proofs of this being the Primary Law of Consciousness . . . 49
1. What are called the Primary Laws of Thought may be reduced by analysis to the single principle of Attention . . 49
2. The most developed forms of thought may be traced to the Law of Attention as their root 51
3. Psychologists of different schools now agree in regarding Attention as the primary element of thought 52
4. Kant's "Forms" and "Categories" have been reduced to the principle of this Law (*a*) by the Neo-Kantian School . . . 61
(*b*) by the School of the New Criticism 62
IV. General result 63

CHAPTER II.

THE UNDERSTANDING.

Limitations imposed by the Primary Law on the Understanding . . . 66
I. As regards the sphere of the Infinite 68
Negative conceptions of the Infinite alone possible 68
Positive ones unattainable 69
Illustrations 69
II. As regards the sphere of the Finite 76
1. The Understanding can advance only by comparing: when materials for comparison fail, her progress is stayed . . . 76
Illustrations 77
2. When attention is required either to a multiplicity of objects, or to relations of great complexity, the Understanding becomes paralyzed 82
Illustrations 83

CHAPTER III.

THE IMAGINATION AND THE SPIRIT.

Recapitulation: character, subjective and objective, of knowledge obtained by the Understanding 89
I. The Imagination 100
1. Points of contrast between the Imagination and the Understanding 100
(1) Their respective modes of *procedure* are different . . 100
(2) They seek respectively for different *kinds* of knowledge 102
2. Mutual co-operation between the Imagination and the Understanding 109
(1) The Imagination lends out some *secondary* powers to the Understanding 110
(2) The Understanding lends herself more fully to the Imagination 111

PAGE

II. The Spirit 114
1. Man's Spirit, as a cognitive faculty, offers remarkable points of contrast with his other faculties of knowledge 114
2. The chief energies of the Spirit seem to be kept in reserve . 115
3. The Spirit aims at another kind of truth than that which the Imagination and the Understanding seek for 116
4. The Spirit co-operates to some extent with the Imagination: less so with the Understanding 120
III. General Result of examination of our Faculties of knowledge . . 123
Human knowledge is limited because
1. the Knowable can be perceived by our faculties only in some few of its relations 124
2. our energies are restricted in what they can perceive by the limitations imposed by the Primary Law of Consciousness . 124

CHAPTER IV.

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMAN KNOWING AND DIVINE KNOWING OR OMNISCIENCE.

Imperfect comparison alone possible, because we can form no positive conception of Omniscience 125
I. The Divine Knowing 126
1. Its Objects are—
(*a*) God Himself 126
(*b*) All that God has called into being 127
(*c*) The whole counsel of the Divine Will 127
(*d*) All that is in the consciousness of any of His creatures 128
(*e*) All which, not being existent, might exist, if God willed that it should 128
2. Its character is to be—
(*a*) eternal and unchangeable, embracing all, extensively and intensively, at once 129
(*b*) not connected with or dependent on the exercise of faculties 130
(*c*) not distinguishable from the Divine Being or Essence Itself 130
II. Comparing the Divine Knowing with Human Knowing as described in preceding chapters, we see that the difference between them is unspeakably great as regards—
(*a*) extent 132
(*b*) perfection and completeness 134
(*c*) character 135
III. Conclusion: such differences point to *radical unlikeness* between the Divine Knowing and Human Knowing 136

CHAPTER V.

THE RELATION BETWEEN OUR LORD'S HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND HIS OMNISCIENCE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONCLUSION.

PAGE

I. The relation considered apart from our Lord's Personality 139
1. Our Lord's Human Consciousness, though far more richly endowed than ours, must have been subject to the same *structural* limitations 140
2. Consequently, considered simply by itself, it would have been separated from the Divine Knowing in the same manner and degree as our consciousness is 142
3. Further question: Would the relation have been altered by reason of the connection with our Lord's Personality? . . 142
II. The Relation considered in connection with our Lord's Personality. 142
A. Statement of difficulty and manner in which solution may be attempted 142
1. Chief point of difficulty: how One Person, possessing both Human Consciousness and Omniscience, could be, think, and act in each of these spheres *separately* . . 142
2. Careful analysis of Personality indispensable: method proposed. 143
(1) Analysis of Personality attempted—
(*a*) in ancient times from *theological* point of view 145
(*b*) more recently from *psychological* point of view 146
(2) Comparison of results of ancient and modern investigation may reveal the true nature of the *Ego* 146
B. Analysis of Personality (the *Ego*) 146
1. Ancient theological analysis—
(1) Its object: to meet difficulties connected with doctrines of Holy Trinity and Incarnation . . . 146
(2) Two standard documents on the subject. 147
(*a*) In Eastern Church: St. Basil's Letter (*Epist.* Class I. *Ep.* xxxviii.) to St. Gregory of Nyssa 147
(*b*) In Western Church: the Treatise *De Duabus Naturis et Una Persona Christi* (ascribed to Boethius) 147
(3) Subject approached—
(*a*) in connection with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity 149
(1) by Greek Fathers from side of Unity of Godhead 151
(2) by Latin Fathers from side of Trinity of Persons 151
(*b*) in connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation chiefly, in the *De Duabus Naturis* . 154
(4) Results 155
(*a*) Not a definition of the *Ego* strictly speaking in itself 156
(*b*) But determination that Person must be distinct from Nature or Essence 156

PAGE

2. Modern psychological analysis 157
(1) Three Schools of thought on the subject 157
(*a*) First School: No *Ego* distinct from phenomena of consciousness: Locke; Hume;—both with retractations. J. S. Mill's paradox . 158
(*b*) Second School: If there is an *Ego*, we know nothing about it: Huxley; Spencer;—neither consistently: Agnostics generally . 162
(*c*) Third School: An *Ego* distinct from phenomena of consciousness is directly testified to by consciousness itself: General judgment of philosophers and of mankind 166
(2) Results 167
(*a*) The self-contradictions of the two first Schools, and the proofs brought forward by the third, establish *existence* of *Ego* distinct from all with which it is associated 167
(*b*) Some *relations* clear: it holds towards the Nature with which it is associated a position of superiority, ownership, direction, being thus separable from it: it is also inseparable from it, since without it the Nature can have neither existence nor activity . . . 167
3. Comparison of results of ancient and modern analysis . . 169
The Patristic distinction between Person and Nature from the theological point of view is fully confirmed by psychological analysis, and the conception of the *Ego* and its relation to its personal surroundings has been made more definite 169
C. Bearing of these results upon the present question 170
1. God the Son could (we see) make His own Self the *Ego* of the Human Nature which He took, without importing into it anything else 171
2. His entry as its *Ego* into the sphere of the Human Nature or, rather, His taking Human Nature to Himself as *Ego*, would, consequently, involve no change in His relation to His Godhead 174
3. Being the *Ego* of both spheres, He would be able to subsist, think, and act simultaneously and separately in both. (Human language must be necessarily inadequate to express the reality of these things) 175
4. Faint analogy presented in the simultaneous relation of our *Ego* to the movements of the Understanding and to those of the Imagination 176

CHAPTER VI.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

I. Respecting the relation between our Lord's Omniscience and His Human Consciousness *generally* 179

PAGE

1. Neither the Godhead nor the Manhood would have undergone, by psychological necessity, any *essential* change in consequence of the Incarnation 180
2. A relation of *non-interference* between the Omniscience and the Human Consciousness would result naturally and of course, they themselves, and their connection with the Person of our Lord, being what they were 181
3. Illustrations and analogies 181

II. Respecting some points of detail 185
1. The view now given
(1) leaves free scope for the growth and development, according to the manner of men, of our Lord's Manhood, Faculties, and Consciousness 185
(2) requires communications to be made from His Omniscience to His Human Consciousness, in order to its receiving whatever it was capable in itself of receiving, and freely admits of their being made. . . 187
(*a*) Time for their being made 191
(*b*) Manner in which they may have been made . 193
2. Bearing of this view upon our Lord's
(1) temptations 195
(2) sufferings 196

III. Conclusion of the First Book 198

BOOK II.

THE THEOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

PRELIMINARY.

1. Summary of argument and results of preceding Book 200
2. Subjects of present Book 201
(1) What the Purposes of the Incarnation made it necessary that there should be found in Christ. 201
(2) The modern Kenotic Theory 201

CHAPTER I.

THE REVEALER AND THE REDEEMER.

I. Importance of insisting upon both these aspects of our Lord's Work 202
1. The Revealer's Office overlooked at present in some quarters. 204
2. Balanced view taken of both by the Fathers 204

II. Christ the Revealer 206
1. The Office regarded in connection with His Person 206
(1) It was inherent in Him as the Word 206
(2) Titles illuminative of it. 208
(3) Christ's manner of revealing contrasted with that of Prophets 212

PAGE

2. The Office regarded in relation to those who received the Revelation: they required what only a Divine and Omniscient Revealer could impart 213
3. The Office regarded in connection with the Revelation itself: the fact of the manifestation of Godhead accompanying the Revelation, and the necessity that it should do so, shown by
(1) the manifold richness of the Revelation 215
(2) the authority with which it was given 216
(3) its central feature being the revelation of Christ as God the Son 217

III. Christ the Redeemer 220
Not the whole work of Redemption, but the special connection of our Lord's Humanity with it, the point here to be considered: this connection made it necessary
1. that our Lord, as the Second Adam, should occupy, morally, the same position in regard to Temptation and Trial as was occupied by the First Adam before the Fall 222
2. that His obedience should be carried, through all the stages of relative perfection, to its absolute perfecting, under the condition of abiding in dependence upon God 226
3. that His victory should be won *only* through such help from God as the First Adam might have obtained 228

IV. Conclusions 230
1. The Revealer's Office required the manifestation of Godhead, and especially of Omniscience 230
2. The Redeemer's Office required that His Human Consciousness should retain entirely its human character and freedom 230
3. The principle of the Incarnation must, therefore, have been such as to admit of *both* these conditions being fulfilled . 230

CHAPTER II.

THE KENOTIC THEORY.

I. Introductory remarks 233
1. Exact meaning of the theory as maintained by English writers difficult to ascertain 234
2. Grounds on which it is maintained—
(*a*) Necessity that our Lord's Humanity and especially His Human Consciousness should have free scope for development and exercise 236
(*b*) Appeal to Phil. ii. 5-7 and 2 Cor. viii. 9 237

II. Examination of Phil. ii. 7 238
1. The passage as a whole compared with Heb. i. 1-3 and Col. i. 15-20 238
2. Exegesis of Phil. ii. 7 240
3. Views of Commentators respecting its interpretation. . . . 246
(1) *Greek* — Chrysostom — Theodore Mops. — Theodoret — Œcumenius—Theophylact—Euthymius Zigabenus . 247

PAGE

(2) *Latin* — Victorinus — Ambrosiaster — Primasius — Rabanus Maurus—Walafrid Strabo 250
(3) *Modern*—Meyer—De Wette—Alford—Ellicott—Wordsworth—Lightfoot—Gwynn—Waite 252
III. The Kenotic Theory tested by the evidence of the Gospels as to our Lord's *Miracles* (the testimony respecting *Omniscience* being reserved for the next Book): that the Miracles proceeded from His own Omnipotence is shown by—
1. His saying that He would raise Himself from the dead . . . 257
2. St. John's account of the Miracles generally 258
3. His not ascribing His working of the Miracles to the Father. True account of His Prayers 259, 260
4. The Church having always taken the Miracles to be tokens of his Godhead. St. Cyril's IXth Anathematism, how received in the fifth century 261
IV. The Theory tested theologically: it contradicts the principle of the Divine Unchangeableness and is therefore untenable . . . 265
1. God is unchangeable not only morally but in Essence . . . 266
2. Statements of Fathers and Divines on this point 267
3. Many Modern Germans regard this as conclusive against the Kenotic Theory 268

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF OPINION IN THE CHURCH RESPECTING THE "KENOSIS."

I. From the First Age of the Church to the Reformation.

I. Early statements incompatible with the Modern Theory 272
1. Series of antitheses from St. Ignatius to St. Gregory Nazianzen 273
2. The Canon Μένων ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν 276
II. Examination of views of Fathers appealed to as favouring it . . . 278
1. The doctrine of *Quiescence* and of *Restraint* 279
2. Passages in Irenæus, Origen, Cyril Alex., Hilary 283
3. From St. Augustine onwards it is admitted that no sanction is to be found for the Modern Theory 296
4. Theory of Beron: he is regarded as a heretic: the Treatise *contra Beronem*, its authorship and date 297
5. Importance of keeping strictly to the Definition of Chalcedon 299

II. From the Reformation to the End of the Eighteenth Century.

I. The Continental Reformers 300
Luther and the Lutheran theory: the *Formula Concordiæ*: the Giessen and Tübingen Controversy: J. Gerhard: Leipzig Conference. 300
II. The Eastern Church. 312
Confessions of Mogilas: Cyril Lucar: Metrophanes Critopulus: Gennadius. 313

PAGE

III. The Anglican Church: claim of sanction from Anglican Divines for the modern theory cannot be admitted 317
Statements of—
1. Hooker: Andrewes: Jackson: Hall: Hammond: Frank: Pearson: Bull: Beveridge: Waterland 318
2. Divines of other Schools: Latimer; Jewel; Tillotson . . . 328

III. The Nineteenth Century.

I. Kenotic theories in Germany 329
1. Their character 329
(1) Multiple in form: agree in supposing that our Lord emptied Himself of that which was *internal* to His Divine Essence 330
(2) The principle of them is a reversal of the earlier Lutheran theory, yet has been adopted by Lutherans as well as Calvinists 330
2. Influences leading to their adoption 330
(1) Hegel's Pantheism, (2) Unbalanced view of necessities of our Lord's Humanity 330
3. Particular forms of the Kenotic Theory: Thomasius; Delitzsch; Godet: opposed by others, especially Dorner . . 331
4. Dorner's view of our Lord's Personality 332
II. The Kenotic Theory has gained attention in some quarters in England, but has not been adopted by many, or by the English Church 335

BOOK III.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE GOSPELS.

PRELIMINARY.

Relation of the two preceding Books to the present one 337
Points to be kept in view in estimating the evidence of the Gospels . . 339

CHAPTER I.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

I. The character of this (which is described as both *immediate* and *complete*) is to be determined from the following passages . . 341
1. St. Matt. xi. 27; St. Luke x. 22 342
2. St. John i. 18; iii. 12, 13, 31, 32, 35; v. 19, 20; vi. 46, 62; viii. 28, 38, 58; xii. 49, 50; xiii. 3; xiv. 9–11; xv. 15; xvi. 15; xvii. 7, 8, 10, 14, 24, 25, 26 343

PAGE
II. Striking features in these passages 345
1. Our Lord's knowledge of God is described as surpassing that which is possible for man 346
2. Our Lord's knowledge is described as commensurate with that which the Father has 351
3. Our Lord claims that His Revelation should be received on account of the Divine character of His knowledge 351
III. The supposition that our Lord might have been speaking of a knowledge which He knew had been His prior to the Incarnation, is untenable 353
IV. Summary of the evidence respecting our Lord's knowledge of God: the Gospels testify to the co-existence in Him of Divine as well as Human knowledge during the whole of His life on earth . . 355

CHAPTER II.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF MAN.

I. Natural and supernatural gifts of discerning character: how distinguished and how limited. 359
II. Our Lord's knowledge of man unlike and surpassing anything found elsewhere by reason of—
1. its universality 361
2. its completeness 365
3. its embracing what conduct would have been under circumstances which did not occur 371
4. its being not conferred, but having its source in Himself . . 374
III. Summary. Such knowledge, though necessarily manifested through our Lord's Humanity, must have proceeded from His own Omniscience, the suggestion that it was a higher kind of the gift of discerning spirits being altogether inadequate to explain the facts 374

CHAPTER II.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND EVENTS.

I. Statements of Gospels produced as evidencing "ignorance" belong especially here: two only of weight, viz., the "Saying" to be examined in the next Chapter, and the expression of "surprise" 377
1. Our Lord's "surprise": probable explanation of it 378
2. Disproportion between the utmost that can be cited as evidence of "ignorance," and the ample statements respecting our Lord's knowledge 385
II. Evidence respecting His Knowledge of Facts and Events 386
1. Belonging to the Present or immediate Future 386
(1) Foreknowledge of details of the Passion minute and comprehensive 387
(2) The Prayer in Gethsemane does not show that "the future was not clear" to Him, but the contrary . . 388

PAGE

(3) His foresight of these things was equally clear from the first, and extended to every detail. 390
(4) What did our Lord's questions indicate? 393
St. Luke viii. 30; St. Mark vi. 38; viii. 5; ix. 21; St. John xi. 34 394
(5) Four remarkable instances of knowledge, viz.— St. John i. 49; St. Matt. xvii. 27; St. Luke xix. 30–32; xxii. 8–12 397
2. Respecting the Past 400
(1) Measureless vista of Glory before the world was . . . 401
(2) Our Lord describes things of the Past not from written records, but from direct vision of them 401
(3) Knowing what people *would have done*, He knows *à fortiori* everything concerning their life and environment 402
3. Respecting the Future 402
(1) Our Lord's vision of the Future contrasts strikingly with that of the Prophets 403
(2) The principle which determined His giving general outlines only or particular details, was not His own knowledge but our needs 405

CHAPTER IV.

THE SAYING RESPECTING THE DAY AND HOUR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT.

I. Unique character of this saying: *precise* import of its terms to be ascertained if possible: various readings in St. Matt. xxiv. 36 . 407
II. Exegetical examination of it 409
A. Meaning of "the Son" 409
1. In New Testament generally—
(1) not equivalent to "I" 412
(2) designates God Incarnate the Mediator 413
(3) context determines which function of Mediatorial Office is chiefly or exclusively referred to in each case 413
2. In the Saying—
It is Christ God and Man, the Mediator, Who is spoken of with reference (*a*) to His Office (*b*) indirectly (not "I") to His Personality 415
B. Force of the accompanying terms: εἰ μή not ἀλλά; οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ not οὔτε . . . οὔτε; "the Father" not "My Father" 416
1. These terms qualify the statement respecting "the Son," and indicate that His ignorance, though real, appertained to His Humanity only 419
2. Three questions—
(1) Why "the Son" not "the Son of Man"? Because the purpose was to convey that the ignorance was official *as well as* human 419

PAGE

(2) Was the statement perfectly truthful, if "the Son" did in one way know? Its truthfulness is perfectly clear, if the relation between His Omniscience and His Human Mind was such as has been maintained in the Treatise 420

(3) Why was the communication of this secret to our Lord's human mind withheld? Perhaps in order that we might be assured that His mind was *structurally* just like ours 421

III. Patristic and other Interpretations of the Saying 422

Their chief features 433

1. Multiplicity: more than one frequently suggested by same writer 433

2. No one universally recognized, or sanctioned by the Church . 433

3. Points insisted on in Western, Anglican, and Eastern Communions respectively 433

4. Explanations have been based more on theological than on exegetical grounds 435

IV. Conditions essential for a fully satisfactory interpretation 435

CHAPTER V.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

I. This subject why included: proposed mode of treatment 439

II. Evidence of extent and perfection of our Lord's knowledge of Old Testament 441

1. From probabilities of the case 442

(1) Relation of the Word towards Old Testament 442

(2) Principal subject of Old Testament the Word Himself . 442

(3) Old Testament a chief instrument for instruction of the Church 443

2. Knowledge of "spiritual contents" without knowledge of "historical setting" an untenable supposition 444

3. From actual statements: significance of—

(1) The "authority" with which our Lord taught 446

(2) His declaration that the Law was to be fulfilled in every jot and tittle 447

(3) Statements in St. Luke xxii. 37 and St. John xix. 30 . 447

(4) His opening the minds of the disciples to understand the Old Testament *historically*—St. Luke xxiv. 27, 44 . . 448

Summary: Our Lord was certainly on a level immeasurably above that of His contemporaries as regards knowledge of the exact meaning of the entire Old Testament. How was this compatible with ignorance of its history? 449

III. Bearing of conclusion thus established upon issues lately raised . 450

1. The great reversal proposed by the School of Wellhausen . . 450

(1) Bishop Ellicott's summary of this scheme 451

PAGE
(2) Two Questions demanding answer 452
(*a*) How came the Jews of our Lord's time to have laid aside and forgotten views which, if this School is right, must have been familiar facts to their forefathers of the Captivity and the Return? . . 452
(*b*) How could our Lord have suffered views which, according to this School, were the reverse of the truth, to pass with His sanction into the Christian Church? 453
2. Single historical points in which there is apparent contradiction between the views of critics and statements made by our Lord 456
(1) Supposition of "ignorance" inadmissible 457
(2) *Precise* meaning of our Lord's statements to be ascertained 457
(3) Probability of assumptions having been traditionally formed and retained which stricter examination would set aside 457
(4) Patience, and abstinence from cutting knots by violence, required 458
Summary: Sound and not hasty criticism greatly to be welcomed, since by it much light may eventually be thrown upon the history, and, thereby, upon the teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures 459

CONCLUSION.

Limits within which the Principle of the Incarnation must be sought for 460
Practical aspects of the Kenotic Theory, and the Theory maintained in the Treatise, respectively 464

INDEX.

I. Holy Scripture 467
II. Authors 470
III. Subjects 479

INTRODUCTION.

ON SOME PRESENT ASPECTS OF THOUGHT, ON THE CONTINENT AND IN ENGLAND, CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INCARNATION.

It has been stated in the preface that *Lux Mundi* originally gave occasion for the writing of the following treatise. But a good deal lies behind *Lux Mundi*. The publication of that work seems to have quickened into life—or, at least, into more decided expression—opinions which were somewhat widely entertained before it appeared. These opinions, if one may judge from the timidity and hesitation with which they were at first put forth, were not the result of matured investigation, and were not held with entire conviction. They had the air of being ideas caught from some influential external source, and of having entered into minds neither prepared to reject them nor quite ready to receive them. If a conjecture may be offered as to what the external source was from which they were derived, it is only natural to point to the writings of the well-known commentator, Professor Godet, of Neuchatel. The brilliancy of his powers, the lucidity and force of his style, and the rare excellencies in more than one respect which he exhibits as a commentator on Holy Scripture, have naturally obtained for his writings a very large measure of attention and influence. It seems therefore to be a supposition neither unlikely nor unreasonable that the advocacy of the opinions referred to by Professor Godet has had a good deal to do with their dissemination. At any rate it is in his various works that

they have received expression more emphatic and decided than, as far as the present writer is aware, has been given to them elsewhere. Here, therefore, we may study them in something like completeness and find their true character. And, since they lie at the root of the whole question of our Lord's omniscience as God and of His knowledge as Man, it seems advisable, and even necessary, to bring them, in the first place, with some care and fulness into view, if only in order that by so doing we may see clearly in what manner and from what points of view the main question will have to be examined.

Professor Godet's whole conception of our Lord Jesus Christ during His earthly life has been evidently moulded by the idea which he has formed of what is called the κένωσις. His notion of this lies at the foundation of his exposition of the Gospel of St. John. Page after page may indeed be read without the reader becoming aware that this is the case; but in the Introduction,[1] and in various other places, statements of it occur. It is, however, in his *New Testament Studies* that the fullest exposition of the theory is given. The second of the essays contained in this volume, entitled "Jesus Christ," is divided into three parts, the first treating of the Son of Man, the second of the Son of God, and the third of the God-Man. The essay as a whole gives Professor Godet's Christology. In the third division of it he asks the question, "How a Divine being—the Son—could, without ceasing to be God, make Himself man, and live as man?" He answers the question first by pointing to 2 Cor. viii. 9 and Phil. ii. 6–8. These passages, he thinks, convey the idea of "putting off of the condition of Deity,

[1] *Commentary on St. John's Gospel*, vol. i. 160–163, Clark's trans. Godet here explains his conception of "the idea which the evangelist (St. John) formed of Christ's Person," by the following exposition of the clause: "The Word was made flesh." This, he says, "evidently signifies that the being whom he calls the Word *stripped* Himself of His divine state, and of all the attributes which made it up, to exchange it for a completely human state, with all the characteristics of weakness, ignorance, sensibility to pleasure and pain, which make up our manner of life here below." Had Godet ever read Theodoret's Dialogue *Immutabilis*?

and entering upon that of humanity." St. John also, he adds, "expresses in his own way these two acts of un-clothing and re-clothing, when he says, "The Word was made flesh." He then proceeds to explain what he means by "putting off of the condition of Deity" in the following really astounding statements, which, as they exhibit this theory of the κένωσις in its naked completeness, and show to what the principle of interpretation which has found favour with others beside Godet must eventually lead, shall here be given in full.

Our Lord, according to Professor Godet,[1] "had been in possession of the Divine omnipotence, and He enters upon a form of existence in which, instead of commanding and bestowing gifts, He has to receive, to ask, to obey; and it is only at the last moment of this new stage of existence that He announces, as an event of recent occurrence, this fact: 'All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth.'

"He had been a sharer in the Divine omniscience, and He accepts a condition in which He has ceaselessly to ask, constantly to learn, often to remain in ignorance, as when He says: 'Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son.'

"He had been filling all things, sharing in the omnipotence of God Himself, and He confines Himself within a human body, so localized that it could be said of Him: '*If Thou hadst been here,* such a thing would not have happened.'

"In Him there had been abiding the immutable holiness, and He accepted a state of being of which one of the fundamental laws is liberty of choice, the possibility of undergoing real temptation, and consequently the power to sin.

"He had been loving with all the force of a perfect, infinite love, and this kind of love He exchanges for one which implies progress both in respect of intensity and of comprehension.

"He knew Himself as the Son, with that knowledge with

[1] Godet's *New Testament Studies*, Lyttleton's trans., pp. 138–140.

which the Father Himself knows Him eternally, and—this is that putting off upon which all those we have already mentioned depend — this consciousness of Sonship, which was the light of His life, He allowed to be extinguished within Him, to retain only His inalienable personality; the individual life endued with freedom and intelligence as all human individuality is endued; for our personality is made in the image of His. By means of this humiliation He was enabled to enter into a course of human development similar in all respects to our own.

"Here we see the prodigy of love which is realized in the life of Christ, and revealed to us by His word. If this miracle is not possible, God is not free, and His love has limitations imposed upon it."

Such is the conception which Professor Godet offers as a true description of "the Lord of Glory!" In what other words can it be characterized than by saying that it is a representation of *God without Godhead?*

This is not the proper place to examine in detail the grounds on which this or any other theory of the κένωσις must be accepted or rejected. Such examination will be required later on. Our present concern is to realize what the features of this theory of the Swiss professor really are, and, together with this, it will be useful to notice the principles which he has followed in his study of our Lord's Person.

Let it, then, be observed that in calling this a representation of "God without Godhead," the lines of Godet's portraiture are strictly followed. For, he tells us, the problem "contains two questions: (1) How a Divine being —the Son—could, without ceasing to be God, make Himself man, and live as man? (2) How the Son of man could, without ceasing to be man, be raised to the perfection of the state of Deity?"[1]

Looking to the first of these questions, it is clear that we are intended to look upon our Lord Jesus Christ as being

[1] *New Testament Studies*, p. 137.

truly God. It is also clear that Godet conceived that, even under the conditions which he pictures as being the conditions of our Lord's earthly life, He would not cease to be God. Whether, therefore, Godet's whole conception be a possible or an impossible one, it is evident that, according to it, Jesus Christ is regarded as truly God.

But, on the other hand, this Divine Being Who, during the incarnate life, does not cease to be God, is in the representation divested—and, except for the verbal qualification "without ceasing to be God," divested absolutely—of all which constitutes Godhead, which is the same as to say, of all which God is. The Divine attributes are described severally as having been "put off"—the Divine omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, immutable holiness, love, and, as the climax and at the same time the foundation of all this "putting off," the Divine consciousness.

The terms which Godet employs show that he does not merely mean that the Godhead in Christ was inactive, quiescent. The Fathers of old recognized that Christ's Godhead stood apart, so to say, from His sufferings and temptations. It could not participate in them, it did not hinder them. Godet's idea is not of the Godhead in Christ being conscious of all, and also quiescent in all. He is not simply extending the idea of "quiescence," which St. Irenæus[1] and others limited to *one side* of our Lord's life, to the *whole* of it. St. Leo,[2] describing the operation of the Divine and the human natures severally in Christ, spoke of "the one flashing forth in the miracles, the other patiently submitting to injurious treatment." Godet is not merely contradicting St. Leo's representation, and saying that there was no actual or direct manifestation of Divine omnipotence in any part of His life and work. What he means is much more than this. His words convey that our Lord, during His state of humiliation, though He did not cease to be God, did cease to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. He had, so

[1] S. Iren., *Cont. Hær.*, iii. xix. 3; Theodoret, *Dial.*, iii. p. 232, Ben.
[2] S. Leo, *Epist.* xxviii. 4.

Godet says, *put off* these Divine attributes; He had *exchanged* the Divine holiness and the Divine love for a holiness and love which were simply human.

That this is really Godet's meaning is made still more clear by what he says respecting consciousness. Our Lord, he says, allowed this to be *extinguished* within Him. A human consciousness of His Divine Sonship He had, but the higher consciousness which was His as God was extinguished, was put off—Godet seems to regard these terms "extinguished" and "put off" as equivalent ones. And this extinguishing of the Divine consciousness, he significantly remarks, is especially important, because it was that upon which the other puttings off depended; without this they could not have taken place. In saying this he is undoubtedly right. For how could God be conscious of omnipotence without being omnipotent, conscious of omniscience without being omniscient, conscious of omnipresence without being omnipresent, conscious of His own Divine holiness and love without being holy as God and loving as God? And, on the other hand, how could He be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnipresent, without being conscious that He was so? The attributes and the consciousness of them are clearly inseparable. If Godet had looked steadily at this, he would have seen that the Being of God and His attributes and His consciousness are all alike equally and utterly inseparable; that He can no more put off the one than the other, for He is the I AM, and what He is He is in an unutterable oneness in which separation has as little place as composition has; it is only our poverty of language and weakness of understanding which oblige us to speak of attributes or consciousness as *in* God, whereas in truth they *are* God.

Here, however, we are trenching upon the ground of criticism, upon which we are not to enter at present. Our object now is simply to ascertain precisely Professor Godet's meaning. And this seems to be so far clear. He intends to represent our Lord as not ceasing to be God, as retaining His inalienable personality, and yet as having extinguished

His Divine consciousness, and having together with it put off from Him the several attributes of Deity. It is clear that this is what Godet intends to convey. But what kind of conception is it? Surely an unthinkable one, for it is a conception of God without Godhead!

The *principles* by which Godet has been guided, as the tenor of his essay sufficiently indicates, in forming this strange Christological view, are well deserving of our attention here. The two following have evidently influenced considerably his course of thought.

In the first place, he has taken the human nature of our Lord, instead of His Divine pre-existence as the Son of God, as his starting-point for the study of His Person. This is shown by the arrangement of the several divisions of the essay, in which the consideration of our Lord as the Son of Man occupies the first place; the second division being assigned to the contemplation of Him as the Son of God. This arrangement is not due to accident; it is no mere matter of convenience; the whole essay shows that it has far greater significance, and that it proceeds from a governing principle of investigation in the writer's mind.

How opposed this principle is to the teaching and the practice of the Church from the earliest times every student of Church history knows. For by the Church it has always been regarded as a principle of the first importance to begin the study of the Incarnation and of our Lord's Personality not from below but from above—to follow Him from His Divine pre-existence to His taking of the manhood into God, not, reversing this order of study, to attempt to rise from His manhood to His Divinity. Theodore of Mopsuestia, the seeds of whose teaching bore such unhappy fruit in the heresies (so cognate in some respects, but branching out into such different directions) of Nestorius and Pelagius, was the first doctor of Catholic reputation who gave an example of taking the humanity of our Lord as the starting-point of Christological investigation. During Theodore's lifetime his teaching on these subjects appears not to have been generally

known. St. Chrysostom, to the end of his life, regarded him as his friend, a fact which shows that there must have been much in Theodore which was deserving of affection and respect. But before the fifth century was far advanced, the real bearings of Theodore's teaching began to be understood, and, in later times, its pernicious results have been fully recognized.[1] It has been seen that it really gave birth, not only to Nestorianism and Pelagianism, but to much false teaching besides. And it has been seen—and this is the point to which attention is especially called—that the root and master-principle of thought which turned the mind of Theodore away from the truth and drew him into these strange paths, was his unhappy determination to study the Christological problem from below, beginning with our Lord's manhood, instead of from above, as the Church had always done, beginning with His Divine Personality.

A little further illustration of a matter so important in itself and in its bearings on our present subject will not perhaps be out of place. The manner in which, in the same period of Church history as that of which we have been speaking, the famous formula of St. Cyril of Alexandria, *μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, made its way—in spite of its being in form open to misapprehension and suspicion—not only to a position of allowance and toleration, but to the position of a highly[2] valued expression of truth, brings out very strikingly the importance—the increasing importance—which the Church came to attach to the principle in question. For it was on account of its embodiment of this principle, that the contemplation of our Incarnate Lord and the study of the mystery of His Person must be from above and not from below, that the formula, when it was understood, came to be regarded as so valuable a shield against error and defence of the truth.

[1] See *Ch. Qu. Rev.*, Oct., 1875, Art. v., *Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought*.

[2] Petavius (*De Incarn.*, IV. vi. 3) calls it "fidei tessera," and says that the Greek Fathers especially "summam in ea contineri putarunt catholicæ totius mysterii professionis."

St. Cyril did not claim to have himself originated the formula. He referred it to St. Athanasius.[1] But, from St. Cyril's having had so much to do with the explanation and defence of it, it has commonly been called his formula. Apollinarianism and Eutychianism were heresies of St. Cyril's age. And the formula, which was *primâ facie* open to a construction favourable to these heresies, was seized upon by their advocates as making for them. St. Cyril was obliged both to vindicate it from these misconstructions, and also to clear its meaning from obscurity in the eyes of friends. There was real need of this; for even in later days much has been written upon it, and theologians have frequently found it necessary to repeat St. Cyril's explanations, and to show to their own generation the important truth which it was framed to guard and to convey. But, notwithstanding the difficulty of the formula, it was soon understood to be a mode of expressing important doctrine, which was really valuable and thoroughly worthy of preservation and remembrance. Accordingly, even in the presence of its partisans, the Eutychians, at the Latrocinium, A.D. 449, it was acknowledged and vindicated by Flavian[2] of Constantinople. The Fourth General Council at Chalcedon, A.D. 451, without explicitly approving the formula,[3] virtually acknowledged it. In the Fifth General Council, A.D. 553, it was distinctly received, and again in the Lateran Council of A.D. 649.

[1] St. Cyril, in his first letter to Successus, also says, *ὡς οἱ πατέρες εἰρήκασιν*. But this may only mean that the substance of the formula was in accordance with the teaching of the Fathers generally.

[2] In his letter to the Emperor Theodosius, Flavian, after stating what was afterwards defined at the Council of Chalcedon respecting the two natures united in the One Divine Person of the Incarnate Lord, goes on to say, *καὶ μίαν μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου φύσιν, σεσαρκωμένην μέντοι καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσασαν, λέγειν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν τὸν Χριστόν*. Flavian clearly had no doubt that the formula conveyed the doctrine of the Church, and was distinctly opposed to the heresy of Eutyches.

[3] For, as Dr. Bright has kindly pointed out to the writer, the profession of faith by Flavian which was explicitly approved by the Council was not the letter to the emperor, although this had just been referred to by Eustathius; but the earlier profession made by Flavian in the Synod of Constantinople, which did *not* contain the formula.

The sense of the formula,[1] rightly understood, will be found to combine tersely and forcibly an expression of the doctrinal truth of the Incarnation with an emphatic assertion of the principle which ought to be our guide in studying it. It sets before us "One Nature of God the Word (and that Nature) incarnated." But the English terms do not convey the full meaning of the Greek. The term φύσις, "Nature," as applied to God, means "God and all that God is;" it includes the Personality of God as well as what we commonly intend when we speak of the "nature" of a person. The "One Nature" which is spoken of does not mean that Divinity and humanity in our incarnate Lord formed together one nature. The words, "One Nature of God the Word," fix our attention upon the Son of God before His Incarnation. He is God—not the Father or the Holy Ghost, but—the Word; personally God, and with all the fulness of Godhead. Then, in the next place, the result of the Incarnation in relation to the "One Nature of God the Word" is expressed by the participle σεσαρκωμένη. The "One Nature" is before us still, unaltered in Itself, and unalterable. But what St. John expresses by "the Word was made flesh" has taken place. The "One Nature,"—that is, God, being all that God is, in the Person of the Word,—has been "incarnated" (this word seems to express the force of the participle better than "incarnate" in this particular case); manhood, without the personality of a man, has been taken into God; it has become His manhood, having personal existence, not apart from, but in Him. So that in Christ we contemplate the One Eternal Nature of God the Word, unaltered as regards Its internal essence and personality, but having assumed manhood into union with Itself. That word which is used in reference to God and all that God is—the word φύσις—is too great a word to be applied at the same time to manhood,

[1] See Cardinal Newman's *Dissertation on St. Cyril's Formula* in his *Tracts Theol. and Eccles.*, pp. 287–336, esp. 321 *sqq.*; Petavius, *De Incarn.*, IV. vi.–viii. Compare Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarnato*, Sect. III. c. v. pp. 311–323. And see Beveridge, *Private Thoughts on Religion*. Works, vol. viii. p. 168.

even manhood, however true, and real, and complete as manhood, in Christ. Something is required to make us feel the difference; something is wanted to place the "One Nature of God the Word" in its due position of pre-eminence —pre-eminence in itself and in relation to the humanity assumed — before, at, and after the Incarnation. Bishop Jeremy Taylor's[1] "Very God by essence, very man by assumption" indicates this pre-eminence. St. Cyril's participle σεσαρκωμένη, "incarnated," does so more clearly still; and when we contemplate the One Nature of God the Word (after the action expressed by the participle has taken place, that is, after the Incarnation) in Its eternity, infinity, and unchangeableness, and, over against It, the manhood assumed indeed into perfect and eternal union with It, but not infinite, not unchangeable, and not *per se* eternal, the pre-eminence of the one and the relatively secondary character of the other become fully realizable.

The point of doctrine which St. Cyril had in view in the formula was not the same with that which the Fathers of Chalcedon were contemplating when they framed their solemn definition of faith. St. Cyril's object was to place the humanity which was assumed by Christ and made His own, in its due relation to Him as the Personal Word of God Who assumed it. The object of the Fathers of Chalcedon was to affirm the essential integrity of the Manhood as a nature (φύσις), no less than of the Godhead as a Nature, in Christ our Lord. Different forms of expression were required for these different purposes. The Chalcedonian Fathers were, we cannot doubt, entirely in agreement with St. Cyril in regard to the point of doctrine for emphasizing which he

[1] *Exposition of Apostles' Creed*, Works, vol. vii. p. 601, ed. Eden. Cf. S. Athan., *Ep. ad Epict.*, § 12 (Migne, *P. G.*, xxvi. 1068): ἐκ δὲ Μαρίας αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος, σάρκα λαβὼν, προῆλθεν ἄνθρωπος, τῇ μὲν φύσει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ Λόγος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ, κατὰ δὲ σάρκα ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς Μαρίας γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος. *Orat.* III. *Contra Ar.*, § 51: Θεὸς ἦν σάρκα φορῶν. S. Hilar., *De Trin.*, ix. 9: "Demonstrato autem et naturæ suæ, et assumptionis nostræ sacramento." *In Ps.* cxxxix. § 2: "Quod enim Deus est, naturæ suæ est; quod autem homo fuit, naturæ nostræ assumptio est."

valued and employed the formula; but, since their object required them to use the term φύσις in a sense different from that which it has in the formula, they could not, at least without explanation, explicitly approve and adopt it. Their approval of it may probably, for this reason, have been limited to a recognition that it was a safeguard against Nestorian conceptions of the Incarnation, and that it was so because it embodied the only true principle upon which that mystery can be safely studied.

This principle was, indeed, no new one. It was only the form of expression which was new. For what other lesson is taught in the Creeds? What other principle for the study of the mystery of Christ is set before us there than this? Take the Nicene Creed for example. When and how are we there guided to contemplate the condescension of the Incarnation? Are we there taught to pass from the Manhood of our Lord upwards towards His Godhead? No, it is only after our souls have been filled with the vision of what from all eternity He was and is—the Very Son of the Father—that we are led on to what He became for our sakes.

Do not those majestic statements concerning Him, in which we express our faith in ONE LORD JESUS CHRIST, THE ONLY-BEGOTTEN SON OF GOD, BEGOTTEN OF HIS FATHER BEFORE ALL WORLDS, GOD OF GOD, LIGHT OF LIGHT, VERY GOD OF VERY GOD, BEGOTTEN, NOT MADE, BEING OF ONE SUBSTANCE WITH THE FATHER, BY WHOM ALL THINGS WERE MADE—do they not drive each one deeper into our hearts the verity of His consubstantial Godhead? And when we have received into our inmost being this faith, when we have been thus prepared to regard Jesus Christ as the Lord of Glory indeed, then, and not till then, are we taught to express, in the clauses which follow, that act of infinite condescension whereby He became our Saviour—WHO FOR US MEN, AND FOR OUR SALVATION CAME DOWN FROM HEAVEN, AND WAS INCARNATE BY THE HOLY GHOST OF THE VIRGIN MARY, AND WAS MADE MAN. Does not the Church seem evermore to repeat to each generation of her children this message of

warning and of exhortation? "Contemplate the Word made flesh first in the majesty of His unchangeable Godhead. Look upon His Incarnation — that mighty act of infinite condescension—not from below, not from the humanity as your starting-point, but from above—from the height of His Divinity. Look upon it as a mystery in which it was not manhood which received the Godhead into union with itself, but in which manhood was taken into God. Do not depart from this contemplation of God in Christ as you follow Him throughout the stages of His earthly ministry, as you stand beside His cross on Calvary, and mark Him rising victorious from the tomb, and behold Him return to heaven whence He came from the Mount of the Ascension. Thus only will you be able to penetrate the truth of His Person and of His work. Thus only will you be able to comprehend, in such manner and degree as is possible for our weakness, the mystery of the union in Him, our God and Saviour, of the human with the Divine."

In the second place, Professor Godet has evidently been in no small degree under the influence of the supposition that logic is a safe guide to truth. Prepossessed by this principle, and having, on whatever grounds, satisfied himself that his theory of the Incarnation is true, he deals with the Gospel narrative as that which is not to be sovereign, but simply subordinate. On reading the paragraphs which were quoted from him above, it is impossible not to ask in utter amazement whether the writer of them really believed that the instances which he gives as examples of our Lord's having put off His Divine attributes were of any weight at all in proving a thesis of such magnitude. The impression is given of one who, seeing only the deductions which, if his premisses are true, ought to follow from them, is determined, in blind deference to logic, to make them follow.

Let us for a moment look at the premisses from which Professor Godet's supposed demonstration starts, and the use which he makes of them. His premisses appear to have

been the following: in the first place, he conceived that "a course of human development, similar in all respects to our own,"[1] was essential to our Lord's fulfilment of the work of the Incarnation. In the next place, he conceived that such a course of development was impossible except on the condition of our Lord's emptying Himself of His Godhead, and putting it for the time aside. "By means of this humiliation" (Godet says) "He was enabled to enter into a course of human development similar in all respects to our own."[1] And in case of any demur, he adds, "If this miracle is not possible, God is not free, and His love has limitations imposed upon it."

The theory is not drawn from the Gospel narrative; it is the result of a process of logical reasoning. If it had been derived from the Gospels, it is inconceivable that the Professor should have omitted to call attention to the broad basis of historical testimony on which, on that supposition, it should have been shown to rest. But it is abundantly clear that Godet brought his theory to the Gospels, and made it his standard of interpretation of them. Whatever he found, either in the Gospels or in St. Paul's Epistles, which seemed in any way to favour the theory, he has naturally made capital of. But the real origin of the theory was the proposition, which seemed to him to be beyond dispute, that our Lord's life as Man upon earth could not have been what the work of the Incarnation required it to be, unless all that we understand by "Godhead" had been for the time in Him as though it were non-existent, without, however, His ceasing to be personally God.

The danger of the principle, without such qualifications as are necessary to guard it, that logic is a safe guide to truth, was strikingly illustrated, by examples drawn chiefly from ancient times, in a passage of Mozley's *Essay on Development*,[2] which has become classical. The passage may be seen quoted by Mr. Gore in the first chapter of his *Roman*

[1] *New Testament Studies*, p. 139.
[2] *The Theory of Development*, pp. 41–44.

The King's Library

Catholic Claims; and in the same chapter the writer makes some excellent observations upon the true use of reason in theology, and on the restraint which the Church has always seen must be placed upon the temptation to trust logical (apparent) demonstration. The caution has by no means ceased to be necessary. "Almost all the errors of modern times respecting the Incarnation (says Heinrich, in his very able and admirable article *Christus*, in Wetzer and Welte's *Kirchenlexicon*[1]) have their ground partly in a false conception of personality, partly in an erroneous notion that the truth and integrity of Christ's manhood, and more especially the freedom and meritoriousness of His actions, must be infringed by the ancient doctrine of His one Divine Personality." The ancient doctrine was that our incarnate Lord was *totus in suis* as God, *totus in nostris* as man, in the oneness of His Divine Personality. The Gospels afford at least as ample evidence of the first as they do of the second; and, accordingly, the Church felt bound to hold these two sides of doctrine in one embrace, whether or no a logical reconciliation of them should be found possible. She did so because she recognized the limited powers of human reason, and therefore thought that the historical testimony of the Gospels must be a better standard of truth than logic could be.

Such is Professor Godet's theory of the κένωσις, and such the principles by which, as it seems, he has been led to adopt it. It is not probable that many persons—at least in this country—have accepted his opinions on the subject in their full extent. But it can hardly be doubted that there are a great many who "think there is something in them;" who have not realized the very great difference which there is between our Lord's putting off that which was merely *external* to His Godhead, that is, to Himself as God, and His putting off that which was *internal* to Himself (which is Godet's supposition); and who have not perceived that if once the principle of putting off *anything at all of the internal* be

[1] Vol. iii. pp. 241–293.

admitted, it is not easy to say why Godet's theory should not be admitted in full, or why and where it is possible to stop short of it? To trench upon the *internal* at all is not merely to go a little further than the bounds as it were of the external. It is to make an entirely new departure, and a departure of so serious a character that nothing but the clearest testimony of Scripture that it was really part of the mystery of the Incarnation could justify its adoption. Whether there is or not any testimony of this kind is a question which will have to be examined carefully by-and-by. The reason why so much space has been given to the analysis of Professor Godet's views and principles on the subject of the κένωσις, is because it is evident that the question of our Lord's knowledge is intimately connected with that of the κένωσις, and because it is also more than probable that a good many persons to whom Godet's views have in some measure commended themselves have not fully realized how far those views are likely to carry them.

To pass from Professor Godet to Mr. Gore, is to pass from one with whom antiquity, in the ecclesiastical sense, weighed but little, to one whose respect for it is beyond question, and of whom, by reason not only of his theological attainments and position, but also of his devotion to our Master's cause, and the service he has rendered to the Church, it would not become the present writer to say anything except, if he may be permitted to do so, to express his sincere and respectful admiration. But he honestly believes that Mr. Gore, in his Bampton Lectures especially, has taken up a position with respect to our Lord, which is both theologically and historically indefensible and dangerous. And he trusts that it will not be regarded as in any way contrary to what he has just now said if he endeavours, with all the plainness and seriousness which the subject demands, to explain the grounds on which he believes Mr. Gore's position to be untenable.

On reading Mr. Gore's explanation of the passages in his

essay on *The Holy Spirit and Inspiration* in *Lux Mundi*, to which exception has been taken in so many quarters, the writer was glad to believe that he would not be obliged to be in conflict, in the present work, to any great extent with the author of that essay. He could not indeed feel satisfied with the explanation given as regards the very grave questions relating to the Old Testament, which the essay brought into prominence. Nor could he help feeling that a theory respecting our Lord, such as he could not believe Mr. Gore could intend to put forward, was hardly separable from some of the suppositions respecting the Old Testament, which were left unchanged in the later editions of *Lux Mundi*. But, in the first place, the concern of the present treatise was limited, as regards the Old Testament, to those points only with which the subject of our Lord's knowledge was directly implicated. And, in the next place, he felt confident that when Mr. Gore should have given a full exposition of his views respecting our Lord in his *Bampton Lectures*, the grounds of objection which had been felt before would be found to be removed, and, especially, that no interpretation of the κένωσις resembling in principle Professor Godet's interpretation, or suggesting that our Lord's self-emptying could be a laying aside in any way of that which was *internal* to His Deity, would have any countenance from him.

This expectation has been disappointed. As was said just now, the present writer cannot but regard the views expressed by Mr. Gore, in his *Bampton Lectures*, respecting our Lord, as being neither historically (that is, having reference to the Gospel portraiture) nor theologically defensible.

That which, rightly or wrongly, the writer cannot assent to in these views may be summed up under the three following heads: (1) the doctrine of the κένωσις; (2) the conception of our Lord's Person which is set forth in the fifth and sixth lectures; (3) the position assigned to our Lord as regards knowledge.

1. Respecting the κένωσις. There is a considerable

difference between Mr. Gore's description of the result of our Lord's self-emptying and that which we have already seen to be Professor Godet's description of it. But it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the principle adopted by each writer is the same. Mr. Gore does not carry out the principle to anything like the same length, but he, like Godet, does seem to suppose that our Lord could and did put off more than the majesty and glory which was *external* to His Divine Being, that He did "abandon" attributes which were *internal*. Mr. Gore uses not only the precise and emphatic term "*abandoned*"[1] in reference to the Divine attributes, but he also uses other expressions which point in the same direction. He says that our Lord "*ceased to exercise*"[2] some Divine attributes; that "the record seems to assure us that 'He' was *not habitually living in the exercise* of omniscience;"[3] that "it is not enough to recognize that our Lord was ignorant of a Divine secret [the day and hour of the Judgment], in respect of His human nature, unless we recognize also that He was so truly acting under conditions of human nature as *Himself to be ignorant*. 'The Son' did not know."[4] He says respecting the "self-beggary" of 2 Cor. viii. 9, that St. Paul evidently means "*something very much more than the mere addition of a manhood to His Godhead.* In a certain aspect indeed the Incarnation is the folding round the Godhead of the veil of the humanity, to hide its glory, but it is *much more than this.*"[5]

Some of these expressions might seem to indicate that Mr. Gore wished to convey that our Lord did not always *use* His Divine powers though He always *possessed*[6] them. Thus, in one passage where the term "abandoned" occurs, it is so used as to suggest that something of this kind was

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 159. [2] *Id. ib.* p. 158.
[3] *Id. ib.* p. 159. [4] *Id.* p. 266, note 47. [5] *Id.* Lect. vi. p. 158.
[6] Mr. Gore does in one place say that "He *possessed* at every moment the Divine, as well as the human, consciousness and nature" (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 266, note 47). He also "recognizes that the work of the Son in nature was in no way interrupted by the Incarnation" (*ib.*). In his *Dissertations*, pp. 91–93, he affirms this more fully.

Mr. Gore's meaning. "In regard to the Divine attributes" (he says) "what He *retained in exercise* and what He *abandoned* —whether He abandoned only the manifest glory, or also, for example, the exercise of Divine omniscience—we could hardly form any judgment *à priori*." The act of abandoning seems to be here contrasted with that of exercising, in which case it would be equivalent to "refraining from the exercise of."

But it is almost impossible to suppose that Mr. Gore means no more than this. First, because this would be simply to state a truism. Our Lord, until He turned the water into wine at Cana, wrought no miracle at all. During the first thirty years of His life He certainly refrained from exercising His omnipotent power in the sight of men. And afterwards, though of course it might, as a matter of words, be stated that our Lord, though He was in possession of omnipotent power, refrained from exercising it in the performance of all or some of His miracles, and preferred to work them by power which His manhood received as a gift from the Father, yet, besides the contradiction of the Gospel record[1] which such a statement would contain, it would be a self-contradictory statement. For it is a theological maxim that all the works of God are common to each Person of the Holy Trinity. So that our Lord, in the case supposed, would have wrought the miracles both by His own power and also not by His own power. Mr. Gore, therefore, if this were his meaning, would be either uttering a truism or making a self-contradictory and therefore impossible statement.

In the next place, what Mr. Gore says on the subject of our Lord's consciousness or omniscience precludes the supposition that "refraining to exercise" is a full expression of his meaning. For in what possible way could omniscience be possessed without being exercised? Can there be in the case of omniscience, which by the very force of the terms includes knowing all and knowing always, a state of both

[1] For, *e.g.*, in His first miracle, we read that He "manifested *His* glory" (St. John ii. 12).

knowing and not knowing? Possession and exercise[1] are, as regards the Divine omniscience, absolutely identical. As regards communication to our Lord's manhood, it is on the one hand certain that it never participated wholly in our Lord's Divine omniscience, since it would have ceased to be true finite manhood if it had; on the other hand it is quite possible that our Lord should have withheld from His human mind a particular secret which it was capable of receiving. But that this is not what Mr. Gore means is made clear by his express statement. "It is not enough," he says distinctly, "to recognize ignorance in the *human* nature."

In the third place, Mr. Gore's emphatic statement that the κένωσις was "something very much more" than hiding the external glory, proves that he had in view some kind of putting off of the *internal* attributes. And, indeed, the whole tenor of what he says on the subject is to this effect. It is unfortunate that Mr. Gore has not explained his meaning more precisely. It does not seem possible to ascertain from his language exactly what result he conceives the κένωσις to have had in relation to the Divine attributes—*i.e.* to our Lord's omnipotence, omnipresence, or omniscience. But it does at any rate seem certain, for the reasons which have been given, that this result was, in Mr. Gore's mind, something decidedly more than merely refraining on our Lord's part from exercising outwardly that which He was all the time in full possession of. The conclusion therefore which it seems we must come to is that Mr. Gore does adopt the same principle as Godet has done, that he does refer the self-emptying to that which was *internal* to our Lord's Divine Being, as distinguished from the putting off of the *external* glory. There are two marked points of contrast between Mr. Gore's treatment and Professor Godet's. Mr. Gore does not suppose such a thorough-going process (extending even

[1] Because exercise in this case means exercise *on behalf of the Person Himself*, not communication to others. "Refraining to exercise" would therefore be equivalent to "refraining to know." An omniscient person could not do this; for this would be to be at the same time omniscient and not omniscient.

to the extinguishing of consciousness) as Godet supposes. It may be doubted indeed whether the extinguishing of consciousness would not be, as Godet says, a necessary preliminary to putting off the Divine attributes—whether without the former the latter would not be impossible and inconceivable. But at any rate Mr. Gore[1] does not follow Godet in this particular. The other point is that Mr. Gore puts forward the Gospel record as the principal standard of appeal. It is because the Gospel record seemed to him to bear this testimony that he thought himself justified in assuming that our Lord "did not habitually live in the exercise of Divine omniscience." To the present writer the Gospel record seems to bear very different testimony indeed. But he is in entire accord with Mr. Gore in regarding it as a standard of appeal which rises supreme above logic or philosophy or dogmatic deduction, though these have a real secondary use and value.

2. Respecting the conception of our Lord's Person, which is given in the fifth and sixth of Mr. Gore's lectures. The fifth lecture is on the revelation of God in Christ; the sixth is on the revelation of Man in Christ. In both the representation appears to the present writer to be, by omissions chiefly, but in a marked degree, out of harmony with the Gospel narrative. Let us look at them in order.

And, first, what is the nature of that revelation of God in Christ which Mr. Gore puts before us? It is, on his own showing, so far from being a complete revelation of God that it was only such a revelation as was capable of being "expressed in terms of humanity,"[2] and containing only such features as could be "reflected without being refracted"[3]

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 145, 146, "It is not possible . . . to doubt that He knew His eternal pre-existence and Sonship." *Ib.* p. 156: "Thus in fact, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God retained and expressed His essential relation to the Father; He received therefore as eternally, so in the days of His flesh, the consciousness of His own and of His Father's being, and the power to reveal that which He knew." These most true statements seem to carry with them consequences which are really fatal to Mr. Gore's theory.

[2] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. v. p. 117.

[3] *Id.*, Lect. vi. p. 156. If all that Mr. Gore meant was that, since it is

through the medium of a perfectly pure and holy human nature. Mr. Gore insists, in eloquent terms, upon the revelation of God's moral attributes—His love, His justice, and His truth—which was made by Jesus Christ. Man, having been made in God's image, capable of these moral excellencies, could in these respects become a mirror of God. They were capable of being "expressed in terms of humanity." And Jesus Christ, by reason of the perfection and height and absolute purity of His moral being, was able to express these characteristics of God to the utmost capacity of humanity. But could He not make a still more complete revelation of God than this? Being personally God, could He not reveal that side of the Being of God which was not capable of being expressed in "terms of humanity"? Was it unnecessary that He should do so? Was there any reason why the specially Divine attributes, omnipotence, for example, and omniscience, which were incommunicable to the human nature even of the Christ, should not be employed by the Son of God, according to His perfect wisdom, in conjunction with the moral revelation, and both irradiating and irradiated by it, in order to bring home effectually to the hearts and souls of His disciples His own true Godhead, and in Himself to manifest to them the Father? Was there not every reason why God should be thus fully revealed in Christ? Mr. Gore admits one addition to the revelation of the moral characteristics of God. He admits, or rather maintains, that our Lord, whilst He instilled into His disciples the gradual conviction that He was the very Son of God, was implanting insensibly within them the lines of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. For since He insisted continually upon the closeness of His connection and oneness with the Father on the

impossible for man to behold God as He is, the revelation which our Lord made could not have been a *direct* manifestation of the Divine nature and attributes, we should entirely agree with him. But this does not seem to be his meaning. He appears to think that our Lord manifested directly the *moral* attributes of God, but that, as regards His omnipotence and omniscience, He manifested these only in the same manner in which any of the prophets did.

one hand, and on the other upon His personal distinction as the Son from the Father, it is clear that the doctrine of the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead would by this means have been formed, unconsciously it may be on their part, in their minds. And at the same time the Personality and the Fatherhood of God would in like manner, without conscious reasoning on their part, have become rooted with enlarged force and meaning within them.

Mr. Gore dilates in striking language upon this side of our Lord's revelation of God in Himself; but he does not seem to see that it is fatal to his argument. For this is a revelation going beyond what could be "made intelligible and interpreted in the manhood" of Christ—not beyond what could be given in and by Christ *personally*, but beyond what His manhood alone was able to "manifest," beyond what was capable of being expressed in "terms of humanity." This was the revelation of which our Lord said to Peter, "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven." It was a revelation admitting those who received it into the inner shrine of the Divine Personality in Christ, where they were permitted to behold that "Life," infinite and eternal, "which was with the Father, and was manifested unto" them. This was a revelation which could be expressed in no other "terms" than those of Divinity. For this it was required that the Christ, the Son of the Living God, should manifest His "glory"—not His glory as man, but His glory as One with the Father. It was not the exercise of bare power which the disciples witnessed in our Saviour's miracles, not even of power blended with love and with wisdom; but—to them at least, whatever it may have been to the world—it came to be more and more clearly the vision of power partaking of all which God is, flowing directly from "that Eternal Life which was with the Father." And, perhaps, even more than this it was the silent persuasiveness of the Omniscience making itself felt with increasing power of conviction as "the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst" them, which most of

all unlocked for them that inner shrine of His Divine Personality.

Mr. Gore prefers to say that if our Lord's "miraculous power appears as the appropriate endowment of His Person, it was still a gift of God to Him as man."[1] He prefers to regard Him as having received "supernatural illumination"[2] as man, which illumination was, "if of higher quality, yet analogous to that vouchsafed to prophets and apostles." He prefers to regard Him as not making any direct manifestations or emanations of the Deity which was in Him.

Mr. Gore has a philosophical reason for this view. He considers that "a really human experience"[3] was incompatible with the condition of absolute Divine omniscience which is proper to God, and that limitations of this Divine consciousness could "alone make possible" such experience. This philosophical question will require careful consideration hereafter. At present we have only to notice that which must be regarded, as Mr. Gore also regards it, as superior in importance to all besides, viz. the agreement or disagreement of this view with the facts of the Gospels. To these, as Mr. Gore most rightly urges, we must "determine at any rate to be true."

Here, then, is a plain, broad issue. Can Mr. Gore affirm that the Church in general has read the Gospels as he reads them? Can he affirm that there was one amongst the ancient Fathers whose study of the Gospels (and, whatever may be said of later scholastic theologians, there can be no question that the Fathers' study of the Gospels was a deep and spiritual study) led him to think that our Lord's revelation of God was limited as he supposes it to have been limited—that it was expressed in terms of humanity only, and not also in terms of Divinity?[4] Was there one who said, or

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 146. [2] *Id. ib.* p. 147.

[3] *Id. ib.* p. 150, cf. p. 157.

[4] Theodoret, *Dial.* i. (Migne, *P. G.* lxxxiii. p. 72): Σάρκα γὰρ περιβεβλημένος, ἐδείκνυ τὴν πατρῴαν εὐγένειαν, καὶ τῆς θεότητος τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἐξέπεμπε, καὶ τῆς Δεσποτικῆς ἐξουσίας ἠφίει τὴν αἴγλην, ταῖς θαυματουργίαις ἀποκαλύπτων τὴν λανθάνουσαν φύσιν. And Theodoret was the chief champion of our Lord's humanity.

would have said, that our Lord's miraculous power was simply "a gift of God to Him as man," or that "He does not appear to teach out of an absolute Divine omniscience, but rather as conditioned by human nature"? Was there one who was not ready to say with St. Leo,[1] speaking of the Divine and the human natures of our Lord respectively, *Unum coruscat miraculis, aliud succumbit injuriis*—"One flashes forth in the miracles, the other submits to injurious treatment"?

Again, the impression which ordinary believing readers of our own time have derived from the Gospel narrative may be seen from the following extract from a non-controversial work which attracted attention more than twenty years ago, before the movements of thought which *Lux Mundi* has stirred had made themselves felt in England. The author of *The Sinless Sufferer*[2] writes as follows: "Even in the midst of outward trials and distresses the conviction of our Lord's Divinity is forced upon us. He is among men, but not of them. There is a point beyond which neither the love nor the hatred of those around Him can penetrate. The loftiest points of His Being are shrouded like the summits of some lofty mountain in thick clouds and darkness. At each instant of His life we feel that there standeth One among men Whom they know not; that the influence of a higher nature is ever imperceptibly breathed through the veil of human weakness." (Thus far the language is such as Mr. Gore would perhaps adopt; but observe what follows.) "His miracles differ from those of prophets or apostles; they are not granted to faithful prayer, to trust in a higher Power, but they flow forth as the majestic and necessary works of a Divine Person. They manifest His glory. . . . Again, His whole teaching is instinct with a consciousness of His Divinity. . . . He speaks not as a Messenger from God, but as One Who Himself lays down the laws of the kingdom

[1] *Epist.* xxviii. 4.

[2] *The Sinless Sufferer*, by the Rev. S. W. Skeffington (3rd edit., 1872) pp. 99, 100.

which He founds. He does not hesitate to claim for Himself the allegiance and love of mankind; He emphatically preaches Himself. He is the Light, the Way, the Truth, the Life, the One Mediator between God and man, the future Judge. Nay, more, He distinctly asserts His unity with the Eternal Father. He is familiar with the unseen world. He is conscious of a pre-existent life in heaven. Nor did He fail to impress on the minds of those around Him an at least partial belief in His Divine nature."

Once more, the following words, expressing the judgment of that continental professor whom more than any other it is natural to place beside Professor Godet, are of interest and importance as showing how a scholar who has certainly not been influenced by any patristic bias has been impressed by the tenor of St. John's Gospel. Writing upon the theology of St. John,[1] and with his eye upon the words (i. 14), "We beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," Professor Reuss remarks, in the first place, that "la gloire est l'ensemble de toutes les perfections divines, considérées dans leur manifestation;" and then, speaking of "grace and truth," proceeds to make the following observations. The word "grâce . . . rappelle surtout le motif de la manifestation du Fils, l'amour de Dieu pour le monde (c. iii. 16; 1 Ep. iv. 9, etc.); le second, au contraire, énonce cette idée que, par cette même manifestation le monde a reçu une connaissance adéquate de l'essence et de la volonté de Dieu. Il n'y a pas jusqu' au mot: il établit sa *demeure,* qui ne renferme l'idée d'une revelation personnelle de l'Être suprême. Cette expression est consacrée dans le langage de la théologie juive pour désigner la personne de Dieu comme présente. . . . Le Logos manifesté en chair était *plein* de grâce et de vérité; *il ne saurait donc être question d'une inanition, d'un dépouillement; la divinité n'a rien perdu en se revelant ainsi, autrement on ne pourrait pas même dire qu'elle s'est révélée.* Seulement il y a à dire qu'elle ne s'est

[1] Reuss, *La Bible*, Nouv. Test. Sixième Partie; *La Théologie Johannique*, p. 120. Paris, 1879.

pas révélée à tous." (The italics in this last passage are the present writer's.)

In a note, Reuss adds significantly, "Il n'y a que l'harmonistique la plus arbitraire qui puisse prétendre que l'evangeliste s'en tient au point de vue de l'Epître aux Philippiens (c. ii. 6 suiv.). Le Verbe incarné conserve la toute-science (c. i. 43, 49; iv. 16; ii. 25, etc.) et la toute-puissance; les miracles sont racontés avant tout pour prouver cela. [In his *Introduction* (p. 16), Reuss dwells at length upon this point.] Comme il possède en outre la sainteté parfaite, il sera difficile de dire à quels attributs de la divinité il pourrait avoir renoncé, *d' après nos textes* [*i.e.* according to the writings of St. John]. Si les croyants ont pu *contempler* ('de leur vue corporelle') sa gloire, c'est-à-dire 'le rayonnement de ses perfections,' c'est que ces perfections n'avaient pas été voilées ou amoindries ou écartées par un 'depouillement.'"

With the present question therefore fully before his mind, with the idea even that a "depouillement" *was* taught by St. Paul, Professor Reuss finds that the Gospel of St. John, so far from bearing out this supposition, furnishes the most ample and decisive testimony against it. May not the same thing be said with equal truth respecting all the four Gospels? Do they not *all* exhibit to us a real though reserved and guarded manifestation of Divine attributes in Jesus Christ such as could not be given in "terms of humanity" alone, and which carries our thoughts beyond His humanity to that fountain-head of Divinity in His Person which is the Centre of all that He is, and the source of all which He was pleased to display concerning Himself and concerning the Father?

In the next place, Mr. Gore's account, in his sixth lecture, of the Revelation of Man in Christ, presents, like the Revelation of God in Christ which we have just considered, an omission which it seems impossible to regard as accidental. The parallel between the humanity of Christ as the Second Adam and the humanity of the first Adam before the Fall is drawn out in the following passage: "In Jesus Christ humanity was perfect. We have no reason to think that

man was originally created perfect. Irenæus and Clement expressly deny it. We believe that when the body of man was first made the dwelling-place of a self-conscious, free personality, man might have developed on the lines of God's intention, not without effort and struggle, but without rebellion and under no curse. But, in any case, all the process of development of all human faculties lay before him. He was imperfect, and only adapted to develope freely. But in Christ, humanity is not only free from taint, but, in the moral and spiritual region, also at the goal of development. In Him first we see man completely in the image of God, realizing all that was in the Divine idea for man. He was perfect Child according to the measure of childhood, Boy according to boyhood's measure, Man according to man's standard; and He was perfected at last according to the final destiny of manhood in eternal glory."[1]

Mr. Gore here says with perfect truth that in Christ humanity was, *in the moral and spiritual region*, at the goal of development. Why in the moral and spiritual region only? Why not also in the *intellectual* region? He says that in Christ "first we see man *completely* in the image of God." Does not the image of God include what belongs to the intellectual region? "The image of God" (writes Bishop Bull[2]) "is a comprehensive thing, and there are many lines requisite to complete the Divine similitude, after which the first man was created." He then specifies the "intellective power" as being the first feature of "that part of the Divine image which is natural and essential to man."

In truth there is good ground for believing—Bishop Bull shows in this discourse that he is expressing the mind of the whole early Church on the subject—that man was originally placed before the Fall on a far higher intellectual, as well as a far higher moral and spiritual level than, until our Saviour came as the Second Adam, any human being has occupied

[1] Lect. vi. p. 167 *sq.*

[2] Discourse on the "State of Man before the Fall," *Works*, vol. ii. p. 114, sq., ed. Burton.

since the Fall. "What Christian can doubt" (says St. Augustine [1]) "that they who in this world, which is so full of error and of care, seem most distinguished for intellectual gifts (ingeniosissimi apparent), whose corruptible bodies nevertheless weigh down their souls, differ from Adam, when comparison is made of their intellect with his, far more than tortoises differ from birds in swiftness." And again, "All the most acute and lively intellects that can now be found [*i.e.* since the Fall], and they are very few, must be judged, in comparison with the intellect of the first created man, to be but intellects of lead." [1]

The language of St. Augustine in these passages is metaphorical, and he ought not to be understood as if he had been using the carefully guarded terms of philosophy. His theory may, perhaps, be considered in any case a little overstrained. It is not necessary to suppose that "Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam." But there is, nevertheless, an important underlying truth. The connection between the moral and the intellectual sides of man's nature is a very close one; and it is not to be thought that the effects of the Fall were confined to one part of his nature only, or that the moral loss was not accompanied by an intellectual loss also.

If, then, there was this great intellectual superiority in the first Adam, what reason could there be for its absence in the Second Adam? It formed one of the lines of the image of God, which Mr. Gore himself says was first realized in its completeness in Christ the Second Adam. It seems to be joined by very close links of connection with the moral and spiritual superiority from the level of which the first Adam fell. Ignorance is not sin; but there are points of junction of a very intimate kind between ignorance and sin; we can, indeed, hardly conceive the perfection of holiness as existing beside or in the midst of real or deep intellectual ignorance. Could our Lord, then, have been less at the goal of development in the intellectual than in the moral and spiritual

[1] *Opus Imperf.*, Lib. v. c. 1., cited by Hurter, *Theol. Dogm. Compend.*, vol. ii. p. 276.

[2] *Id.*, Lib. iv. c. 75.

region? Why should He not have realized in the successive stages of childhood, boyhood, and manhood, the relative perfection belonging to each of those stages as regards the intellectual powers, as well as regards the moral and spiritual powers?

Mr. Gore does not assign any reason for the omission of this feature from his portrait of our Lord's humanity, and we are therefore left to conjecture respecting it. But one thing is clear. If our Lord's intellectual powers as the Second Adam possessed that kind of superiority which it seems reasonable to suppose was found in the first Adam, the argument from silence, on which Mr. Gore lays some stress in making out his case for our Lord's supposed ignorance of certain branches of knowledge, would have to be reversed. For the presumption would then be, in any case of silence, that is, in which positive evidence was wanting, not that He did not know, but that He did.

3. Respecting the position assigned to our Lord as regards knowledge. This position is, according to Mr. Gore, both on the Divine side and on the human side of our Lord's Personality, a position of *limitation.*

It is so especially on the Divine side. Mr. Gore speaks in very indefinite terms respecting the extent of the limitation to which he supposes our Lord's omniscience to have been subject; but as to there having been some limitation of it, he uses expressions which distinctly convey that this is his belief. Thus he tells us that our Lord "does not appear to teach out of an absolute Divine omniscience, but rather as *conditioned* by human nature."[1] He speaks of "human experiences which seem *inconsistent with* practical *omniscience.*"[2] Many of his expressions convey the idea that he regarded our Lord as living and teaching under the conditions of human consciousness only, that is to say, as not being omniscient at all.[3] This, as we have seen, was Godet's view. But at other times Mr. Gore speaks differently. Our Lord

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 147.
[2] *Id. ib.* p. 147.
[3] *Id. ib.* p. 149.

"received (he says) as eternally—so in the days of His flesh —the consciousness of His own and of His Father's being."[1] The use of the word "eternally," as well as the fact that the object of this consciousness is that Being of God which none but God can comprehend, show that Mr. Gore here speaks of the Divine consciousness or omniscience. But on the next page he speaks of the human nature being allowed to "subject" this Divine consciousness "to limitation," though it was not allowed to deface or distort it. And again, he says that our Lord "could not, as far as we can see, abiding in the exercise of an absolute consciousness, have grown in knowledge." His conclusion, therefore, is that He did not "abide in the exercise of an absolute consciousness," that is, that He was sometimes (or in some respects) omniscient, and sometimes (or in some respects) not omniscient. And so, again, he says that "the record seems to assure us that our Lord in His mortal life was not habitually living in the exercise of omniscience."[2] But then the next paragraph speaks of "*conscious* voluntariness" in our Lord's self-abnegation, and of "*deliberateness*" belonging to His limitation of consciousness, in such a way as to suggest that the idea in the writer's mind was that our Lord consciously and deliberately held in check His own omniscience, that is to say, being omnisciently conscious, made Himself to be at the same time not omnisciently conscious. It is no wonder that Mr. Gore proceeds to ask whether such a process is really thinkable. Assuredly it is not. There is, indeed, no difficulty whatever in supposing our Lord to have consciously and deliberately withheld Himself from *communicating* any of the contents of His omniscience. But that, remaining in possession of omniscient consciousness, He should consciously and deliberately make Himself not in possession of omniscient consciousness—this is simply and absolutely unthinkable. It is a contradiction in terms. It is impossible that the same consciousness should be at once conscious and unconscious, in possession of omniscience and not in possession of omniscience. And yet Mr.

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 156. [2] *Id. ib.* p. 159.

Gore says that "It is true, of course, that as being God in manhood our Lord *possessed* at every moment the Divine, as well as the human consciousness and nature;"[1] and, almost in the same breath, says that "it is not enough to recognize" that He was ignorant of the day and hour of the Judgment, "in respect of His human nature, unless we recognize also that He was so truly acting under conditions of human nature as Himself [*i.e.* in respect of His Divine nature] to be ignorant." At this very moment, then, He was, according to Mr. Gore's direct statement, both in possession of the Divine consciousness and also Himself ignorant, *i.e.* not in possession of the Divine consciousness.

On the human side of our Lord's Personality Mr. Gore supposes that there was also limitation of knowledge. This limitation is not that which attaches to all natures which are finite, by reason of their finiteness. It is a kind of limitation which is not necessary, not unavoidable. It is limitation of a similar kind to that to which we are all subject when, from not exercising our faculties, we fail to acquire knowledge of a particular kind, or when, from circumstances, such knowledge is not communicated to us. Mr. Gore seems, as we have already noticed, to suppose our Lord not to have been, as man, at the goal of intellectual development. He distinctly says that he "shows no signs at all of transcending the history of His age."[2] On the other hand he supposes our Lord's human consciousness to have been in other respects "extraordinary."[3] He assigns to His human consciousness not quite all which Godet does (for Godet supposes our Lord's Divine consciousness to have been "extinguished," and is therefore obliged to find or make room in His human consciousness for all the supernatural knowledge of God and of man, and all the supernatural insight and foresight of which the Gospels speak), but he assigns to it a great deal. But even within the sphere of our Lord's supernatural illumination he thinks he perceives limitations. And he

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 266. [2] *Lux Mundi*, p. 360.
[3] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 147.

does not apparently admit that the sphere of supernatural illumination extended at all beyond such knowledge of moral and spiritual truth and such insight into character and foresight of events as the Gospels expressly testify to. On the whole, therefore, the description which Mr. Gore gives of our Lord's human consciousness is a description which distinctly involves limitations beyond those which belong inherently to every nature which is finite.

It will be readily seen that these views of the κένωσις, of our Lord's Person, and of His position as regards knowledge, are closely connected together, and really form part of one body of thought. Hence it is evident that the subject of our Lord's knowledge could not be treated to any good purpose without taking account of views which must greatly influence the conception entertained on that subject.

It is also important to remark that there is a presupposition, evidently of very great influence, lying at the root of the whole of these opinions. This presupposition is that if the Divine nature and attributes of our Lord had remained in their integrity, without any change or modification except that of union with the human nature, then it would have been impossible for our Lord to have lived a true human life developed in freedom according to the natural laws of our experience. Mr. Gore, as well as Professor Godet, evidently has this conviction strongly in his mind. Thus, after remarking that our Lord was "to exhibit a true example of manhood—tried, progressive, perfected,"[1] he adds, as if he were stating an acknowledged truth, that "for this purpose it was necessary that He should be without the exercise of such Divine prerogatives as would have made human experience or progress impossible;" and he goes on to specify "the exercise of an absolute consciousness" as one of the "prerogatives" which it was necessary that our Lord should be without.

One cannot but suspect that this presupposition has had a great deal to do with the formation and moulding of the

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vi. p. 157; cf. p. 150. See above, p. 18.

views above spoken of. At any rate it cannot be otherwise than of great importance to ascertain, if it be possible to ascertain, whether the necessity which is supposed has any real existence or not—whether the ancient view of the Council of Chalcedon, that both natures remained in their full integrity after the union which took place at the Incarnation, must after all be abandoned as untenable, or whether we may still take it as the basis and starting-point of endeavours to penetrate the mystery.

Accordingly, it has seemed advisable to examine this question fully, from a psychological point of view in the first place, in the first book of the treatise, and, in the second book, from a theological point of view. Examination from a psychological point of view seemed to offer this further advantage, that it would probably help towards clearing up in some degree the rather vague conceptions which are perhaps generally entertained respecting Divine Omniscience on the one hand, and human consciousness with its limitations on the other.

But, necessary as it seemed to be to examine this question and that of the κένωσις as connected with it, with care and fulness, from these points of view, the evidence of the Gospels, and the manner in which that evidence has been understood and interpreted in the successive ages of the Church by her best and wisest and most learned representatives, must occupy the principal place and form the chief standard of judgment in this as in all other theological questions. The third book is, accordingly, devoted to an examination of the evidence of the Gospel record respecting our Lord's knowledge. It did not seem possible that this evidence should be quite impartially studied, or even rightly understood, until something had been done to show that the presupposition just now referred to, and the questions connected with it, were not based upon such solid grounds as was supposed. It seemed, therefore, better to place the examination of the Gospels after rather than before the investigations contained in the first and second books. It had been the intention of

the writer to give, in a fourth book, an historical account of what the writings of the Fathers, the Schoolmen, and later theologians of the Church contain on the subject of this treatise. This would have naturally included the interpretation by the Fathers of all the important statements bearing upon it which the Gospels contain. A *résumé* of interpretations of the saying respecting the day and hour of the final judgment is given in the third book. For reasons already stated it has been thought better not to include the historical account as a whole in the present publication.

BOOK I.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRIMARY LAW OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

It is not a little remarkable—considering how active the curiosity of mankind has been from very early times, and in how many directions laborious investigations have been carried on—that a really thorough and comprehensive examination of our mental faculties should have been one of the last subjects to be taken in hand. Such, however, is the case. Often apparently on the point of being taken up, this subject has been as constantly just touched and opened, and then, as though some secret power barred further advance, turned aside from or dropped. Time after time Psychology has placed herself beside the great masters of the world's thought, pointing to where her treasures lay concealed, and inviting them to follow her and take possession, and time after time each one whom she has invited, after moving perhaps a little way with her, or it may be after casting a glance only in the direction towards which she pointed, has turned away to the pursuit of other subjects. Until comparatively quite recent times attention has never been *fully* awakened to the supreme importance of ascertaining all that may be ascertained respecting the secrets of our own inward being, and taking stock of our own faculties. Why this has been so it is certainly not easy to say. It has not been for want of opportunity, nor, as has been already said, for want

of invitation. Thus, for example, in the course of Aristotle's marvellous intellectual career, three times was there offered to him what might have seemed the fairest occasion for a thorough investigation of all that is within man—when he was writing his Metaphysics, when he was engaged in the study of Ethics, and last, not least, when he was professedly occupied in mapping out (in his *De Anima*) the invisible part of our being. But what was the result? In none of these cases did he follow up the clue which he had apparently seized. "If," said Dean Mansel,[1] "Aristotle for a moment grasped the important truth that the laws of things and the laws of thought were alike objects of metaphysical inquiry (*Met.* iii. 3), the conviction produced hardly any result in the details of his treatment: his psychology allied itself chiefly to physics; his metaphysics, after its introductory chapter, deserted the track of psychology." Sir Alexander Grant[2] remarks that early Ethics generally are characterized by this feature, namely, "that they contain extremely little psychology." Nor can Aristotle's ethical writings be regarded as an exception to this statement. Casting into a scientific form the concrete phenomena of ethics as they presented themselves to his mind, he doubtless laid an important foundation for ethical science; but it was not a psychological foundation. In his incomplete theory of the will the idea of such a foundation might seem to be germinating in his mind; but the idea, if he had it, was not followed up. Again, in his treatise *On the Soul*, whilst he regards the "Soul" or "Mind" chiefly in its relation to the bodily organization, he once seems on the point of following up the subject on its strictly psychological side. "The soul,"[3] he is beginning to say, "is certainly in some respects inseparable from the body; but it is perfectly conceivable that in other respects it

[1] "Metaphysics," *Encycl. Brit.*, 8th ed., vol. xiv. p. 552.

[2] *Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 168.

[3] *De Anima*, II. i. 12. The striking expression in *De Anima*, I. iv. 12, where Aristotle speaks of *the man* feeling through his soul, rather than the soul itself feeling—*βέλτιον ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν . . . ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ*—is just such another instance.

is not so; it may be that its true relation to the body is like that of a sailor to his boat." "Here," as Sir A. Grant[1] truly remarks, "is the point at which the interest in Aristotle's conception of the ψυχή begins for us. . . . But here is the point also where he becomes less explicit. Having once mooted this comparison, he does not follow it up."

What Aristotle failed to realize, was not realized for many a long age afterwards; and that notwithstanding the strong light which was thrown by Christianity upon the path towards which Psychology did not cease to point the finger of invitation, offering again and again her services as guide. In reading the writings of the Christian Fathers, it is impossible not to feel how great would have been the gain if the views which have been opened by the psychological investigation of modern times had been as fully open to them. Psychological ideas there are no doubt in abundance, in the works of the Greek Fathers generally, and, amongst the Latins, in those especially of the great thinker, who has been styled "the most psychological of the Fathers"—St. Augustine. But one cannot but feel that men whose views, as it was, were the loftiest, the most spiritual, the most comprehensive, the most morally fruitful and elevating which have ever been given to the world, would still have gained very largely in depth and completeness if they could have received a deeper insight into those associated topics which we are accustomed to include as belonging to psychological science. And, in later times, amongst the scholastic theologians, the absence of clear views on these subjects led, as we shall hereafter have occasion to notice, to a confusion of thought on weighty matters of doctrine which was not without results on the whole after-history of the Church.

We must come down to the seventeenth century before any real prospect offers of genuine psychological research. When Descartes had arrived at his *Cogito, ergo sum*, it might

[1] *Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 297. Cf. Wallace, *Psychology of Aristotle*, Introd. ch ii., "The Scope and Method of Psychology as conceived by Aristotle,"—a very interesting chapter of a very able book.

have been thought that the inquiry concerning the origin of our ideas would now at length be undertaken in earnest. But it was not so. This important inquiry was "indicated rather than commenced by Descartes." [1] Still more might it have been expected that when Locke, a little later, came to the deliberate conclusion that a wrong course had been taken in inquiries of a metaphysical nature, and that the course which ought to be taken was first "to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with," [2] this examination would now, at any rate, be vigorously prosecuted. And, indeed, the publication of Locke's essay did turn thought with a more powerful impulse than it had ever received before in the direction of the study of mind; but the actual contributions of Locke himself to psychological knowledge were not very considerable.

The most remarkable instance of all is that of Kant. Considering that the problem which Kant set himself to solve was emphatically a psychological problem, and considering the impulse which had been given by the writings of Locke, Hume, and Berkeley, towards the consideration of the psychological aspects of metaphysical questions, it might have been confidently expected that Kant would have taken care to ground his conclusions upon a solid psychological foundation. Yet this is precisely what he failed to do. This is precisely that which it has been the work of post-Kantian schools of criticism to accomplish. Herbart, indeed, maintained that Kant did ground his critical doctrine on psychology. But the position of Fries that it ought to have been so grounded, although Kant did not himself rest it upon this foundation, is now, it may perhaps be said, much more generally the accepted view, at least amongst Kantians. A prominent member of this school, J. B. Meyer,[3] published a

[1] Mansel, *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 160.

[2] Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*. Epistle to the Reader.

[3] *Kant's Psychologie, dargestellt und erörtert* von J. B. Meyer, Berlin, 1870. See Ueberweg's *Hist. of Philos.*, vol. ii. p. 331, Eng. trans., and compare Ueberweg's remarks on the relation of Kant's *Kritik* to Psychology, vol. ii. p. 202.

work in 1870, having for its object to show that there is a psychological foundation for the critical philosophy. It is true that there is; but Kant did not show what it was, or attempt to do so. Riehl's work, *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*,[1] the first volume of which appeared in 1876, has probably disposed altogether of the misconception—not entertained by Kant himself, as Riehl remarks, but by his expositors and critics—that the critical philosophy was actually founded on psychology. More recently an Italian critic, Professor Cesca, has ably developed, in his work, *La Dottrina Kantiana dell' A Priori*, the view that Kant only put the theory of knowledge *sulla via di una giusta soluzione*,[2] and that this was largely due *al poco conto che ebbe della Psicologia*.

However, since Kant's time it cannot be said that there has been any neglect of psychology. Changes there have been, and enlargements there have been, in the treatment of the subject; but it has not been neglected. Certainly the description which Mansel gave of it in 1857, in the first half of his article on metaphysics, bears no very great resemblance to what is to be found in some recent treatises. His conception of it as the philosophy of the facts of consciousness as such, excluding almost entirely all merely physical facts, has been by some writers all but turned round, the physical facts having been exalted into the position of chief importance, and the spiritual ones, if allowed to be such at all, being thrust into the background. But this is a temporary

[1] See *Der Philos. Kriticismus*, Erster Band, pp. 294–311. G. von Gizycki of Berlin, in a Review (in the *Viertelahrschrift für Wissenschjaftliche Philosophie*) of so much of Riehl's book as had appeared in 1880, speaks of this as Riehl's cheif service in the historical portion of his work, to have done away with this and another misconception. "Diese beiden Vorurtheile [das psychologische und das idealistische] mit Hülfe urkundlicher Belegstellen, aus dem Wege geräumt zu haben, ist das grösste Verdienst dieses historischen Theiles von Riehl's Werk" (p. 500 of the Review). This reference to Riehl and Gizycki, it should be added, is not meant to indicate acceptance or approval of all that they say respecting the relation of psychology to the critical philosophy. They are referred to only for their testimony to the fact that Kant did, in the Critique of Pure Reason, set aside psychology.

[2] *Introduzione*, pp. 2, 3.

phase. Aristotle's comprehensive glance took in physical or bodily facts as standing in a very close relation with facts of mind, and psychology will be none the worse for this being recognized more fully than it was by Mansel. The adjustment of the relations between them will in time be worked out more and more clearly, and light will doubtless be thrown upon the whole subject, even by what seem the very crude and materialistic conceptions which in some quarters are being applied to it.

Such being the facts respecting the history and progress of psychological study, it will be seen that until quite recent times the question now before us—that of the relation between the Divine Omniscience of our Lord Jesus Christ and His human consciousness—never could have been fully and properly examined in its psychological bearings, and, in point of fact, as far as the present writer is aware, to the present day it never has been thoroughly investigated from this point of view.

And yet it is evident that this is one of the most important aspects in which it can be considered, and that it is indeed indispensable to arriving at a solution (if that be possible) of some of its chief difficulties, that it should be investigated psychologically, and that with as much care as possible.

It will not therefore, it is hoped, be thought to require apology, although the question before us is a theological question, that in the first place consideration should be invited to it from an exclusively psychological point of view, that is to say, with as little admixture as may be, for the present, of purely theological views or reasoning. There are two chief factors in the problem: one of them is our Lord's human consciousness, the other is His Divine Omniscience. And before we can hope to be able to determine what may have been, during His life upon earth, the relation between them, it would seem to be imperatively necessary that each factor should receive separately as careful an examination as it is possible to give to it.

This, then, is what it is proposed to attempt in the following chapters, forming the first book of this treatise: our Lord's human consciousness will naturally occupy our attention first; then His Divine Omniscience—if we may venture to speak of examining a subject so far above us; and, lastly, the psychological relation in which they may be conceived to have stood towards one another in our Incarnate Saviour.

And in speaking of attempting to examine our Lord's human consciousness, what is meant is less presumptuous than might at first be thought. What we have to consider is not, for the present at least, what our Lord's knowledge as man actually was, but what those human faculties of knowledge and that human consciousness, which for our sakes He condescended to take to Himself and make His own, were capable of. And this, it will be observed, is tantamount to inquiring what human faculties of knowledge as such—our own faculties—are capable, *structurally* capable, of attaining. For we may be sure that our Lord's human faculties were not different, *structurally*, from our own. The knowledge which He possessed as man may have been far greater in extent, far higher in quality, than any other son of man has ever possessed. But we may be sure that whatever our Lord's knowledge as man was actually, it was neither more extensive nor more exalted than human faculties of knowledge are capable of attaining (or of receiving) *without alteration of their structure*. For, if there had been, in any part of our Lord's human nature, an alteration of its proper structure, He would not have been true man,—He would not have been, as we know He was, and as it was absolutely necessary for our salvation that He should be, in all things "made like unto"[1] us. We shall, then, attain our object if from an examination of the structure of our own faculties of knowledge and our own consciousness, we can ascertain what limitations attach to them in consequence of their having received this structure, and what kind of knowledge and of

[1] Heb. ii. 17.

is this: that human consciousness can only be exercised by being concentrated first on one part and then on another part of the object or objects which may be before it; but that the Divine consciousness embraces all objects simultaneously, eternally, and with unchangeably equal force, *without any division of attention.* The division of attention in the one case, and the absence of division of attention in the other case, are the features—and most striking and important they indeed are—to which he especially directs our notice. In thus holding up to view the necessity which we are under of concentrating our consciousness upon successive parts of whatever objects we think of or study, St. Augustine has really hit upon and described the primary law of our minds, the very root and master-principle by which the exercise of our intellectual faculties is conditioned, and which determines the limits and the character of all our knowledge.

Let us examine this more closely. What appears to be matter of demonstration is that when analysis has been carried to the furthest point possible, we arrive at *consciousness* as that beyond or behind which we can in no way pass; that consciousness, when it is exercised, can be exercised in one way only, viz. in the manner to which we give the name of "attention," which is simply the concentration of consciousness upon a particular point; that, taking the law of attention as the starting-point, it may be shown from this law why the method by which the Understanding (the only discursive faculty) in fact works, is what it is, and could not be other than it is; that from the same law it may be shown that the Understanding must be subject to limitations, and such limitations as it is found in fact to be subject to; and that the same law also conditions in a certain manner the Imagination, which, unlike the Understanding, possesses an intuitive power of its own.

Leaving the particular consideration of the Understanding and the Imagination, and the limitations to which they are subject, to the chapters following, what we have now

to do is to lay bare the root-principle and to exhibit its connection with those faculties.

In the first place it will be admitted that it does not need proof—and, indeed, no proof is possible, seeing that it is an ultimate fact—that *consciousness* is that beyond which analysis cannot be carried. As soon as we understand what is meant by the term "consciousness," we have the proof of it—all the proof that can be given—before us. By "consciousness" we intend to express that relation in which our minds, or we ourselves, stand towards whatsoever objects we in any way know. The consciousness may be of any degree, from that which is almost unconsciousness to that of the fullest and clearest knowledge which is possible for man. But of whatever degree it may be, it is still consciousness—a something which we cannot go behind, and which we cannot further analyze.

In the next place, it is also undeniable that our consciousness—human consciousness—can only be exercised in the form of attention. It will be seen that it is simply a truism to say that we cannot study anything, we cannot have any knowledge of any object, without giving attention to it. It is a truism indeed, but it is a most important one. For in this truism is wrapped up the very law of all our knowing. For attention is nothing else but the concentration of consciousness upon a defined and limited object of thought; and it is this necessity of concentration which makes our knowing finite, and distinguishes it from the Infinite Knowing. We are so accustomed to the way in which our own minds work, and we are so utterly ignorant of any other way —being, indeed, unable to conceive any other—that we are apt to take the law of our minds as being the law of all minds; and hence such a very elementary fact as the necessity of giving attention comes to be taken as so utterly a matter of course, that to bestow examination upon it must be quite unnecessary. But what if our way of giving attention be not the only way in which consciousness and the objects of consciousness may be related? Will not then the

case be altered? Will not then the importance of attention, as being the law of *our* knowing, but not the law of *all* knowing, be thrown into strong relief? For example: if a number of persons are speaking all at once, especially if it be on different subjects, to one of ourselves, the effect is that we are bewildered and stunned. "Let me hear you," we say, "one at a time." That is to say, we have it forcibly brought home to us that our consciousness, if it is to be of use to us at all, must be concentrated on a limited object: we must *attend*, we say, first to one and then another, or all will be confusion. But is it so with God? Do not, or may not, all the myriads of mankind pour their separate complaints at one and the same moment into His ear, and, so far from there being confusion, will He not be able to attend —as we must express it, though the reality is not attention, but something else—to each one, as if that one soul and He the Creator were alone together? Nay, more: are we not necessitated to believe that the consciousness of God is never turned from one object to another, which is the essential fact in our "attention"; that it is never *withdrawn* from any object in order to be concentrated on another? And when we consider that this must be so, though we cannot throw ourselves into it so as to conceive or understand it, does it not very forcibly bring home to us the fact that our way of knowing, by fixing attention on things successively, is our way of knowing certainly—that which has been assigned to us as finite creatures—but that it is not the only possible way of knowing? The maxim of Hobbes—"Sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt,"[1]—which correctly marks the fact that in our knowing there must be a *passing from part to part* of the objects of consciousness, whether of thought or feeling, is true respecting *human* consciousness, but respecting the *Divine* consciousness the reverse[2] would

[1] *Elementa Philosophiæ*, iv. 25 (*Works*, ed. Molesworth, vol. i. 321), quoted by Mansel, *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 149; *Bampton Lectures*, iii., note 5, p. 329.

[2] Sentire semper idem et *perfecte* sentire ad idem recidunt. In saying that the Divine consciousness does not grow larger or clearer, it is not meant

better express the truth; for God's consciousness has no beginnings, no growth, no becoming clearer or more complete; but it is eternal and unchangeably perfect.

It may, however, be said that we can, in a manner, be conscious of a good many objects at once; and if this were so, it might perhaps be argued that the difference between our consciousness and the consciousness of God was rather a difference between our feebleness and His strength, than an absolute difference of kind. It is certainly true that the stringency of the law of attention is mitigated by the amazing rapidity with which we are able to pass from one point to another. The rapidity of thought is greater than the rapidity of light. Every one is familiar with the story of Julius Cæsar dictating six letters at once. And even so acute and accurate a thinker as Sir W. Hamilton was of opinion that it was possible to attend strictly simultaneously to three objects. But since Sir W. Hamilton's time a good deal of consideration has been given to the subject of attention, with the result of showing that even in those most rapid movements of consciousness which require to be seized by a kind of instantaneous photography, where movement is quite indiscernible to ordinary observation, there are successive acts of attention. In a recent text-book of psychology it is stated that "a good deal of fine work has been done in this field by Professor Wundt. He tried to note the exact position on a dial of a rapidly revolving hand at the moment when a bell struck. Here were two disparate sensations, one of vision, the other of sight, to be noted together. But it was found that in a long and patient research the eye-impression could seldom or never be noted at the exact moment when the bell actually struck. An earlier or a later point were all that could be seen."[1] All this goes to show that the law of attention is really absolute, and that the difference between our minds and the Eternal

that it is without movement. It can lack nothing which pertains to perfection; but we have no thoughts to grasp that perfection, and no words to express it. Cf. *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1891, p. 21.

[1] James, *Text Book of Psychology*, p. 220. Macmillan, 1892.

Mind is not one of degree but of kind. The law of attention is the law of our finiteness: the Infinite Consciousness is not merely that which is not finite because it is greater, larger, stronger than the finite; but it is not finite because it is *different*, in some manner which we do not know, from the finite.

The position of *attention* as the root-principle of all our knowing is further illustrated by the fact that what are usually called the primary laws of thought—the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle—may be easily seen on examination to be simply an expanded description of what attention is, viz. consciousness concentrated upon a defined and limited object. Let the following description of the three laws from the pen of Dean Mansel be carefully followed, and it will be seen that this is true. "The office of thought," says the Dean, "consists in arranging the confused materials presented to it in such a manner as to constitute *an object*. This is done by *limitation* and *difference*. The object, as such, must contain a definite portion of the materials, and a portion only. Without the first of these conditions, there would be no contents out of which the object could be constructed: without the second, there would be no distinct representation of an actual object, but a confused and imperfect consciousness of the universe of all possible objects. An oak, for example, to be discerned as an oak, and as nothing else, must have certain constitutive features of its own; and these must in thought be separated from those of the surrounding objects. These two conditions of all thought, expressed in the most general terms, are the well-known logical laws of identity and contradiction, *A is A*, and *A is not not-A*; that is to say, every object, to be conceived as such, must be conceived as having a contents of its own, and as distinct from all others. But these two conditions necessarily involve a third. The object which I distinguish and that from which I distinguish it must constitute between them the universe of all that is conceivable; for the distinction is not between two definite objects of thought, but

between the object of which I think and all those of which I do not think. *Not-A* implies the exclusion of A only, and thus denotes the universe of all conceivable objects with that one exception. This relation, in its most general expression, constitutes a third law of thought,—that of excluded middle: *every possible object is either A or not-A.* These three principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, constitute the laws of thought as thought, and are the foundation of pure or formal logic."[1]

These three laws are, it is evident, an expanded statement of the one primary law of human thought. We can only begin to think by attending: and attending means separating in thought one particular object or one portion of an object from others, and concentrating consciousness upon it. Thus A is first distinguished as A, then further discerned as distinct from other objects (A is not not-A), and that absolutely without exception (not-A being explained in the third law to mean all conceivable objects except A). The first law describes the concentration of consciousness upon a single defined object, the second and third laws describe the separation of that object from all others, or, in other words, the withdrawal of consciousness from all others in order that it may be fixed upon the one selected for attention. As long as human consciousness and human thought and knowledge are regarded as the type and model of all consciousness and knowing, the importance of this description

[1] Mansel, "Metaphysics," *Encycl. Brit.*, 8th ed., vol. xiv. p. 586. The obligations of the present writer to Dean Mansel are very far from being adequately represented by the quotations from or references to his writings which appear in these pages. Whatever there is of philosophical value in them at all may rather be said to have come from him. It is the writer's full conviction that Dean Mansel in the present century was, not less than Bishop Butler in the preceding, a philosophic thinker of the very highest order. Both alike exemplified what such thinking ought to be—sober, profound, comprehensive, conscious of its own limits, solid. Both alike, though suffering (the Dean especially) from miscomprehension, have left permanent proofs of the important aid which philosophy is capable of rendering to the highest truth, when it is taken in hand in the spirit of unwearied diligence, humility, modesty, and loyalty, which so eminently distinguished these two truly great men.

will consist solely in its being an accurate description of the earliest stage of thought; but the case is greatly altered when it is perceived that we have here before us that which distinguishes our consciousness and knowing from the Infinite Consciousness and Knowing. Then we see that the necessity which we are under of attending (that is to say, of concentrating our consciousness upon a small defined portion at a time, and that we can only think or know by passing from one to another of these small defined portions) is the very law of finite minds—the law of their working, and that which makes them finite.

It will now be readily seen in what way only we can advance in our thinking. For since we are constrained to pass from one to another of the small defined portions upon which attention is successively fixed, it is evident that unless we are to go on endlessly in movement from one to another of these portions, the only way in which another object of attention can be formed is by building one up from two or more of the portions. This we can do by comparison, which is simply an application of the power of attending—of concentrating consciousness. We can at pleasure concentrate consciousness at once or successively upon features in which two or more objects resemble each other, or upon their differences. That is to say, we can compare, and we can gather up the results of comparison, forming from them fresh objects of attention — steps by which we mount upwards.

Thinking is simply developed comparison. This may be easily tested by taking one by one the processes of thought which have been sifted and explained by logicians—conception, judgment, reasoning, and the different forms of reasoning as, for example, induction and deduction. Conception has already come before us in speaking of the primary laws of thought. Judgment is plainly an act of comparison between two given concepts. It is true that in synthetical judgments something more is required besides the primary act of comparison. In order to decide that "two straight

lines cannot inclose a space," besides the comparison of the two straight lines as such, there must be a mental intuition of them and of the positions which they can assume in space. That intuition requires separate consideration; but at any rate it does not interfere with the fact that judgment is comparison. Again, reasoning, whatever form it takes, is, like judgment, an act of comparison between two concepts. It only differs from judgment in that the two concepts are not compared together directly, but by means of a third concept. But this only means more comparison, for each of the two primary concepts is compared separately with the third. It is unnecessary to go through all the different forms of reasoning. Induction shows perhaps most plainly how dominant comparison is. John Stuart Mill's famous four methods of induction are conspicuous examples. Their very names show sufficiently that they are only varied forms of comparison—comparison by *agreement*, comparison by *difference*, comparison by *agreement and difference jointly*, comparison of *residues*. And, indeed, considering the manner in which we have had of late the comparative study of almost all conceivable subjects urged and practised, it cannot be necessary to multiply examples of the place of comparison in reasoning.

The following quotations from recent works of living writers will show that what has been here maintained—viz. that the concentration of consciousness upon successive limited portions of the objects of thought is the root-principle of all human knowledge—is the conclusion towards which all examination of the subject tends, from whatever quarter, and under the influence of whatever school, it is undertaken.

In the article "Psychology," in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*,[1] Mr. James Ward quotes Dr. Bain as saying that "we do not know any one thing of itself, but only the difference between it and another thing;" and upon this he remarks, "There is an ambiguity in the words 'know,' 'knowledge,' which Dr. Bain seems not to have

[1] *Encycl. Brit.*, 9th ed., vol. xx. p. 49.

considered. 'To know' may mean either to 'perceive' or 'apprehend,' or it may mean 'to understand' or 'comprehend.' Knowledge in the first sense is only what we shall have presently to discuss as the recognition or assimilation of an impression; knowledge in the latter sense is the result of intellectual comparison, and is embodied in a proposition." Mr. Ward's distinction between an earlier and a later stage of "knowledge" is obviously a correct one. What is to be noticed is that in what he describes as the earlier stage there is comparison as truly as in the later stage. For an impression can only be recognized or assimilated by being distinguished from others; and distinction implies comparison. We are thus brought to those successive acts of attention or concentrated consciousness of which we have spoken, as the ultimate result of analysis of that which, when developed, becomes knowledge.

Again, the author of one of the most recent works on psychology, Mr. Sully, writes as follows: "All knowing means discriminating one impression, object, or idea from another (or others), and assimilating it to yet another (or others). I perceive an object as a rose only when I see how it differs from other objects, and more especially other varieties of flower, and at the same time recognize its likeness to other roses previously seen. And so of other forms of knowing. Hence discrimination and assimilation have been called properties or functions of intellect."[1] Now, if "all knowing means discriminating," it is obvious that there lies behind this another step of analysis, viz. that to discriminate implies making at least two separate acts of attention, or concentrating consciousness upon two portions in succession of that which is before it.

This final step of analysis has been taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer. His views on the subject are given with true French lucidity by M. Ribot in the following passage: "M. H. Spencer examine en détail les divers rapports de coïntensité, coétendue, coexistence, identité de nature (connature).

[1] Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 26, 2nd ed., 1885.

Il montre qu'ils se ramène tous en dernière analyse à des rapports de *ressemblance* et de *différence.* Mais, différence peut se traduire par *changement* et ressemblance par *non-changement.* En effet, pour que deux objets soient connus comme différents, il faut qu'ils y ait dans la conscience deux états correspondants et par suite un changement du premier au second; la perception de la similitude, au contraire, n'implique aucun changement interne. Nous voici donc arrivés au *dernier terme* de notre analyse. Le rapport le plus simple que l'intelligence puisse percevoir, c'est un rapport de séquence ou de succession; c'est là le rapport primordial qui constitue le fond même de la conscience, et par conséquent la condition de toute pensée, c'est le changement, la succession, la dissemblance."[1]

This, then, according to Mr. Spencer, is *the last term of analysis.* The most simple relation which intelligence—he ought to have said *our* intelligence; for we have no right to say more than this — is able to perceive, is a *relation of sequence or succession. This is the primordial relation which constitutes the very foundation of consciousness.* It is stated in an Italian periodical[2] that the Danish psychologist, Höffding, arrived at a conclusion similar to this in his large work on *Recognition, Association, and Psychical Activity.* The writer in the periodical says, "*La conclusione principale è che l'attività psichica, essenzialmente considerata, resiede nell' 'attenzione' o 'volontà.'*" The mention of *will* requires one remark. It is certainly true that *attention* cannot take place without *will;* but it does not follow from this that *will* is a step further back in analysis, or that it is a foundation, of the same order as *attention,* of psychical activity. It only shows—what is probably true universally of the phenomena of consciousness, feeling, and will—that there is an inseparable connection between them.

Thus far we have been occupied with the connection

[1] Ribot, *La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine,* p. 232, 2nd ed. Paris, 1875.

[2] *Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica,* Novembre, 1891.

between the root-principle of all our knowing—that is, the necessity of consciousness being concentrated upon a *limited* portion successively of the objects before it—and the exercise of the understanding. We have seen that all the processes of the understanding, as we know them in fact, may be deduced from that principle; that, in fact, that principle having been constituted the law of our minds, the processes of the understanding must have been what they are, and could not have been different from what we find them to be. There is, however, still another feature, already referred to, the connection of which with the root-principle requires to be separately considered.

The intuitions of space and time which are, so to say, always in the mind, available for use whenever they are required, are not the result of any single act of comparison which it is possible to specify. This is evident, because they accompany all our acts of comparison and the whole exercise of the understanding from first to last. They cannot be traced back to the primary law of consciousness in the same way as that in which, as we have seen, the processes of the understanding can be traced back to it. Can they be traced back to it in any other way?

There are also the forms of thought—what Kant called the categories of the understanding—whose presence is in like manner universal. Can these be traced back to the root-principle?

Kant did not attempt to do this. He analyzed knowledge into its objective and subjective elements. He found the subjective elements which the mind itself contributes to the consciousness of every object, in the intuitions of space and time, and in the categories as the forms of thought. And there he left the matter. He did not seek for any psychological explanation of these, or endeavour to go back to any root from which they might be derived. The intuitions of space and time are, he said, universal: so are the forms of thought: we cannot escape from either: we cannot think except under those forms of thought which

the constitution of our faculties furnishes us with: we cannot set anything before us as an object of perception except as existing in space and time, or (in the case of internal facts) in the latter: this again is due to the constitution of our faculties. It was enough for him to establish as an immovable foundation that we were enclosed within this circle, and on this foundation to build the conclusion that constituted as our faculties are, they give us the power of knowing the *phenomenal*, that is whatsoever comes under the forms of our thought and the intuitions of space and time; but they exclude us from knowing anything which does not come under these forms and these intuitions. In other words Kant established upon an immovable foundation the doctrine that *all our knowing is relative to the constitution of our faculties*—for this was the extent of meaning which he gave to the term *phenomenal*. The attempts of a hundred years to show that knowledge not limited by the constitution of our faculties is possible for us, having all failed, Kant's conclusion has only been more firmly established by them. The correlative of this doctrine of course is that there may be knowledge of things-in-themselves, and not simply of things as they are presented to our faculties: but, if so, the knowing of this knowledge cannot be *our* knowing; it must be the knowing of beings—perhaps of the Infinite Being only—whose faculties of knowing are not like ours.

No criticism of Kant's main conclusion has attained any measure of success. The efforts of friends and foes have alike tended to strengthen it. But it is otherwise as regards —not exactly the account which he gave of the constitution of our faculties, but—the way in which he arrived at the account which he gave of them. The account which he gave was that there are certain ways in which we are obliged to contemplate all presented objects, whether without or within ourselves, without exception. We must regard them as existing in space and time, and we must consider them under one or other of certain forms of thought, which he called categories, and specified as twelve in number.

It is here that Kant has been found open to criticism. Accepting his conclusion that our knowledge must be relative to the constitution of our faculties, and that this means that there are certain moulds (as it were) in which all our conceptions must be formed, it may still be a question whether he has described these moulds or forms of our thought correctly, and whether they may not be shown to spring from one common or root-principle.

Now that which we have described as the root-principle of all our knowing is that the power of consciousness which the Creator has given us must be exercised according to this law, viz. that this power of consciousness should be concentrated upon limited portions in succession of the objects presented to it. Will this law, then, account for the moulds or forms of thought as they are given by Kant or as subsequent criticism has reduced them? Let us take first the forms of space and time. The essential character of them is succession. We cannot conceive a beginning or an end of either. We cannot think of an end of space without supposing more space beyond; and it is the same with regard to time; we cannot help adding on successive portions *ad infinitum*. So that the primal law of consciousness thoroughly accounts for that element of *succession* which is so prominent in these intuitions and which gives them their special character. The primal law also accounts for their *universality*—for our not being able to get out of them. For if every exercise of consciousness can be made only according to this law, it is evident that succession must be stamped upon all our conceptions of every kind. Their universality need not be sought in the *matter* of them: whatever the *matter* may be, it must be conceived under this law of succession. Nor need we suppose such intuitions as those of space and time to be full formed in us from the first: they are sufficiently accounted for by the exercise of our faculties according to the law imposed upon them. Again, the law of successive attention accounts strikingly for the remarkable fact that we are at once compelled to

suppose the existence of an Infinite as the counterpart to finite space and finite time, and yet are utterly unable to *conceive* the Infinite. For this law necessitates the addition of an unending succession of parts (of space or of time), whilst it makes it impossible for us ever to complete the process. It thus leads necessarily to the supposition of there being an Infinite, but forbids our ever being able to form anything but a negative conception, in other words a supposition, of what it is.

As regards other forms of thought, we should be inclined to say that such forms as this primal law would necessarily give rise to would be the true categories—these and these only. Wherever the element of succession can find place, there its authority will be predominant. It finds place distinctly not only in space and time but in number also, which is the basis of the first set of Kant's categories, those of quantity, viz. unity, plurality, and totality. It is very evident that, as regards our minds, the conception of number is only another way of expressing succession. When we regard things in respect of their quantity, it is clear that these three ways of regarding them exhaust the contents of quantity. We must consider either the unity of a single object, or the plurality of many objects, or the totality of many regarded as one. How do we come to follow this line of thought? Evidently the primal law, which necessitates the fixing of consciousness upon successive limited portions of the objects of thought, leads directly to it. Again, the category of quantity may be regarded as expressing the primary laws which condition all thinking. For "by the act of thought, the confused materials presented to the intuitive faculties are contemplated in three points of view; as a single object, as distinguished from other objects, and as forming, in conjunction with those others, a complete class or universe of all that is conceivable. We have thus the three *forms* (or, as they are called by Kant, *categories*) of *unity, plurality,* and *totality;* conditions essential to the possibility of thought in general, and which may therefore

be regarded as *a priori* elements of reflective consciousness, derived from the constitution of the understanding itself, and manifested in relation to all its products."[1] In whichever way we regard this category, therefore, we are brought back to our primal law or root-principle; for we have already seen that what are called the three primary laws of thought, are nothing more than this one root-principle, unfolded and expressed more fully.

We may evidently test the character and power of what appears to be the root-principle of all human knowing, in one or the other of these two ways: we may take the root-principle itself as our starting-point, and see whether all the processes of the understanding, and all the phenomena of knowledge, can be shown to grow out of it; or we may start from what have been previously regarded as the ultimate elements of knowledge, and see whether they are not reducible by analysis to this one single principle. We have hitherto been following the first of these two courses; let us now turn to the other, and see whether by it we shall arrive at the same conclusion or not.

We need not go any further back than Kant for what should be taken as, until recently, established views respecting the ultimate elements of human knowledge. By the principles which the *Criticism of the Pure Reason* laid down respecting the meaning and value of knowledge having a true claim to be called *a priori* knowledge, an entirely new era was begun. And at the present day, as has been already said, Kant's main conclusion remains unshaken. But because this is so, it does not follow that there is not a deeper and more unassailable foundation for that conclusion than the foundation upon which Kant himself built it. And this is, in fact, that which criticism, since the time of Kant, has been more and more tending to show that there is.

Kant's ultimate subjective elements were, as we have seen, the intuitions of space and time, and the categories. "The mind itself," he said, "contributes these to the

[1] Mansel, "Metaphysics," *Encyl. Brit.*, 9th ed., vol. xiv. p. 586.

consciousness of every object." But he did not inquire *how it is* that the mind contributes these forms. And from the very first it was felt that there was an incompleteness. It soon began to be perceived that there were two considerable objections to his classification of categories. The first was, that the forms of the proposition, or table of judgments, from which they were avowedly taken, had been adopted by Kant without examination from the ordinary books of logic, and that this table of judgments could not stand the test of critical examination. The second was, that the whole scheme was defective, because it was not constructed on a psychological, or truly scientific principle. Other objections[1] were also made; but these were the most important ones. For if the table of logical judgments, from which the table of categories was professedly constructed, was in itself erroneous, the errors in it would of course pervade the classification of categories also. Dean Mansel points this out clearly in the following remarks: "The Kantian categories are not deduced from an analysis of the act of thought, but generalized from the forms of the proposition, which latter are assumed without examination, as they are given in the ordinary logic. A psychological deduction, or a preliminary criticism of the logical forms themselves, might have considerably reduced the number. Thus the categories of quality are fundamentally identical with those of quantity—reality, or rather affirmation and negation, being implied in identity and diversity, and limitation in their mutual exclusion. The remaining categories are, to say the least, founded on a very questionable theory in logic; and the two most important—those of substance and cause—present features which distinguish them from mere forms of thought."[2]

It will be noticed that Mansel, by criticism of the logical forms, reduces Kant's twelve categories to three, viz. those of *unity, plurality,* and *totality,* which were placed under the

[1] Enumerated and discussed by Cesca, *La Dottrina Kantiana dell' A Priori*, pp. 157–173.

[2] *Metaphysics, ubi supra*, p. 586 note.

head of *quantity*. And these three, as we have already seen, are only expansions of the primal law or root-principle which we are considering.

But Mansel also speaks of what might be effected by *a psychological deduction*. This psychological deduction he did not himself make. But it has since been made. Two schools of criticism, known respectively by the names of the Neo-Kantian School and the School of the New Criticism, have laboured upon that psychological side of the question which Kant, perhaps deliberately, turned away from. An account of the successive stages of advance made by these two schools is given in detail by Professor Cesca, in his able work, *La Dottrina Kantiana dell' A Priori*, published in 1885. It would be out of place to attempt here to describe the steps by which, in the way of psychological deduction, it was shown that what Kant took without further examination as ultimate elements, were really resolvable into simpler ones. Professor Cesca describes these steps clearly and succinctly, and with apparently ample knowledge of the writers whose conclusions he enumerates and in many instances criticises. It must suffice to state the principal results.

In the first place,[1] it was in consequence (Professor Cesca says) of the progress of psychology that both schools were led to correct the Kantian doctrine, and to remodel and complete it on the critical side.

The adherents of the Neo-Kantian school advanced as far as this. They perceived that to regard the *forms* under which the mind apprehends objects of knowledge as being *a priori*, and to regard *knowledge* itself as *a priori*, were two different things. They denied that there was in the mind any *a priori* knowledge; they affirmed that there were *a priori* forms. They denied that the mind possessed any "innate ideas." They would not admit the existence in it

[1] *La Dottrina Kantiana*, Introd., p. 3: Erano spinti dai progressi della psicologia a correggere la dottrina kantiana ed a rifare ed a completare l' opera critica.

of any propositions—such as, *e.g.* "Everything must have a cause"—to the formation of which it had not itself contributed. But they affirmed that there are in it "forms," *i.e.* structural necessities, which occasion and make it obligatory for it to regard things under certain aspects, which mode of regarding constitutes the so-called *a priori* knowledge or innate ideas.

The adherents of the other school—the School of the New Criticism—advanced further. They could not admit even the Kantian *forms* to be original and incapable of further analysis. On the contrary, they affirmed that there was a root discernible from which they all sprang; that, in fact, all the forms were reducible to one, and that this was therefore the one form which was really *a priori*. "The one function is that of integration and differentiation which is manifested in all judgments, and to which all the other processes of the understanding are reducible, so that this is *the* one form of the mind, the one true category." [1]

"The result, then, of the critical exposition of the Kantian doctrine of the *a priori* is as follows: (1) knowledge *a priori* cannot be admitted; (2) we cannot admit the many *a priori* forms of sensation and of the mind; (3) time, space, and causality have a priority relative to our developed consciousness; and (4) the one form of the spirit which is *a priori* is the synthetic unity of consciousness." [2] That which Professor Cesca calls sometimes "the synthetic unity of consciousness," sometimes "the one general form of the human spirit," sometimes "the function of integration and differentiation," appears to be identical either with what has been described in this chapter as the primary law of our finite consciousness, or with its constant and necessary mode of exercise. The law is that *for us* consciousness is only possible when it is concentrated upon limited portions successively of the objects presented to it. This is the one general form of the human spirit. The constant and necessary mode of exercise of our consciousness is to act upon

[1] Cesca, *La Dottrina Kantiana*, p. 177. [2] *Id. ib.* p. 277.

the portions of the objects before it in the way of integration and differentiation—that is, in the way of comparison to integrate or combine certain features which are capable of being combined, and to differentiate or set apart those which are not capable of being combined.

Thus, in whatever manner the question is examined, the result is the same. We may take as our point of departure the description of the constitution of our intellectual faculties which Kant, for whatever reason, regarded as that which it was not possible or not necessary to submit to further analysis; and when those intuitions of space and time, and those categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality, which he accepted as part of the original outfit of the human mind, of which no further account need be given, are placed under the lense of the psychological microscope, they are found to be growths springing all in one way or another from one root or principle. The twelve forms of thought which Kant arranged as categories under the four heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, become reduced to the three belonging to the head of Quantity; and these three, on closer examination, are discovered to be simply the result of an original primal law. In like manner, the intuitions of space and time, instead of being implanted in the mind in addition to its faculties, exhibit themselves as the necessary result or consequence of the same original primal law, according to which alone we can exert ourselves to make any exercise of the understanding, the unchangeableness, the universality, the absolute dominance of these intuitions being due to the fact that consciousness, from its earliest to its latest exercise, must needs leave the stamp or mould of *succession* upon every idea to the formation of which it contributes.

On the other hand, if we take this primal law or root-principle as our point of departure, and endeavour to explain by means of it alone the phenomena exhibited by the processes of the understanding when seen at work, the endeavour is found to be perfectly successful: the several processes

of conception, judgment, and reasoning, the more elaborate as well as the simpler exercises of the understanding, are found to be perfectly explicable as the result of a principle which would naturally issue in exactly those modes of exercise which we find invariably prevailing; the presence and the autocracy of the primal law is patent throughout.

We seem, then, to be fully justified in regarding what may be called indifferently either the Law of Attention or the Law of Finite Consciousness as the real root of our intellectual powers, and the true measure of them. We can neither perceive nor comprehend except under the law that our consciousness must be fixed or concentrated upon a limited portion of that which is before it, and then upon another limited portion. This is what is really meant when we say that we must give attention. It means that our consciousness is a finite consciousness. All our knowing is determined by this principle — all our knowing as regards both the manner of it and its extent and limitations. The original principle gives rise to other principles which at first sight appear to be themselves original, and which are as absolute in their dominion over us as if they were original. These principles create limitations of our knowledge and of the possibilities of knowledge. Other limitations arise from the character which the primal law imposes upon the manner in which we can come to know— the path which it constrains us to follow in the pursuit of knowledge, and from which it forbids us to depart. What and how many these limitations are we have next to examine. We have no concern with any which do not arise out of the actual structure of our faculties. But the primal law or root-principle which we have been examining is in the strictest sense a structural principle. Whatever limitations therefore it may give rise to must partake of the same character—they must be structural limitations. And, being such, they must also be universal in their dominion over the being to whom this structure of his faculties of knowledge has been assigned. They must be limitations affecting

the knowledge, not of this man or that man, but of all men —of man as man. These are of great importance for our purpose. We must examine both what limitations are imposed by this our mental structure upon our power of prosecuting the pursuit and conquest of knowledge, and also upon our power of receiving it when presented to us from without. It will be well to begin with the understanding as the discursive faculty, and as that in which the dominion of the primal law is especially apparent. To this, therefore, we shall proceed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

THE UNDERSTANDING.

In the law of successive attention—the law which lies at the root of human consciousness, and dominates absolutely over it—there has been given us both a primal power, and a primal limit to the power. The power of attention, that is, of concentrating consciousness upon a definite object, is the primal power. The limit to it lies in the fact that attention can only be exercised upon a single object at once, or upon a variety of objects only in succession. In other words, we must break up objects—all objects of thought—into parts in order to comprehend them, and if the object which we desire to comprehend is one which cannot be broken up into parts, it will be found to be, *ipso facto*, beyond human comprehension altogether.

This is the law which has been assigned to human consciousness, and it is in this law that we find the measure of our power to comprehend and know. There may be other beings, finite like ourselves, to whom some other law has been assigned, in virtue of which their powers of comprehension, though still finite, are able to grasp objects of thought which we cannot. The One Infinite Intelligence cannot be subject to this or any other form of limitation.

The nature of the law of successive attention, and of the limit which it imposes, and the proofs of its primary character, have been considered in the preceding chapter. The limit which is imposed by this law, since it is a law of consciousness in general, naturally applies to all our intellectual faculties—to the imagination as well as to the understanding,

to the spirit, as far as that mysterious part of our being is, or contains, an organ of knowledge, as well as to those more familiar powers of thought which we exercise continually. In whatever way, or by whatever faculty, consciousness is exercised, there must be attention; and attention carries with it the necessity of contemplating objects not all together but singly.

But though our whole consciousness is subject to this law, it is in those modes of exercise of consciousness which are proper to the understanding that limitations having their origin in the primal limit, and growing out of it, are most clearly displayed. It would be, perhaps, too much to assert that in the exercise of other faculties—of the imagination, for example—there is no limit except the primal necessity of concentrating attention upon a single object; but, at any rate, it is very difficult to discern any other. This may be simply because the operation of the imagination is so very much more rapid than the processes of the understanding. The imagination possesses a power of intuition: the understanding has no such power. The swiftness of imaginative intuition baffles observation completely; whatever operations may be wrapped up in it can be neither measured nor seen. The processes of the understanding, on the other hand, can all be distinguished with precision, and mapped out, and measured. Hence, without affirming or denying the existence of similar limitations in any other intellectual faculties which we possess, it will be sufficient for us in the present chapter to study those modes of limitation to which, as regards the understanding, we are undoubtedly subject. In the next chapter, in which an attempt will be made to exhibit the general characteristics of the understanding, the imagination, and the spirit, considered as organs of knowledge, occasion will be offered for noticing the limitations to which the two latter are subject, not so much in regard to their actual operation, as in regard to their range and the general conditions of their exercise.

I.

The most comprehensive form of limitation—with which, therefore, we may suitably begin our survey—by which the operations of the understanding are curtailed, is that which forbids their exercise to any real purpose beyond the confines of what may be called the province of the Finite. As soon as the boundary of the Finite is passed, as soon as the attempt is made to form, in the strict sense of the term, *conceptions* of the understanding within the province of the Infinite, a kind of paralysis falls upon the operations of this faculty; it finds itself struggling with an inability which no effort can overcome, and in the end is constrained to desist from the endeavour as altogether hopeless.

It is important to notice what it is precisely which it is denied that the Understanding, or we as possessing understanding, can accomplish within the sphere of the Infinite. It is not at all denied that we can have some ideas respecting it. What is denied is that we can have ideas or conceptions or knowledge of the same kind concerning objects belonging to it, as we have concerning objects belonging to the sphere of the Finite. We not only may have, but we cannot help having, some *ideas* respecting the Infinite, and, therefore, using the term not according to its strict meaning, but popularly, some *knowledge* of it. But the ideas which we have of it are not positive, but negative ideas, and of this character must consequently be all that we can really know about it.

Or the matter may be put in this way. The operations of the understanding are of a certain kind, fixed, and capable of being accurately described. These operations, when they are properly carried out, accomplish regularly certain results; they give to the objects upon which they are exercised a particular shape and mould; they place them before the mind in a certain manner; and the results thus obtained, the work thus performed, we describe as knowledge. Now what is meant in saying that the understanding cannot

operate to any purpose within the province of the Infinite, is simply that the results which it attains there, are totally unlike those which it attains within the sphere of the Finite. In the latter sphere the conceptions which it is able to form of finite objects are consistent with themselves, and will bear the test of examination. Those, on the contrary, which it attempts to form respecting the Infinite in itself, or its relations with the Finite, are invariably found to be inconsistent with themselves, and such as will by no means bear the test of examination. This being the case, it seems both right and necessary to regard the understanding as incapable of attaining positive knowledge of objects within the province of the Infinite. To take some instances. How differently does the understanding deal with the idea of *time* under those aspects of it which are finite, and under those which are not finite. Time, regarded as a name for the succession of facts and events in nature, in life, or in history, does not present any difficulty to the understanding. So far from it, the fact is that we cannot view events in any other way than as succeeding each other. Other beings than ourselves may be able to view them in some other way, but we cannot. We have no difficulty even in prolonging the succession, or supposing it to be prolonged, indefinitely either in the past or in the future. What we cannot do is to exchange the idea of succession for some other idea. We can *suppose* an everlasting Now, but we have no positive notion of it; it is simply a negative idea. Infinite time, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived either as having a beginning and an end, or as having no beginning and no end. If we take the first alternative we find that it is impossible to conceive it, and, further, that if we could conceive it, we should not have grasped the Infinite. If we choose the second alternative, we find that in it the Infinite is indeed offered, but that we are wholly powerless to grasp it.

Take again, the case of *space*. Succession of parts enters into the idea of space, just as succession of events enters into the idea of time. And, as before, so long as the

understanding continues to deal with the succession of parts even indefinitely prolonged, it experiences no difficulty. But bid it exchange the idea of succession for some other idea, or bid it not shirk the question of the Infinite as the notion of merely indefinite succession does, but say plainly whether the succession has a beginning and an end, or no beginning and no end, and its incapacity must at once be confessed.

If we take *causation*, which presents one important feature in addition to that of succession, the case as regards the limit of the power of the understanding receives further illustration. There is no difficulty in conceiving a chain of causation—let us say in the world of material things—running back indefinitely into the past. Nor does it make any difference at all whether the causes supposed at different links of the chain are single or multiple. So far there is nothing before us which there was not in the instances of time and space. But causation insists, so to say, upon having a beginning, and such a beginning as has its origin in itself. The understanding, therefore, is in this instance compelled to deal with a first cause or beginning of causation, having its origin in itself. That is to say, it cannot in this case shirk the question of the Infinite by putting forward the indefinite. It must say plainly whether it can or can not form a conception of an Infinite First Cause. It is greatly helped in *supposing* such a Cause by the direct consciousness which we have of possessing in our own wills a cause which in a limited sense has or is a beginning in itself. (For will has no meaning unless at some point and in some manner it has a beginning in itself.) The consciousness of this, therefore, makes it comparatively easy to suppose a First Cause which is a beginning in itself, and which is unlimited or Infinite. But there is a wide difference between supposing such a Cause and being able to conceive it or explain its nature. As soon as this is attempted, all the difficulties which were just now mentioned as attending the conception of the Infinite rise into view,

besides others more particularly belonging to the notion of an Infinite Personal Being. These difficulties do not affect or hinder our supposing the existence of such a Being. They have nothing to do with our grounds of belief in an Infinite Being. What they make impossible is that the understanding should exercise its powers upon this subject in such a manner as to be able to present a conception of it which should be as consistent with itself, as free from paradox, and as satisfactory to the mind, as those conceptions which it is able to form and to present respecting finite objects.

The thought of the Finite runs out on every side into that of the Infinite, and always with the same result. Perhaps the most general form of the problem is presented in the question, How can the One be many, or the Many one? And in this question we see clearly the true explanation of the inability under which the understanding labours. For what is it which we are unable to conceive? We cannot conceive a One in which there are no parts, or, in other words, which cannot be divided. We can suppose it, just as we suppose or accept Euclid's point, in which there are no parts and which has no magnitude. But we can by no effort conceive or understand it. And, conversely, we cannot conceive many parts as not being many but One. We can conceive a One compounded of many parts readily enough; but when we try to conceive the many parts disappearing in the One, we find we cannot. On whatever side we approach the problem, we are always baffled.

Even more clearly may we recognize the origin of this incompetence of the understanding in the old puzzle so often fought over about matter, and its divisibility. Matter, it is said, must be either infinitely divisible or not: which is the truth? We cannot say; for we can conceive neither of these alternatives. If we say that it is not infinitely divisible, we find it impossible to assign any point at which (theoretically, of course) division should stop. If we say that it is infinitely divisible, we find it equally impossible to get beyond indefinite division; and the indefinite is

simply a device for refusing to think the Infinite or to say what it is.

If, instead of matter, we take *extension* as the subject of division, the problem is brought into line with the similar difficulties relating to space and time. And when it is perceived that in all these several modes in which the Infinite is presented, the difficulty is that in order to conceive it the understanding must be released from the necessity of contemplating its objects according to a succession of parts, and that it can by no effort whatever emancipate itself from this law, are we not directly conducted to the conclusion that the explanation of the whole matter lies in that law of successive attention which we have seen reason to regard as the primary principle on which the human understanding, as a faculty, is constructed, the controlling and limiting influence of which attends it throughout every form and manner in which it is capable of being exercised?

It is not, perhaps, at first obvious that the understanding can no more conceive God as Infinite than it can conceive the Infinite as presented in any of the abstract forms which we have been reviewing. But a little consideration will show that it must be so. We may give a positive form to our negative ideas about God, but that will not make them really positive. Instead of saying that God is *not* finite, that He is *not* limited in power, wisdom, holiness, love, or any of His attributes, we may speak of His omnipotence, omniscience, and the like: but, except in the verbal expression of them, the ideas will remain unchanged. Or we may abstain—which is what people commonly do—from the endeavour to grapple with the problems which are hidden within the Infinitude of God. But they will still be there. And, as soon as the understanding tries to operate upon them and to form conceptions about them, as she is able to do with success about finite objects, she will inevitably find that the Infinite in God presents not less of difficulty than the Infinite in time or space—that, in fact, the Infinite is still the Infinite, and that her power in respect to it in

connection with the Supreme Object of thought, the One Uncreated Infinite Being, is subject to precisely the same limitation, arising out of the same primal law, as she experiences in the endeavour to say whether matter is or is not infinitely divisible.

This inability of the *understanding* to conceive the Infinite has been fully recognized by some who have still thought that it might be possible for us to know God in his infinitude in some other way. In striving to invent or to postulate some other way, as Schelling and Hegel have done, they have at all events left it on record that they were satisfied as to the impossibility of such knowledge as far as the understanding was concerned. In devising his *Intellectual Intuition* Schelling seems to have thought that the intuitive power of the imagination might be employed to supply that which the understanding did not possess. But such violence cannot be done to our faculties. The imagination does indeed possess an intuitive power, but it is one which cannot be exercised, as will be shown in the next chapter, except within its own proper sphere. It cannot be lent out to the understanding, as some secondary powers of the imagination can be, but is incommunicable. Hegel's postulate, again, of a logical process different from that of the understanding, and emancipated from its laws, whilst it makes distinct admission that what is desired cannot be accomplished by the ordinary processes of the understanding, does equal violence with Schelling's supposition to human faculties. For it supposes us to be endowed with a faculty of finite thinking, and at the same time with a faculty of infinite thinking. The scheme reminds one of the little hole which was cut for the kitten beside the large hole which had been cut for the cat. But, apart from any special criticism of these schemes, there is one fact which, if its truth be admitted, will be seen to cut at the root of them altogether. If not merely this or that faculty but human consciousness in general is subject to the primary structural law, the law of attention, and if it is this law which really makes it impossible for us to conceive the

Infinite, then it is clear that all such attempts as those of Hegel or Schelling are simply futile. The very initial structure of human consciousness must be altered before the possibility of them could even be entertained.

In order to obviate misapprehension, it may be necessary to remark, before leaving this subject, that the fact of the understanding being by its structure precluded from comprehending or knowing God as He is in His infinitude, does not at all prevent our knowing Him in other respects, though of course it does prevent such knowledge of Him as we may have in those other respects from being anything like perfect knowledge. What cannot be is that the understanding, when it is exercised upon the subject of God, should—as far as His infinitude is concerned in itself, or as far as it enters into His relations with the universe or with the finite creatures whom He has brought into being—obtain results which it is unable to obtain in dealing with the Infinite in other fields of inquiry. It can do just as much and no more in the one case as in the other. It can be freely exercised upon all which God has been pleased to reveal to us concerning Himself or His relations with us, and may evidently obtain similar results in this field as in any other, except so far as it may happen—which must also be the case at times in other fields of inquiry besides theology—that the Infinite is involved at a particular point, the understanding being then incapable of comprehending what is before it, to the extent to which this is the case. No other kind of knowledge of God appears to be excluded; and certainly not that which belongs to those personal relations into which we as finite spiritual beings are permitted to enter with the Infinite Father of Spirits.

It is much to be regretted that Mr. Gore has thought fit to revive the old misapprehension respecting what the distinguished author of the Bampton Lectures for 1858 intended to convey on this subject. Nor does there seem to be much more grace in the form of his attack than in the attack itself. Dean Mansel, Mr. Gore says, "exposed himself to the charge

of denying that we have, or can have, any real and direct knowledge of God Himself at all. 'We cannot know what God is,' he seemed to say, 'but only what He chooses us to believe about Himself.'"[1] Is there not something a little unworthy in this kind of taunt? Is there not something also a little weak? Does Mr. Gore really think that we can have any knowledge of God which He does *not* choose that we should have? And has not God prescribed what knowledge it is His will that we should be able to attain concerning Him, by the structure which He has assigned to the human understanding? If the structure of this faculty—and, indeed, the principle lying at the root of our whole consciousness—is such as to preclude the possibility of our being able to comprehend the infinitude of God, or anything belonging to or proceeding from Him in so far as infinity enters into it, has not God by this means effectually "chosen" what knowledge we should have of Him? Probably Mr. Gore might reply that he did not deny this, but that this was not exactly what he meant. But this *was* what Mansel meant. The knowledge which he asserted that we could not have was knowledge of God as Infinite—of His Infinite Being in itself or in its relations—or *complete* knowledge of Him in any respect so far as comprehension of infinitude was required to make it complete. Any other kind of knowledge of God, however real and direct and fitted to act upon and quicken and nourish our moral and spiritual being, Mansel was as far as possible from denying. His position, as stated and defined in the following memorable words, with the consequences which he showed to follow from it, was surely a position worthy of one of the greatest thinkers of this or any other century, and, in spite of misapprehensions which it is sometimes hard not to regard as a little wilful, it remains and will remain unshaken, for it is based upon an estimate of human faculties the accuracy of which investigation from different points of view is constantly confirming. What Dean Mansel said was this: "How the Infinite and the Finite, in any form

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 115.

of antagonism or other relation, can exist together;—how infinite power can coexist with finite activity: how infinite wisdom can coexist with finite contingency: how infinite goodness can coexist with finite evil:—how the Infinite can exist in any manner without exhausting the universe of reality:—this is the riddle which Infinite Wisdom alone can solve, the problem whose very conception belongs only to that Universal Knowing which fills and embraces the Universe of Being."[1]

II.

The understanding, as we have seen, is unable to operate successfully beyond the province of the Finite. But within the province of the Finite she is also subject to limitations. Two there are especially demanding attention, which must now be examined.

The first efforts of the understanding being made under the law of attention—that is, of the necessity of concentrating consciousness first upon one point and then upon another—it follows that in order to advance from the consideration of parts separately to any other view of them, there must be comparison of one part with another. It is by comparison that concepts are formed, and judgments are founded upon the comparison of one concept with another. In like manner no reasoning is possible without comparison. Throughout all the operations of the understanding, from the earliest and simplest to the most elaborate and complex, comparison occupies the position of an indispensable condition, and may without exaggeration be described as the skeleton or framework of the organism which is as it were moulded and brought into being by the operations—which it must be remembered are not arbitrary, though they may sometimes appear so, but conducted according to fixed laws —of the understanding.

The understanding cannot, therefore, make any progress

[1] Mansel, *Bampton Lectures*, 2nd ed., p. 223.

without the exercise of comparison. But for comparison materials are necessary. There must be a possibility of observing the likeness or unlikeness of different parts or features of an object upon which attention is fixed. Here, then, comes in at times a limit to the progress of the understanding. Whenever materials for comparison cease to be forthcoming, whenever, that is to say, there are no *parts* upon which attention can be successively fixed in whatever we are studying, the work of the understanding is necessarily brought to a standstill. Nor is it very unfrequently that this occurs. Let us take some instances.

We need not travel far to find one. The "meanest flower that blows" will furnish it. The scientific botanist will have a good deal to tell us about the flower. He will dissect it; he will analyze it; he will explain the functions of each of its parts, and their relation to one another; he will point out how this particular plant is related to other plants, and will show you its place in the great family of nature. Thus whatever in the flower itself or in its relations can be handled, measured, weighed, or otherwise investigated by any of the processes of comparison which science can employ, of *that* our botanist will give an account.

But is there not in the flower something more? Is there not a mysterious something, a reality whose presence is undeniable, but whose form is unrevealed and whose nature is not to be expressed or described? Is there not even in the meanest flower a mystery of *life* which science has again and again essayed to grasp, but which has always eluded her?

It is needless to say that it is so indeed. Life in the lowest form in which it is presented is a fact just as incomprehensible as it is when we contemplate it in the highest order of created beings. Not, of course, that the life of an archangel does not include indefinitely more of matter for wonder than life in a plant does. But the initial mystery which is before us in the plant is just as impenetrable as the more amazing reality of life which is in the archangel; and, moreover, the thought readily occurs that if the key

to the initial mystery could be obtained, we should most surely be placed on the way to a comprehension of mysteries which soar far higher. This thought is strikingly expressed in the following perhaps intentionally rugged lines of Tennyson—intentionally rugged, because the grandeur of the thought may have seemed to require a rugged setting, as that which was fittest to it—

> "Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies;—
> Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> *I should know what God and man is.*"

That the reason why it is impossible to lay hold of this mystery so as to see what life as a physical fact really is in its inmost essence, is because materials for comparison fail as soon as we approach the shrine, is very clearly to be gathered from considering the various forms of definition of life which have been from time to time proposed. For when they are examined we find that, whatever may have been the point of view of their authors, and whatever differences they may in consequence show in form and expression, they all exhibit in a marked manner these two features.[1] In the *first* place, they throw into strong relief the history of past investigation. They indicate clearly the direction taken by it, and the high-water mark of its progress. They show how the thoughts of men have been moving round the shrine of the mystery, classifying and comparing various phenomena connected with it, and so making it manifest that as long as comparison was possible, some progress might be made. In the *second* place, in all without exception the reality itself, the essence of life as distinguished from its manifestations, is conspicuously not expressed. Here are some examples. Kant: "Life is *an internal faculty*, producing change, motion, and action." Humboldt: "A living body is a whole, whose parts, notwithstanding the constant operation of causes tending to change their form, are hindered by *a*

[1] See Whewell, *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, 3rd ed., vol. ii. pp. 195, 207, *sqq.*

certain inward power from undergoing such change." Bichat: "Life is the sum of the functions *by which death is resisted.*" Cuvier: "Life is a *vortex.*" Whewell (recasting the two latter): "Life is the system of *vital* forces," and "Organic life is a constant form of a circulating matter, in which the matter and the form determine each other by *peculiar* laws (that is, by vital forces)."

The words in italics in these definitions show where the expression of what life is ought to come in, if it had been known, and does not. The remaining part of the definitions points to and expresses the result of researches of considerable value amongst the phenomena exhibited by the several orders of living beings. The line is thus very clearly drawn which bounds the progress of the understanding. Where there are what are called phenomena, which are neither more nor less than materials on which comparison can be exercised, the work of the understanding can go on; but it cannot go a step beyond the point at which such materials cease to be found.

The word *force* presents another example in which the progress of the understanding has been similarly arrested. Many different kinds of force have been observed as operative in nature. Much has been made out respecting their modes of operation. It has been even perceived that the modes of operation of some of the principal forces in nature are interchangeable, and the doctrine of the correlation of physical forces, which seems to go some way towards substituting *force* for *forces*, is one of the triumphs of modern scientific discovery. But are we any nearer the knowledge of what force is in itself? Surely not. In the tenth edition (1881) of Sir J. F. W. Herschel's *Outlines of Astronomy*, the following words of the distinguished author—even amongst the masters of science distinguished—respecting one particular kind of force, have stood their ground. "All bodies," he says, "descend. . . . They are therefore urged thereto by a force or effort, which it is but reasonable to regard as the direct or indirect result of a *consciousness* and a *will* existing

somewhere, though beyond our power to trace, which force we term *gravity*." [1] Can anything more be said respecting force in general than is suggested in this passage respecting the particular kind of force which is termed gravity? The suggestion is, it must be admitted, a reasonable one. For the only thing of which we have any experience, at all resembling what we call force in nature, is the action of will. Moreover the supposition, apart from revelation, of a Consciousness and a Will at the beginning of all nature and all force, gives far the best account of what is presented in nature. But, accepting this, what is there to show whether force is the direct or indirect result of this Consciousness and Will? May not force, as operating in nature, still be something distinct from will, though having its origin from it? May it not resemble, for example, some of those molecular changes which intervene between the first motion of my will to lift up my arm and the action itself?

Of course this is not the place to discuss such a point. All that is intended is to point out that in the case of force, as in that of life, there is something which is beyond the ken of the understanding. And since, in point of fact, when from investigating the manifestations of force we pass on to consider what force is in itself, there is found nothing on which the understanding can lay any hold, it is evident that the inability to advance proceeds from the same cause as before, namely, from the absence of materials for comparison. That there is a reality before us we cannot doubt. But we are like mountain climbers, who might be suddenly confronted with a vast circular mass of granite or crystal, impenetrable to the axe and perfectly smooth, all advance on any side of it being also impossible. In such a case, it would "pass the wit of man" to mount any higher without wings. And the understanding, in her similar circumstances, does not possess wings.

It may be worth while to give one more example, taken not from the material universe, but from another sphere.

[1] Herschel, *Outlines of Astronomy*, p. 291, § 440.

What do we know about *mind* in itself as distinguished from its manifestations? We have a direct consciousness that we have minds, but does this consciousness tell us what the mind is in itself? The "phenomena" of mind can be analyzed and classified. Here the understanding is on familiar ground, for here there are materials for comparison. But the mind itself is something distinct from its phenomena or manifestations. This is admitted even by Mr. Spencer. "If," he says, "by the phrase, 'substance of mind,' is to be understood mind as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is separable by introspection, but seems homogeneous and undecomposable; then we do know something about the substance of mind, and may eventually know more. . . . But if the phrase is taken to mean the underlying something of which these distinguishable portions are formed, or of which they are modifications; then we know nothing about it, and never can know anything about it."[1] By these last words Mr. Spencer may have intended the inference—the illogical inference as it would be—to be drawn that there was no such thing as mind, or "substance of mind." This illogical inference is at any rate that which Agnostics are perpetually smuggling in from the know-nothing premisses. But whether Mr. Spencer intended this or not, his words, strictly and logically taken—and still more his facts—place something quite different before us. They place before us two propositions: (1) that there is an "underlying something" which is called "mind"; (2) that, beyond the fact of its existence, we know nothing about "mind," though we do know something, and may know more about its "modifications." For Mr. Spencer would be the last person to say that there could be "modifications" without an "underlying something" to be modified. The real truth which the facts point to is plainly that to which consciousness itself distinctly testifies, namely, that which Mr. Spencer virtually states, that mind exists, but is known to us only in its modifications or manifestations.

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, i. 145.

This, then, is a fact of just the same order as what we have seen in the instances of life and force. "Manifestations" can be compared, and, where comparison is possible, the understanding is at home, and can bring what is presented into that relation to our intelligence according to which we are said to "understand" or "know." But there is nothing with which mind, as distinguished from its manifestations, can be compared. It is *sui generis*, single and alone. Here, therefore, the progress of the understanding is necessarily stayed.

The Kantian distinction between "things-in-themselves," and "phenomena," will naturally be suggested by what has been said in this chapter. But there is a difference between Kant's mode of dealing with this distinction and what has been here attempted. Kant, as was stated in the first chapter of this treatise, did not bring to light the lowest, the primary, foundation upon which what is *a priori* in the mind rests. He did not trace consciousness to its very root. Consequently he could not, and did not, attempt to explain the limitations to which the understanding is subject, by reference to a single primary law of consciousness. The forms of space and time, for example, were for him *a priori* in themselves. He sought no further ultimate origin of them. His explanation of the fact that the understanding cannot grasp "things-in-themselves," but only "phenomena," started accordingly from this platform. It has been the object of what has been here said, on the contrary, to show that the primary law of consciousness being such as has been described, the limitations of the understanding of which some illustrations have been given could not but follow as effects from that law.

III.

There is a third form of limitation—of which, as far as the present writer is aware, no mention is made by Kant—which follows, like those previously illustrated, from the

primary law, and which in like manner precludes us from attaining comprehension or knowledge of a very important kind. This limitation, like the last, arrests the progress of the understanding within the province of the Finite. It also, like the last, springs very distinctly out of the primal law of attention.

The nature of this limitation may easily be seen by a simple example. Let us imagine ourselves to be standing before one of the magnificent stained-glass windows which surround the choir in Milan Cathedral. They are perhaps the largest windows in Europe. In the one we suppose ourselves to be looking at there are more than a hundred compartments, in which are represented scenes of Old Testament history, each of the compartments being more than two feet high, and about a foot and a half wide. Each of them, consequently, is large enough to contain, and does contain, several figures. Now, since it is a matter of familiar experience, it is unnecessary to explain that the study of such a window, as of any subject, whether presented to the bodily or mental view, in which a multitude of details are included, is a work of time. Each compartment, and each figure in each compartment, besides the other details, must be studied separately. And after they have been studied separately, and by such study the scene represented in each compartment has been made out so that some judgment can be formed respecting the treatment of it—respecting the harmony of the composition, for example, the beauty of the colouring, the variety of expression and of attitude in the characters represented, and so forth—we find that we can by no effort arrive at an actual or mental vision of the window as a whole, with all its details included in the vision. However often and however closely we study it, either standing before it or reproducing it in imagination, we can never accomplish this. It is not a question of memory, it is a question of the power of conception, of gathering together a multitude of details into a whole, which may be placed before the mind as a whole at once. The whole is always a merely

generalized whole, from which the greater number of the details have been dropped. Where the power of observation has been specially cultivated, no doubt an amount of detail which, as compared with what people in general can take in rapidly, is surprising, may be carried away, and, perhaps, may be afterwards visualized as a whole, so as to show that the feat has not been one merely of memory. Performances of this kind may be found described in the memoirs of professional conjurors as practised by them for the purposes of their profession. But the very rarity of such instances shows that they must be numbered with those "exceptions" which are usually regarded as proving the contrary rule. And, after all, they fall far short of what we are speaking of.

Our incapacity to grasp many details at once is, of course, a matter of common experience. And, just because it is so, there are not, perhaps, a great many persons who have considered what a strong light the fact throws upon the structural character of the understanding, regarded as a faculty of knowledge. It must be borne in mind, in order to appreciate the full importance of the fact, that the incapacity does not belong only to the first efforts of observation, but to the most prolonged efforts which it is possible for us to make. We might stand before the window for ever, but we should never succeed in exchanging the power to study it bit by bit for the power to grasp it *with all its details* in one all-comprehending act of vision. The power which we have of generalizing will carry us a little way; but when we generalize—as the word itself intimates—it is always at the cost of dropping details. How powerfully, for example, is this necessity of dropping details illustrated by language! Every common term which we employ is an instance of this; for every such term exemplifies the substitution of a generalized unit of thought for a multitude of details, which are covered by the mantle of the conception which it represents, and which it would be not merely inconvenient but impossible to keep before the mind continually in their multiplicity. Language is the current coin

of thought, and is just as necessary in the great exchange of the world where mind meets mind, as the currency of the realm is necessary for the Stock Exchange of the metropolis, or the market-place of the country town. As a sovereign represents so many shillings, each of which again represents so many pence, so does each common term of language represent so many ideas which have been welded together into one conception. And as thought has mounted, so to say, higher, and calculations of more and more intricacy have had to be dealt with, the history of such speculations contains the record of a continual struggle to palliate and neutralize by artificial devices the initial incapacity of the understanding to include more than a few details in a single act of comprehension. Symbols go further in this respect than words or even figures can. For symbols may be used to represent anything you choose, and by no means always the same thing or things of the same magnitude. The symbol x, for example, may represent at one time the contents of a doll's house, at another, the contents of the universe.

But with all the aids which either language, or figures, or symbols can furnish in order to mitigate this incapacity of the human understanding, the limits to which it confines us are very soon reached. Even in the very field of symbols this is so. It is well known that in algebra there is a point in the solution of equations beyond which it has never been found possible to advance. A recent authority on the subject says that "cubic and biquadratic equations can be solved, whatever they may be; but equations of higher orders, in which there exists no relation amongst the several co-efficients, and no known or assumed connection between the different roots, have baffled all attempts at their solution."[1] The history of mathematics would no doubt furnish abundant similar instances.

And if the limit of human capacity to grasp the multiplex is found to be so soon reached where it can be aided

[1] *Encycl. Brit.*, art. "Algebra," 9th ed., vol. i. 515.

by artificial means with most effect, how much more must it be so where the aid of symbols either cannot be employed at all, or can be only very partially used! An intermediate example of this kind is offered in the science of meteorology, to which belongs the study of the phenomena of climate and of the weather. Respecting the study of these phenomena a great authority wrote as follows, thirty years ago: "We come to the subject, as we have every reason to believe, with a clear apprehension of all the principal efficient causes, and a pretty distinct conception of their *direct* action. It is the number and simultaneous operation of their derivative causes, the immense influence and complication of their *indirect* actions, which constitute the difficulty of this branch of physics."[1]

Observations of weather-phenomena have been immensely multiplied since Sir John Herschel gave this description of the condition of the study, but does it not still hold good?

And when from the sphere of material phenomena we pass to that of human life and action, and run over in thought "the number and simultaneous operation" of both primary and derivative causes, and "the immense influence and complication" of actions both direct and indirect, which are everywhere to be met with in a field in which the mystery of the human will is a potent factor, it must be at once manifest that the power of the understanding here to integrate or to unify forces so various in their origin, so multitudinous in number, and so conflicting in their action, can at the best be but infinitesimal in relation to the work to be accomplished.

The point to be insisted upon at present is, however, not so much the narrowness of the limits within which the understanding is confined as the connection of this limitation with the primary structural principle. In the form of limitation of which some illustrations have just been given, the fact that it is to the primary structural law of consciousness that

[1] *Encycl. Brit.*, art. "Meteorology" (by Sir J. Herschel), 8th ed., vol. xiv. 636.

that limitation is due may, perhaps, be more clearly seen than in the two other modes of limitation which we considered first. But in truth in all three the connection between limitation and principle, between the inability of the understanding and the structural law, seems too clear to be matter of doubt. Still less can we hesitate to acknowledge the *potency* of the primary law, and the iron constraint with which it controls and regulates the operations of the understanding. The primary law—the necessity of giving attention in the manner in which alone we find that we can attend—makes comprehension possible only according to a succession of parts: consequently when we approach that which, as is the case with the Infinite, cannot be comprehended in this manner, the understanding finds itself helpless and impotent. The same primary law makes comparison the sole way in which it is possible to proceed beyond attention to each object or each part of an object singly: here again, therefore, as soon as comparison, through failure of materials, becomes impossible, the understanding finds a limit placed which absolutely bars its progress. And, once more, since the initial necessity of attending to parts is one the yoke of which the understanding can never throw off, it is obvious that as soon as a different form of attention comes to be required in order that it should grasp things not one by one but simultaneously, in their totality, or in the multiplicity of their relations, the understanding must find itself unequal to the demand.

It might have been otherwise. It is at least conceivable that the human understanding—or, rather, what is more comprehensive, as being the basis of all human intelligence, the human consciousness — should have had a different structure assigned to it. We might have had power given us to apply our consciousness not to parts but to wholes. Other finite beings may possibly have such a power. Such a thought is perhaps required to enable us to realize the full significance of the structure which actually has been given to our minds, and the nature of the limits which it imposes. But whenever it is realized, we shall not be likely in future

to underestimate it. It enables us to measure in a manner what the human mind—not the mind of this man or of that man, but the human mind itself—is capable of coming to know. And that not only as regards what it can *attain* by its own efforts, but also what it is capable of *receiving* by communication from without—by revelation, for example, from God. For it is evident that the structure of our minds would have to be altered in order to enable us to receive by communication a knowledge of the Infinite, just as much as this would be necessary before we could pass of ourselves out of the province of the Finite into that of the Infinite. The same holds good respecting the third limitation which has been described. It holds good also as regards the second so far as comprehension depends upon comparison; but it seems not impossible that mysteries such as those of life, or force, or mind, which, for want of materials for comparison, we cannot of ourselves reach, might be presented to our minds in some form which would be comprehensible without involving any violation of their structure. What is certain is that the structure of our minds bars the reception of certain kinds of knowledge as much as it bars the possibility of attaining such knowledge by efforts of our own.

CHAPTER III.

THE IMAGINATION AND THE SPIRIT.

In the preceding chapters our endeavour has been, in the first place, to lay bare that primary law which lies at the root of human consciousness in general, and governs every form of its development; and, in the second place, to trace the limitations to which the primary law gives rise in the instance of the understanding. The sketch thus given may be sufficient to establish the fact that the capacity of our intellectual faculties to acquire (and even to receive) knowledge is in important ways limited; and that the reason why this is so is to be sought in the initial law of their structure.

But this is not all which our present purpose requires. We are not yet in a position to institute a comparison between the extent and range, and the general character, of our human faculties of knowledge, as dependent upon their structure, and that which for want of a better term must be called the character or the nature of Omniscience. We proceed, therefore, in the present chapter to take a somewhat wider view than we have yet done. It is necessary that we should consider, as regards the understanding, not only (as we have already done) the limitations to which it is subject when it is at work; but also *the character of the knowledge which it puts us in possession of* when its work has been fully performed. With this it will be important to compare and, indeed, to contrast, the knowledge of a quite different order which may be obtained through the energy of the imagination. This comparison, or this contrast, will be properly supplemented by the consideration

of the manner in which these two faculties—the Understanding and the Imagination—widely different from each other as they are in their respective primary aims and powers and mode of procedure, are nevertheless able in certain ways and for certain purposes to co-operate, each placing at the service of the other such of its powers as are not in their nature incommunicable. Lastly, even in so brief a survey as we have now in hand, some notice ought not to be omitted of the human Spirit, as possibly being or possessing in itself an organ of knowledge which, though its exercise may be chiefly intended for another time and another place, may perhaps be found to be intrinsically superior in power to the Understanding and even to the Imagination. Incomplete in details as such a survey must necessarily be, it may still be sufficient to bring the principal features by which human knowledge is characterized distinctly into view, and so to enable us to compare—as far as comparison is in this case possible—the structure of our faculties of knowledge and what they are capable of enabling us either to obtain or to receive comprehension of, with that Illimitable Knowing which is imperfectly described as omniscience.

I.

The terms *subjective* and *objective* by no means always divide between them with perfect accuracy the area of thought of which they are supposed to occupy equal halves, or, if not equal halves, at any rate portions of that territory which are strictly demarcated by a boundary line. There is apt to be a subjective presence on the objective side, and, less commonly perhaps, there is an intrusion from the objective side into the subjective. Nevertheless the terms are too convenient to be easily parted with, especially as it would be hard to find any to express with more accuracy that which we want them for. In the present case they are peculiarly indispensable. For our object is to ascertain how

far it is possible for us to know, and it is also important that in pursuing this object we should be able to distinguish where the limits to our knowing are connected exclusively with the operation of our faculties, and where they are also determined, wholly or in part, by the nature of the objects which we seek to comprehend.

Confining ourselves for the present to the Understanding, it does not seem very difficult to see what is the *subjective* perfection of knowledge as obtainable by this faculty. For it must once more be noted that the understanding is not a faculty possessing vague and indefinite powers, or modes of operation which can be multiplied at pleasure. Marvellously elastic as the methods of reasoning are in their application to diverse subjects, the methods are always reducible to certain known and fixed and regular types, which may be found classified and described in works on logic. The subjective perfection of the work of the understanding consists in the execution with full force and precision of its regular operations of forming concepts, judgments, and trains of reasoning; and especially in these operations being kept free from the fatal blemishes of obscurity and of fallacy, to which they are so liable. For our present purpose a very general indication of the conditions required in order that the operations of the understanding may be fitly and fully performed, is all that is necessary. For it will be sufficient, as will be seen presently, if we are able to postulate correct performance or subjective perfection, with a general comprehension of what the supposition includes, without either going far into details, or raising questions which, however important in themselves, we need not now be troubled with.

Some observations seem, however, to be necessary to make even a supposition of this kind quite intelligible. The remarks of Leibnitz in his *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis*, in the shape in which they have found their way into Logical Manuals,[1] will give us fully all that

[1] What is given in the following paragraphs is taken mainly from Jevons' *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, pp. 53–60.

we require. They are directed especially towards putting into a definite shape the dictate of common-sense that knowing must not be obscure or confused. This applies with the greatest force to the first operation of the understanding—which, as we have seen, grows out of a still more primary law, the law of attention—the operation of forming concepts. But, inasmuch as the correctness both of judging, and of reasoning, depends upon the accuracy and clearness of our concepts, we need not hesitate to regard the remarks or rules of Leibnitz as showing sufficiently in what the perfection of all the operations of the understanding must be held to consist.

What we are told is that our conceptions must be *clear* as opposed to *obscure; distinct* as opposed to *confused; adequate* as opposed to *inadequate; intuitive* as opposed to *symbolical.* Perhaps it should be added that wherever it is possible for these conditions to be united, *there* more perfect knowledge will be possible also; but not unfrequently it will be found impossible to unite them all.

An object is *clearly* apprehended when it is discerned *as a whole* in contrast to other individual objects of apprehension. This is sometimes an easy matter, but not always. A shepherd knows each sheep of his flock clearly by itself: to an ordinary observer one sheep is much like another. The passion of anger *may* be distinguished clearly from other forms of ill-temper or agitated feeling; but it is probably more often only obscurely regarded as belonging to a class in which sullenness on the one hand and rage on the other may also be found.

An object is apprehended *distinctly* when its *parts* are included in the mental conception, or, it may be, the mental image, which is formed of it. Two persons enter a cathedral: one an ordinary visitor, the other an architect. The first in all probability will carry away only a confused impression of the beauty of the windows and the various features of the building; the architect will realize distinctly the particular forms of the tracery, and the parts in detail of each architectural feature.

The distinction between *adequate* and *inadequate* relates to the *extent* to which attention should be given to the parts of an object. How far this should be carried, and what kind of particulars should be included, depends obviously upon the observer's point of view and the aim which he is pursuing. A man may, if he pleases, or if he is able, study a particular district successively from a geologist's point of view, and from a painter's. But many features which would be necessary for adequate comprehension in the one case would have no proper place in the other. A knowledge of geological facts would no doubt indirectly be of service to the painter, but the geological facts, as such, would not make his artistic conception more adequate, but the contrary.

The distinction between *intuitive* and *symbolical* requires to be understood with some caution. There is nothing intuitive in the procedure of the understanding. What is referred to here is a secondary power of the imagination—the power of visualizing—which is borrowed by the understanding. A triangle can be visualized; a figure of one thousand sides cannot. Not all conceptions can be visualized; but, when they can be, it is easy to see how much risk of misconception will be avoided.

The readiest way to see the importance of these distinctions is to test them by their application to some abstract term; for example, to some "ism." How many persons are there whose conception of (let us say) Positivism is so *clear*, as to stand distinguished in their minds from every other "ism"; so *distinct*, that they can describe without hesitation the ideas which it includes; so *adequate*, that there is no essential feature which is not included in their thoughts of it; so little lost in the haze of the symbolical term by which, like a labelled parcel whose contents are unknown, it passes from one man to another in the philosophical mart, that, in a particular example of its application, it can be almost, if not quite set before the mind intuitively in a vision having shape and form? Probably the number of such persons is

not very large. But, since the number of conceptions having to be employed in reasoning, which partake more or less of the same kind of difficulties as hang around such a conception as Positivism, is undoubtedly very great, it is needless to insist upon the importance of using all means possible to give them distinctness of form and outline.

However, it has not been for the sake of insisting upon their importance that the foregoing observations have been introduced, but because of their use in showing what the perfection of human knowledge on its subjective side requires. And, perhaps, if we suppose the precautions which have just been described to be carried out with due care through all the processes of conception, judgment, and reasoning, by which the work of the understanding is performed; and if we also suppose the various forms of fallacy which logicians have noted as likely to beset the unwary reasoner to be duly avoided, there would seem to be not much more of consequence required in order to indicate with as much accuracy as is now needful, what is meant when we speak of *subjective* perfection in the operations of the understanding, and in the knowledge thus procured.

We now turn to the *objective* side, and ask what it is which the understanding aims at drawing out, as it were, from the universe of objects which she studies, and expressing in her own favourite manner. And we find that to whatever quarter her attention is turned, whether it be to the world of material objects, or to the sphere of morals, or to history, or to philosophy, or to the problems of social or political life, or to any of the divisions of art, or to the material offered by theology and the Bible, her aim is always in its general character strictly and literally one and the same. It is to ascertain (1) what may be called the constitution of objects, and (2) their relations. When the mind has before it the manner in which objects are put together, or, if that expression be thought inapplicable to immaterial objects, the parts of which they consist, or their essence; and when it has also come to comprehend how these objects are fitted together,

and work together as parts of one system, acting and reacting upon each other; then the task of the understanding is regarded as complete.

Now upon this view of what is accomplished by the Understanding, some not unimportant observations present themselves.

In the first place, it is very worthy of note that this is the *exclusive* aim of the Understanding. Nothing less than this will satisfy her, but she desires nothing more. Not that we, as thinking beings, desire nothing more. But the understanding, as one of our intellectual faculties, is unable to deal with the objects of knowledge which come before her in any other way than this, and accordingly she has no other aim. It matters not whether the objects with which for the time she is occupied form part of the material universe, or belong to the sphere of morals, or to the realm of the spiritual. Whether she is busied with the contents of one of the natural sciences, or with some problem of ethics or of politics, or with an historical character or event, or with the subject-matter of a theological dogma, what she wants to find out is always what the individual object of thought *is* in relation to her perceptions, and how it is related to other objects—what are, as she says, the laws of its existence, and of its action. Consider any one of the sciences—and science is simply a name for the most accurate performance of the operations of this one intellectual faculty, the understanding, or the results of that performance—and what do you find? The science of chemistry offers one of the most conspicuous examples of how the understanding satisfies her desire to find out how things are put together. Chemistry analyzes each thing, and traces it to its ultimate elements. But this is just what the understanding desires to do in the case of such a different object as justice, or virtue, or conscience. Her aim is to get inside it, and see what it consists of, and how it is distinguished from other objects. And then, after this, the next thing is to find out what is its action, and by what laws it is regulated, and how the

action of one object is connected with the action of another object.

All this, it may be said, is very true, but is it very important? The understanding certainly does aim at finding out all about things, what they are in themselves, and how they act together; but what more could she aim at? This is indeed her sole aim, but what other could she have?

And, indeed, it must be admitted that, as far as the understanding is concerned, any other aim than this is not possible. The understanding is fitted for dealing with things in this way, and is not fitted for dealing with them in any other. So much of all that is in the universe as can be thus dealt with, so much as can be comprised within the formulæ which are the especial joy of this faculty, so much as can be brought into the particular perception-relation which is hers, so much as (with or without the aid of any other faculty) she can obtain cognizance of after her own fashion and of the kind which alone she cares to have—that, it is most true, may undoubtedly be hers.

But—and this is the second observation which one cannot help making—can this possibly be regarded as the whole of knowledge? In saying this, reference is not intended to be made to the restrictions upon the action of the understanding and her range, which, as was shown in the previous chapters, very considerably confine and limit her power. What is referred to is the *character* of the conquests of the understanding. Suppose her to have carried her conquests to the utmost bound of what is possible for her. Suppose her operations to have been conducted throughout with faultless accuracy. Suppose, that is to say, that both on the objective and on the subjective side nothing has been wanting to the perfection of her work, and of such knowledge as she is able to put us in possession of. Our consciousness will then have been placed in a relation of knowledge with objects around or within us with the utmost perfection which the understanding is capable of, and in regard to all objects with which she is any way able to deal. As far as the

Understanding is able to make us know, we shall have been made to know. We should *understand* all that by the exercise of this faculty we could come to understand. The desire of the Understanding would be satisfied. It would have done its work, and there would be nothing more which it could do. But when we had gained that knowledge which we call understanding, and the circle of science was complete, would this be of itself complete knowledge? We might perhaps at first be inclined to say it would, but on reflection we should more probably be disposed to pause. Let us note some reasons which point to the conclusion that that kind of knowing which we obtain by means of the Understanding, is very far from being the only kind of knowing.

And, first, let us observe that a good deal of the material which the Understanding comes across in its progress proves to be such as cannot be comprised in the formulæ by which the constitution of things and their relations or laws are described. It is a striking fact that the further the Understanding moves away from the sphere of the natural sciences, the more untractable does she find the material before her to be. She passes into the sphere, for example, of Ethics. She is not only willing 'to shape her old course in this country new,' but she is constrained to do so; for she knows no other. But whereas, in the case of the natural sciences, it seems as if their whole contents could be readily poured into the scientific moulds of the Understanding—as if when the constitution of the several facts comprised in them and their manifold relations and laws had been accurately traced out and described, there was nothing more to be done—as if, then, all that was knowable in them had been exhaustively drawn out—the case is very different when the Understanding proceeds to deal with moral material. Here, for the first time, she experiences a feeling of hesitation and uneasiness, because her methods do not now seem to be as adequate, as all-sufficient, as before. It is not that there are not materials in plenty in ethical subjects for her to exercise her powers of analysis and comparison upon. It is not that there are

not here, as in the material world, manifold relations capable of being mapped out as laws. Nor does her hesitation arise solely or even chiefly from the multiplicity which she perceives, and the complexity of action and reaction in the laws of mind and of society. Seeing this, she may indeed feel some doubt whether these are "capable of becoming subjects of science in the strict sense of the term."[1] But supposing this difficulty to be overcome, and this ground of hesitation to be done away; supposing the Understanding to have succeeded in dealing with this class of subjects in the same manner as with those belonging to the material world; supposing this work to have been carried out by her exhaustively and with entire completeness;—would there not be a great deal still in presence which was evidently knowable, but which as evidently could not come to be known by the mere energies of the understanding? Is it not a patent fact that as a skeleton is to the living, breathing, thinking being, so is ethical *science* as compared with the immeasurable contents of morals?

A second reason is that we are actually in possession of another faculty by whose energies a relation is established between our consciousness and the objects of consciousness which is clearly a quite distinct relation from that which is established by means of the Understanding. That which we come to know, and the manner in which we do so, are alike different in the case of the Understanding and in that of the Imagination. This difference of knowledge-relation will come before us for consideration almost immediately. It is referred to now because it seems to make it quite certain that to *understand* and to *know* are not equivalent or simply convertible terms. We come to know by means of the Imagination, as well as by means of the Understanding; but the two faculties do not work on the same plane; the knowledge which is proper to the one is not increased in sum by the knowledge which is won through the other; they are *two* knowledges, not *one*, or, rather, they are two distinct

[1] See Mill, *Logic*, p. 546, People's Edition.

forms of relation towards the whole body of objects of knowledge into which our consciousness is brought through the action of these two faculties.

Now, if we find, as a matter of actual experience, that there are two distinct modes of relation between consciousness and the objects of consciousness, into which we are able to enter; if we find, as we certainly do, that the knowable is very far from being exhaustively taken possession of by the Understanding, and that a similar statement must be made respecting the Imagination, if only because of its occupying an area distinct from that occupied by the Understanding,—we surely are placed by these considerations in a point of view in which the character of our knowledge, especially as regards the Understanding, seems to shrink into much narrower proportions, and to have much less of universality and completeness than we might have been disposed at first to think. We see that even if it were possible for us to *understand* all things, we should not thereby *know* them perfectly. We see that, even for ourselves, there is more than one knowledge-relation. Is it not then probable, to say the very least, that the contents of the universe are presented to other beings than ourselves in relations, perhaps many relations, of which we know nothing? And is it not certain that, in order to have full and perfect knowledge of them—that is, of the material, moral, and spiritual contents of the universe, it would be necessary that we should be endowed with additional faculties besides those which we now have, seeing that experience proves conclusively that what we can obtain by means of our present faculties falls greatly short of what we cannot doubt would be found knowable if we only had perceptions capable of apprehending it? The importance of this view in regard to our principal subject is very considerable. It will come before us in its proper place in the next chapter. At present we must proceed to note the points of contrast which the Imagination offers as compared with the Understanding, in regard both to the kind of knowledge which it enables us

to enter into, and in regard to the mode in which it works to this end.

II.

Perhaps it may be best to note first the contrast which the Imagination offers to the Understanding on the subjective side. Its procedure is in two respects radically different from that of the Understanding. In the first place it is not discursive but intuitive. Whilst the Understanding proceeds onwards by slow degrees, by attention to resemblances and differences, by analysis of the component parts of an object, by successive steps and stages of comparison, by lengthened processes of reasoning—the Imagination, on the contrary, penetrates at once into the inner recesses of that which is before her. Her energy has a directness and force which can be neither analyzed nor measured. In virtue of that primary power which entitles her to a rank far higher than can be claimed for the Understanding, she seizes by the heart whatever she busies herself with, she seats herself upon a throne at its very centre, and thence surveys with a glance of possession whatever related features lie around. Hence her power to create, whether it be poem, or painting, or work of art of any kind. "He alone," said Fuseli, "can conceive or compose who sees the whole at once before him: no great idea was ever formed in fragments."[1] Hence her wonderful insight—her truly marvellous power of penetration, and not of penetration only, but of poising herself as if upon a razor's edge, or moving unerringly amongst labyrinthine mazes. How else, for example, could Shakespeare have been able at one time to enter into the inner being of Lear, when every thought and feeling of the injured king was being whirled about in the hurricane fury of a madness which had in it no feigning; and at another time to stand secure at the very centre of Hamlet's deeply contemplative soul, invaded as it was and all but seized by accesses of madness, which

[1] Quoted by Ruskin, *Mod. Painters*, vol. ii. p. 148, 5th ed., 1869.

were nevertheless kept at bay? Such a power is indeed wholly inexplicable; and when we contrast its working in instances like these with the measured processes of the Understanding, we cannot but feel how great a gulf lies between them.

Not less remarkable is the second point of contrast in the procedure of these two faculties. The Understanding, when she is at work, keeps feeling and emotion of every kind as much as possible at a distance; the Imagination, on the contrary, allies herself with them as closely as she may. "Facts, when used as the materials of physical science"—wrote the historian of the inductive sciences—"*must be referred to conceptions of the intellect only*, all emotions of fear, admiration, and the like, being rejected or subdued."[1] In like manner, from a poet's point of view, the late Principal Shairp, in one of his Oxford Lectures, spoke as follows: "The scientific man must keep his feelings under control, lest they intrude into his researches, and colour the dry light, in which alone Science desires to see its objects. The poet, on the other hand—it is because his feelings inform and kindle his intellect [should it not be his imagination?] that he sees into the life of things."[2] Mr. Ruskin, who, as we all know, has so eloquently described the power and functions of the imagination in his *Modern Painters*, points out further that there is a reciprocal influence of the affections upon the imagination and of the imagination upon the affections, and, moreover, that the movements of moral emotion accompany the imagination both in the active exercise of her energies and when she is passively percipient, and that in both cases her powers are thereby quickened. "The Imagination," he says, "is in no small degree dependent on acuteness of moral emotion; in fact, all moral truth can only thus be apprehended—and it is observable, generally, that all true and deep emotion is imaginative, both in conception and expression; and that *the mental sight becomes sharper with every full beat of the heart.*"[3]

[1] Whewell, *Nov. Org. Renov.*, p. 54, 3rd ed., 1858.
[2] Shairp, *Aspects of Poetry*, p. 4. [3] *Mod. Painters*, vol. ii. p. 184.

Such being the striking differences between the procedure of the Imagination and that of the Understanding, it follows almost of course that the enlargement of consciousness which we obtain through the energy of the former faculty should be of a kind correspondingly different from that which we gain by means of the latter. The Imagination cannot add to that knowledge of the constitution of things and their laws of action which it is the special work of the Understanding to put us in possession of. But neither can the Understanding give us those richer possessions of consciousness which exist, to feed the heart and the deeper communings of man, alike in nature and in the moral and spiritual realms—possessions the existence of which the Understanding can indeed perceive, but which she can by no exertion of her own powers touch at all except on their mere outer casings. Respecting the relative value of that which we obtain by means of the Imagination, and that which we obtain by means of the Understanding, the judgment of mankind has long since been pronounced in no uncertain tones. This judgment has been well expressed, in his usual rugged but forcible manner, by Thomas Carlyle. "Wouldst thou plant for eternity," he said, "then plant into the deep, infinite faculties of man, his fantasy and heart; wouldst thou plant for year and day, then plant into his shallow, superficial faculties, his self-love, and arithmetical understanding."[1] The contrast is as instructive as it is true. On the one hand the "arithmetical understanding" and what it can give us—that knowledge which Positivists, accounting it strangely enough to be the only knowledge obtainable by us, call the "knowledge of measure!" And on the other hand the "deep infinite faculties of man, his imagination and heart," and the possession which they give us of that which is without measure, the inexhaustible riches of moral truth! If the Understanding were blotted out, or, rather, if what it has procured for us were blotted out, what should we lose? We should lose, principally, the whole body of the sciences.

[1] Quoted in Reed's *Lect. on Eng. Lit.*, p. 56.

If the Imagination and its products were taken from us, we should lose the world's chief masterpieces, all the treasures of poetry and of art, all that makes external nature something more than a piece of skilful mechanism, all that works in us the conviction that there is something at least in us whereby we are akin to the Infinite. Great as are the treasures of knowledge which have been amassed by the efforts of the Understanding, the wealth of those treasure-chambers into which the Imagination gives us access is far greater.

But, it may be said, granting that the influence of the Imagination and its products upon the thoughts and feelings is full not only of delight but of profit, it is nevertheless not increase of *knowledge* which is procured by this faculty. Call it what you will, put what value you like upon it, but do not confuse it with knowledge.

Certainly if the term *knowledge*[1] is to be restricted to the results of the exercise of the Understanding, that is to say, to an enlargement of consciousness of one kind—that particular kind whereby objects, material or immaterial, are marshalled before it in the superficial relation of facts and laws—we cannot speak of the Imagination as increasing such knowledge. But an enlargement of consciousness it certainly does give, and, not to quarrel about words, this may be a preferable way of describing the result of the workings of the Imagination.

Let us then note in some instances what is the character of the enlargement of consciousness which we obtain by means of the Imagination. It will be found to be a new relation, quite distinct from that in which we are placed through the operation of the Understanding, a relation of

[1] Few terms have been used in a greater variety of meanings than "knowledge." The products of scientific investigation, the results of metaphysical reasoning, the broader conclusions of philosophy, the judgments derived from the every-day teachings of experience, the thoughts of men as "widened by the process of the suns," the observations of common sense—each of these is in turn described or spoken of as "knowledge." Is any of them anything but a special form of consciousness? It is not easy to see why any one of them should claim exclusively for itself the proud title of "knowledge."

consciousness towards things around us by which we become percipient of that in them of which, had we no faculty but the Understanding, we should have known only as a hidden treasure which we had no means of reaching.

In order to test the accuracy of this description, let us look first at the world of nature. Nature presents herself in one way to the Understanding, and in another to the Imagination. To the investigations of the Understanding she offers the framework and skeleton of her being, her mechanism and modes of working. She invites the Imagination on the other hand to enter into her secret chambers, to feel the pulses of her life, to behold with purged eyes the glory and the beauty which is upon her and within her, to know her as what she is in relation to the moral being of man. The poet Wordsworth has more than any other revealed to the world what this means. Nor, since he was a philosopher as well as a poet, could we have a better example than we have in his writings of what it is which the Imagination is able to make us know and feel which the Understanding cannot. Wordsworth's aim throughout his life was, as he himself has told us,[1] to bring home to men's hearts and minds the essential adaptation to each other of man as a moral being on the one hand, and of external nature with all her powers of moulding,

[1] *Poetical Works*, ed. Moxon, vol. vi. p. 15, *sqq.* The lines in the preface to the 1814 edition of the *Excursion*, in which he explains his aim, are memorable—

> ". . . by words
> Which speak of nothing more than what we are,
> Would I arouse the sensual from their sleep
> Of death, and win the vacant and the vain
> To noble raptures; while my voice proclaims
> *How exquisitely the individual mind*
> (And the progressive powers perhaps no less
> Of the whole species) *to the external world*
> *Is fitted :—and how exquisitely, too—*
> Theme this but little heard of among men—
> *The external world is fitted to the mind;*
> *And the creation* (by no lower name
> Can it be called) *which they with blended might*
> *Accomplish* :—this is our high argument."

quickening, training, soothing, exalting, healing, restoring, the moral being of man, on the other. He described the large "philosophical poem" which he projected and partly completed, as intended to hold in regard to this theme, as developed variously in his poems, the same kind of relation which the main body of a Gothic Church holds towards the rest of the building, the minor poems having "such connection with the main work as may give them claim to be likened to the little cells, oratories, and sepulchral recesses" belonging to it. Wordsworth had therefore pondered over and realized this great theme—before him "but little heard of among men"—not only with the love of a poet, but with the serene contemplation of a philosopher. As far as the Understanding could enable him to do so, he knew it as a fact and as a theory; he had also entered into its essential significance, its inner life of power, by the energy of his imagination. He might therefore have discoursed as a philosopher respecting it without going on to reveal that within it which only a poet could either perceive or reveal. But, if he had done no more than this, if he had spoken only of that external casing of the whole matter, if he had made it known as a theory and nothing more, explaining only what the "arithmetical understanding" was capable of apprehending in it, is it not manifest how far, far short this would have been of what he really has done? Is it not plain that our great debt is owing to Wordsworth the *poet* and not to Wordsworth the *philosopher?* It is through the poet's Imagination that we have learnt what nature really is, and was meant to be, to man. Only to the Imagination will nature reveal "the breath and finer spirit" of all that is in her. And if the enlargement of consciousness which comes to us when we receive this revelation is not to be called *knowledge*, it is hard to say by what other name it should be called. For by it we come to know the inner life and power of nature, which through the Understanding alone we never could have known. Nature presents herself, as was before remarked, under one aspect to the Understanding, and under

another to the Imagination, and if it had so happened that it had been given to us to be acquainted with the material universe only under that aspect in which, as matter of fact, it is seen by the Understanding, and that other and richer aspect in which it is viewed by the Imagination had been as much hidden from us as other aspects of it are perhaps now hidden, it is easy to see that our knowledge of nature would have been a very different thing, poor indeed by comparison with what it is now.

To take another example. There is such a thing as ethical *science*, that is to say, the subject of Ethics is one which the understanding is not wholly incompetent to deal with after its manner. But here, even more than in the case of nature, we can hardly fail to see how very much there is which the methods of the understanding cannot touch or grasp. Miserable indeed would be our knowledge of moral truth if we had only the understanding with which to deal with it. When Milton averred that he "dared be known to think our sage and serious poet, Spenser, a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas,"[1] who does not feel that he was right? As in nature it is not the Understanding but the Imagination which alone can reach those "thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears;" so, when we would gain a knowledge of the very substance and inner being of moral truth, we must seek it, not in the philosopher's *catalogue raisonnée* of virtues and vices, but in the living pictures of all that should make "a very perfite knight" which the poet's genius is able to set before us. The Understanding is by itself quite incapable of fathoming the depths of any great moral truth. "The obligation of man to sacrifice himself for right" (it has been said) "is a truth which springs out of an abyss, the mere attempt to look down into which confuses the reason."[2]

Once more. Why is it that so small a portion of the Bible is addressed *directly* to the Understanding? Why is

[1] Quoted in Reed's *Lect. on Brit. Poets*, p. 80.

[2] J. B. Mozley, *Bampton Lectures on Miracles*, p. 70, 3rd ed.

so large a portion of it addressed predominantly to the imagination and the affections? It is a fact which has often been noticed, and generally not without some feeling of surprise.[1] Even the most argumentative part of God's Word to man, that part in which the special doctrines of Christianity had to be unfolded, in which, therefore, the understanding of the readers had necessarily to be called largely into exercise, is very far from exhibiting the mere form and character of a scientific treatise. It has been cast in the form of letters, and full advantage has been taken of the opportunities which this form of composition affords for the personal expression of the writer's feelings, and for calling out in a corresponding degree the emotions of the reader. The imagination and religious feelings are at least as largely drawn out, in St. Paul's Epistles, for example, on the part both of writer and readers, as the understanding is, although at the same time the precision of doctrinal statement is never in the slightest degree put in danger thereby. On the contrary, so far from the exact statement of doctrine being endangered, its real force and power is by this means brought out and inexpressibly enhanced, so that the readers of these inspired writings feel that they are in contact verily with "the words of an endless life,"[2] and with their unseen Author and Giver.

More than one reason may no doubt be assigned for this striking characteristic of the Bible—most striking "quippe carmine, ni fallor" (said Keble) "conceptum est *dimidium ferme totius sacrosancti Voluminis;*" and where the actual form is not that of poetry, the presence of the imagination and movements of religious emotion are almost everywhere apparent; "etiam illa" (as he adds) "quæ numeris carent, Poeticum quendam præ se ferunt saporem." Keble himself, with his eye on the *Old Testament* Scriptures, was inclined to view this feature of their inspired moulding in connection with the

[1] See the passage in Keble's *Prælect. Acad.*, p. 808, beginning, "Omnino miretur aliquis, tantas Poeticæ tribui partes in Divinis sanctisque Libris."

[2] Acts v. 20; Heb. vii. 16.

forward-looking attitude in which the spirits of the men of old time were trained to hope for the good things to come. It may be so; yet one cannot but think that it had also a deeper relation to the whole nature of man; for surely it was to man in the completeness of his nature, not to a being of one faculty, that the Bible had to be addressed. But together with, and, indeed, including these considerations, there is the wider and weightier one that the Bible, like God's revelation of Himself in the natural world, contains so largely truth which the "arithmetical understanding" would by itself have been quite incapable of entering into. It is for this reason, more than any other surely, that the Giver of these inspired writings has been pleased to call into exercise the imagination and religious feelings, both of those through whom the revelation has been given, and of us to whom it has come, because in no other way could they who wrote, or we who read, be percipient of the most valuable part of the knowledge which the Word of Life offers.

There is, then, alike in the natural world and in the spheres of moral and of spiritual truth, that which may be received by us into our consciousness, and so *known*, but which cannot be so received by the action of the Understanding. The formulæ of the Understanding are inadequate to express it. The powers of the Understanding are incompetent to grasp it. The powers of another faculty, the Imagination, acting in conjunction with the energies of awakened feeling, are required for this. The *knowable*, in short, presents itself to be received by us in more than one way, and by more than one channel. If we had understandings only, we might know much of the constitution of things, we should know them as far as they could be known under the form of facts and laws, but of their moral substance we should know only the exterior covering and outline. Being what we are, and having received the gift of the Imagination, we are enabled to know more than this. If not in their fulness, at least in something of their fulness, we can discern what things are in a moral or spiritual point of view, as they are related not

to the bare understanding, but to our whole moral being, and so take them into our minds and hearts. Is it not then a reasonable conclusion that, since we do not take in all that we know by means of the Understanding, but what is at any rate the richer part of knowledge by means of another faculty, *we may be very far from exhausting "the knowable" by these our present faculties,* and that to other beings "the knowable" may be, not only in volume and compass, but in character also, widely different from what it is to us, far more varied and far more comprehensive?

III.

Partly in order to avoid misconception, partly in order to make this brief description of the characteristics of human knowledge less incomplete, it is desirable that we should here take note of the relations of mutual co-operation which subsist between our two intellectual faculties, the Understanding and the Imagination.

How then, in the first place, can the Imagination render aid to the Understanding? It is not, as has been already observed, in regard to its principal endowment, that the Imagination can do this. It cannot place at the disposal of the Understanding what Mr. Ruskin justly calls its "awful, inexplicable power" of intuitively penetrating the depths and mysterious recesses of truth. It cannot be used to pierce the mysteries of the material world, to find a way where the Understanding is powerless and can find none; or be summoned as an "Open Sesame!" to bid the door before which science stands helpless, be unclosed and hide no longer the secrets hidden within. The highest of all the intellectual gifts which the Creator has bestowed upon man was not given for this, and cannot be thus employed.

But there are powers of less worth and dignity belonging to the Imagination which she is able to lend out; and by the aid of these the work of the Understanding may be and has often been largely furthered. There is what Professor

Tyndall aptly named the "scientific imagination"—imagination placing at the disposal of science such of her powers as are not incommunicable. The power of combining in ever-new forms such images or ideas as experience or observation has stored up is one of these. By such scientific imagining fresh hypotheses, possible explanations, new methods of solving or placing in another light stubborn and difficult facts, have often been suggested. The works of Kepler[1] the astronomer contain (it is said) the record of a vast number of such scientific imaginings. Laplace and others have regarded this as a blot on Kepler's scientific character; but Dr. Whewell has placed it in its true light. And indeed the assistance which the Imagination may render in this way to the Understanding is now fully recognized, in consequence no doubt in some considerable degree of the prominence given to it in Professor Tyndall's writings.[2] In a comparatively recent psychological[3] work a special division is assigned to the description of this feature. The author of this work, Mr. Sully, gives to this mode of exercising the Imagination a name which seems less happily chosen than Professor Tyndall's. He calls it the "cognitive imagination." To those modes of assisting the work of the Understanding which have been mentioned, Mr. Sully adds another important kind of aid which the Imagination is able to give. This he calls "picturing." An excellent example of it is at hand in the manner in which it has been found possible to deal, partially at least, with subjects lying entirely beyond the reach of sight or sense, by a visualizing process. The most powerful instruments cannot in any way make present to sense the undulatory movements of sound, light, and heat, or the chemical changes of molecules, or the ether which is supposed to pervade the universe, or the atoms which are

[1] Dr. Whewell has an interesting chapter in his *History of the Inductive Sciences* (b. v. c. iv. sect. 1) on the intellectual character of Kepler, and especially this feature of it. Cf. Whewell, *Phil. of Discovery*, pp. 119–122.

[2] See his *Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science*, 1870, and *Address as President of the British Association at Belfast in* 1874.

[3] Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 311 foll. Longmans, 1884.

thought to be its component elements. Yet these have been made to some extent the subject of reasoning by the aid of the *picturing* or *visualizing* power of the Imagination.

Let us now consider, in the second place, how the Understanding can co-operate with and render aid to the Imagination. It is the more important to do this, because there is much more risk on this side of misconception, much more possibility of confusing what belongs to the one faculty with what belongs to the other. A great poet, for example, must be a man of understanding, but it is not in virtue of his understanding that he is a great poet. All that makes his poems to be the work of a great poet, all that proves their true lineage, comes not from the Understanding but from the Imagination. The Imagination stands quite apart and alone in the exercise of her supreme gift of intuition. It is her exclusive prerogative, in exercising which her peculiar powers are greatly quickened by the sensibility and fervour of emotion which belong to the poet, but which is wholly unshared by any other *intellectual* power.

It is in giving *expression* to what she sees and feels that the Imagination requires aid. No existing modes of expression are really adequate to her requirements. The powers of language, of the pencil or the brush or the graving tool, even the harmonies of music, all fall short. The truths which come before her in her visions are, *in their fulness*, unutterable. What she sees and feels she can only partially reveal, only partially tell. She has no language of her own; she must adapt to her purposes that which she finds to her hand as best she may. The poet must be content to make language, which is a product of the *Understanding*, the vehicle for conveying as much as can be conveyed of the deep or lofty truths which he would interpret. Here, then, is both room and need for the co-operation of the Understanding. Language cannot indeed give *full* expression to imaginative thought, but it is only by such aid as language can furnish that the creations of the Imagination and her revelations of truth can be clothed at all in perceptible forms. What the

poet sees must be so expressed as to be *understood*, and for this the aid of the Understanding is of course necessary. The richer part of truth cannot indeed be comprehended by the mere understanding, nor comprised within the limits of its formulæ. But since there are no other, the poet must make use of these. And so he does, but he so uses them as to make them carry or reflect a meaning which is not their own, and which is far beyond their own. Since he cannot express directly what his soul is full of, the poet employs every kind of indirect manner of expression, metaphors, similitudes, illustrative images, allusions, associations. This use of indirect modes of expression is no doubt partly due to an innate shrinking from laying bare to the unsympathetic and uncomprehending, thoughts and feelings having a real sacredness of their own. Keble,[1] as is well known, assigned this as a principal cause of the employment of the *ambages, quas optime norunt poetæ*. But although it may be even a principal cause, it cannot be the only one. For, though poetry is largely occupied in giving veiled expression to feelings which crave for utterance in some way, but which shrink from baring themselves wholly to the rude gaze of the unthinking, it is by no means occupied altogether or solely with such feelings as these. Much of what is found in poetry is of another kind, in which there is not, or hardly at all, the same reason for avoiding open expression. And yet wherever there is real work of the Imagination, wherever, that is to say, there is real poetry, that which is of the Imagination is indeed wedded to the words employed, but is very far from being fully or openly expressed by them. The vision of the Imagination is, in fact, incapable of being uttered fully in human language. Partly, then, because he desires to throw a veil over his deeper thoughts and feelings, but partly also because he is literally unable except indirectly to express them, the poet can seldom use language in its literal meaning only. It is always a vehicle for something much more. There is a deeper, richer harmony to which it is simply an accompaniment.

[1] *Præl. Acad.*, p. 12. See also Lock's *Keble*, p. 31.

Take a single example, in which perhaps both the reasons which have been mentioned may be found blended—the impulse to conceal, and the struggle to utter the unutterable —and mark how the poet, whilst he speaks of one thing, has in the depth of his spirit another, the form of which by the force of his imagination he in a manner makes us see with him. Take one of Tennyson's latest poems, the beautiful lines called *Crossing the Bar*. All the images employed, all the objects which he sets before the eye, have a literal meaning of their own; but that is not *his* meaning. What he is thinking and feeling is something far deeper, belonging not to the things of sense which can be expressed in words framed by the Understanding, but to the things of the spirit for which as yet at least we have no adequate language. Consider only what is due to the Imagination and what to the Understanding in those two lines, which seem to contain the very heart of the poem—

> "When that which drew from out the boundless deep
> Turns again home."

What a music of the soul is in those words! How far is the literal meaning from that which swells within, reluctantly submitting to be thus confined! What is that "deep"? What is that "home"? To what does the expression "drew from out" point? Who can feel all that is in such words, or, again, in that "turning" home! Far less, then, is it expressible.

The relation between the Understanding and the Imagination as co-operative powers is an interesting one, upon which much more might be said in illustration. But perhaps enough has been said for the purpose just now in view. For what is this purpose? It is to put in a caution against the not uncommon supposition that the domain of knowledge is capable of being enlarged by the joint exercise of our intellectual faculties to a greater extent than is possible by the exercise of them singly. This is clearly a mistake. The Imagination can assist the Understanding in the operations by which that faculty seeks to gain increased comprehension

of facts and laws, but cannot make over to her her own peculiar power of intuition so as to enable her to dispense at any time with those operations. And in like manner the Understanding can assist the Imagination in giving intelligible form and expression to her visions of truth and beauty, but cannot of herself even enter into those visions, and far less add to or enlarge them. What we can become conscious of by means of the Understanding is knowledge of one kind. What we can become conscious of by means of the Imagination is knowledge of another kind. Neither faculty can increase the knowledge which is the peculiar product or fruit of the other faculty. Nor is there any third kind of knowledge which is the product of the two faculties working together. The relations between them are not of such a primary character as this, but secondary—relations of assistance in production, not of production itself.

IV.

The Spirit of man stands in two respects in a remarkable position of contrast with the Understanding and the Imagination. In the first place its exercise is not in our own power. We cannot employ what may be termed the intellectual energies of the Spirit when we will, and as we will. To a certain extent this is true respecting the Imagination and the Understanding, respecting the first in a greater, respecting the second in a less degree. There are times when the imaginative power of a poet wakes up within him he knows not how or why. There are other times when he cannot rouse it up. But its exercise is not involuntary or independent of himself in at all the same manner or degree as that of the Spirit is. And, as regards the Understanding, it seems to be always in our power to exercise it, though it may be with effort, and not always with equal energy and effect.

In the second place the Spirit appears to be not merely not dependent on the brain, or the bodily organization generally, but to have no actual relation to it. Here, again,

there are some resemblances in the case of the Understanding and the Imagination. The Understanding undoubtedly works in connection with the brain, and in a certain dependence on it. When the brain becomes exhausted, hard thinking becomes impossible. And yet this dependence on the body may for a time be kept at arm's length. Newton would continue for a whole day absorbed in calculations, without a thought, and seemingly without the need, of dining. The Imagination seems to be in a much less degree dependent on the body. Yet it is dependent on it, for the powers of imagination are always found to flag as old age approaches. Not so as regards the Spirit. During the most vigorous years of life it needs no assistance from the brain or the body. On the contrary, it requires emancipation from the restraints of the body; it seems to desire as much as possible freedom from bodily conditions, not to work through the body, but to be out of it. And when death approaches, so far from having its energies—as distinguished from those of the Understanding—weakened, it seems to exult in the prospect of its coming liberty.

Remarking these facts, remarking that there seems to be a gradation of dependence on the body—the Understanding being most dependent, the Imagination less so, and the Spirit not at all, except so far as it may be held in check by it; remarking also the gradation of superiority between the three—the Understanding being the lowest in excellence and also that which is common to all men, the Imagination being higher and rarer and more akin to the Spirit, and this last being found in abnormal conditions of exercise in a few instances only in this life, and yet being manifestly that which is highest in man:—the conclusions seem to be almost forced upon us (1) that the energies of the Spirit are held in reserve for another state of existence, and (2) that through it we may then find ourselves placed in a relation to truth and knowledge far more immediate, and conveying far more than we can possibly attain by means of the faculties which we now exercise.

The exercise of the intellectual energies of the Spirit occupies indisputably at present a very different position from the exercise of the Understanding or of the Imagination. There are in the case of the Spirit no such abundant manifestations from which a judgment may be formed respecting its character, as the experience of every day offers concerning those other faculties. Nevertheless, there are not wanting some important indications from which may be conjectured with some real probability what the relations of the human Spirit towards knowledge are now and what they may develop into in the future. Such indications are to be found principally within the sphere of spiritual life, amongst the records especially contained in the Bible. There are also some to be found in the sphere of human life generally as distinguished from life of a distinctly spiritual kind. And there are lastly a very few belonging to a sphere in which human interests have a much less prominent place.

It is not necessary to insist upon the fact that there is a spirit in man, or that it is through his spirit that man is able to enter into communion with God, the Father of Spirits. But it is important to observe that the conscious Spirit—for it is of the very essence of the Spirit to be conscious—has a consciousness which is not simply identical with our ordinary consciousness, with that of sense, for instance, or with that of the Understanding, but which is in certain respects peculiar to itself. Not that there is any reason to suppose that human consciousness is other than one and undivided, but that there is in consciousness, as connected with the Spirit, a something which seems almost to partake of infinity, which it does not exhibit in connection with our faculties generally.

It is this kinship with Infinity which especially strikes us, and that not only in regard to *what* the Spirit (and nothing but the Spirit) is able to become conscious of, but also in regard to the *manner* in which it does so.

In the first place, as regards *what* the Spirit is able to become conscious of. When St. Paul says, "Who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the Spirit of the

man which is in him?"[1] And when he proceeds to compare the relation of knowledge between man's spirit and "the things of a man" with the relation of the Divine Infinite Spirit towards the infinite "things of God," it is evident that this relation of the human Spirit stands apart on the one hand from the relation of any other of our faculties towards things knowable, and that on the other hand it approaches towards that highest relation of knowledge truly infinite which exists between the Divine Spirit and "the things of God." With this agrees the fact that it is the human Spirit, as distinguished from any other faculty in man, to which is universally assigned in Scripture the power of seeing God-given visions and receiving God-given revelations. The gift of speaking in a mystic tongue is also described as an exercise of the human Spirit. The Spirit is thus found to be capable of being made cognizant of mysteries of knowledge which no merely intellectual faculty of ours can reach to. The Spirit alone knows the secrets of the man's own inner being, not certainly with that perfection and fulness with which God knows them, but with a knowledge to which nothing else in man can attain. The Spirit receives communications from God which it alone can receive. The Spirit, enabled, under the influence of the Spirit of God, to speak in an unknown tongue, does so with a consciousness of its own, which is not shared by the man's own understanding. Finally, the Spirit is capable in a special manner —and we may be sure in a manner full of that consciousness which is peculiar to it—of union with God in Christ. For "he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit."[2]

Outside the sphere of strictly spiritual life, there are also in the general sphere of human life, and apart from any guaranteed co-operation of the Spirit of God with the human Spirit, evidences respecting the powers of the Spirit which have at any rate the character of facts requiring to be explained or accounted for. Such are the instances of particulars respecting persons or transactions or scenes being

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 11. [2] 1 Cor. vi. 17.

accurately described by persons standing at such a distance either in place or in time from what was described as to preclude the possibility of their knowing them by any of the ordinary means of knowledge. Making all allowances for deliberate imposition, for self-deceiving, or for whatever could in any way make such instances nugatory, it will probably be admitted that there are some which cannot be thus eliminated or set aside. And, indeed, if there have been such phenomena of the Spirit within the strictly spiritual sphere, it would be strange if no similar manifestations were found in the sphere of human life and activity beyond it. The instances referred to seem to lie in the same plane with those of which an account is given in Scripture as exhibiting a relation of consciousness towards objects obtained through the Spirit, which is quite different from the relation obtained through the Understanding. Instances there are also which seem to lie in the same plane with the Scriptural account of speaking in a mystic tongue. Such are more rare than those of so-called second-sight. Two, which seem worth quoting, are related by Dr. John Abercrombie in his interesting work on the *Intellectual Powers*.[1] Dr. Abercrombie, besides having been trained by his medical education to habits of accurate observation and description, was evidently a careful and conscientious writer; we may therefore reasonably accept as authentic what he tells us. He expressly describes the following statements as "appearing to be authentic," and they are, he adds, "sufficiently remarkable."

In the French work from which the first instance was taken, two females, being in a condition described as "extase," were related to have expressed themselves "very distinctly" in Latin. They had some previous acquaintance with the language, but it was imperfect. Neither quickening of the Memory nor of the Understanding—instances of which, under abnormal bodily conditions, are by no means rare[2]—

[1] Abercrombie, *Intellectual Powers*, 2nd ed., p. 313, *sq.* Edinburgh, 1831.
[2] See *Id. ib.*, pp. 149–152, 324, 357.

seems capable of accounting for a knowledge going, as it appears, considerably beyond what they possessed previously. For memory can only reproduce what has actually passed before it; and the Understanding, though its action may be very rapid when materials are before it, is not intuitive, and can do nothing without materials.

In the second instance, "an ignorant servant girl," under similar conditions, "showed an astonishing knowledge of geography and astronomy; and expressed herself, in her own language, in a manner which, though often ludicrous, showed an understanding of the subject." There was a basis in this case also. The girl had overheard a tutor giving instructions to the young people of the family. The fact of her expressing herself in her own language proves that it was no mere case of a quickened memory. There certainly was a quickening of the Understanding; but it seems difficult to believe that there was nothing more than this; what is presented seems much more like the action of a power greater than that of the Understanding, seizing the object directly and without those intermediate processes of comparison which the Understanding requires. One would be inclined to think that in the ludicrous forms of expression which the girl employed was to be seen the working of an understanding quickened indeed but labouring; and in what was seized and attempted to be expressed the conquest of a power greater than that of the Understanding, namely, the power of the girl's Spirit.

The *manner* in which the human Spirit comes to attain its peculiar knowledge gives further evidence of the distinctness of this form of consciousness from those which belong to the Understanding or the Imagination. For before the powers of the Spirit can be exercised there seems to be always required a suspension of our other faculties, and a release in some manner from the enthralment of the body. To be "in the spirit"—the human spirit—means being "withdrawn from the relations of ordinary life,"[1] being or

[1] Lee (in *Speaker's Commentary*) on Rev. i. 10. See also the good note

standing out of them ἐν ἐκστάσει. Moreover St. Paul sharply contrasts the conscious activity of the Spirit in the case of the person speaking in a mystic tongue with the inactivity and unconsciousness of the Understanding whilst the Spirit is at work. "The Spirit prayeth, but the Understanding is unfruitful."[1] It seems most probable that we are to suppose the action of the Spirit under these circumstances—that is, during the exercise of its special functions—to be inconsistent with the exercise at the same time of the powers of the Understanding. What the Spirit is capable of being made conscious of appears to be represented as transcending both in character and in extent what can be *understood*—that is, comprehended by the Understanding; and for this reason (namely, because its objects are not *in pari materia* with those of the Understanding) the Spirit must energize apart. The efforts of the Understanding to enter a region which is really beyond its ken would be useless if not embarrassing. Nevertheless it would seem that, though simultaneous action of the Understanding and of the Spirit is either impossible or undesirable, the Understanding might have communicated to it from God, perhaps in immediate sequence, as much of the vision of the (human) Spirit as it was capable of comprehending, and so of transmitting to others. "Let him that speaketh in a tongue pray that he may interpret."[2] He must pray that he may interpret, because he cannot of himself transfer, wholly or in part, the vision of his spirit to his understanding. But this may be given him in answer to prayer, and then—though not till then—he will be able to communicate to others what he himself has entered into first with his spirit, and, afterwards, in a lower degree, with his understanding. At first "he holds high converse with God in the shrine of his own transfigured spirit, between

of Düsterdieck (*Meyer's Kommentar*) on the same verse. Cf. 2 Cor. v. 13, ἐξέστημεν. In Dan. vii. 15 the description of the spirit as unquiet in its "sheath," and impatiently springing upward, forcibly illustrates the condition of enthralment by which its energies are in this life held down. See note *in loc.* in *Speaker's Commentary*.

[1] 1 Cor. xiv. 14. See Ellicott's note. [2] 1 Cor. xiv. 13.

which and the thinking faculty or *noûs* communications are intercepted and suspended during the ecstasy. How, then, can his ecstatic utterances, unless they have passed through the reflective *noûs* into *logos* or rational and articulated speech, become utterances intelligible to ordinary men?"[1] This they may do, either through the agency of the Understanding of the mystic speaker himself, or of some bystander. It seems that the revelation was made sometimes to the Understanding of the man himself, sometimes to that of another.[2]

There may not improbably be less incompatibility of concurrent action of the *Imagination* and of the Spirit than exists in the case of the Understanding. The latter is clearly the lowest of our cognitive powers. The Imagination shows, on the contrary, tokens of kinship with the Spirit, and also tokens that something like a suspension of the Understanding occasionally takes place, perhaps is required, when it is engaged in its loftiest efforts of imaginative consciousness, similar to the suspension which, as we have seen, is required to give the Spirit free scope. Thus poets have been known to declare that they were unable to say exactly what their own meaning was in some of their utterances. In the case of the prophets of the Old Testament, the use of the Imagination was (Archdeacon Lee[3] thought) continued in dreams and ecstasy. "The infusion of the spiritual influence" suspended (he supposed) "the usual succession of ideas, and the ordinary current of thought."[4] That is to say, there was a complete suspension of the action of the Understanding; but this would not perhaps preclude some concurrence of the Imagination with the peculiar energies of the Spirit.

The relation between the Spirit and our other cognitive faculties may not always be of precisely the same kind. There may be in some cases possibilities of co-operation which at other times there could not be. If the energies of the Spirit should be called into operation not upon objects —such as those "unutterable things" which were presented

[1] Evans (in *Speaker's Commentary*) on 1 Cor. xiv. 2.
[2] 1 Cor. xiv. 27. [3] *Inspiration*, p. 176. [4] *Id. ib.*, p. 175.

to the Spirit of St. Paul when he was caught up into Paradise and into the third heaven—wholly transcending the forms of which our ordinary faculties are perceptive, but upon others not in themselves entirely beyond the range or power of the Imagination or even of the Understanding, it would be natural in such cases that these lower faculties should bear their part with the Spirit.

The kind of truth which is especially the object of the cognizance of the Spirit is further shown by the fact that moral conditions are sometimes found to be not merely useful, but (as it would seem) essential to the exercise of its energies. A hint of this kind appears to be given when St. John remarks that it was "on the Lord's day" when, in Patmos, he was first placed in the condition of one in the spirit.[1] Such conditions are, indeed, necessary for the contemplation of the loftiest objects of thought by the aid of any of our faculties. It is, therefore, no more than we should expect, that the energies of the Spirit should be most unimpeded when accompanied with purity of heart. The union of this condition (aided moreover by voluntary abstinence[2]) with elevation of soul—all contributing to place the Spirit in the best condition for receiving the visions of God—is very clearly shown in the instance of Daniel.

Since both these conditions—enfranchisement in some manner or degree from the body, and moral purity—seem to be requisite in order to the Spirit's attaining full power to exercise its energies, it is evident that this fact must have an important bearing upon the question of our Lord's having, as Man, enjoyed during His whole earthly life what is called the beatific vision. Something more will have to be said on this subject on another occasion. Here it may be sufficient to remark that the perpetual presence of one of these conditions—namely, absolute moral purity—may have made the other condition—detachment from the body—to a great extent unnecessary or less necessary. We can, at any rate, not think otherwise than that a spirit absolutely holy,

[1] Rev. i. 10. [2] Dan. ix. 3; x. 2, 3.

absolutely stainless, as our Lord's human spirit was, and absolutely in union, not only hypostatically but morally, with God, must have been in a condition for seeing what the Spirit alone is capable of seeing, far superior to that of any other human spirit (with the partial exception of Adam in his state of innocence before the Fall), and that without any infringement of the truth of humanity or of the conditions of earthly life.

On a general view of the knowledge or of the enlargement of consciousness, which is obtainable by means of the Understanding, of the Imagination, and of the Spirit respectively, we can hardly fail to be struck by the clearly marked lines which separate their several provinces. The Understanding gives us possession of truth of fact, *material* truth. The Imagination gives us admittance into the heart of *moral* truth. The Spirit enables those who are pure in heart to pass beyond the conditions of time and space, to see the outskirts of the vision of the King in His beauty, and to apprehend, with an apprehension different from and superior to that of the Understanding, God's highest revelations of *Divine* truth. As yet, indeed, we have but glimpses of what may ultimately be ours through the energies and action of the human Spirit. The grossness of our present bodily frame exercises a kind of thraldom over our Spirit. Even the release from the body which death will bring may not enable the Spirit to manifest all its power. But when at the Resurrection the whole relation of body, soul, and spirit shall be changed, and the Spirit shall have had given to it its rightful position of supremacy in our being in connection with the spiritual body, then it does seem something more than probable that—since the Spirit is unquestionably that within us which is nearest to God and the true medium of communication with Him—it will prove capable of admitting us to the participation of hidden mysteries of knowledge which are far beyond the capacity of the Understanding, or even of the Imagination, to approach.

And, finally, what a view is here offered of the character of human knowledge! Not of its extent—that were little to say—but of its character! Of the knowable as it is in itself, and as it is known or perceived in one or two relations by us! How far short must what we call *understanding* fall of a real comprehension of the knowable! With the Understanding we approach it as it were on one side. With the Imagination we find ourselves touching it on quite another side, and in a different manner. And we have a prevision of finding ourselves one day able, when the Spirit shall have become within us all that it is capable of becoming, to attain a comprehension of an order differing from and higher than either of these, and, as we cannot help feeling, more akin to that of beings who are nearer than ourselves to the Infinite Being. To what conclusion do these considerations point? Do they not indicate the very strong probability of there being modes of knowing which are not merely more powerful modes of the same kind as ours, but actually of a nature and character *unlike* ours? A physical illustration may help to make what is meant more clear. "Two-thirds of the rays emitted by the sun fail to arouse in the eye the sense of vision. The rays exist, but the visual organ requisite for their translation into light does not exist."[1] Even so two-thirds of the knowable may be unknown by us, not because our faculties have not been exercised with sufficient energy or perseverance, not because their present power is unequal to the effort required, but because only another mode of knowing, differing in kind from any which we possess, could receive and translate into the light of consciousness those now unseen and unfelt rays. The import of this conclusion, in its bearing upon the relation of omniscience to human faculties of knowledge, is what we must next consider.

[1] Tyndall, *Scientific Limit of the Imagination*, p. 65.

CHAPTER IV.

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMAN KNOWING AND DIVINE KNOWING OR OMNISCIENCE.

ANY comparison which can be made between human modes of knowing and Omniscience must, of course, be very imperfect. For, in order to institute anything like a really correct and adequate comparison, it is obviously necessary that we should be thoroughly acquainted with both the objects compared. And this, in the present case, is plainly impossible. For, in order to comprehend what Omniscience is, one must be omniscient. Nevertheless, although we are incapable of forming any even approximately adequate conceptions of a *positive* kind respecting Omniscience or the Divine manner of knowing, and must be contented with *negative* ideas respecting it, such negative notions may be definite enough in regard to the consequences which they involve, for it to be possible to build upon them conclusions possessing at any rate a very high degree of probability.

Discussion of the subject of the Divine knowledge has naturally found a place in all the most important treatises on dogmatic theology. It may be sufficient here to refer to the treatment of it by St. Thomas Aquinas,[1] as professedly combining all that may be drawn from revelation on the one hand, and from reason on the other; by Dionysius Petavius,[2] the learned collector of the thoughts and judgments of the Fathers, and of other writers anterior to the Schoolmen;

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I. Qu. xiv. vol. i. pp. 114–137. Paris, 1880.

[2] *Theol. Dogm.*, lib. iv. cc. i.–xi. vol. i. pp. 334–402, ed. Fournials. Paris, 1865.

and by our own Bishop Pearson,[1] who, whilst professedly following in his admirable *Lectures on God and His Attributes*, the scholastic method and, in particular, the manner of treatment adopted by Aquinas, was enabled, by reason of his very extensive learning and ample grasp of mind, to deal with this loftiest of subjects with a force and clearness and fulness which were altogether his own, and which remain unsurpassed, as far as the present writer is aware, by anything which has been written upon it since.

It will not be necessary to follow these great writers in the details of their treatment of the subject, and still less to enter upon the discussion of any debatable points. In all more important conclusions there is full agreement between them, and it is with these alone that we need now concern ourselves. It will be sufficient to bring into view such broad outlines as no one probably will be disposed to question in regard, first, to the extent and compass of God's illimitable knowledge, and, secondly, to the manner in which He knows. From such a survey in itself, all inadequate as it must be to the Divine reality which we seek to contemplate, and still more from what it will be seen to involve, we ought, at any rate, to be able to satisfy ourselves whether it is possible to regard the Divine and the human modes of knowing as being in the same plane, or whether we can reasonably suppose them to be other than differing radically from one another.

As regards, in the first place, the extent and compass of God's illimitable knowledge—what must it be taken to include?

1. The first object of God's knowledge is Himself. And, in order to form even a faint idea of what this means, we ought to consider how absolutely measureless is the gulf between God Himself, the One Uncreated Eternal and Infinite Being, and all which is not God. It is for this reason that God only can know God. No created intelligence

[1] *De Deo et Attributis Ejus*, Lect. xv.–xix. Minor Works, vol. i. pp. 149–205, ed. Churton.

could span the abyss between whatsoever God has created and God the Creator Himself. Far less could any such finite intelligence comprehend the infinite perfection of God. God only can know God. And God's knowledge of Himself is of course a perfect knowledge—a knowledge of all the mystery (to us so unfathomable) of His Triune Being and Personality, yea, of all the "deep things"[1] of Him Who, since our understandings can receive no real conception of what He is, names Himself by a name by which His inexpressibleness is declared—I AM THAT I AM.

2. The second object of God's knowledge is all that He has called into being beside Himself—all the material worlds, and all the orders of living and intelligent and spiritual beings, from the lowest creature that hath life to the Cherubim and Seraphim who are before His throne. God's knowing of these is a knowing which passes through and through them and enfolds them utterly in itself, comprehending them alike individually and in all the complexity of their manifold relations with an all-perfect knowledge. All the laws by which he has ordered their existence and their action and interaction are always before Him, with all their hidden links of connection, wheel within wheel, the material subserving the moral, the moral rising into and uniting itself with the spiritual.

3. The third object of God's knowledge is "the counsel of His own will"[2]—that will in which are united perfect wisdom, perfect power, and perfect love. We name this counsel of God His Providence, because by it He has appointed beforehand that all which He has made shall work out that which is His will—those things or those creatures on which He has bestowed no gift of reason or of choice, according to the fixed laws of their several natures; and those higher beings, on whom He has conferred the mystery of a will having even over against His Infinite will a real though not unlimited freedom of its own, according to those moral laws which direct the ultimate issues of the action and

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 10. [2] Ephes. i. 11.

the life of free, personal, creatures. This counsel of God's Providence, constituting or including the government of the universe, of which we perceive dimly and by fragments only such portions as He Who made us has in His wisdom seen fit to reveal to us, is in its totality, from the beginning to its final conclusion and development, in its broadest features and in its minutest details, alike as belonging to what we call Time and to what we call Eternity, naked and open before Him. In it He is manifested Who is Perfect Power, Wisdom, Love, Holiness. It is an unfolding of the mind of the Creator, and, being such, must be possessed by Him with an absolute knowledge.

4. The fourth object of God's knowledge is all which is in the consciousness—in the mind, in the thoughts and purposes, in the heart and will—of any of the creatures whom He has called into being, and, indeed, of what will be called into being in the future. The consciousness of all, whether it be developed or undeveloped, whether known or unperceived by themselves, whether that which will actually pass into clear perception and act, or that which, being dependent on something else (as the men of Keilah giving up David in case of Saul's coming and demanding him of them), may or may not emerge from the recesses whence it would have birth—is all equally clear and fully known to Him.

5. The fifth object of God's knowledge is all which not being in existence might exist, all which it has not pleased Him to call into being, but which, if He willed, might be—all, in short, which, beside that which does exist and is known by God as existing, has any possibility, on condition of His willing it, of coming to be. Worlds not yet formed, counsels of Providence which may only begin to be unfolded in what is to us a far-off eternity—if such there be—must be in absolute clearness before the mind of Him of Whom we read that "known unto God are all His works from the beginning."[1] And not less all which never will, perhaps, exist, but which might exist, and so enter into the sphere of the

[1] Acts xv. 18; cf. Ecclus. xxiii. 20.

knowable, on the one condition of His willing them to be. That which will be, and that which might be, are alike in the possession of God, because it is from Him only that they could have any being.

Thus the knowable in its fullest extent—both what is and what might possibly be—is, and has eternally been, before the mind of God. All is before Him in its entirety, not in some aspects, but in all aspects, with omission of nothing which is included in it, or enters into it, or is related to it. There is nothing, actual or possible, which is not wholly manifest in His sight. For "all things are naked and open unto the eyes of Him with Whom we have to do."[1]

In the next place we have to consider the *manner* in which the mind of God embraces the length and breadth and depth and height of His illimitable knowledge. Here again we can evidently form no *positive* conception of what we attempt to contemplate. We cannot enter by experience into the Divine manner of knowing. We cannot know *as* He knows any more than we can know *all which* He knows. Nevertheless there are certain statements which, as it seems, not only may be made, but must be made respecting God's manner of knowing, statements which to those who have thought on the subject have always seemed to be unavoidable conclusions, and which are sufficiently definite and of great importance. They fall very far short, no doubt, of a *description* of the Divine manner of knowing, yet, if they give clear evidence that that mode of knowing must include certain features, we need not for our present purpose of comparison require more.

Let us then carefully note the significance of the following particulars.

1. God's knowing is eternally and unchangeably one and the same. What His knowledge is now it was before the worlds were made. God does not come to know: He simply knows. He knows in such sort that nothing can at any time be added to the knowledge which has been eternally one and the same in Him, neither can anything ever be taken from it.

[1] Heb. iv. 13.

He knew all things before He created them as perfectly as He knows them now. "The world (says St. Augustine strikingly) could not have existed unless it had been first known to God; but without having first existed it could not be known by us."[1]

2. God does not know by the exercise of faculties of knowledge as we do. This follows from what has just been said: for if God's knowledge is eternal and unchangeable and precedent to the existence of all things created, it is evident that it can be in no way acquired, or dependent in any manner or degree on the exercise of faculties. It cannot be acquired from things created, since it preceded them. It cannot be acquired from any exercise internal to God Himself, since it is eternal. The exercise of faculties in any way is excluded by the supposition of eternity and unchangeableness; for the exercise of faculties implies both growth and change. We cannot look upon God's knowledge as being both eternal and unchangeable, and also the result of the exercise of faculties; for these are contradictory suppositions. But it is impossible to suppose God's knowledge not to be eternal and unchangeable without supposing the same respecting God Himself. Therefore, since the very idea of God is of a Being eternal and unchangeable, we can only conclude that God's knowing is not through faculties, but is simply co-eternal and co-equal with Himself.

3. God's knowing is therefore not really distinguishable from His Being or Essence. There is, in fact, no kind of composition which can be supposed in God.[2] He is, as our Article says, without "parts."[3] The composition of either parts or faculties is so plainly a mark of imperfection that all the greatest thinkers have been entirely of one mind in affirming that there can be nothing like composition in God.[4]

[1] St. Aug. *De Civ. Dei*, xi. 10, qu. by Petavius *ubi sup.* p. 345. Cf. Aug. *De Trin.*, xv. 13: Non quia sunt, ideo novit; sed ideo sunt, quia novit.

[2] Bp. Pearson, in his admirable fifth Lecture, *De Simplicitate Dei*, shows this in detail.

[3] *Thirty-nine Articles*, Art. i.

[4] St. Augustine's thoughts on this subject, expressed in many places of

It is indeed quite out of our power to represent to ourselves this truth as it really is. Yet we may feel it to be quite impossible to suppose the reality to be otherwise. We may feel that there is an axiomatic certainty in the proposition that *omnis perfectio in identitatem collecta, perfectior est earundem perfectionum multiplicitate.*[1] We say unhesitatingly with Hooker, "Our God is One, or rather *Very Oneness;*"[2] or with St. Bernard, "Deus *unissimus* est."[3] God then must know directly by and of Himself, without the intervention of any sort of instrumentality either without or within Himself. Nothing can come between His knowing and that which He knows. We shall not, perhaps, be wrong if we say that God knows with all that Himself is, or, that His knowing is as infinite as His Being, and is not distinguishable from it.[4]

Now, when we compare what we are able to set before the mind respecting the Divine knowing with the previous description of human faculties of knowledge and what they are able to attain, we cannot of course fail to be struck by the greatness of the differences between them. The difference in extent and compass is so great as to be not easily expressible. The difference in the perfection of comprehension is not less great. And greatest of all is the difference between the Divine manner of knowing and our own. And on reflection the conclusion seems to be one not to be avoided, that there is a correlation between the extent and perfection of the Divine knowledge on the one hand, and the Divine manner of knowing on the other; that God could not know Himself as He does perfectly, nor all which He has made with that thoroughness which results from all being the out-

his writings, are summarized with striking terseness by Dr. A. Dorner (*Augustinus*, p. 17): "Wissen, Wollen, Handeln, Leben, Sein ist in Gott Ein und Dasselbe."

[1] Pearson, *Lect.* iv. p. 40.

[2] *Eccles. Pol.*, I. ii. 2.

[3] *Serm.* 80, *in Cant.*, n. 6.

[4] Klee (*Dogmatik*, p. 272, 4 Aufl.) shows that the essential identity between God's Being and His knowledge is quite consistent with the formal distinction from Him of the objects of His knowledge.

come and manifestation of His own mind, nor all the mystery of the counsel of His providence, and still less all which, not being, might possibly be, unless His manner of knowing were what we have seen cause for believing it to be. And this is for us a very important reflection. For it leads directly to the further conclusion, that the Divine manner of knowing must be *radically* different from ours.

Let us consider. Let us recall to mind what we have seen to be the characteristics of human knowledge and the human manner of knowing.

The contrast between the Divine knowing and our knowing comes out with increasingly striking emphasis as we contemplate each severally in regard to extent, perfection, and character.

As regards, in the first place, the *extent* of each. We have seen that the Divine knowing embraces (1) the infinitude of the Divine Being and Essence; (2) the entire contents of the universe of created things and beings, in all their manifold variety; (3) the counsel of God respecting all His creatures from its first beginnings to its final development; (4) all which either actually is in the present, or certainly, or even conditionally, will be in the future, in the hearts and minds and wills and whole consciousness of His creatures: and (5) besides all which actually has come into existence, or will come into existence, or be done in the future, everything also which could possibly come into existence, or might possibly be done, if God willed that so it should be.

Now, we have not merely to contrast with this immeasurable knowledge of God the insignificant proportions of human knowledge as it is now, or as by any conceivable growth and development or enlargement it might become. What we have to ask ourselves is whether the knowable, being what it is in the Divine mind, could by any possibility be known or perceived by minds such as ours. As regards the mere extent of the knowable, we must surely answer this question in the negative. Each of the particulars mentioned as belonging to the knowable and as known by God partakes in some

degree of infinitude. God Himself is wholly infinite. What is the mind and counsel of God? What is all which God hath made but to us relatively infinite? Have we faculties which can in any way lay hold of far the greater part of that which is to God both knowable and known? Conviction is brought home to us in many ways—by the entire failure of all efforts to grasp it, by the examination of our faculties, by the confession of all who, from whatever point of view, have contemplated the mystery—that the Infinite in itself, and, by consequence, the true relations of the Infinite with the Finite, are wholly beyond our comprehension. We should fall far short of the truth in saying that we *do* not know God in His infinitude. What we ought to say, and what we must acknowledge, whether we like it or not, is that we *cannot* comprehend the infinitude of God. God has made such a revelation of Himself to us as was fitted for our finite faculties. He presents Himself to us in those personal relations which He, as the Creator Spirit, has been pleased to establish with us as created spirits. But the whole infinitude of God neither has been, nor could be, revealed to us. And though in our personal relations with God, we may indeed have a most blessed apprehension of Him as our God and Father, yet even so neither mind nor heart nor spirit is able so to embrace Him as to comprehend His infinitude. When, therefore, we contemplate on the one hand God's uncomprehended and incomprehensible infinitude, and on the other hand the finiteness of our faculties and capacity, the conclusion seems inevitable, that between God's knowing and such comprehension as is possible for us there must be a difference, not merely of degree, but of kind.

As we examine further the extent of God's knowledge, we find everywhere confirmations of the correctness of this conclusion. Can we imagine that nothing but time and opportunity is wanting to enable us to search out fully the mysteries of the created universe? The structure of our faculties being what it is, would they ever be able to accomplish this? Would any mere enlargement or heightening of

their power, without a change of structure, make this possible? Would not those limitations of the Understanding which have been described, and which we saw to be inherent in its structure, form just as potent barriers to its progress under any conceivable increase of its actual power? Would such increase supply it with the power of intuition which now it has not? Would it enable our understandings to grapple with the complexity of physical phenomena? or with the far greater complexity of the counsels of God's Providence? Would it enable them to penetrate the secrets of man's inner heart and being? What is the force of the word "only" in the saying of Scripture[1] concerning God, "Thou, even Thou *only*, knowest the hearts of all the children of men," but to set apart God's knowing as unique and having no counterpart, either in degree or in kind, in the knowledge of created beings? And still more does this seem to be proclaimed by God's knowledge of the future, of things conditioned and dependent, of that which will not be, but might be and, given a particular condition, would be; and, lastly, of all which could possibly be created, and, consequently, of all which can enter into the sphere of the knowable, either as existing or meant to exist, or as non-existent and not intended to exist, but which, if God willed, might come to be. When, in contemplation of such things we cry, as cry we must, "Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me; I cannot attain unto it,"[2] the thought which underlies our feeling is not merely that God's knowledge infinitely surpasses ours, but that in its very nature His knowing must be of a different order from ours.

When we consider the *perfection* of God's knowing, additional and very weighty grounds for this conclusion present themselves. For, in speaking of the perfection of God's knowing, what we mean is that whereas our faculties enable us to contemplate the knowable only in one or two of its manifold relations, God's knowing embraces it wholly and perfectly. Just as we are able to look upon the moon only on one

[1] 1 Kings viii. 39. [2] Ps. cxxxix. 6, P.B.V.

side, since that bright satellite never turns any other towards us, so do we look upon the knowable only as it is presented to our faculties, and as it is related to them. The mind, like the eye, can receive only such rays as its structure fits it to receive. And we are sure that the knowable does not enter and cannot be received in its totality and fulness into the consciousness of man. Equally certain is it that it is absolutely possessed by God. What, then, can we conclude but that God's knowing, in which the knowable is contained wholly, is knowing of a kind, and not only of degree, far higher than ours?

Once more. Some glimpses we have of God's *manner* of knowing. They are no more than glimpses, and from them we can form no positive conception of what God's knowing really is. Yet, though neither by experience nor in any other way are we able to comprehend it in its real nature, we cannot but believe that it is not such as ours. We cannot believe that God's knowing is merely part-by-part knowing as ours is; we cannot but believe it to be all-at-once knowing. God's knowing must be, we feel, what God Himself is—unchangeable, eternal, all-embracing. Again, we cannot believe that God knows by the exercise of faculties of knowledge. That would imply that once He knew not; it would imply that He, like us, comes to know, instead of knowing all eternally and unchangeably. And, since we cannot suppose this, we are led on further to conclude that God has no *media* of knowing, that He knows by Himself and of Himself, that His knowing is not to be distinguished from His Being, that when we speak of the Mind of God we use an inadequate form of speech, since God does not merely possess mind or will as we do, but He is whatever we speak of Him as possessing. It is evident that we cannot further grasp such a thought as this. But thus much, at least, we cannot help seeing, that if God's knowing is identical with His Being, then there must be as great a difference between His manner of knowing and our manner of knowing as there is between His infinite Being and our finite being.

This, then, is the conclusion to which the comparison of God's knowing with our own, as far as we are able to make any comparison between them in respect either of extent, or completeness, or character, seems necessarily to conduct us. God knows in a manner of which we can form no positive conception, but which it seems impossible to doubt must be *different* from our manner of knowing, not only as regards its extent and perfection, but also *in its nature and kind.*

Such a conclusion is of the deepest importance in reference to the present subject. For, it is to be observed, not only are we constrained to regard the Divine infinite knowing as being unlike and different in kind as well as degree from our finite knowing, but the one would seem to be so unlike the other as to leave actually only one point of resemblance between them. And what is even this? It is that in both cases there is what must be described as mental possession of objects. And yet, when we have said this, we are almost compelled to take our words back again. For how can we speak of that eternal and unchangeable possession of the knowable which is inherent in God and inseparable from His Being, as resembling that mental possession of the little which we can know, which is not inherent in us, but can only be acquired with labour, and which, when acquired, is only held or possessed in a feeble fashion which is not eternal, not unchangeable, not inseparable from ourselves? Plainly in whatever way we contemplate what we can discern of the Divine knowing, and our own knowing, it is not the likeness between them, but the unlikeness which grows continually upon us. Just as the gulf between finite beings and the One Eternal and Infinite Uncreated Being seems to grow wider and wider (as respects not the relations between that Being and ourselves, but what He is and what we are), as we steadily contemplate His Infinity, so is it also when we contemplate the Mind of minds, to which knowing belongs as its very substance, and contrast with its limitless and unchanging vision the puny faculties by which we slowly come to know partially some portion of the knowable—

faculties which are wholly governed and limited by the primal law which they have received, and which in all their working are strictly subject to the limitations which it imposes.

Probably all who will take the pains to bring before their minds the several features of contrast between the Divine manner of knowing and our own, and to weigh the amazing differences which (though, in the case of the Divine knowing, we cannot comprehend the very nature of that which is before us) we cannot but perceive at any rate to be existing, will readily admit that it is the *unlikeness* between them which ever more and more forcibly impresses itself upon us. We feel that if it had been possible to find any other terms than those which we employ to describe the characteristics of our own mode of knowing, in order to express more fitly that knowing which God only has and, indeed, is, we should most certainly have used them.

Here, then, is the first landing-stage of our argument. As regards human faculties of knowledge and the human mind in general, and its manner of knowing, we find, on comparing them with what we are able to discern of the Divine manner of knowing, that we are looking at two things which differ very greatly in kind as well as in degree, and, perhaps, not less in the one respect than in the other. We have next to carry these results on to what is the real heart of our subject. We have to consider what bearing the conclusion which so far we have reached will have upon the relation, in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ, between God knowing after the Divine manner, and God Incarnate knowing also according to the very property and laws of the nature which He took and made His own. As the human nature itself as a whole was not swallowed up by reason of the closeness of its union with the Divine Nature, but remained in all its truth human nature still, so we may be sure that every part of that nature, and therefore the mind with all its faculties, remained also unaltered, and continued to operate and to be exercised in accordance with those laws and limitations which we experience in ourselves. But,

accepting this as certain, can we form any conception of the relation thus established between Divine omniscience in our Lord, and the limited human consciousness which He took? Whether we can do so or not, and how far it may be possible, we have now to examine. What measure of success we may have in this examination will depend upon the distinctness with which that unlikeness between the Divine knowing and our human manner of knowing (the reality of which has now been, it is hoped, clearly shown) is kept in view. The great importance of this can hardly fail to be recognized. And, if it be also recognized that this unlikeness has hitherto not been so fully searched into as its importance requires, it will not perhaps be thought that too much space has been given to the examination of it in this and the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER V.

THE RELATION BETWEEN OUR LORD'S HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND HIS OMNISCIENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONCLUSION.

In the preceding chapter we have had in view the contrast between Divine Omniscience and what man, as man, is capable of in the matter of knowledge. We have seen that human faculties of knowledge limit us, by their very constitution, to a range which, compared with Omniscience, is infinitesimally small. And we have also seen that comparison of the procedure to which the constitution of our faculties limits them with what may be discerned respecting the Divine manner of knowing, almost constrains us to conclude that God knowing and man's knowledge are distinguished by differences not of degree only, but of kind. The qualifying word "almost" is added only because we are not able to form any *positive* conception of that Divine knowing which is really one with the Divine Being, and therefore we cannot speak with the certainty which a positive conception would justify; but the only conclusion to be formed, from what we are able to make out, certainly seems to be that there is a difference in *kind*—and that a very great difference—between our manner of knowing and that which is peculiar to God.

We have now to consider what we may perhaps call these facts in their bearing upon the relation of our Lord's knowledge as God to His knowledge as Man.

And, in the first place, let us note some features of *His* humanity, as distinguished from that of humanity in general,

which have special importance in reference to the point we are now coming to. The most notable feature of difference, viz. His Personality, will come before us presently.

From the psychological point of view, with which alone we are at present concerned, we could expect nothing else than that our Lord, as the Second Adam, the one Perfect Representative of humanity, having in Him none of the entailed consequences of sin, none of its blighting and weakening and darkening effects, would be in respect of His faculties of knowledge, as well as in all other respects, at the highest point of excellence. Whatever human faculties of knowledge are anyway capable of, that we should most certainly expect that His would be capable of.

Again, looking to the fact of the hypostatic union, we could, from the psychological point of view, place no limit upon what our Lord's human faculties of knowledge might *receive*, except that of natural capacity. Whatever a human understanding, or a human imagination, or a human spirit might, as such, be recipient of, that plainly not only might, but would, in all probability, have been communicated to our Lord's understanding and imagination and spirit.

One limit only can be supposed, psychologically speaking, though from the theological point of view, and having regard to the purposes of the Incarnation, it is conceivable that there might be others. This is, that whatever is strictly essential to the constitution of human nature and human faculties, should have been maintained as entirely in our Lord as in any of us. If His faculties of knowledge had been rendered capable either of attaining by their own exercise or of receiving what could not be attained or received except by an alteration of their constitution, the truth of our Lord's humanity would evidently have been overthrown. We cannot, therefore, suppose that anything like this took place. His manner of knowing must have been that manner of knowing which is proper to man, and must have been accompanied with all such limitations as are essential to it. And this would apply to His receiving as well as to the active exercise

of His faculties. In both cases He must have acquired as Man and received as Man.

Hence it will be seen to follow that whatever limit the *constitution* of our faculties imposes upon the range of human knowledge, that limit must have prevailed in the case of our Lord as well as in our own. And whatever manner of knowing we are tied to by the constitution of our faculties, that, we may reverently feel assured, our Lord, as Man, was restricted to also.

If, then, we are entitled (as it would seem that we are) to regard our Lord's human faculties of knowledge as having been, *in respect of constitution*, precisely such as all men have —although in excellence, and in regard to what, without change of constitution, they may have received, they were exalted to far higher perfection—it does not seem very difficult to discern the kind of relation which there would be between them and His Divine Omniscience, so long as we only have in view the two natures in themselves, without regard to the manner of their union in His Person.

For no degree of excellence or of power, and nothing which they might receive, so long as no change of constitution was involved, would bring them appreciably nearer to the Divine Omniscience. And in like manner they would be kept apart from one another—the Divine from the human—and protected, as it were, from amalgamating or coalescing or blending with each other, by their constitutional unlikeness. Whatever the Divine consciousness or the Divine knowing may really be in itself—and this we cannot know—we can see strong reasons for believing it to be actually *unlike* our human consciousness and manner of knowing. And this unlikeness would be cause sufficient for our Lord's Divine consciousness and knowing having remained in Him separate from His human consciousness and manner of knowing—separate though united—as truly under the conditions of the hypostatic union as apart from those conditions.

Whilst, then, we contemplate only the two Natures of our blessed Lord as we have now been doing, it does not seem

very difficult to realize the mutual relation of that to which in the one and in the other we give (as our poverty of conception obliges us to do) the common names of "consciousness" and "knowing." We conceive His Divine knowing to have been unalterably all that the Divine knowing must be. We conceive further that, as Man, He had a human consciousness and manner of knowing not constitutionally differing from what we ourselves possess. And we conceive that these continued in harmonious union—the human not being overwhelmed or set aside or changed in character or interfered with by the Divine—because the unlikeness—we may say the constitutional unlikeness—between them rendered such harmonious co-operation perfectly possible.

But when from the contemplation of the two Natures in themselves we pass to the consideration of the manner of their union in the One Person of our Lord, a difficulty presents itself which is certainly of no inconsiderable magnitude. For, whatever might be the differences between the Divine knowing and the human manner of knowing, He certainly *possessed* both. Granted that they were so unlike as to be able to co-exist without confusion, without any essential alteration of the human being caused by contact with the Divine, still our Lord was Himself at every moment filled with the light of the Divine knowledge—rather, He was Himself at every moment God knowing. How, then, could He be at once in possession of all that this implies, and unaffected by it as Man? Granted that His human consciousness was not filled (as indeed it could not be) with the infinite fulness of the Divine knowledge, still *He* was filled with it. How, then, could this be without affecting such features of His life as Man as His temptations and His sufferings? Is not the nature both of temptation and of suffering materially changed according to the state of our minds—according to the light which is in them, and the power of that light to alter the character of temptation, and to lessen or remove the pressure of suffering? If He Who was tempted and Who suffered was *in any way* fenced round,

as it were, by that light, how could He have been really under the same conditions of temptation and of suffering as we are?

It is evident that we have not yet searched into the deepest part of the mystery. It is something to have seen grounds for believing that the Divine knowing and the human manner of knowing were so unlike as to be able to co-exist in our Lord without the latter being overwhelmed or impeded in action by the former. But a greater difficulty lies in His Personality. And until we have searched into this, we cannot tell how far it may be possible to set before ourselves the relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His human knowledge according to its actual reality.

We must therefore now consider as carefully and fully as possible what it is precisely which *personality* means.

To guard against confusion, it must be observed that we have nothing to do here with personality in the sense in which it is sometimes taken as expressive of the combined effects of character, position, function, and conduct—the manifestation, in successive stages of growth and development, of what is within the person, in and under the influence of varying outward conditions. What we have to consider is not this, but what that is in virtue of which a person is a person—not at all what kind of person he is or what sort of manifestation he makes of himself, but what the actual Self within him is. The term "person," as used in a concrete sense, designates a being who by the possession of certain attributes and qualities is raised above the level of other beings having an individual life, but not having these higher attributes. Taking this for granted, what we have to determine is, if possible, what the Self, the *Ego*, of such a person as man is—what is the personality, that which makes the person, in all men as men, irrespective of any differences of character or manifestation.

It is only in, comparatively speaking, quite recent times that the question of what the Self, or *Ego*, in man precisely is, has become a subject of really deep and careful

consideration. It does not seem to have presented itself at all to the mind of antiquity. It has often been remarked, for example, as a conspicuous omission in the psychology of Aristotle, that he makes no attempt to define personality. Mr. Wallace,[1] who, following Zeller, makes this remark, assigns at the same time what is no doubt the true reason for it. He points out that it is not surprising that even such a thinker as Aristotle, and in a psychological treatise of which comprehensiveness is certainly not the least remarkable feature, should have omitted this apparently all-important question. The reason, he says, was because "the conception of a personal, isolated and yet universal, self had not been grasped by the philosophers of antiquity." Dr. J. B. Mozley's words have been often quoted. "When we examine the ancient mind all the world over, one very remarkable want is apparent in it, viz. a true idea of the individuality of man; an adequate conception of him as an independent person—a substantial being in himself, whose life and existence was his own. Man always figures as an appendage to somebody"[2]—or, we may add, if, as the head of a family, he was not an appendage, the members of the family were regarded as appendages to him. The family, not the individual, was the unit. "The movement of the progressive societies," says Sir H. Maine, "has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account."[3]

In the midst of the prevalence over the whole ancient world of the tone of thought which made the Family the unit of society and sank the Individual in it, the idea of the

[1] Wallace, *Psychology of Aristotle*, Introd., p. cxxvi.

[2] *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, p. 37. See Dean Church's *Discipline of the Christian Character*, Lect. i. p. 10, *sqq.*, where this passage of Mozley's is quoted. Compare Noiré in Max Müller's *Translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, vol. i. p. 117.

[3] *Ancient Law*, p. 168; cf. pp. 126 and 183.

singleness and individuality of the soul was steadily inculcated amongst the people whom God chose to be the recipients of His earlier revelation. The Psalter, it is enough to say, sufficiently attests this: for what is the Psalter but the individual soul pouring itself out before God, and God speaking in varied tones to the listening soul that waiteth still upon Him? But it was Christianity[1] which raised to its true height the conception of the value of each single soul, and of its place in relation to Him Who called it into being. It was Christianity which first placed fully before the world this great idea, which in its various bearings has been ever since taking root more firmly in the thought of successive generations, and influencing them more and more powerfully.

This being so, it was natural that the first movements of thought in the direction of defining and fixing the conception of personality should take place within the sphere of the Christian Church. Not that there was any attempt made at an exhaustive psychological analysis of the inner being of man, or, in particular, to determine the precise contents of the conception of the *Ego*.[2] All such attempts belong to a much later period. But what happened was this. The Fathers were led to draw certain lines round the conception of personality by the necessities of the case, in the course of their efforts to bring out clearly, and to defend against the encroachments of heresy, the true doctrine of the Trinity and of the Incarnation as revealed in Holy Scripture and enshrined in the Creeds. Parts of these doctrines, which were recognized as being of vital importance, were seen to involve certain views respecting personality, and imperatively to require that its proper limits should not be infringed upon So that what was defined about it was rather what it was not than what it was—rather its external boundaries than its internal contents. This was, at least broadly speaking, what took place; though of course the minds of such men

[1] Cf. Bp. Littlejohn, *Individualism*, pp. 5–7. Cambridge, 1881.

[2] Cf. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. I. vol. ii. p. 510, E. T.

as the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries could not be directed towards such a subject as this, even though psychology as a science did not yet really exist, without giving expression to many thoughts and ideas respecting it which are of permanent value.

Modern scientific examination of the subject of personality has naturally been made from a very different point of view, and has followed a very different course. Psychology, as such, would evidently have no direct concern with Christian doctrine. Even Biblical Psychology, as it is called, would have for its first duty the task of ascertaining accurately what the psychological conceptions which the Bible contains might be, without reference to their bearings on doctrine. The ancient theological and the modern scientific investigation of personality being, then, as regards alike their starting-point, their aim, and their procedure, of such a different character, it is evident that if they should be found to be in agreement in their results, such agreement would furnish strong grounds of confidence in the correctness of those results.

What we have now, therefore, to do is to compare the conclusions respecting personality which were arrived at in ancient times, mainly on theological grounds (and which, it may be added, have since met with general acceptance in the Church), with those which have been obtained in modern times on scientific grounds, and strictly as the result of psychological analysis.

It was inevitable that, with the rise of Sabellianism, an attempt should be made to frame, if possible, such a conception of the term "person" (or, rather, of that which we now intend by that term), as might express, as nearly as human thought and human language could, the great truth respecting the Divine Trinity which that heresy disguised and sought to overthrow. Thought could not but be turned henceforth in this direction. There were great difficulties in the way. There were difficulties arising from the want of a fixed terminology. This point has been largely illustrated.

Petavius[1] devotes to it no less than four chapters of the fourth book of his work on the Trinity. Dr. Newman's[2] writings upon it are well known. The greatest thinkers, such as Athanasius, all along knew what they meant, and expressed what they meant. But it was long before terms attained a fixed and generally accepted meaning. In the East this point was gained, as regards the important terms, *essence* (οὐσία), and *person* (ὑπόστασις), when St. Basil[3] wrote (not long before A.D. 370) a letter on the distinction between these terms to his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, which became,[4] and has ever since continued to be a standard authority in the Eastern Church on the subject. In the Western Church the writing which most nearly corresponds to this letter of St. Basil, as having become something like a standard authority, is the treatise *De Duabus Naturis et Una Persona Christi*, which for a long time was ascribed to Boethius, the well-known author of the *Consolatio Philosophiæ*, who was put to death by Theodoric about the year A.D. 524. Recent criticism[5] has shown the very great improbability that Boethius was the author of any theological works at all. The treatise *De Duabus*

[1] Petavius, *Theol. Dogm.*, vol. ii. pp. 605–646.

[2] Newman, *Arians*, Appendix, Note iv.; *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical*, Dissert. iv., and *On St. Cyril's Formula*. See also Le Quien's Note (22) to S. Joan. Dam., *Dialect.*, c. xxx. (Migne, *P.G.* xciv. 591–594); and Note (30) to c. xliii.

[3] *Epist.* xxxviii. (formerly xliii.); Migne, *P.G.*, vol. xxxii. pp. 325–340. (Dorner assigns this letter to Greg. Nyssen. But Dorner's strength did not lie in literary criticism. St. Basil's editor, Garnier, says, "*Basilio tribuunt omnes nostri codices MSS.*" The style also, he says, is Basil's; and the Council of Chalcedon referred to Basil as having explained *hypostaseōn differentiam* in an epistle.) Cf. Basil, *Ep.* ccxxxvi. (*alias* cccxci.) 6 (Migne, *ut sup.* p. 883).

[4] Le Quien (Note to S. Joan. Damas., *Dialectica*, cap. xliii.; Migne, *P.G.* xciv. 614) says of this letter, *receptam ab Orientalibus fuisse, uti certam indetrectabilemque regulam, qua vocum istarum sensus definiretur.* Long after, in the fifteenth century, at the Council of Florence, A.D. 1439, the letter was referred to in the manner described by Le Quien. See Hard., *Conc.*, vol. ix. p. 202 D. E.

[5] See the art. "Boethius" (in *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, vol. i. 320 *sq.*) by Rev. E. M. Young.

Naturis appears not to be mentioned by any writer earlier than Alcuin, who was not born till more than two hundred years after the death of Boethius; and the probability is that it was not written till near the end of the seventh century, or perhaps not before the eighth. The point of chronology is only of importance as showing at what period a standard, similar to that of St. Basil's letter, was established in the Western Church. The definition of "person" which this treatise contains, has held its own to the present day. It is this which St. Thomas Aquinas[1] made the text of his examination of the subject in the *Summa*. It is called, in the Roman Catholic Encyclopædia of Theology, "the generally received definition of Boethius."[2] It is expressly maintained and defended in a recent Latin treatise of note on the Incarnation.[3] Although, however, this treatise of the seventh or eighth century became a sort of standard in the Western Church, it was not at so late a period as this that Western theologians emerged from the difficulties occasioned by an unfixed terminology. They had done this not long after the date of St. Basil's letter. The important points are fully recognized in St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*, which was finished about A.D. 416.[4]

But besides difficulties of language, there were also more important difficulties of thought, especially in regard to personality in the Divine Trinity. We are unable "to conceive a sense of the word *person*, such, as to be more than a mere character, yet less than an individual intelligent being; our own notions, as gathered from our experience of human agents, leading us to consider *personality* as equivalent, in its very idea, to the unity and independence of the

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I. Q. xxix.

[2] Wetzer und Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*, vol. iii. p. 266.

[3] Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarnato*, Thesis xxix. *Vindicatur Boethiana definitio personæ.*

[4] Yet even then not entirely without perplexity. See *De Trin.* v. c. viii. *fin.* Migne, *P. L.* xlii. p. 917. In *De Trin.*, viii. c. vi., St. Aug. says, respecting the terms *essentia* and *substantia*, that *non diu est ut in usum venerunt.* Older Latin writers, he says, *pro his naturam dicebant.*

immaterial substance of which it is predicated."[1] "*Cum quæritur*" (says St. Augustine) "*quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen Tres Personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.*"[2]

In such a spirit as this, and in the face of these difficulties, and from the point of view which they were restricted to—the idea of psychological analysis in the modern sense not having yet risen above the horizon of thought—the Fathers were led to approach the question of personality. Let us now see what the results were. It must be remembered that their concern was with personality in relation to the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. Any ideas on the subject which related solely to man were employed only by way of illustration, and as helps towards the higher conception, which was the real object of inquiry.

The chief point which was established in regard both to the Holy Trinity, and to the questions presented by the revealed doctrine of the Incarnation, was that a real difference was to be recognized between *essence*, or *nature*, and *personality*. If there was no such real difference, then the Sabellian conception of God must be true. Again, if there was no such real difference, how could it be said that not God indifferently, but God the Son only, became Incarnate? Once more, if there was no distinction between *person* and *nature*, it would seem to follow that there could have been no separation in our Incarnate Lord between His Divinity and His humanity; in which case He could not have been really man, as we are. But since all these positions were matters of direct revelation—because the language of Scripture could not be reconciled with the Sabellian view, and it emphatically pronounced that the Father sent the Son, that it was the Word only Who was made flesh, and that He was made like unto us in all things, sin only excepted—it was clear that a distinction there must be,

[1] Newman, *Arians*, p. 160.

[2] *De Trin.*, v. c. ix.; Migne, *P.L.* xlii. p. 918. Cf. vii. c. iv.; Migne, p. 939; and vii. c. vi. p. 943.

even in the Godhead, between what was to be understood by essence or nature, and what was to be understood by person.

What, then, did this distinction amount to? Starting from the well-ascertained Scriptural truth of the absolute Oneness of God, the Fathers saw that the distinction could not be concerned with anything of what God IS. This Divine Essence was absolutely the same, absolutely equal, absolutely identical in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Each was, as regards Essence, all which God IS, without any difference or inequality. Each was ὅλος Θεός. Each was, as regards Essence, no less than the Other Two, or than the Three together, for Each was God, and God is—God.

Since, then, the distinction could not be found here, it must lie in the *relations* of the Three towards Each Other. Absolutely equal in Essence as the Father and the Son are, it is clear that *as Father* and *as Son* they are distinct from one another. And the same (*mutatis mutandis*) must be true respecting the Holy Ghost. The statement respecting the First Person of the Eternal Trinity, that He begat the Son, could not be made respecting the Third Person. Again, of the Son it could be said that He was begotten, but this could not be said of the Holy Ghost. And in like manner there are statements respecting not only the relation of Each of the Eternal Three towards the Others, but also respecting the *action* of Each, which could not be made concerning the Other Two. Holy Scripture, for example, virtually, if not in these very words, asserts that Creation was *from* the Father, *by* the Son, *through* the Holy Ghost. Creation was the conjoint work of the Triune God, but there was a distinction of operation on the part of Each of the Eternal Three, indicated by the prepositions *from*, *by*, and *through*—a mode of operation proper to Each, which could be predicated of that One, and could not be predicated of the Others. In like manner for the work of the New Creation the Father sent the Son, the Son was sent by the Father, and the Holy Ghost was sent both by the Father in the Son's Name, and by the Son

from the Father. What is ascribed to One Person is not ascribed to Either of the Other Two.

Holy Scripture then sets before us a distinction of *relation* and a distinction of *action* in regard to Each of the Eternal Three. These distinctions do not touch the Essence of the Godhead. The distinction of relation indicates a mode of being which is indeed eternal and without beginning, which therefore cannot be comprehended by us, but which may be distinctly apprehended as real in fact. The distinction of action indicates a mode of working which is in each case appropriate to One of the Three and not to the Other Two.

But the distinction of relation must be consistent with that eternal Oneness in which the Three are One God, and the distinction of action must be consistent with that inseparableness which makes every work of God to be a conjoint work of the Ever Blessed Trinity.

Thus the Unity comes before us as we contemplate the distinctions of the Trinity, showing that those distinctions which are personal to the Three, are such as to be wholly consistent with the Unity: and on the other hand the Trinity manifests itself as we contemplate the Unity, since we find that there are Three Divine Subsistencies, Each being all that God IS—not one Essence divided into three—and therefore as such emphasizing the Unity, yet presenting distinctions which in their turn proclaim the Trinity.

The mystery may be approached from either side, from the side of the Unity, or from that of the Trinity. The Greek Fathers, it may perhaps be said, for the most part took the former course. St. Augustine, among the Latins, chose the latter. It makes some little difference in regard to the conception formed of personality whether the path of thought proceeds from the Essence which is common to Each of the Divine Three, and which is absolutely equal and identical in Each, to those points of distinction which constitute the Trinity; or whether its course is *vice versâ* from the Trinity towards the Unity. Thus St. Basil says, "We must add that which is peculiar or individualizing (*τὸ ἰδιάζον*) to that which

is common, and thus confess the faith. The Godhead is common, the Fatherhood is peculiar."[1] And again, "Since what we want is to obtain a clear view of the distinctions in the Trinity by means of the individualizing marks (*διὰ τῶν ἰδιαζόντων σημείων*), we must not combine that which we contemplate as common to the Trinity—as, for example, the being uncreated or incomprehensible, or the like—with our conception of that which individualizes; but our endeavour must be to obtain our view without obscurity or confusion from those particulars only by means of which the idea of each may be severed from that which is common to all."[2] St. Basil's method was, therefore, to ascertain what was individualizing by carefully separating those particulars which could not be regarded as common to the Three, from all which was common to Them—first the common, then the particular. And in framing the conception of the Person, he took first that which was common, and to that *added* what was particular. The effect of this was to throw the individualizing particulars into the class of (in philosophical language) *accidents;* and this name (*συμβεβηκότα*) was actually given to them. Now it is obvious that a conception of person in which that which makes the person occupies a secondary place, must in many ways be different from a conception in which that which is especially the personal element holds the first and commanding position, since the rest of the conception is then regarded as belonging to it. The differences resulting in thought in the two cases will, it is easy to see, be not inconsiderable; and such in fact they have been.

The conception of *person* which was thus arrived at by the Greek Fathers is described in the following terms by St. John of Damascus. He seems to think something more might be said than they had said; for he defines *person* himself as "by operations and peculiar properties affording a manifestation of its own being, clear in itself and discrete from others of the like nature"[3]—thus bringing into view

[1] *Epist.* ccxxxvi. 6. [2] *Epist.* xxxviii. 3.

[3] *Dialectica*, c. xliii. Πρόσωπόν ἐστιν ὅπερ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργημάτων

the Personal Being as the source of action: and having said this, he continues, "But it must be understood that the holy Fathers used the terms hypostasis and prosopon and atomon [*i.e.* individual] as names for the same thing, viz., for that which subsists *per se* in its own proper being, consisting of essence and accidents, being numerically different from others, and denoting a particular individual." [1]

The view of St. Basil, in common with other Fathers, was a view of *person*, not of *personality*—of *personality* only so far as to show that, whatever it is in itself, it is at any rate distinguishable in certain respects from *essence*; of the *Ego*, as constituting the Personality, he says nothing.

The Eternal Three, says St. Basil, are, as Personal Subsistencies, distinguishable in certain respects from Each Other. But it is in certain respects only. In another point of view They are inseparable and One. "We perceive in Them" (he says) "both a Oneness (*κοινωνία*) and a distinctness (*διάκρισις*), such as can be neither expressed nor comprehended, in which the difference of the Persons sunders not the continuity of the nature, nor does the oneness of essence cause confusion of the individualizing characteristics. Marvel not, however, that the same object should be described as both One and distinguished into Three (*καὶ συνημμένον καὶ διακεκριμένον*), and that we should contemplate, as in an enigma, the novel paradox of there being distinction in that which is one, and oneness in that which has distinction (*καινὴν καὶ παράδοξον διάκρισίν τε συνημμένην, καὶ διακεκριμένην συνάφειαν*). For," he goes on to say, "the rainbow in nature offers some resemblance of this, since the light in it is all one, and we can detect no interval between the colours, and yet they are different." [2]

St. Augustine carried this a little further. He points out

τε καὶ ἰδιωμάτων ἀρίδηλον, καὶ περιωρισμένην τῶν ὁμοφυῶν αὐτοῦ παρέχεται ἡμῖν τὴν ἐμφάνειαν.

[1] *Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι Πατέρες ὑπόστασιν, καὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἄτομον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάλεσαν· τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοσυστάτως ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκότων ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ ἀριθμῷ διαφέρον, καὶ τόν τινα δηλοῦν.*

[2] *Epist.* xxxviii. 4, 5.

that to be personal belongs altogether and absolutely to the idea of God: *non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem.*[1] Personality is therefore, when thus regarded, inseparable from essence. And, indeed, it must be so, since *all* that the Son IS, is communicated to Him by the Father, and this *all* certainly includes His Personality. His distinction from the Father consists in these two particulars: first, that He is the Son and not the Father; and, secondly, that in order—not of time but—of being and of operation, He is the Second, as in like manner the Holy Ghost is the Third, in the Divine Tri-unity. The conception of Personality in the Divine Being approaches more nearly to Tri-personality than to that of Personality as it is in man.

To sum up what has been said, it will be seen that the Fathers did not attempt to ascertain what personality is in itself. It was sufficient that distinctions of a personal kind should be shown to exist in the Eternal Trinity, such as to preclude the Sabellian hypothesis in whatever form it was put forward, to show it to be not impossible for the Son alone to have become man, and to show that His act of Incarnation did not involve a fusion (as distinct from a union) of the Divine and human natures.

St. Basil, in the letter of which (as representing substantially the views of the Greek Fathers) an account has been given, does not go beyond the questions connected with the Holy Trinity. The writer of the treatise, *De Duabus Naturis et Una Persona Christi*, had in view, as the title shows, more particularly those connected with the Incarnation. The notoriety of this treatise was probably due, not to its containing more on the subject of personality than had been said by earlier writers, for this it does not; but to the convenience of the definition in which what was held upon it was summarily expressed. *Persona*, the treatise says, *est naturæ rationalis individua substantia.* The most noteworthy feature here is the reversal of the point of view from which the personality is regarded. In the Greek view the

[1] *De Trin.*, VII. c. vi.

individualizing marks were the *accidents* which were to be added to the essence—that which was common—in order to form the conception *person*. But in the Latin treatise it is the personality—the *individua substantia*—which comes first, and the *accidents* are found in the nature or essence, the personal substance or subsistence being that in which the *accidents* of the nature were supposed to inhere. This certainly seems to be the truer way of looking at the matter; the nature must belong to—must be secondary to—the person, not *vice versâ*. The definition confines personality to *rational* beings, distinguishing it from the individuality which is found in beings lower than man; and it gives as the conception of personality all that we can get out of the terms *individua substantia*, at the same time marking this off as separable in some manner from nature; but it does not bring into view that which is the most distinctive feature of personality, viz. the relation in which it stands towards the phenomena of thought, feeling, will, and action.

The writer of the treatise does not further explain *substantia* than by saying that it means *id quod aliis accidentibus subjectum quoddam, ut esse valeant, subministrat*. In his view it is more than *subsistentia*; for *genera* and *species subsistunt*, but only *individua substant*. Later writers have preferred *subsistence*, as being free from some misleading associations connected with *substance*, and as bringing into view more clearly the Personal Being.

The meaning of the term *individua* has also been expanded beyond that which the writer of the treatise expressed. Substance or subsistence which is personal must be regarded as not only that which is found in a *single* or *individual* being—in a single man, for example, as contrasted with the universal term man or animal, which can be predicated of many individuals—but also as being complete in itself and not a part of something else; as existing for itself; and as being incommunicable to any other.

We are now in a position to see how far the Fathers advanced in their investigation of personality. They did

not attain to a definition of it as it is in itself; but they did very carefully determine its external relations, especially in regard to nature or essence. They ascertained that whilst in some respects it was absolutely inseparable from nature, in other respects it was quite clearly distinguishable from it. In the Holy Trinity they found that there was a mode of being and a mode of action or of acting by which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were the personal expression of these distinctions, that which was intended by these names being also the source of the distinctions.

Their work, therefore, on this subject, as on others, was a careful balancing of opposite truths, not in the spirit of compromise, but in the spirit—the only spirit befitting those who deal with Divine mysteries, which in their fulness are above human comprehension—of reverence, and of anxious care not to infringe upon the truths which on either hand close in upon the subject of investigation, but as far as possible to express its exact relation to each of them.

The importance of such care in the adjustment of their statements has been strikingly illustrated on opposite sides in later times. On the one hand, in the sixteenth century [1] and onwards, there were writers who could be described as *multi* and *sane graves*, who thought that personality must have a real existence by itself apart from nature, and nature apart from it. On the other hand, in our own day Anton Günther,[2] on the ground of the inseparability of nature and personality, has not hesitated to revive in a form of his own the speculations of Nestorius, and to maintain that the human nature which our Lord took had a personality of its own, which, however, was swallowed up in His Divine Personality, as being inferior to it.

[1] See Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.*, p. 261, note.

[2] The work of P. Knoodt, *Anton Günther*, Wien, 1881, 2 vols. (which the present writer has not seen), seems to contain the best account of the views of Günther, whose writings for thirty years before his death at Vienna in 1863, attracted a good deal of attention on the Continent. He was a Roman priest, but his books were put on the *Index* in 1857. Cf. Franzelin, *ut sup.* p. 170, *sq.* notes.

We now pass to the consideration of what modern psychological analysis has accomplished in the work of ascertaining what personality is in itself.

It is a long way from even the last of the Fathers to the seventeenth century, but it is not till we come to the first half of this century, and to Descartes' well-known *Cogito, ergo sum,* that we find ourselves really in sight of "the principle unknown to the whole of antiquity, and which in future should become the only starting-point of all philosophy"[1]—namely, the *Ego.*

This principle was indeed discovered by Descartes, but we must come further down still before we find the *Ego* made the subject of psychological investigation. The first to set this on foot was Locke. The Essay on the Human Understanding was first published in England in 1690, and from that time onwards the nature of personality, and questions connected with it, came to be more and more subjects of interest and of contention. Hume, writing in the year 1736, or, at any rate, before 1738, testifies distinctly to this, describing "personal identity" as having "become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late years, in England."[2]

The views which have been entertained respecting the *Ego*—for it is this which is really at the bottom of the questions which have been raised, whether concerning personal identity or any other kindred point—have taken one or other of the following forms. Either it has been asserted that there is no real *Ego* distinct from the phenomena of consciousness; or it has been contended that we know nothing really about it, and that, therefore, in all probability there is no such thing; or, lastly, it has been maintained that our consciousness testifies clearly and positively to an *Ego* which is distinct from consciousness, and that to refuse to accept

[1] Noiré in Max Müller's *Translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 117.

[2] Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature,* Book I. Pt. IV. § 6. *Philos. Works,* vol. i. p. 319. Edinb., 1854. Bishop Butler's *Dissertation on Personal Identity* belongs to the same year, 1736.

the direct testimony of consciousness on this point would be tantamount to cutting away the ground of all knowledge whatever on any subject.

It is remarkable that those belonging to the two first classes should have been the chief contributors towards overthrowing the conclusion which they desired to establish, and establishing that which they wished to overthrow. But such is undoubtedly the case. For, so far from being able to demonstrate the non-existence of the *Ego*, they have been in turn compelled to make admissions fatal to such a contention, and thus have unwillingly shown that no argument of any value is capable of being urged in disproof of its reality.

The results of psychological analysis respecting the *Ego* cannot be better shown than by reviewing and contrasting the arguments of these three schools of thought. To this, therefore, we proceed.

The first school confuses the *Ego*, the Self, the Personal Being, with the phenomena of perception and consciousness. Locke certainly led the way towards views which, as taken up by others after him, went far beyond his own. He did confuse personal identity with the consciousness of it, thus committing himself so far to that "wonderful mistake,"[1] as Bishop Butler from the first clearly showed it to be, which runs through all the reasonings of those who would persuade us that consciousness, and that to which consciousness testifies, can be one and the same. Locke did indeed make this mistake, but in carrying out this supposition to its logical results he arrives at conclusions so utterly paradoxical[2] that it is no wonder that Bishop Butler[3] should have thought his observations must have been hasty, and that he had not really thought out the subject. And, indeed, as Bishop Butler adds, Locke himself "seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made relating to it." The bishop no doubt refers to what Locke

[1] Bishop Butler, *Works*, vol. i. p. 304, *Dissertation on Personal Identity.*
[2] See, for example, Book II. ch. xxvii. § 19.
[3] *Ubi supra*, p. 307.

says, Book II. ch. xxvii. § 27, "I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers, and, possibly, they are so in themselves." But more than this. In the course of his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet, Locke, feeling no doubt that his views were mistaken by the bishop, asserted distinctly and emphatically his conviction "that there is a spiritual, thinking substance in us."[1] And elsewhere, in even more unequivocal terms, he writes as follows: "*Person* stands for . . . a thinking, intelligent Being, that has reason and reflexion, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."[2] And again, "I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of one individual, immaterial substance."[3]

Bishop Butler remarks that Locke's "hasty observations" were "carried to a strange length by others;" and certainly this was done by Hume, though Butler could not have been referring to him. But if Locke was "dissatisfied" with his suppositions, Hume was still more dissatisfied, after bestowing less hasty thought upon the subject than Locke had done.

Hume's first view was that the *Ego*, or Self, was to be identified with our acts of perception; that is to say, with the mind generally. He insisted that there was not merely a very close connection between them, but that there was actually no difference between them—that the *Ego* was, in fact, nothing but a "collection of perceptions." He states this with great distinctness in an often-quoted passage of the *Treatise on Human Nature*. "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception."[4] There may be, he

[1] Note to Book IV. ch. iii. § 6. Vol. ii. p. 165 of *Essay*, 15th edit., 1753.
[2] *Essay*, Book II. ch. xxvii. § 9.
[3] *Id. ib.*, § 25.
[4] Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, Part I. Book iv. Section vi. "Of Personal Identity." *Phil. Works*, vol. i. p. 312.

thinks, here and there some one who "may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls *himself;*" but, he adds, "I am certain there is no such principle in me. But, setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."

This is pretty plain speaking. But let us see what Hume's after-thoughts were on this subject. He wrote, at some time subsequent to the publication of his *Treatise on Human Nature,* an appendix to it.[1] It is of the nature of a *retractatio,* containing what, on second thoughts, he found to be his maturer views on some points. It must be remembered that the treatise was planned before he was twenty-one, and published before he was twenty-five. In this appendix, then, Hume wrote as follows: "Upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity,* I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent." . . . "I shall propose the arguments on both sides, beginning with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being."[2] These arguments having been stated, he turns to the other side, and continues: "But, having thus loosened all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connection which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity, *I am sensible that my account is very defective,* and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it." His statement of the arguments which he perceived to lie

[1] By some oversight, Professor Huxley, in his account of Hume's views on personality, has taken no notice of the later thoughts upon it in this appendix. See his *Hume,* ch. ii., and ch. ix., and especially p. 171, where he gives "the final result of Hume's reasoning," without any mention of the appendix.

[2] Hume, *Phil. Works,* vol. ii. pp. 548–551.

against the view given in the treatise follows, and he then concludes with saying, "For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions."[1]

Hume then found himself "involved in a *labyrinth*." And if that to which consciousness so explicitly testifies—the existence, namely, of an *Ego* which is distinct from all our feelings and from all the movements of thought, will, and action, by which it manifests itself—be denied or set aside, this is an accurate description of the condition in which every thinker must ultimately find himself, who attempts to account for the facts on any theory resembling that of Hume. The attempt was made, with every desire to find a solution of the difficulties which Hume had experience of, by a really great thinker—the late J. S. Mill. And this is the confession—it deserves to be well considered—which he found himself obliged to make: "If we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from the series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, *ex hypothesi*, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a

[1] The true solution of Hume's difficulty seems to be very clearly given in the following remarks by a recent writer: "While it is quite true, as Hume said, that when we enter into what we call ourselves, we cannot point to any particular perception of self, as we can point to particular perceptions of heat or cold, love or hatred, it is as undoubted that *the very condition of all these particular perceptions, given along with each of them, and essential to the connecting of one with another, is precisely the self, or subject, which Hume could not find—which he could not find, because he looked for it not in its proper character, as the subject or correlate of all perceptions or objects, but as itself, in some fashion, a perception or object added to the other contents of consciousness.*" Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, i. p. 11; quoted by Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine* (*Bampton Lectures*, 1894), Lect. ii., Note 7, p. 234.

series."[1] Comment upon this seems to be altogether superfluous.

The second school of thought is that of the Agnostics, of whom Professor Huxley and Mr. Herbert Spencer may be taken as representatives.

We should not have any great reason for quarrelling with the Agnostics, if they would keep strictly to the principles which they profess. One of these, at any rate, they are continually violating; and of this Professor Huxley's treatment of the question of personality is a conspicuous example. The principle is, that whenever that line is reached which marks the boundary beyond which, in the Agnostic judgment, human knowledge does not and cannot extend, the Agnostic is then bound to say, concerning all that may lie beyond that line, "Respecting this I can neither affirm nor deny: I simply know nothing at all about it." But instead of this, they are continually drawing the conclusion, contrary to all rules of logic, that where, either really or in their opinion, there is no evidence to prove the existence or reality of some fact or truth, they are forthwith at liberty to *deny* the existence or reality of that fact or truth.

This is, at any rate, what Professor Huxley has done in the present case. The conclusion, stated as Hume's,[2] but with which he shows plainly his own agreement, is that "the conception of a soul as a substantive thing, is a mere figment of the imagination." His view, clearly, is that there is no *Ego* distinct from the series of phenomena which make up the individual mind. In short, he denies the existence of the *Ego*, and agrees with Hume's *first* view, that the *Ego*, or Self, is nothing but "a bundle, or collection, of different perceptions."

Now, on what does Professor Huxley base this conclusion? He says it is "nothing but a rigorous application of

[1] Mill, *Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, c. xii. p. 212, 2nd ed., qu. by Rickaby, *General Metaphysics*, pp. 239, 240. See also Mr. Ward's criticism of Mill's position in *Mind*, vol. viii. p. 467.

[2] Huxley, *Hume*, pp. 166–172; esp. pp. 171, 172.

Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter to mind," and he further shelters himself under the authority of Kant, saying that it is fully adopted by him. But, on Agnostic principles, and, indeed, on all sound principles of reasoning—as was pointed out by that keenest of logicians, the late Dean Mansel—Berkeley went beyond the conclusion which he was entitled to draw. Berkeley, it need hardly be said, was quite of one mind with other people as to the reality of whatever can be perceived by the senses. He no more denied the existence of "matter" in this sense than anybody does. He would have admitted matter in the most subtle form—for example, the ether—provided that in any way, directly or indirectly, its existence could be made apparent, either to the senses or to any of our faculties. "I do not argue," he said, "against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question."[1] What Berkeley meant by "matter" or "substance," was the philosophically supposed but unknown *support* of the things which we see and touch. The existence of this he did deny; and in denying it he went beyond the conclusion which his premisses entitled him to draw. "Had he," said Mansel, "contented himself with maintaining that we have no evidence for asserting that matter, in this sense of the term, has any existence, he would have said no more than the testimony of consciousness fully warrants. But when he went a step beyond this, and not only doubted the existence of matter, but asserted its non-existence, he transcended the evidence of consciousness on the negative side, as much as his opponents did on the positive. If consciousness says nothing about the existence of matter at all, we are equally incompetent to affirm or to deny."[2]

In Mansel's judgment, therefore, Berkeley was guilty of dogmatizing in negation in the application which he made

[1] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, xxxv.; cf. xxxvii., lxxxiv.
[2] Mansel, "Metaphysics," *Encycl. Brit.*, 8th ed., vol. xiv. p. 612.

of his reasoning concerning "matter." He had no logical right to call matter a mere fiction of the imagination. How will the case, then, stand when "a rigorous application" is made of this reasoning to "mind"? Supposing the case to be—as Professor Huxley assumes—strictly parallel in regard to the mind or *Ego:* supposing, that is to say, that the evidence respecting mind were of exactly the same character as Berkeley found it to be respecting matter, what would be the legitimate conclusion? Would it be that the mind or *Ego* was "a mere fiction of the imagination"? Would not this be dogmatizing in negation every bit as much as in the former case? Professor Huxley at least cannot deny it, for he had already written on an earlier page his condemnation of the error into which—having, it must be presumed, forgotten what he had before said—he is hurried, and would hurry others with him, later on. For, referring (at p. 63 of his *Hume*) to Hume's statement that "what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions," Professor Huxley remarks, "With this 'nothing but,' however, he obviously falls into the primal and perennial error of philosophical speculators—dogmatizing from negative arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else, can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions."[1]

Evidently the only conclusion which Agnostics are entitled to draw respecting the mind or *Ego* is that of the Scotch verdict "not proven," supposing that the evidence respecting it is really not different from that which there is respecting the unknown "matter." But Berkeley at any rate did not think that the evidence was no greater in the one case than in the other. He thought that the testimony

[1] This sets aside the appeal to Kant. The authority of Kant is worth just as much or as little as that of any one else in favour of a logically untenable supposition. Kant's inconsistencies of this kind did not escape Mansel's notice and criticism, great admirer as he was of his genius. See his "Metaph.," *Encycl. Brit.*, 8th ed., p. 616 and note (2), and *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 177 and note †, and p. 199.

of consciousness to the existence of the *Ego* was absolute and complete. In answer to Hylas urging this very thing, that the evidence in both cases was alike, he emphatically makes his representative reply, "How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but something else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas? . . . But I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of matter." [1]

Mr. Herbert Spencer sometimes takes a line similar to that of Professor Huxley, indulging, like him, in the luxury of dogmatizing in negation. Thus he speaks of that which, as we have just seen, Bishop Berkeley was fully convinced that there was ample evidence of, as an "illusion." He does not say that there is evidence to disprove it, to show it to be "a fiction of the imagination." It is easier to call it an illusion. And so he says, "There is an *illusion* that at each moment the *Ego* is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual or nascent, which then exists." [2]

But sometimes Mr. Spencer feels that after all there is something more in the matter than an "illusion." "Mr. Spencer" (writes Mr. Ward in *Mind*) "admits that 'states of consciousness' imply an *Ego* or Self or Subject of consciousness, and concludes with 'a mystery—the consciousness of something which is yet out of consciousness'—a mystery, or rather contradiction, which he finds himself 'obliged to think'!" [3] And so Ueberweg, in his *History of Philosophy*, gives the following account of Mr. Spencer's views on this subject. "As to what matter and mind are, he replies sometimes that we can know it, because a being is required to manifest phenomena . . . sometimes that matter and mind are simply bundles of phenomena, and nothing besides." [4]

[1] Berkeley, "Third Dialogue," *Works*, vol. i. p. 204, ed. Wright, 1843.

[2] Spencer, *Prin. of Psychol.*, Part VII. c. ix. § 220; qu. by Rickaby, *Gen. Met.*, p. 293; compare Bishop Temple's criticism of Mr. Spencer's views on Personality, in his *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 43–45.

[3] Vol. viii. p. 469.

[4] Vol. ii. p. 432, Eng. trans.

Surely a conclusion with which its advocates are "dissatisfied," which involves them in "a labyrinth," or lands them in "a paradox," which has to be maintained by resorting to false logic and "dogmatizing in negation," which at best keeps them in a state of uneasy consciousness that they are on ground which is altogether insecure—surely such a conclusion can only be regarded as hopelessly weak! And when men such as those whose opinions we have noticed—men who are no strangers to deep and prolonged thought—give us assurance, as they do, that all that can be said for this hypothesis has been placed before us—for if these can say nothing more, who can?—are we not entitled to say that the maintainers of this strange supposition that there is nothing more within us than "a series of feelings aware of itself as a series," or "a collection of perceptions" without a perceiving Self, or a "bundle of phenomena and nothing besides," have done more to demonstrate the utter untenability of their hypothesis, and therefore indirectly to establish the contrary to it, than could have been effected in any other way?

The third school is that of those who to the instinctive and all but universal judgment of mankind add the confirmation of it which is afforded by the strictest psychological analysis. The verdict of the common sense of mankind is that there is within us an *Ego* or Self or Personal Being distinguishable from all our perceptions and feelings. We have already seen that all attempts to overthrow or to confuse this general verdict simply recoil upon those who make them, since by their own confession they are unable to give anything like an adequate or consistent explanation of the facts. Taking then this verdict as established on an immovable foundation, we have now to see what may be said further respecting the nature or relations of the *Ego* as the result of accurate analysis.

In the first place analysis thoroughly confirms what we all instinctively feel. We are, we find, directly conscious of ourselves as distinct from our feelings or perceptions. There is ample ground for the distinction which is expressed

probably in all languages, namely, that which we express in our own when we speak of "*my* body," "*my* soul," "*my* spirit," "*my* feelings," "*my* perceptions," "*my* understanding," "*my* will." The *my* in all these cases means *belonging to me;* and what *belongs* to me cannot be actually the same as *myself.*[1] In like manner when we say, "I think," "I will," "I feel," there is clearly a personal being intended by the "I" just as much as acts of thinking, willing, and feeling are intended by the verbs. It would be evidently absurd to say that the "I" and the "think" mean the same thing. The more the testimony of consciousness is examined in the numerous forms of inward movement which language has seized and, as it were, photographed for us, the more clear and certain it becomes that what is testified is the existence of an *Ego* which is in a very real sense distinct from all with which in each individual it is associated.

And as the *existence* of the *Ego* is thus clearly seen, together with its distinction from all with which it is associated in an individual person, so also may its *relation* to the same be discerned as to certain particulars with great clearness. For in the first place the *Ego* manifestly holds a position of superiority, of ownership, of directive power. Thinking, willing, acting, are not automatic. In "I think" there are two factors, one expressed by each word. Set aside the "I" and where will be the "thinking"? It sinks into nothing. And in like manner all the phenomena of movement and of action in a conscious being are absolutely dependent upon the *Ego.* To obviate a cavil, which however does not really touch the argument, it may be better to say all the *principal* phenomena: for of course there is in each individual much bodily movement which is spontaneous and of which he is unconscious; and even of spiritual movement there is some which proceeds without our full consciousness of it. But of the principal phenomena the statement is strictly true.

[1] The verbal similarity in the expression *my self* is obviously due simply to the fact that "*I*" is here expressed *objectively.* "My self" may be used either for "*I*" or "*me.*"

They are manifestations of the *Ego*, and without the *Ego* they could not take place. In fact, thought and will and feeling, and, again, understanding and imagination, are not separate entities, capable of existing apart by themselves. We speak of body, soul, and spirit, as if they were separate entities: and of body perhaps with reason, for as a frame of flesh and blood it may be seen apart from the *Ego* after death; and the powers which act through it have then ceased to act. But *soul* and *spirit* are surely collective terms, the powers of which respectively are faculties of the *Ego*, and never either exist or act without the *Ego*.

On the other hand, the inseparability of the *Ego* from the faculties belonging to an individual being, after the individual being has once begun to exist, is equally manifest. Hume was quite right in saying that he never could catch *himself* without a perception, though, as he himself found, this did not involve the conclusion that Self and the perceptions which Self has are identical, so that the one is nothing more than the other.

The *Ego*, then, is both separable and inseparable, of course in different ways or respects, from the nature with which it is associated. It is separable, because it cannot be identified with either the body, or the soul, or the spirit, or with any of what may be called their contents, not even with consciousness. And it is inseparable, because the several faculties of an individual human being can only act as they are set in motion by the personal being which is their *Ego*, nay they exist only through and after their union with the *Ego*—for the existence of faculties consists in the possibility of their being set in motion, and this they have not apart from the *Ego;* and because, on the other hand, the *Ego*, whether it can or cannot exist apart from the faculties through which it manifests its existence, could only be called nothing without them; stripped of consciousness, stripped of the powers of reason and of will, it would be at any rate beyond our ken.

This twofold relation of the *Ego* to that which surrounds

it and with which it is clothed in an individual human being, seems to be disclosed with great clearness as we analyze the testimony of consciousness. Perhaps this also may be added. The relation of the *Ego* to the spirit of a man seems to be closer than its relation to the soul or body. The spirit seems to be its inner shrine. In other words, the powers of the spirit seem to be those which are most indispensable to the *Ego*, and to be those through which it becomes the centre of union and of direction to the whole being.

The importance of this twofold relation is also very evident. For here we have, brought into view by psychological analysis, the very points on which theological considerations impelled the Fathers to insist. And what they felt sure they could not be deceived about, is now brought into the clear light of day. Had they arrived at the conception of the *Ego*, instead of stopping at the less perfect conceptions of *hypostasis* and *substantia*, it can hardly be doubted that they would have enunciated their conclusions with greater fulness and clearness. But in substance their conclusions are the same as those of modern psychology: the difference is in the form of expression, not in that which is intended to be expressed.

But if psychological analysis enables us to apprehend more clearly the relations of the *Ego*, does it also enable us to see what the *Ego* is in itself as well as in its relations? The answer can only be that it does not. Consciousness testifies to the existence of an *Ego*, a Self, within us; as we gaze upon it, we can distinctly perceive that it is distinct in itself from all with which in each person it is nevertheless indissolubly associated, which belongs to it, and which receives from it direction and motion. But when we ask further, what is this *Ego?* what is this Self? what is Personality?—there comes no answer. And the reason why there is no answer is very clear. It is because in the presence of the *Ego* we have arrived at an object which is unique, which can be compared with nothing else; and, as was shown in an earlier chapter, where materials for

comparison fail, the work of the understanding is at an end, we are powerless to advance. In the words of Dean Mansel, "Personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable; but it is so because it is superior to definition. It can be analyzed into no simpler elements; for it is itself one element of a product which defies analysis. It can be made no clearer by description or comparison; for it is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition, of which description and comparison can furnish only faint and partial resemblances." [1]

It now remains for us to examine how far the difficulties before referred to as presenting themselves when the question of the relation of our Lord's human consciousness to His Divine Omniscience is viewed in connection more particularly with His Person, can be regarded as removed or mitigated by the conception of personality which we have obtained.

The chief point of difficulty, it will be remembered, is this. The oneness of our Lord's Person, as God and Man, seems at first to imply an absolute oneness of consciousness. We see indeed that this view must be wrong; for a human consciousness which was really one with Omniscience, would be no longer a true human consciousness at all. But though this is apparent, it is not so easy to see our way out of the difficulty. When, indeed, viewing the whole subject of the two natures, we have grasped the truth of the real unlikeness between the Divine manner of knowing and human consciousness, we have clearly made some advance towards it. But there still remains this point, that whatever might be the unlikeness between the one manner of knowing and the other, the *results* at any rate of both must be in the absolute possession of the one Person; and, if so, it seems impossible that the temptations and the sufferings of the Man Christ Jesus could have resembled, as Holy Scripture assures us they did, those of men in general. Can then this difficulty be removed by a closer examination of personality? It does seem that if it cannot be altogether removed—and, considering

[1] Mansel, "Metaphysics," *Encycl. Brit.*, vol. xiv. p. 584, 8th edition.

that what we have before us contains the mystery of the union of the Infinite with the finite, we could not expect this—it may at any rate be considerably lessened.

Let the matter be looked at in this way. What was it which took place at the moment of the Incarnation? The doctrine of the Church has uniformly been that Holy Scripture teaches us to view our Lord, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, as having taken human nature into union with Himself personally, so that He was made flesh or became truly man. Now what is to be understood more precisely by our Lord's act of taking human nature into union with Himself *personally?* Human nature, as we have seen, has no existence by itself or without an *Ego*. It comes into existence only through union with an *Ego*. The human nature which our Lord took came therefore into existence through its union with the *Ego* which the Son of God gave to it, that is to say, through its union with *Himself* as distinguished from His Divinity. We have seen that the *Ego* or Self of *man* is in different ways separable and inseparable from that which is called by the collective name of human nature. It might seem a bold thing to assume that the same would hold good when not man but God is in our thought. But we have seen that the Fathers did find this a conclusion not to be avoided in regard to the Persons of the Eternal Trinity. There is a sense therefore in which the *Ego* or Self of the Eternal Son is separable from His Divinity without any infringement of the corresponding truth that in another sense it is inseparable from it. It is according to the first sense that we must conceive the Eternal Son to have taken to *Himself* humanity, that is to say, to have become man in a manner which did not involve the carrying over, as it were, of His Divinity into the humanity (which would have made it to be not humanity but something else); and which, consequently, also limited the Incarnation to Himself as distinguished from the Father and the Holy Ghost.

When we look at the matter from the side of God we find

that it is in this manner that we must understand the act of the Word taking human nature into union with Himself *personally*. And when we look at it from the side of man we can only come to the same conclusion. For what did the nature which our Lord took require in order to become existent as a human being, as man? It required an *Ego*. Now, if our Lord had given to it more than an *Ego*, what would it have been? Not man, but something else. If the *Ego* could not have been given to it without giving to it (in just the same way; for in one way it was united to the Godhead in Christ) the Divinity as well, the Incarnation could not have taken place; for by the Incarnation we mean that the Son of God became as truly Man as He was truly God. The Incarnation required that He who was made Man should be, within the sphere of His Manhood, Very Man, and not something different from man. There was no reason why He should not bestow gifts upon His Manhood, provided that they were not such as would change its nature and make it not to be very manhood; or, in other words, provided that they were such as it could receive without any essential change of its structure. But it was absolutely necessary that He should not alter His humanity in any point pertaining to its structure. In order to this, therefore, it was manifestly requisite that the *Ego* which our Lord gave to the humanity which He assumed, should not be *essentially* different—not as an *Ego*, different—from the *Ego* which is in every man. It might and did differ infinitely in respect of dignity, in respect of its eternal and indissoluble association with Divinity—with all that God is—in the Person of the Eternal Son; but in this one thing, in the act of Incarnation, in the assumption of human nature, it was necessary that it should be simply an *Ego*, in order that the Incarnate Son should be, *as Man*, very Man, and not other than man.

The whole examination of the subject of personality seems to justify us in looking at the matter in this light. Both from the point of view of the Fathers and from that of modern psychology, we find ourselves regarding the *Ego* as

standing in a certain sense, apart. Apart it is not only from other *Egos*, but, within its own personal sphere, apart from all with which in that sphere it is otherwise indissolubly associated and one. It is apart because it alone has being in itself; since the body, soul, and spirit of a man have their being not in themselves, but in it. It is apart because, whilst the body, soul, and spirit, are parts of it and belong to it, it is not a part of them or with them, but is the possessor of them. It is apart because it employs freely the different faculties, now one and now another, which belong to it, and are placed at its disposal. All this can be said of the *Ego* only: it could not be said of anything else which is in man, not of his will, not of his spirit, not of any of his faculties; neither can it be said of his person as a whole, because that includes the nature which is distinct from the *Ego*, and upon which and through which the *Ego* acts. It can be said only of that in which, in the strictest sense, the personality consists—that *Ego* or Self in which we most emphatically find the man.

This, then, is what we believe to have taken place at the Incarnation: God the Son took our nature into indissoluble union with His Self; He made Himself its *Ego*. In so doing He acquired the power of thinking, willing, and acting in the same way and under the same *structural* conditions and limitations as belong to all men as men. He made Himself subject to all such feelings, sufferings, and temptations as men *quâ* men are subject to. He thus made His own that sphere of consciousness, of experience, and of action, which He Himself had prepared for man, and had created man for. And, on the other hand, He entered into this sphere without importing into it that which would have changed its character, which would have made it not a sphere of human experience but a sphere of Divine experience. In taking human modes of consciousness, of thinking, and willing, He took them as they were, entering personally into them with that freedom or disassociation—within their sphere—from His Divine consciousness and power, which it

was *personally* possible for Him to do. At the same time He remained—He could not but have remained, for God is absolutely unchangeable—in the Divine sphere, if the expression may be allowed, precisely as He was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, Eternal God.

And if this is a true description of what took place at the moment of the Incarnation, it is clear that these conditions could not have been altered during the whole period of our Lord's life upon earth in any essential feature: because the reasons which made them necessary at the first would have been equally imperative, and have had just the same force at any moment afterwards. Our Lord undertook for our sakes to pass through the whole course of a human life, from the cradle to the grave; and it was essential that throughout it should be, in absolute truth, human.

We may now see how far the difficulty which appeared so formidable is lessened when the fact of the Incarnation is looked at in this way. The difficulty was that our Lord, by reason of the unity of His Person, must have been at every moment in possession of all that His Divine consciousness gave Him, that is of Omniscience in the fullest sense, as well as of all that His human consciousness gave Him. We now see that this is most certainly true, but that the conclusion which seemed to follow, namely, that His human experience must have been essentially affected by this fact, so as not to be a true human experience, does not really follow. For if our Lord could have taken human nature to Himself at the moment of the Incarnation without any infringement of its structure, it is clear that He could keep it so afterwards. There is no real difficulty arising from the development of human consciousness by natural growth, because the most highly developed human consciousness is not appreciably nearer to Omniscience than the consciousness of an infant is. If our Lord could *enter* into the sphere of human experience at all without changing it, it is clear that He could *abide* in it without changing it.

And, further, although our Lord was at every moment in

possession of the Omniscience which was His in respect of His Divinity, as well as of the knowledge belonging to His human consciousness, it was not a *homogeneous* consciousness which extended over these two spheres. The Divine sphere lay outside His human mind, being not comprehensible by it; and although His Omniscience of course comprehended perfectly the human, that fact did not affect the human consciousness, so as to make it other than it was. On this line of thought we come nearer to comprehension of what is the real point of difficulty—the being in the human sphere without being affected by what belonged to the Divine sphere. Yet, when we have realized that our Lord entered only *personally* into the human sphere when He became Man, without any *essential* change of that sphere taking place by reason of His doing so, it does not seem so difficult to grasp the fact that no essential change need have taken place in it afterwards. Our Lord, if we may with reverence express it, became the *Ego* of two spheres—the Divine and the human. And as at first He entered the human sphere as its *Ego*, apart from all the Essence of Divinity, which in the Divine sphere was inseparable from Him, so did He continue in the human sphere. Without for a moment leaving the Divine sphere (which was impossible for Him to do), He entered into and remained in the human sphere as its *Ego;* and because He was in it as its *Ego* only, *i.e.* attaching it to His *Person* only, and His Person to it, it remained essentially unchanged. The structure of Christ's human nature was the structure of humanity generally. And of course, if the human nature which our Lord took remained essentially or structurally unchanged, the human consciousness, which is a part of human nature, remained unchanged also; for the greater includes the less.

Certainly the difficulty of apprehension is only lessened, not removed. For, in order to its being removed, it would be requisite that we should *comprehend* that omniscient consciousness which in Christ was associated (but not confused or blended) with His human consciousness. Without

comprehension of what this is in itself, it is obviously impossible that we should be able to comprehend the *relation* which subsisted in our Incarnate Lord between it and His human consciousness. But though such comprehension is altogether beyond us, it is something to realize that there was a real unlikeness between the omniscient consciousness and the human consciousness; and still more is it helpful to realize that our Lord entered only personally into the lesser sphere, without carrying His Divine attributes into it, and without changing its essential nature, as truly as He was eternally, and did not cease to be, in the greater sphere. How one and the same Person could be simultaneously in two spheres of being, entering perfectly and unconfusedly into what belonged to each, it is indeed hard to conceive. But here we touch at one point upon the mystery of the union of the Infinite with the Finite, a mystery which is assuredly not peculiar to our subject or to revelation, but which is a mystery of the universe, which thought has essayed again and again to penetrate, and always in vain.

Yet even here we have some faint analogies,[1] which help to show that if more were open to us, the difficulty might be still further lessened. For, within the compass of our own personal being, we have at least two forms of consciousness which are not like each other, and into which we are able to enter not merely successively, but simultaneously. The consciousness which attends the exercise of the Understanding is one, and the consciousness which attends the exercise of the Imagination is another. The first is discursive, progress being made by the Understanding by successive acts of attention and comparison of them: the second is intuitive, the working of the Imagination being penetrative, instantaneous, governed by no assignable rules, and offering no stages which can be described. Yet the poet, or the artist, or the musician, being one and the same person, is able to enter *at once* into both forms of consciousness,

[1] Cf. *C. Q. R.*, vol. xxxiii. p. 22 (Oct., 1891), for a different kind of analogy.

exercising at the same time his Imagination and his Understanding. In every great work of the Imagination, the traces of the exercise of the Understanding are undeniable. The actual *expression* of it is mainly the work of the Understanding; for otherwise it could not be understood. What is difficult in it of apprehension, but which, at the same time, gives it all its life and power, comes, on the other hand, from the secret, undefinable, *imaginative* presence which haunts and pervades the whole. Shall we say that the poet or the sculptor is first imaginative and afterwards intellectual? Can we draw a line of demarcation between the exercise of the two faculties? Surely not. Imagination, doubtless, comes first, and in her own marvellous way seizes the whole conception—be it poem, picture, building, or any other form of imaginative creation—by the heart; but in order that it may receive intelligible expression, even in the artist's mind, and still more outwardly for others, the help of the Understanding must be called in, and henceforth the two faculties work together.

There is, then, even in ourselves, a possibility, which is realized in fact, of one and the same person entering at the same time into two spheres of consciousness, which yet remain separate, each preserving its own characteristics, and not being essentially affected or changed. This, no doubt, presents only a far-off resemblance to the great mystery of the Incarnation; but it does, perhaps, bring us a little nearer to it. And, certain though it is that we can by no effort arrive at a full comprehension of the manner in which our blessed Lord, without in any way or for any moment departing from the sphere of His Divine Omniscience, did at the same time occupy a sphere of human consciousness which was in all essential respects similar to our own, and did think and will and act with faculties which were not altered structurally by becoming the faculties of the Son of God, this is assuredly the conclusion towards which we are conducted by the examination of this mysterious but deeply interesting subject, alike from the point of view which is offered when

we endeavour to trace the contrast between Omniscience and human modes of thought and consciousness, and from that which we attain when, after analyzing personality, we seek with the light thus gained to realize the manner in which our Lord took to Himself a human nature and with it a human consciousness.

CHAPTER VI.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Our object in the preceding chapters has been (1) to examine the nature and character of the knowledge which may be attained by the exercise of human faculties, and especially the limitations to which it is subject by reason of the structure of those faculties: (2) to obtain such a view as is possible of that manner of knowing which belongs to God only—our view of it being, of course, mainly negative, (that is to say, comprehending those features in which the human manner of knowing must plainly be replaced, so to say, by that which is unlike it, but of which we can form no positive conception,) and not extending very much beyond this: (3) to set before ourselves, as plainly as might be, the contrast between God's omniscient and eternal consciousness and such knowledge as is possible for man, as regards both compass and extent, and also more especially (seeing that it is on this that the compass of knowledge must depend) as regards the manner of knowing which belongs to the One Uncreated Being, and that which has been allotted to created man: (4) to consider what light might be thrown by the views thus obtained upon the relation between the Divine Omniscience of our Incarnate Lord and His human knowledge; regarding this relation, for greater clearness, separately from the point of view of the two natures which were combined in the unity of His Person, and from the point of view of His Personality.

The conclusions to be drawn from this inquiry have naturally been taking shape gradually as we have advanced in it. But, besides that certain points of detail have not as yet been noticed at all, it will not perhaps be thought amiss to restate as succinctly as possible the general principle governing the relation between the two natures of Jesus Christ (and, as parts of these, between the Omniscience belonging to the one, and the human consciousness belonging to the other), towards which we have been all along tending. With this general principle clearly before us it will be easier to judge of the points of detail.

It must be remembered that what we are at present occupied with is the psychological point of view exclusively; we have to consider what, from this point of view, is either possible or necessary, and, as regards what is only possible and not necessary, we may find that present conclusions may require or admit of being modified or supplemented when we take theological bearings more directly into consideration, as we shall have to do in the next book.

There are two general conclusions which our whole previous inquiry has been tending, if we mistake not, more and more clearly to bring to light and establish. The first is that our Lord's Godhead was wholly untouched and unchanged by the Incarnation, and that in like manner the human nature which He assumed was, as regards its essential structure, untouched and unchanged. Without an apparently constraining necessity, it would probably never have occurred to any simply believing Christian to suppose that any change could have taken place in the Unchangeable God. Such a supposed necessity has, however, led to the theory which we shall have to examine in the next book. But in the present book our inquiry has shown that at any rate no psychological necessity exists for the supposition of any change in our Lord's Godhead. This has been manifested as our second general conclusion has been evidenced more and more distinctly, namely, that there was an absolute non-interference on the part of our Lord's Godhead with any part of the

essential structure of His Manhood, and that in particular there was no interference of It with His human consciousness. The relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His human consciousness was, we conceive, as regards what may be termed the structure of each, a relation of absolute non-interference. The nature and the exercise of the human consciousness and human faculties need not, there seem to be solid grounds for thinking, have been in any essential particular affected by their being brought into such close contact with the omniscient consciousness of God. No doubt as long as we carry with us the conceptions of consciousness and knowledge, of thinking and of understanding, which we derive from our own experience, into the Divine sphere, and endeavour to apply these conceptions to Omniscience, it is impossible to imagine our Lord's human consciousness not to have been affected by His Divine consciousness. If they were of the same order and kind they could not have been so drawn together in One Person without the less being not merely affected but radically changed by the greater. But if they were not of the same order and kind it need not have been so, and this difficulty would disappear. We have, it is true, only one set of conceptions, and one set of terms expressing those conceptions and having all their associations clinging about them: these conceptions and these terms belong to what is of us—to our consciousness—and not to what is of God: and so we can neither positively conceive nor express the reality of the Divine consciousness. But we can at any rate by similitudes set some faint image before us of what the distinction between Divine and human consciousness may be. For example: it is said that if, whilst standing amidst the deep still silence of a tropical forest, there should be granted to us the power of apprehending those sounds which the present constitution of our organs of hearing forbids their receiving, the roar of the sounds of growth—growth being there of such superabundant force—would be absolutely deafening. Or again: it is far from improbable that there is an incapacity in our

organs of sight to receive certain objects of perception, similar to the incapacity of our organs of hearing to receive certain sounds. May it not, then, be that as it would be quite possible for those voices of nature which are the expression of the Divine will to echo all round us without one note of them reaching our ears; or as we might be placed in the very midst of a circle of overpowering light without being affected by it or being conscious of its presence,[1]—so our Lord's human mind (since He vouchsafed to assume, as Man, faculties identical in structure with ours) may have been wrapped around as it were wholly and enclosed by His own eternal and omniscient consciousness, and yet have moved in perfect freedom and play of every faculty, just because a created mind is in itself and by its very structure incapable of apprehending the all-glorious Light of the Uncreated Mind?

One more illustration may be added. Henry Vaughan, the seventeenth century poet, employs the following fine image in order to convey some idea of the contrast between eternity and time—

> "I saw eternity the other night
> Like a great *ring* of pure and endless light,
> All calm, as it was bright;
> And round beneath it, time in hours, days, years,
> Driv'n by the spheres,
> Like a vast shadow mov'd. . . ."[2]

That "great ring of pure and endless light," with its calm changelessness and its eternal radiance, seems as fit an emblem of the Divine Mind as it is of that eternity which is inseparable from It. And in like manner time with its ceaseless change, driven ever onward in endless succession, strikingly resembles the human mind in that feature which is most especially characteristic of it; that is to say, perpetual change, movement following movement unceasingly, one thought continually following or displacing another. How great is the contrast between eternity and time, although

[1] It is said that in the middle of the flame of a candle there is a hollow place in which a match, if it could be introduced into it, would remain without taking fire.

[2] Vaughan, *Silex Scintillans*, p. 96. Cf. Plato, *Timæus*, p. 37, D, *sqq.*

both are in thought or imagination so closely linked together! Even so, although when we speak of the Divine Mind and the human mind we seem to have before us conceptions or objects of thought as closely allied as eternity and time are, may it not be that there is as little real resemblance in the one case as in the other, and that the human mind with its succession of movement can as little enter into the sphere of the changeless calm of the Eternal Mind as time can blend with eternity? Time may seem to be eternity in little—its shadow—a part of it. And yet how great is the difference really between them! In the one is no succession; in the other all is succession. Even so in the Eternal Mind is no succession; in the human mind all is succession. There is resemblance, as between eternity and time; but the difference is far greater than the resemblance.

This is a condition of things which it would not be difficult to realize and accept, were it not that in the case of our Lord, the Uncreated Light and the light of the human consciousness were the absolute possession of one and the same Person. One and the same Person stood, as it were, in the midst of both, having consciousness of both. If this were a really accurate description of the fact—accurate in every particular—the difficulty would seem to be insurmountable. But it is not quite an accurate description of the fact. We ought to say that it was one and the same Person Who stood in the Divine sphere with a *Divine* "consciousness," embracing the Uncreated Light and all created things, and in the human sphere with a *human* consciousness, which could embrace only what it belongs to man to comprehend. The difficulty is then reduced to that of one and the same Person occupying two separate spheres. (For though we have only the one word *consciousness* to express both, we do not mean the same but different things when we speak of *Divine* consciousness and *human* consciousness.) But when we realize the *apartness* of the *Ego* from the nature with which it is otherwise indivisible in the personal sphere of each individual being having an *Ego*, it seems less difficult

to imagine the *Ego, in virtue of its apartness,* entering apart into a second sphere, or rather taking to itself different modes of consciousness, of thinking, willing, and acting, and keeping itself in them separate from what belonged to its own proper sphere. The conclusion derived from an independent psychological examination of the relation in which the real *personality* of a person (that is to say, his *Ego,* his *Self*) stands towards what we are accustomed to call his *nature*—a conclusion pointing directly to the *possibility* of one person entering into two spheres of being in the manner supposed—exactly coincides with the conclusion derived from established theological truths, maintained by the Church as *de Fide,* respecting the *necessity* of conceiving the Incarnation after this manner.

The more closely the subject is examined, the more clear it seems that the difficulty is one of conception, not of fact. Everything points to the Incarnation having taken place in the manner we have supposed; every step we have taken has enabled us to feel more confidence that such was the fact indeed, and we have also felt that we were making some approaches towards realizing it. But fully to realize it, unless we could realize the infinite Divine "consciousness," is clearly impossible for us.

It ought also to be observed that this mode of regarding the mystery of the Incarnation entails no forcing. This cannot be said of the hypothesis that our Lord actually divested Himself of the attributes of Deity in order to enter into the human sphere, which will be considered in the next book. According to the view which we have taken our Lord was, as God, after the Incarnation, precisely what He was before. In respect of the attributes of Godhead, or the exercise of them, He was absolutely unchanged. He had, in becoming Man, taken to Himself a sphere of thinking, feeling, willing, and acting, which was different from the Divine sphere. And this sphere, into which he entered personally, He did not so enter as to bring into it anything which must have changed its essential character as a truly

human sphere. But this involved no paring down of His Divinity in any respect. Both spheres, both natures, both consciousnesses, which were His, retained their own proper integrity and perfection. The *Kenotic* theory supposes that our Lord's Godhead did not retain its absolute integrity and perfection after the Incarnation—a supposition which is based upon the further supposition that in no other way could the integrity and perfection of the manhood of Christ have been secured. According to the view which we are maintaining, it appears that both these suppositions are wholly ungrounded, since there was not really anything in the Incarnation which endangered the integrity or perfection of our Lord's manhood. There was, it has been endeavoured to show, a natural or psychological possibility of His being, without any change in His Godhead, at once, as the Athanasian Creed has taught us to regard Him, perfect God and perfect Man.

Holding, then, in general, respecting the relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His human consciousness, that the latter was not in any way affected *structurally* by the former, and that His human faculties and consciousness were exercised and employed by Him in as human a manner (if the expression may be allowed) as if He had been only Man, it remains for us to see how certain details of our Lord's Incarnate life come to be regarded under the light of this general principle.

1. The first of these relates to the *growth* of His Manhood, and with it of His faculties and consciousness generally. If His human consciousness as an Infant or a Child had really been made at once, as has been sometimes represented, practically omniscient, there could of course have been no room for growth, or possibility of it. But, on the contrary, if the relation of our Lord's Divinity towards His Manhood was a relation of structural non-interference, the growth of His humanity—His mind, His consciousness, and all His faculties—would have proceeded, as with all men, from stage to stage, from infancy to boyhood, from boyhood to manhood,

as a matter of course. He Himself, in respect of His humanity, would have passed personally through these stages, from the unconsciousness of infancy to the mature consciousness of manhood. But He Himself also, in respect of His Godhead, would have been, throughout all these stages of human growth, perfect God, perfect in omniscience as in all else. The human sphere of His being would have been, as it were, enclosed within the sphere of His infinite consciousness, He being the true centre of the human sphere, and of the imperfect consciousness belonging to it, and yet living also in that far different infinite consciousness which is inalienable from God.

It is thus that the point of growth must certainly be regarded under the light of our general principle. Nor does it seem advisable to attempt further explanation of it; for mystery—that is, *something* which we cannot fathom—there must be in the Incarnation, in whatever way or from whatever side we look at it. But it does seem worth while to notice how strongly the requirements of the theory mentioned just now (viz. that our Lord was, as an infant, humanly omniscient; or, as perhaps it should rather be stated, that there was no distinction between His Divine and His human consciousness, but that they were as one), testify with their whole strength, though involuntarily, in favour of the *fact* having been as has been here stated, and by consequence in favour of the whole view which we have taken.

For, in the first place, the theory in question puts a great strain upon the plain, unmistakable expressions of Holy Scripture. Thus it is said in St. Luke,[1] first, that "*the Child grew, and waxed strong, becoming full of wisdom;*" and, a little after, that "*Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and men.*" There is no question as to the meaning of the terms employed; they *distinctly* indicate and assert growth. If this meaning is rejected, there is no choice but to put force upon them, and *make*

[1] ii. 40, 52, πληρούμενον σοφίας—προέκοπτε σοφίᾳ.

them say that our Lord did not really *grow* in wisdom, did not really *become* more full of it, but only *manifested* more and more what was perfect in Him from the first; and this, whilst it is admitted that He must have advanced in bodily growth, and that when it is said that He "increased in *favour* with God and men," this could only be spoken literally, and could refer to Him only as Man, thus making a distinction between Him as Man and as God, which the view in question tends to obliterate.

In the next place, this theory which so strains God's Word written, puts an equally great strain upon His will as expressed in the laws of our being. For growth is not an *accidental* feature in human life: on the contrary, it is an *essential principle* of it. Growth, inward as well as outward, is, as far as we can see, an unalterable law for man. Such is the construction of his nature that perfection of any kind, bodily, intellectual, moral, or spiritual, is simply for him unattainable except through growth. In particular what we term *mind* or *consciousness*, is emphatically subject to growth. It becomes what it is capable of becoming only through the gradual exercise of the faculties which God has implanted in us. It is enlarged only as they are enlarged, and increases in strength and in compass *pari passu* with them. For a child to have the mind of a man would be an absolute violation of nature. If then our Lord had not actually and in fact passed through the regular stages of human life, inwardly as well as outwardly, if He had not really and truly increased as a child, as a boy, and up to mature manhood, in wisdom, there would have been, in His case, a real violation of nature. And where then would have been the truth of the Second Adam? How would He have been "like unto us in all things"?

2. The next point relates to the *communications* which may or must have taken place between our Lord's Omniscience and His human consciousness. Respecting this subject there are several particulars requiring notice. What kind of communications may we suppose to have been made?

What was necessary in order to their being made? What limitations were there to the reception of what might be communicated? What was the time and what was the manner in which they may probably have been given?

To all these questions it seems that some answer can be given from the psychological point of view, and in the light of that general principle by which we are now endeavouring to judge of each point of detail. Perhaps we may conveniently group the particulars indicated in the questions which have been set down, under these two heads: viz. first, the communications themselves with anything qualifying them; secondly, the time and manner in which they were made.

(1) As regards the communications themselves. It may be taken for granted, it is to be supposed, that our Lord's human mind did have imparted to it a knowledge (*a*) of His own Godhead (and, it may be added, in order to show fully what is meant, though it is really contained in this) of the Father and the Holy Trinity; (*b*) of the whole counsel of the Incarnation; (*c*) of His own Office as the Christ; (*d*) of everything bearing upon that counsel and that office or otherwise necessary or useful (as, *e.g.*, the knowledge of men's hearts) for its fulfilment. In regard to all this knowledge it is to be remarked that since in the form in which it was possessed or held by His Divine omniscient consciousness it must have been inaccessible to His human mind (human faculties being, as we have seen, incapable of comprehending things as God knows them, or entering at all into the manner of the Divine knowing), it follows that it must have been translated into a form in which human faculties were capable of receiving it. Moreover the *full* contents of our Lord's Omniscience could not have been communicated to His human mind. He could not as man have known either Himself or the Father in the same manner as He as God knew Himself and the Father. And the same may be said respecting the other points of knowledge specified. Not to know them in the same manner is equivalent in this case to not

knowing them fully. As regards limitations, then, to what might be communicated, it does not seem that we can be in error in saying that only so much could have been communicated as our Lord's human faculties were capable of receiving without alteration or straining of their proper structure; and that, further, what was communicated must have been given in a form in which it would be intelligible to human faculties. These limitations would not be inconsiderable. The knowledge of God Himself and of God's counsels, with their illimitable extent and bearings, as God Himself knows them, must be far far beyond what any human mind, as such, could possibly receive; and our Lord, Who, as God, of course comprehended all perfectly in His Infinite Mind, could not have broken the laws of His human mind, and therefore could only have communicated to it what, under those laws, He Himself had fitted it to receive.

These limitations, it would seem, there must have been. But, from a psychological point of view at least, no others can be supposed. For it is evident that all knowledge of every kind whatsoever might have been communicated by our omniscient Lord to His human mind, provided, first, that it was of a kind which a human mind, as such, could receive, and, secondly, that it was presented to it in a form in which a human mind could apprehend it. And, it must further be observed, we cannot measure by the estimate of our minds or spirits what the human mind and spirit of our Lord might have received. His absolute innocence and purity on the one hand, and, on the other, the probability that all His faculties, as being those of the Second Adam, the one Perfect Representative of our race—to say nothing at present of the requirements of the work which He came to fulfil—were of the highest order of excellence that is possible for man, point strongly to the conclusion, to say the least that can be said, that nothing could have been wanting to our Lord's knowledge as man which it was possible for man to have. In all cases and on any subjects on which decisive evidence of His knowing or not knowing was wanting, the presumption would

seem to be very strongly in favour of His knowing. Psychologically speaking, at any rate, it is certain that He might have known *everything* which human faculties can comprehend, and in the fullest manner in which a human mind or a human spirit has any capacity of receiving. It has been remarked that in the Gospels a deep background of consciousness makes itself felt as we listen to our Lord's sayings.[1] The writer who makes this remark supposes that in this we have an indication of our Lord's *Divine* consciousness. It may be so; but it may also be understood in another way which, if the other supposition be adopted, must at any rate be included with it. For a mind like our Lord's human mind, which had received the consciousness of belonging to One Who was all that Jesus Christ was, which had received the knowledge of God and of His counsels according to the utmost capacity of a created mind, must needs have had *in itself* a very very deep background of consciousness. Our Lord cannot in the Gospels have expressed Himself *directly* out of His eternal mind. If He had He would have been unintelligible to us. All that He has expressed must, as regards the form of its expression, have been cast in His own human mind in human forms of thought, and have been given to us in human forms of speech. It was not possible for us to contemplate the Eternal God in Christ, or to gaze into the depths of the Eternal Mind and Counsels, without any medium interposed. Neither could we have heard His voice had He spoken to us in the accents of Deity. The Manhood of Christ, the human consciousness, the human mind and speech, were the all-necessary medium. It was through this medium that "the Life was manifested;" it was through this medium that God spake with us; and although the Omniscient Mind was behind the human mind of our Lord, there was no actual blending of His human consciousness with that Divine consciousness which was also His, and therefore it would seem that the deep background of which we are sensible does not reach back so far as to

[1] *Church Quart. Rev.*, Oct., 1891, p. 23; *cf.* p. 14.

that eternal consciousness, but is rather that which a human mind such as that of our Lord, resting upon God, and being filled with the knowledge of God, could not but manifest of itself.

(2) As regards the time and manner of the communications. As to the *time* it would seem in all respects most natural and probable, and psychologically most suitable, that the communications should have been given *pari passu* with the stages of growth of our Lord's humanity. At each successive stage there would be a somewhat greater capacity to receive. And so, in respect of communicated knowledge, as in all other respects, it seems reasonable to believe that our Lord attained at each stage such perfection as was relative to that period of His growth. It is not, indeed, for us to say when precisely His human mind received the consciousness of all that He was; but when, at twelve years old, He spoke, in terms which His mother and His foster-father did not comprehend, about His Father's business, it is evident that He had received a consciousness about both His Divine Sonship and His mission, which was wanting altogether as yet in them. And surely those eighteen years at Nazareth about which the Gospels are silent, must have been years of great import. As Dean Alford most truly said, "the growing up through infancy, childhood, youth, manhood, from grace to grace, holiness to holiness, in subjection, self-denial, and love, *without one polluting touch of sin* —this it was which, consummated by the three years of active ministry, by the Passion, and by the Cross, constituted '*the obedience of one man*,' by which many were made righteous."[1] But more than this: it was during those years especially that we may suppose the human mind of our Lord to have been equipped, by communication from His own omniscient mind, with the full knowledge "of God, and of the Father, and of Christ,"[2] as well as of the office and mission which were His, and of all things relating to it and its accomplishment. When He began to be about thirty

[1] On St. Luke ii. 52. [2] Col. ii. 2.

years old, and had consequently arrived at man's maturity, and entered upon His public ministry, it seems reasonable to suppose that His mind had received all that a human mind can receive, as regards at least the entire substantial contents of that knowledge of which transference was made from His Divine omniscient consciousness to His human mind. It has indeed been suggested by the writer of the article in the *Church Quarterly Review*,[1] to which reference was just now made, that the translation of what was always present to our Lord's Divine consciousness into a form in which it was capable of being received and understood by His human mind, was made not once for all prior to the commencement of His ministry, but from time to time in the course of His ministry as occasion required. But, at least as regards the main substance of what was communicated, this does not seem probable. If anything like this did take place, it must surely have been of a supplemental character. Instances of this may possibly be found in *some* of the occasions on which our Lord is recorded as having read *on the instant*[2] the thoughts of those about Him. But, as regards the disciples at any rate, it is expressly stated that our Lord "knew from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) who they were that believed not, and who should betray Him."[3] And, indeed, it seems much more in accordance with the general character of the operations of God, as well as with the requirements of the case, that our Lord should have entered upon His ministry having in His human mind, as well as in His omniscient consciousness, full and *matured* knowledge of every particular connected in any way with His office and His work—and it may be also (for we are no judges of what may or may not have been communicated to Him) with all possible knowledge which a human mind is any way capable of receiving. Even as regards such a

[1] Page 23.

[2] If the εὐθέως in St. Mark ii. 8 belongs to ἐπιγνούς, and not to the verb εἶπεν, this would be a case in point.

[3] St. John vi. 64.

fact as that of the day and hour of the final judgment, if the true interpretation of that passage be that the knowledge of it was withheld from our Lord's human mind, it seems most probable that it was made known to Him from the first that this fact lay outside the revelation which His human mind was meant to receive. This question is indeed mainly one of evidence from the text of the Gospels, and when we come to consider that evidence, more will have to be said upon it. But, from our present psychological point of view, it certainly seems much the most probable that our Lord's human mind should have received all or almost all which was communicated to it, before He began His ministry.

As regards the *manner* in which the communications were made, it might seem presumptuous to venture even a conjecture. Yet this one thing may perhaps be said, with due reverence in drawing near to ground so holy. It is that it does seem both probable in itself, as being consonant to the ways of Him who ordereth all things "by measure, and number, and weight,"[1] and also in full accordance with the evidence of the Gospels—viz. that our Lord not only was intimately acquainted with the Old Testament scriptures, but constantly spoke of His course as depicted in them as in a mirror—that these Scriptures should have been a principal means whereby that truth, which in its Divine form no human faculties could receive, was conveyed during the life at Nazareth to the human mind of Christ. If this was so, who could believe that our Lord's human understanding of those Scriptures did not embrace the fullest and most comprehensive knowledge of them of every kind, historical and critical (which it has of late been suggested was wanting in Him as being unnecessary) as well as moral and spiritual? This again is largely a matter of evidence, about which more will have to be said in the proper place. The general remark, however, does not seem out of place here. It has often been observed that our Lord's mind, as revealed to us in the Gospels, shows no trace of any either local or national

[1] Wisdom xi. 20.

colouring, far less of His having ever sat at the feet of any human teacher to learn of him. How should there have been in Him anything that was narrow, anything limited in thought, or feeling, or sympathy, by merely local or national prejudice or association? Were there no other preventive reasons, this would have sufficed, that His mind and spirit should have been steeped in the full, pure, deep truth of that sacred Volume in which God is self-revealed, and in which human nature as it really is, with its evil and its good, with its innate weakness and its possibilities of being lifted up from strength to strength, with its aspirations after God and its all too fearful gazings into the depths of Satan, is searched out and laid bare. And when we remember that He Himself was the Revealer and Giver of the Old Testament Scriptures, that it was in a very special sense *by Him* that the counsels of God's providence there recorded had passed into act, it seems as if we could in some measure understand and realize with what a mind He would have passed out of the retirement of Nazareth, with all the stores which His own Omniscience had poured into it through the barriers which marked off within Him the Divine from the human—stores of far-reaching and all but omniscient truth, inly received, rooted, pondered, matured—and thus in calm steadfastness have been prepared to meet unflinchingly all that should come upon Him, foreseen and accepted as the Divine will, in the hour of His own conflict and the world's salvation.

The thought may, perhaps, occur that the representation that our Lord Himself was as it were the Instructor of His own human mind, communicating to it from His omniscience that which without an act of His will would have remained hidden from it and unknown, stands in at least apparent conflict with our Lord's own repeated declaration in the Gospels, "As the Father hath taught Me, I speak these things."[1] But the solution is easily given. Every work of God is a joint work of the Holy Trinity, in which each of the Holy Three fulfils that which in the working of the One

[1] S. John viii. 28.

God is of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. The Father is in all the Source, the APXH. He was so in regard to the Old Testament Scriptures, of which the Son was the Revealer, and which holy men of old spake and wrote for us as they were moved and inspired by the Holy Ghost. And when we say that our Lord communicated to His human mind that which it was needful that it should receive, from *His* Omniscience, the statement does not exclude but include the joint operation of the Father and of the Holy Ghost. And the reason why our Lord should have spoken especially of the Father as His Teacher was, we may with some confidence venture to believe, a threefold reason: for, in the first place, the Father *was* the Source of the teaching; secondly, the mention specially of the Father did not exclude any One of the Holy Trinity, but the contrary; thirdly, it was important and necessary that a distinct and clear as well as a true impression should be made upon the minds of those to whom our Lord in the first instance addressed this saying, and when His statement was thus framed, it was plainly such as they could understand; had it been stated otherwise, the theological knowledge which was the result of the later teachings of the Holy Ghost would have been necessary in order to its being understood.

3. The last point requiring to be noticed in its connection with our general principle is our Lord's temptations and sufferings. This important question will have to be more fully considered presently from the theological point of view. At present, and from the psychological point of view only, there is but one feature which comes specially before us. It is this. We have already seen that, according to the view which has been taken in this book, there was no limit to the knowledge which our Lord's human mind actually did receive or might have received, except this one, viz. that what was given to it should be only knowledge of such a kind, and presented in such a form, as a human mind could properly receive without any violation of its structure or nature—without, that is to say, being made

something different from a true *human* mind. We have supposed that our Lord's human mind did under this condition receive the knowledge "of God, and of the Father, and of Christ," of the whole counsel of God's Providence, and of all—and it may be much more than all that we can imagine—belonging in any way to His Office and Work, as well as to His Person as the Redeemer of the world. We believe that this included a foreknowledge of all that should come upon Him to the very end, and of "the joy" beyond "that was set before Him." We believe that He carried the consciousness of all this with Him when He went forth from Nazareth for His ministry, and that it must have been His throughout His earthly life. How, then, would this consciousness bear upon His temptations and sufferings? Would it make temptation unreal? Would it take away the pang of suffering?

The answer, from our present point of view, seems to be thoroughly clear and consistent. Such consciousness as this would indeed lift our Lord's temptations and sufferings to a higher level than that of man's temptations and sufferings generally; it would carry them beyond our ordinary experience; but it would not make them unreal; it would leave them thoroughly human; it would in some respects greatly intensify them.

And why? Because we are supposing our Lord's consciousness as Man to have been from first to last thoroughly and exclusively human. However great the objects of His knowledge were, and however great His knowledge and consciousness and comprehension of them was, it was still a human knowledge only; it was with a human and not with a Divine apprehension that He was, as Man, conscious; His life as Man was in all respects lived upon a human plane; His faculties were exercised after a human manner; every movement of His Body, Soul, and Spirit, was made within the human sphere, and neither did nor could pass beyond it, although He Himself as God was all the time filling heaven and earth.

Realizing this, we seem to be not far from being able in some measure to understand how even the consciousness of so stupendous a fact as His own Divinity would not have impaired the reality of temptation as presented to our Lord from without; because temptation was addressed of necessity exclusively to His human nature, and because His realization of this greatest of truths with His human consciousness fell so far—it may be said so infinitely—short of His Divine apprehension of it; He *could* not as Man know Himself with that knowledge with which as God He knew Himself. Still more clearly do we see this when we contemplate the sufferings in which, after all, the great stress of temptation—the trial of obedience—for our Lord lay. They belonged so wholly to His human nature; they reached to the very core of His being as Man, penetrating and piercing it in every part. The consciousness of Divinity might enhance; it could not remove them. There is a great difference between consciousness of Deity, and receiving from Deity those consolations which it is of course capable of imparting. Our Lord's human consciousness of all that He was would not carry with it as a necessary consequence the removal or relief of suffering by influences proceeding from His Deity. He was, as regards His sufferings, enclosed, shut up, within the human sphere. Consolations from outside that sphere might reach and uphold Him: they might also be withheld: in that cry upon the Cross which seems more almost than the Agony in the Garden to reveal the unfathomable depth of suffering into which our Saviour for our sakes was contented to be brought—"My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?"—we are enabled to see how His sufferings did really close in round Him, even shutting out for the time the Light of God's Presence.

It is then in this, that our Lord's consciousness as Man of all that He Himself was (including of course His Deity), and of everything to which His knowledge as Man extended, was a true human consciousness, and not more than a human consciousness, that He knew after a human manner and, as

Man, not otherwise than in a human manner as we do—it is in this that we find not the possibility only, but the necessity of His temptations and His sufferings being most truly human and most truly real. It could not but be so, because He, as Man, was enclosed within the circle of humanity. Certainly He was at the same time possessing in its fulness that infinite Life which has no bound or limit. But then He entered not into that infinite Life with any consciousness but that which was Divine. Within the circle of His life as Man all was human; His consciousness was human, His feelings were human, and so His temptations and sufferings were also human; they differed from ours, not in being other than human, but solely because, He being what He was, and the burden which was laid upon Him being so well-nigh infinite, the intensity of them and the trial of His obedience was beyond all expression greater than any other son of man has borne or could bear.

It will be seen, then, that in the view which it has been the aim of this book to explain and to uphold, as being a psychologically correct description of our Blessed Lord's Incarnation, and especially of the relation between His Divine Omniscience and His human consciousness, there is no trace of Docetism. In fact, the following three points seem to offer very convincing evidence in favour of its being the true view. First, that according to it Docetism could have no place, our Lord as Man being free to be, to suffer, and to do, all that belongs to man, without any impediment to this freedom being placed in the way by His Godhead. Secondly, that according to it our Lord as God remained after the Incarnation in every particular all that He was before; our view rejects—as in all reason, and it must be added in all reverence, we are bound to do—the possibility of any change having taken place in the Unchangeable God. Thirdly, that according to it the relation between our Lord's Divine and human natures, and more especially between the consciousness belonging to each (if a term which is strictly appropriate only to the human nature may be applied to

both) was what may perhaps be called the *natural* relation: that is to say, it is the relation which comes to view when we examine and compare, as far as we are able to do so, the actual characteristic features of each form of consciousness—of each mode of knowing—the Divine and the human; we find that no force is required in order to establish the relation supposed; it is the relation which, the natures and the consciousness belonging to each being what they were, they would (we see) *naturally* assume towards each other. It might surely almost be said that these three points present three essential conditions which any view, purporting to be a true view of the mystery of our Lord's Incarnation, is bound to show to be fulfilled in the picture which that view offers. At any rate the belief that these conditions are really fulfilled in the view here presented, is the present writer's chief ground of confidence that what he has ventured to write concerning our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, has not been written altogether untruly.

BOOK II.

THE THEOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Preliminary.

In the preceding book we regarded our subject from the psychological point of view. We examined the structure of human consciousness and human faculties of knowledge, and we endeavoured to ascertain, by such comparison as was possible, in what respects we might be sure that the Divine manner of knowing must at any rate be unlike our mode of knowing. As the result of this comparison we were led to conclude that there must be so much unlikeness between them that no blending or mixture of the Divine with the human could possibly take place; that, however closely united the human consciousness was with Divine Omniscience in our Lord by reason of the unity of His Person, the very structure of His human consciousness must have, as it were, protected it from the entry within it of His Omniscience as such; that whatever His human consciousness received from His Omniscience, was received in a shape and manner adapted to human faculties; and that, consequently, the human consciousness was enabled to retain its integrity and true human character, even in such unimaginable contact with Omniscience, just as perfectly and really as was the case with the rest of that human nature which our Lord condescended to make His own, which, though as it were touching the Infinite, remained nevertheless finite. As regards the confessedly great difficulty of conception arising from the fact that the

Lord, by reason of the absolute unity of His Person, must have at every moment possessed alike His Divine Omniscience, and also His human consciousness, with all that belonged to both, we saw that the true idea of what the *Ego* or *Self* is does in some measure mitigate even this difficulty. For it shows from the psychological side (as was laid down theologically in the formula of the Council of Chalcedon) that, by reason of the nature of the *Ego*, there could be and would probably be a union of the finite nature with the *Ego* of the Infinite Son of God (ἀδιαιρέτως), without involving the consequence of the finite nature being thereby changed or made infinite (ἀσυγχύτως). And the relation of the human consciousness to the *Ego*, or of the *Ego* to it on the one hand, and to its Omniscience on the other, is only a particular aspect or particular part of the general relation of the *Ego* towards the finite and the Infinite.

These conclusions, arrived at in studying the mystery from a purely psychological point of view, must now be further tested. The point of view is to be changed. Looking at the subject now *theologically*, we have to consider what the purposes were which the Eternal Son designed to accomplish through His Incarnation, and what conditions were essential to the fulfilment of those purposes. If we find that from this point of view we are conducted to similar conclusions with those obtained from our first point of view, we shall naturally and properly feel increased confidence that they are substantially correct.

And since the modern Kenotic theory, of which mention was made in the Introduction, offers an entirely different explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation and, in particular, of the relation of our Lord's Divine Omniscience towards His human consciousness, the present book seems to be the proper place to consider that theory with all the care which the importance of the subject demands. Accordingly we shall proceed, in the latter part of the present book, to the examination of this theory.

CHAPTER I.

THE REVEALER AND THE REDEEMER.

THE Divine counsel of the Incarnation embraced, it will be readily understood, purposes wider than those which it will be necessary to consider in the present chapter. Respecting the entire scope and range, indeed, of that surpassing mystery, we know, as has been well said, "just enough to take the measure of our ignorance."[1] We are able to perceive that it includes relations towards God Who planned it, towards man for whose salvation it was especially designed, towards the powers of evil under whose dominion man had fallen, and towards the universe to which the effects of man's fall had extended. Such a stupendous fact as the Incarnation could not, moreover, be accomplished without reaching in its results, (through the contemplation of it certainly and, it may be, in other ways besides,) to those glorious beings, the holy Angels, from whom, as being especially God's host, a well-known title of the Almighty is derived. We know, moreover, that in all that God worketh the manifestation of His glory, that is, of what He is, must needs be the all-including final cause. And who can assign any limit to the ultimate effects upon any of God's creatures who are capable of "seeing His face," and, especially, upon beings like the holy Angels, of such a manifestation of God's surpassing goodness as was made and is being made through the Incarnation? To know God truly in any degree is eternal life. What must it be to know Him more and more perfectly! This is given to the Angels now in their contemplation of the unfolding counsel

[1] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 98, 6th ed.

of the Incarnation. This in a lower degree is given to us also. But it is evident that we at present stand at the outskirts only of a vast economy. We know that the Incarnation was designed as the means of bestowing upon man reconciliation with God, re-creation in Christ, and eternal life. We know that through it was to come the overthrow of the powers of darkness and the kingdom of Satan. We perceive that through "the gathering together" in one which is promised "of all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth,"[1] the gifts of unity and truth will one day (in some manner and under conditions not yet fully revealed) be once more bestowed upon the dislocated universe. But even these things we know in part only. The economy of the Incarnation stretches out before our view on every side to spiritual distances which can only be compared to those measureless depths of the starry heavens which the telescope enables the bodily eye dimly to discern but not to fathom.

The purpose of the Incarnation, however, as regards mankind is much more fully and much more clearly made known to us. And, without entering into any parts or details with which we are not at present concerned, there are two aspects of our Lord's coming which relate especially to ourselves, and which are of great importance in relation to what is now before us. In order to the accomplishment of our Lord's gracious purpose of reconciliation and salvation, it was clearly essential that He should present Himself to us both as a Revealer and as a Redeemer. Without the work of the Redeemer the Revealer's office would have been barren and useless or even a mockery of our misery. But, on the other hand, without the illumination bestowed by the Revealer, the blessings of redemption would have remained unwelcomed because not understood.

These were the two chief and most comprehensive aspects of our Incarnate Lord's work as regards ourselves. He came to us in the double capacity of a Revealer and of a Redeemer.

[1] Ephes. i. 10.

It might have seemed superfluous and unnecessary to insist upon this point. The connection between the offices of the Revealer and the Redeemer seems so obvious and so important. But our Lord's office as Revealer is an aspect of His work which has of late been singularly overlooked and neglected. No doubt this is partly in consequence of the increased attention which has been bestowed upon the relation of our Lord's *Manhood* to the accomplishment of His work of Redemption. But attention to one part ought not to entail neglect of other parts. It is just in this way that "the proportion of the faith" comes to be overthrown or obscured. And of this there seems to be some danger in the present instance. For example. In Professor Godet's *New Testament Studies* there is an interesting essay upon our Lord's Work. The essay balances another one upon the subject of His Person. It may be presumed, therefore, that the intention of the writer was to give a general view of our Lord's Work in the second essay, corresponding to the general view of His Person which was given in the first. But throughout the essay on our Lord's Work no mention at all is made of His office as Revealer.

Of old it was customary to make expressly this division.[1] The office of the Revealer and the office of the Redeemer were regarded as two sides of our Lord's work which it was equally important to study. St. Augustine called the Revealer's work *magisterium*, and the Redeemer's *adjutorium*.[2] St. Athanasius, in his Treatise on the Incarnation,[3] dwelt at some length on each of these reasons for God's becoming man—the necessity of bestowing upon fallen man the lost principle of life, which was the work of redemption and grace, being what St. Augustine called the *adjutorium;* and the necessity of giving to darkened man a revelation which should disperse the mists encompassing him, and lead him to

[1] See Petavius, *De Incarn.*, Lib. II. cc. vi. x., and the passages there quoted or referred to. Compare Heb. i. 1–4.

[2] *Epist.* cxxxvii. 12 (Migne, *P. L.* xxxiii. 521).

[3] See the Synopsis prefixed to the Rev. A. Robertson's translation of this Treatise.

understand what was the life of holiness, love, and endless felicity, to which God was calling him, being St. Augustine's *magisterium.*

Amongst the Fathers of old, and amongst theologians of later times, some have naturally dwelt with especial emphasis upon one of these aspects of our Saviour's work and some upon the other.[1] But whilst it is of course impossible to overstate the importance of His redemptive work, the work of the Revealer must at the same time be regarded as holding a position which seems to be fitly described as primary. For the functions of the Revealer are required both before and after the work of the Redeemer. Redemption is from first to last encompassed by the illuminating power and gifts of the Revealer. Without that illumination of the heart and spirit of man which it was His to bestow, the Redemption would never have been understood or received. And when sinful man has been awakened by the gift of faith, and enabled through the atoning blood of the Redeemer to draw nigh to God, then does the reality of eternal life begin to unfold before his cleansed soul its infinite fulness. For, "this is life eternal" (as we know from our Lord's own lips), "to know the only true God and Him Whom He sent, even Jesus Christ."[2] The work of the Redeemer is therefore in a certain sense secondary to that of the Revealer. Revelation prepares the way for the reception of redemption, and through the grace of redemption the purified and forgiven soul becomes fitted for a continually ascending life under the touch of the Revealer. Salvation, begun by the work of the Revealer, is carried onward through His redeeming grace to the issues of eternal life, as the Revealer bids the soul behold with quickened powers Him Who made it, and in His Light for evermore see light. It was thus that the earliest Fathers—St. Justin Martyr, St. Irenæus, St. Clement of Alexandria—came to regard the work of the Redeemer as leading on to and as it were swallowed up in the work of the

[1] Cf. Bright, *The Incarnation as a Motive Power*, p. 56, *sqq.*

[2] St. John xvii. 3.

Revealer. It was thus that St. Athanasius and St. Augustine loved to contemplate the Incarnation in the inception of its purpose and in its completion. It was thus that St. Hilary was fain to exclaim: "*Hoc maximum opus Filii fuit, ut Patrem cognosceremus. . . . Summa dispensationis est Filio, ut noveris Patrem: quid irritum facis opus prophetarum, Verbi incarnationem, Virginis partum, virtutem operationum, crucem Christi? Tibi hæc omnia impensa, tibi præstita sunt: ut per hæc manifestus tibi et Pater esset et Filius.*[1]

But it is time to turn to the separate consideration of these two aspects of our Saviour's work. And first let us contemplate Him as the Revealer. The point to be borne in mind, as that upon which an answer is required, is whether, in order that the revelation which He came to give might be understood and received, it was requisite that He should manifest His Godhead and employ its influences and power, or whether it was sufficient that He should simply proclaim it as man after the manner of the prophets who were sent before Him. If we consider the revelation in connection in the first place with the Lord Himself as the Revealer, next in connection with those to whom it had to be made, and, lastly, in itself, we shall perhaps take as good a course as could be taken in order to arrive at the truth.

Christ the Revealer.

I. The revelation regarded in its connection with the Revealer Himself. (i.) Let it be considered in the first place that the office of Revealer is essentially inherent in our Lord's Person.[2] As the consubstantial Son, the Word and Wisdom of the Father, "the brightness of His glory and the express image of His substance,"[3] He is the eternal manifestation of all that God is. Creation is the primary manifestation of God. Creation is accordingly the appropriate work of the Son: for

[1] *De Trin.* iii. 22 (Migne, *P. L.* x. 90, 91).

[2] See Lee, *On Inspiration*, Lect. III., *The Logos the Revealer*, esp. p. 120, *sq.*, 2nd ed.

[3] Heb. i. 1.

"without Him was not anything made that was made."[1] By the creation the Son revealed the Father. All after manifestations of the glory of God—of what He is—go back to creation as their original and foundation. In being Creator the Son is proclaimed as the Revealer. Herein lies in part the fitness of *His* becoming Incarnate—and not either the First Person or the Third in the most Holy Trinity—because in the Incarnation "God was manifest in the flesh."[2] By natural right the Son Who is "the measure of the Father" must be the Revealer of Him. The "Theophanies" of the Old Testament History, whatever explanation be adopted of the difficulties relating to this form of manifestation, must be regarded as illustrations of the Son's office of Revealer.[3] The Old Testament revelation was in like manner given by Him. Revelation may be made by word, or it may be made by act. In the Old Testament our Lord is seen as the Revealer both by word and by act. But though this is so, and though it is attested in many ways, there is naturally a difference between the Eternal Son as Revealer before and after His Incarnation. Before it His presence was comparatively concealed: after and through it He was with us as Emmanuel as He never was before, and His revealing was in a corresponding degree more open and more perfect. "In the Gospel history," as has been well said, "we see the Son of God combining in His own Person the two great phases of all *immediate* revelation: unfolding, that is, the mystery of the Divine counsels by His words; displaying the wonders of Divine power by His acts."[4] One other stage of action of the Revealer is yet to come. In the day when it is promised that we shall see face to face, God will be manifested to us as He is. But the Revealer of Him will be then and ever the same, none other than God the Eternal Son and Word, Jesus Christ our Lord.

[1] St. John i. 3.

[2] 1 Tim. iii. 16. The reading ὅς only makes this a virtual instead of an actually verbal statement. Cf. 1 St. John i. 2; ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη.

[3] See Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 56 *sq.*, Lee, *ubi supra*, p. 124; Bull, *Def. Fid. Nic.*, I. i. 10, 11.

[4] Lee, *ubi supra*, p. 118.

Our Lord is the Revealer not simply by right of office, but because He is *in Himself* the revelation of the Father. He reveals God, the Eternal Life, the Excellent Glory, not merely truths about God.[1] This is the very substance of His revealing. He is the Revealer because He is what He is. There is, therefore, and must always be an immeasurable distance between His revealing and that which He entrusts to any of His prophets. They speak from Him about God: He reveals God in Himself. To suppose Him to have spoken simply like one of the prophets, with whatever higher degree of illumination, during His Incarnate life on earth, would be to make a supposition standing in fatal contradiction to the true conception of Him as the Revealer. No prophet could ever say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."[2] The adequate discharge of the Son's office of Revealer could only be by the manifestation of *Godhead* in Himself. Any proclamation about God which was apart from this would be inadequate. Looking, therefore, at our Lord in this light as the Revealer, we should certainly expect that His manifestation of God upon earth would have as its centre the showing of Godhead in Himself.

(ii.) Our Lord's discharge of His office as Revealer is further illuminated by the titles given to Him as descriptive of what He was to be and was upon earth in His Incarnate life. It was foretold of Him by the old Evangelist, Isaiah, that He would be the "Wonder-Counsellor."[3] The original word for "wonder" or "wonderful" points to His possession of a nature which is *separate* and which man cannot fathom; and the title "Counsellor," as connected with it, points to the fact that in virtue of this nature He "shares and unfolds the Divine mind." In like manner He is spoken of in Job as the Interpreter Who among a thousand or the whole body

[1] 1 St. John i. 2; 2 St. Peter i. 17.

[2] St. John xiv. 9.

[3] Isaiah ix. 6. The root of פלא signifies to be "separate." Vitringa notes that יועץ *Counsellor* means one who *gives* counsel, not one who receives it. See Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 87; from whom some words in the text are taken.

of angels has no equal, that is to say, Who is unique in His office as Interpreter because He is unique in His nature.[1] Both passages point to the close connection between what He is and His mode of revealing.

The prediction in Deut. xviii. 15–18 may at first sight seem to be descriptive of an office of a character less unique and more on a level with that of the prophets generally. But a little consideration will show that this impression is incorrect and has no real foundation. "It cannot be denied" (said Bishop Pearson[2]) "but the Messias was promised as a Prophet and Teacher of the people. So God promised him to Moses; *I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren like unto thee.* So Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Hoseah, have expressed him . . . And, not only so, but as a greater prophet, and more perfect doctor, than any ever was which preceded him, more universal than they all . . . not like Moses and the prophets, saying, *Thus saith the Lord;* but *I say unto you;* nor like the interpreters of Moses, for *He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes:* with the greatest perspicuity, not, as those before him, under types and shadows, but plainly and clearly; from whence both he and his doctrine is frequently called *light:* with the greatest universality, as preaching that Gospel which is to unite all the nations of the earth into one Church, that there might be one shepherd and one flock." So Bishop Pearson, clearly intimating that He Who was "the Prince and Lord of all the prophets, doctors, and pastors, which either preceded or succeeded him," was like indeed, but also unlike them even in the office which He held in common with them. For likeness in some particulars does not necessitate likeness in all. Our Lord was like Moses in the verity of His human nature. He was like him in having a prophetical office. He was like him in so far as Moses himself was distinguished from other prophets by his nearness to God. But in this last important point the Lord was also unlike

[1] Job xxxiii. 23.

[2] *On the Creed*, Art. ii. p. 85 (p. 161, ed. Chevallier, Camb., 1849).

and removed from Moses by all the interval which separates that which was said of Moses—"With him will I speak mouth to mouth,"[1] in which he was more like the Lord than other prophets were—from that which was said of the Lord Himself, and which could be said of no other, "The only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."[2]

The actual title "Prophet" is not given to our Lord in the New Testament,[3] probably in order that there might be no confusion between His office and that of those who were prophets indeed but on a far lower level. The distinction between all others and Him "in whom the functions of Moses and Aaron are combined, each in an infinitely loftier form, Who is the last Revealer of God's will and the Fulfiller of man's destiny,"[4] is the point upon which stress is laid. Thus John the Baptist, because he was His forerunner, is described as "more than a prophet."[5] How much greater, then, both in function and in nature was He Whose messenger John the Baptist was! Again, how forcibly is the same thought conveyed in the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, spake to us at the end of the days in Him Who is His Son"![6] And again, in the contrast between the word spoken through angels,[7] and the great salvation spoken through the Lord! Or between Moses[8] as a servant and Christ as a Son! Such contrasts point not only to the superior dignity of the Person of "that Prophet,"[9] Whom not to obey is death, but also to a difference in His mode of fulfilling His office and their mode of discharging it who were sent before Him.

The Revealer's *mission*, upon which emphasis is laid in

[1] Numb. xii. 8; cf. Exod. xxxiii. 11, "The Lord spake unto Moses face to face;" Deut. xxxiv. 10, "Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face."

[2] St. John i. 18.

[3] Perhaps it may be thought that it is virtually given in Acts iii. 23.

[4] Westcott, note on Heb. iii. 1.

[5] St. Matt. xi. 9.

[6] Heb. i. 1.

[7] Heb. ii. 2, 3.

[8] Heb. iii. 5, 6.

[9] Deut. xviii. 19; Acts iii. 23.

the title "Prophet," is also that which is most prominent in the title "Apostle," which is given to our Lord in the Epistle to the Hebrews.[1] This term, chosen probably rather than that of "Angel," because Christ the "Son" had been just before contrasted with the angels, seems to be the designed counterpart of the titles of "the Angel of Jehovah"[2] —of Whom God said, "My Name is in Him;"—"the Angel of Great Counsel"—which St. Jerome[3] supposes that the LXX., *nominum majestate perterritos*, put for all the other titles in Isa. ix. 6;—or "the Angel of the Covenant," Who is also called "the Lord" in Mal. iii. 1. But although the title "Apostle" accentuates especially the idea of "mission," upon which our Lord Himself lays such frequent stress, it denotes also the *office* of the Revealer. This cannot be better expressed than in the words of St. Justin Martyr: "He is called both Angel and Apostle. For He Himself announces (ἀπαγγέλλει) whatsoever things are needful to be known, and He is sent (ἀποστέλλεται) to make known all which He announces."[4]

One other title there is which emphatically points to our Lord's Person as the source of the revelation which proceeded from Him. He is the true (the ideal) "Light." "John the Baptist was the *lamp*, the derivative and not the self-luminous light."[5] Our Lord was the latter, not the λύχνος, but τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν—"*the* Light, that is, the Light Which is the very essence of God."[6] From Him issued all the scattered rays which have in various ways and degrees penetrated the darkness of the heathen world at large, and which have in individuals lighted the recesses of the heart and conscience, as well as that much larger measure of illumination which was granted to the Jewish people. And

[1] Heb. iii. 1. [2] Exod. xxiii. 20, 21.

[3] Isa. ix. 6, LXX. (Vatic.), St. Jerome, *in loc.*, and Kay in *Speaker's Commentary*. See Lee, *ubi supra*, p. 124, and Dr. W. H. Mill, as quoted by him, p. 129; and cf. Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, p. 121, *sqq.* Additional note on 1 St. John iii. 5, πέμπω, ἀποστέλλω.

[4] *Apol.*, i. § 63, qu. by Lee, *ubi supra*, p. 127.

[5] Westcott, on St. John v. 35. [6] Liddon, *B. L.*, p. 231.

our Lord seems pointedly and designedly to call attention to the fact that in His Incarnate life, no less than in the ages before the Incarnation, He is in Himself inherently the Light of the world. For, He says, "*whensoever* I am in the world, I am the Light of the world;"[1] "whensoever"—that is, whether as Incarnate or not. It is deeply significant that our Lord declares this concerning Himself. The other titles, even that of the Word, are *given to* Him. He Himself calls attention to this, and bids us contemplate Him as the True Light. Surely we cannot be mistaken in concluding that in His Ministry on earth our Incarnate Lord exercised His office as Revealer, not in a manner analogous to that of prophets and apostles, but in that manner which is proper to Him Who is the self-luminous Light?

(iii.) Our Lord's absolute possession of the entire revelation which He unfolded so gradually and carefully to His disciples, contrasts very strikingly with what we read concerning the prophets. To them God spake πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως, "by divers portions and in divers manners,"[2] making known to them here a little and there a little. None of them ever had the whole of God's counsel communicated to him. Of them we read that they "searched what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify" or point to.[3] Nothing of this kind is presented in the case of our Lord. He speaks with a complete mastery of everything of which He speaks, and not only so, but with as evident a mastery and possession of very much more of which He does not speak. Although all that He reveals, being addressed to the finite apprehensions of human beings, is necessarily expressed in a human manner and in human words, and so has His human consciousness for its immediate source, yet, so deep is the background encompassing it, that, as we listen to the words of Jesus Christ, we cannot help feeling that behind that in itself most wondrous human consciousness of His, beyond which we cannot pass, there is

[1] St. John ix. 5, ὅταν. See Westcott's note.
[2] Heb. i. 1.
[3] 1 St. Pet. i. 11.

nevertheless the Mind of God. Our Lord does indeed refer all that he makes known, to the Father.[1] The revelation which He makes is that which God gave unto Him.[2] But the communication which the Son receives from the Father is not like that which His servants receive. It is a communication which is consonant with the Son's abiding in the bosom of the Father (St. John i. 18); with His seeing what the Father doeth (*id.* v. 19); with His alone seeing the Father (*id.* vi. 46), and knowing Him with that knowledge which belongs to God only (St. Matt. xi. 27). A revelation so received is in no way contradictory to Christ's having the necessary and essential possession of all knowledge. It is quite the reverse. The statement that He received all from the Father is the proper complement of the statement that to reveal is inherent in His Person. For He is the Revealer *both* because He possesses all essentially in Himself, *and* because He receives all by an eternal communication from the Father.

II. Let us in the next place look at the revelation in connection with those to whom it was made. What manner of revealing was it which was required for them being such as they were? We need not take any other than those immediate disciples whom our Lord chose as the fittest recipients of what He came to reveal. There can be no doubt that whatever difficulties of reception existed in their case, existed in a much greater degree in the case of others. They were, it is evident, simple-hearted, single-minded, and comparatively free from prejudice. Yet even in their case the Lord had reason to complain of slowness of heart. Instead of being half way on the road to reception of the fuller truth which He had to unveil, through their study of the Old Testament Scriptures, it was necessary for Him to open their understandings before they could perceive their true meaning. More than once we find Him exclaiming,

[1] St. John v. 20, vii. 16, xii. 49, xiv. 10, xvii. 7, 8.

[2] Rev. i. 1. See Lee *in loc.*, and cf. the same writer *On Inspiration*, p. 137, and note 3.

How is it that ye do not understand! It is evident that the truths which He taught penetrated their minds slowly and with difficulty. Nor can we altogether wonder that it was so. For the revelation made by the Lord, although it had its roots in the Old Testament, and under the light of the New Testament may be seen foreshadowed there in outline, was to the disciples practically a new revelation.

Consider, again, in what manner it was requisite that our Lord's disciples should receive what He revealed. The revelations made by the instrumentality of the prophets in earlier times had for their chief purpose to place the people in an attitude of forward-looking expectation. They were emphatically "saved by hope." They did not receive the promises, but beheld them afar off. The prophets were taught that they did not minister the things which they foretold, to themselves or to their own generation. The fulfilment of them was to come only in a future age. But when the fulness of time was come all this was changed. That which was revealed was actual present fact, and was to be received and acted upon as such. It was necessary that the revelation of Christ should strike its roots very deeply into the whole being of His disciples—not only into their understandings, but into their affections and conscience, and the depths of their spirits. The time was come for the power of faith—and of faith in a deeper sense than ever before—to be joined with the power of hope, and together to awaken the whole strength of love. Nothing less than this could have been sufficient for those through whom it was our Lord's purpose to awake a dead world to life, and set it on a new course.

When these things are considered, it is surely evident that the manner in which the revelation should be given was of not less importance than the revelation itself. It was not the time for a revelation merely of the same order as those which had beforetime been granted through the prophets. As it was a time for fulfilment and for action, as it was a time for the scattered rays which before had been shot

portion-wise through the darkness to be concentrated, and the Very Truth to be brought as a living Presence before men, so it was a time when if there was one way in which what was revealed might be made to enter into the heart and spirit more deeply than in any other way, it was of the last importance that that method of revealing should be employed. And it cannot be doubted that the difference in respect of penetrative power between a revelation emanating from an illumination of the same order as that vouchsafed to prophets, however higher it might be in degree than theirs, and a revelation emanating from God in Christ, though conveyed through His humanity, could not but be very great indeed.

III. Lastly, let us look at the revelation in itself. Its novelty was just now noticed. St. Augustine's antithetic saying respecting the two Testaments has almost passed into a proverb. "*Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet: Vetus in Novo patet.*"[1] The word *latet* ought to have its full force. For, as has been remarked by a deeply thoughtful writer, "the new revelation is a continuation of the old so far as God is the Author of both. It is wholly new and separate in character so far as Christ is the Mediator of it."[2] The whole counsel of salvation which has its root in and grows out of the Incarnation, is consonant with the facts, the principles, the types and prophecies and promises, which form the very groundwork of the Old Testament. It is consonant with these in such a measure and degree as fully to justify St. Augustine's remark, and to establish the unity of the two parts of the sacred Volume. But, without the light thrown by our Lord upon all that was wrapped up in Himself, how little could we have understood of that blessed mystery of new-created life which is His gift! How should we have known Him as the Second Adam? How should we have been able to perceive the reality and power of that Sacramental Life in Him which is the very ground of all that we hope to know the fulness of hereafter? How should we

[1] *Quæst.* lxxiii. *in Exod.*

[2] Westcott, *Ep. to the Heb.* p. 7.

have understood the "great mystery" of the inner being of the Church of Christ, as constituting verily His Body, and being the fulness of Him Who filleth all in all? How should we have been able to enter into the real importance of its external organization as intimately connected with the truth of its inner being and preservative of it? It is needless to pursue the subject further. In whatever way we look at the revelation made by our Lord Jesus Christ—whether we look at it in its novelty and originality, or in its moral and spiritual richness, or in its marvellous compass, embracing as it does the end of this world, and the final judgment, and the vistas of eternity—we cannot but feel by how great an interval it is separated from everything of the nature of revelation which preceded it.

Nor can we help remarking in this connection the calm precision of our Lord's *legislation.* What was required was that He should furnish His Church with principles which should be sufficient to guide her in all the changing circumstances of the world to the end of time. It might have seemed wholly impossible to do this. Yet there is not a trace of hesitation in the Lawgiver's words; and the principles which He laid down have never yet been found insufficient. If He Who thus spoke must have spoken in words adapted to man's apprehension, and, so far, must have spoken humanly, yet how could He have chosen sayings of such almost infinite adaptability, unless that which passed through the channel of His human consciousness was really derived from His eternal encompassing Omniscience?

All the considerations which have been brought forward seem to be, both separately and, still more, when taken together, of great weight. The very least that can be said is that they are far more in accordance with the view that our Lord gave what He revealed, Divinely and from Himself, than with the other view that He had to receive after the manner of the prophets what He revealed, and that His illumination was analogous to theirs.

But the weightiest point of all remains still to be noticed.

It is this. In order to place not merely His first disciples (though what is now to be remarked did apply with peculiar force in their case), but all who have since had the blessing of coming to believe in Him through their word, in a position to comprehend the whole revelation of which the Incarnation is the centre and substance, it was absolutely necessary that they and we should be brought to a believing comprehension of the mystery of our Saviour's Person. When He is really known as God the Son on the Divine side of His Being, and as the Second Adam on the human side, then those who thus know Him find themselves placed in the one position from which the several parts of the Christian revelation may be seen in their proper relation to each other, and all illuminated with the light falling upon them from the Incarnation itself. The training of the Twelve meant emphatically the bringing them to occupy this position. When our Lord spoke His last sayings on the eve of the Passion, their faith was still both weak and imperfect. They were wholly in the dark as to most of what they afterwards came to understand, and which is enshrined for us in the Epistles of the New Testament. But they had been placed once for all in the right position, and, as our Lord's words show, were fixed securely in it. And being so placed they were ready to receive the full illumination which from Pentecost onwards was to be given them. In the sacred utterance of the Son to the Father which is recorded in the seventeenth chapter of St. John's Gospel, our Lord states explicitly, in verses 7, 8, what faith the disciples had attained. "Now they know that all things whatsoever Thou hast given Me are from Thee: for the words which Thou gavest Me I have given unto them; and they received them, and knew of a truth that I came forth from Thee, and they believed that Thou didst send Me." As Bishop Westcott says, "These verses unfold the growth of discipleship which is summarized in the preceding clause (*they have kept Thy word*). The disciples who followed Christ in obedience to the Father had come to know by actual experience the nature and the source of His

mission. They trusted Him, and then they found out little by little in Whom they had trusted." Our Lord does not say that they knew Him as yet *fully*. The ἐξῆλθον παρά of verse 8 is not the same as ἐξῆλθον ἐκ in ch. xvi. 28. The latter expresses the Son's true unity of essence with the Father. The disciples had not yet grasped this. But the point is that they were now in a position in which their faith would speedily blossom out into the full acknowledgment of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ. Our Lord's work with them was summed up in this, that He had brought them on step by step until they were firmly placed in this position.

How, then, had this been accomplished? By what means had our Lord placed them in this position? Was it by open proclamation of the truth to them? Or was it by the slow but sure teachings of experience, by which, as He was gradually manifested to them as what He was, they came little by little to know in Whom they were trusting?

The evidence of the Gospels leaves no doubt upon this point. It was the latter, not the former method which our Lord followed. There is a marked contrast between His dealing with "the Jews," and His dealing with the disciples. It was to the Jews that the utterances were made which contained open declarations of His Deity: "Before Abraham was, I AM,"[1] or "I and My Father are One."[2] The disciples may probably have been present, but it was not to them that these sayings were addressed. To them He *manifested Himself*. His method with them is shown us very plainly in His question to St. Philip, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known Me, Philip?"[3]

Nor yet is it at all more doubtful *what* it was which He manifested to them, and what it was which they had not indeed fully realized, but which had at least struck its roots into their hearts, and which they had begun to comprehend. It was clearly His Godhead. This is expressed in the words following the question put to St. Philip: "He that hath seen

[1] St. John viii. 58. [2] St. John x. 30. [3] St. John xiv. 9.

Me hath seen the Father." For the Father is not *seen* in the Son as Father—the truth of the Fatherhood is a matter of revelation and of inference—but He is seen in Him as God.

And how could our Lord manifest His Godhead to the disciples but by letting its actual powers and influences be seen and felt by them? How else could He reveal *Himself?* There was no difficulty in convincing them of His Manhood. They received that as a matter of course. Nor could the revelation which was continually before them of His moral perfection establish anything more than His truth, since what they witnessed was His moral perfection as Man. The moral revelation was, doubtless, of very great power in connection with the deeper revelation of Himself, but it could be no substitute for it. It could not do by itself that which was done by it in conjunction with the gradual revelation of Divine Power and of Divine Omniscience. The disciples seem to have been from the first haunted, as it were, by a dimly seen vision of God in Christ. When He first manifested Himself at Cana, the vision began to take shape. Each work of wonder, each ray of moral beauty, each deep saying, each of the countless influences of daily intercourse, and above all, as it seems, each succeeding proof that He knew all things, and needed not that any should express to Him by questions what was in their minds, since He knew it all beforehand—each of these repeated touches made the vision more tangible. Within them, as within the two on the road to Emmaus, their heart burned while He talked with them by the way; nor was it without effect, for their imperfect vision at last became a vision of the King in His true beauty, when they knew the reality and passed into an unchanging faith in Him as their Lord and their God.

When these things are fully considered—when it is borne in mind that a believing grasp of the truth of our Divine Lord's Person gives the only position from which the true meaning and proportions of the several parts of the Christian revelation can be seen, and that the key to the truth of the Person of Jesus Christ consisted, for the first disciples,

emphatically in the sight and conviction of His Divinity, and when the whole tenor of the Gospel narrative is summoned before the mind's eye—it seems as if doubt could no longer have place as to what kind of revealing our Lord's was. His purpose required that His revelation of all that belonged to the Christian dispensation should take its beginning from the knowledge of His Person, and especially from faith in Him as God. Through Him was to be seen the mystery of the Holy Trinity; through His Person was to be understood the meaning of all that He fulfilled in His life and in His death and resurrection; the power of the sacramental life was to shine out clear in the light of His Person; the place of His Body, the Church, could only be recognized in that light. It was therefore essential that He should reveal Himself as God. Our Lord came on earth as Revealer, and the very kernel of His revelation, the root from which all which He revealed besides had its proper development, was the manifestation of the fulness of the Godhead which dwelt in Him.

Here, then, for the present we pause. From the point of view of our Lord's purpose, it was clearly indispensable that He should first of all reveal Himself, and especially His Godhead. The most effectual means of doing this was, we can readily understand, not verbal proclamation, but experimental manifestation by act and word. And the evidence of the Gospels shows very plainly that this was the method which He, in fact, followed.

We have next to consider another and very different side of the counsel of the Incarnation, another part of our Lord's purpose, connected not with His work as Revealer, but with His work as Redeemer.

Christ the Redeemer.

It will not be necessary to examine here the great subject of our Lord's redeeming work in all aspects, but only the special connection of His humanity with it. Had it not been

for the infinite worth imparted to the Sacrifice of Calvary by the fact that He who there gave His life for us was none other than the eternal Son of God, that Sacrifice could not have been the all-perfect propitiation for our sins which we humbly thank God that it was. But there were also human conditions which were requisite for the perfecting both of that sacrificial death and also of the victorious life which preceded and prepared for it. There were, indeed, three several respects in which our Saviour's humanity was essentially concerned in the work of our redemption. In the first place, since He came as a Second Adam to effect in His own person as Man a reversal of the moral failure of the first Adam, it was necessary that He, like the first Adam, should be subjected to temptation and trial; and, in order that His moral victory as the Representative of our race might be absolutely complete, and available to the utmost for imparting strength to others, that His obedience should be completely tested by its being made to bear the severest extremity of suffering of which human nature was capable. In the next place, it was necessary to the perfection of His sacrifice that He should have been previously proved to be "a Lamb without blemish and without spot." And, thirdly, the life of trial and suffering through which He condescended to pass was necessary in order that He might be, and that we might know Him to be, that "merciful and faithful High Priest" to Whom in all our sorrows we might draw near with confidence of perfect sympathy, being also assured that He ever liveth to make intercession for us.

In all this we see that our Lord's humanity was deeply and essentially concerned. It was as Man that He came to be proved by temptation and suffering. It was as Man that He came to meet the foe. It was as a Man in Whom the foe could find nothing that He met him in the last awful struggle of Calvary and "through death destroyed him that had the power of death," and delivered us. It is to Him in His Manhood (though certainly not in His Manhood only) that we now look to make us partakers of that victory over

evil which as Man in His life and in His death He won, and now imparts as a merciful High Priest to those who seek His strength.

If this may be regarded as a not unfaithful picture of the manner in which that humanity which the Son of God was pleased to make His own for our sakes was concerned in the accomplishment of His redeeming work, let us now see under what conditions it was indispensable (as, with all reverence, we cannot but conclude that it was,) to our Saviour's merciful purpose as Redeemer that what He thus undertook to fulfil as Man should be discharged.

1. In the first place, it was clearly indispensable to His purpose—and it is in relation to the purpose of the Incarnation, and not simply in regard to truth of fact that the points before us have to be considered—that in meeting the enemy of mankind, and in being subjected to temptation and trial, He should be a true Second Adam. And what did this imply? It implied both that the circumstances of the first Adam, as regards his moral condition before the Fall, should be reproduced in the case of our Redeemer, and also that to the very end, under all circumstances of temptation and of trial, moral evil should be kept at a distance, wholly outside Him. Through His miraculous birth of a virgin mother by the power of the Holy Ghost, the entail of inherited corruption was in His case cut off, and for the first time since the Fall there stood upon the earth One Who was very Man, yet into whose nature no trace of moral evil had ever entered, and in Whom evil had absolutely no place. Thus our Redeemer entered upon the work which He undertook to accomplish for our salvation, as a true Second Adam.

But it was clearly requisite that to the very end He should continue in the same perfect innocence, only passing at each stage of trial to a higher degree of *relative* moral perfection, as His obedience was tested more and more, until all circumstances of trial should be exhausted. And this meant that His temptations, though in all respects temptations proper to man and so similar to ours, could not be on

the same plane as ours now are. They were and could not but be on the plane of temptation as it was *before* the Fall, not on the plane of temptation as it has been *since* the Fall. We know too well the truth of the descriptions in the New Testament of what temptation is to us now, since, through the Fall, sin came to dwell in us. We know what that inward struggle is which St. Paul pictures with such force in Rom. vii., and which has really formed the essential feature of the life of temptation for mankind ever since the Fall. No doubt there is a great alteration for the better in the condition of those whom God places in that blessed relation to Himself in Christ, under the guardianship of the Holy Spirit of grace, which we obtain through Holy Baptism. But it is an alteration for the better, not because the inward struggle has no place within the regenerate Christian, but because the issue of the struggle is, through the grace of our Lord, so full of blessed hope. Christians still know what St. James meant when he said that "every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed."[1] They still know what St. Paul meant when—speaking apparently of the general condition of man in relation to moral evil, not particularly in his own person as a Christian, but at the same time without excepting himself or any other Christian—he cried, "The good which I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do."[2] The inward struggle is a matter of daily experience. If it is not so to any, it must be because they do not struggle, not because evil has no place in them. There is a broad difference in the conditions of moral life since the Fall and before it. Before the Fall, man had evil outside him; since the Fall, he has had evil within him. The circumstances of temptation before the Fall were in agreement with the fact that evil was then *without* man; the circumstances of it ever since the Fall have been in agreement with the sadly altered fact of evil having obtained place *within* him.

The circumstances of the temptation of the Redeemer of

[1] St. James i. 14. [2] Rom. vii. 19.

mankind must have been similar to those of Adam before the Fall. Otherwise He would have been no real Second Adam. An inward struggle within Him, partaking in any degree of what St. James speaks of as "the drawing of a man's own lust or desire" towards what was morally evil, would have been not only such as we could not contemplate in connection with Him Who, though the Second Adam, was also the Lord from heaven, but it would have been also fatal to His purpose. For He could have been no Source of new life to mankind unless as the Source He had been, as indeed He was, from first to last of purity wholly untainted and unimpaired.

But from this a consequence follows that has not always been clearly perceived. It is that temptation—as far as it is distinct from the trial of pain and suffering—would not have occasioned in our Saviour's case effort or struggle to repel it. There could not, at any rate, have been any of the effort or struggle which comes from resisting the drawings of desire. The sight of suffering which would be involved in following a certain course no doubt would occasion a struggle, for human nature naturally and innocently shrinks from suffering, and only accepts it in obedience to the promptings of the spirit obeying the will of God. But since there could have been in our Lord no desire for or drawing towards moral evil, there could have been no struggle not to give way to it. Even *we* know how the effort not to be drawn away becomes less and less; and if evil were kept outside from the first, temptation refused would evidently be repelled with ever-growing ease and force. It is in the accompaniments to temptation that the trial to a perfectly pure will—as distinguished from the testing of it—would lie, not in the presentation of what was morally evil in itself. That would be to one perfectly pure an object not of desire, but of abhorrence. We cannot comprehend the whole mystery of the first temptation, but we do know that "the woman" was "*deceived.*"[1] She was not drawn

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 14, ἐξαπατηθεῖσα.

simply to that which was morally evil, as such. And without entering into the grounds or causes why the Second Adam was not deceived, we are sure that He never was. In whatever way the tempter may have sought to represent what was morally evil as being something else, or whatever he may have introduced with it as an object of (apart from it) innocent desire, we are sure that the true issues and the true nature of what was presented to Him were always clearly seen by the Second Adam. Consequently, in the temptation in the wilderness, for example, it seems that we have presented the *proof* of our Redeemer's absolute purity and uprightness, but not an occasion on which His obedience was subjected to a great severity of trial.[1] The Fathers generally speak of Him as repelling the temptations with absolute ease. Certainly there is nothing in the narrative of the Gospels which is not in accordance with this view, and if the remarks which have just been made are correct, it would seem to be certain that effort or struggle could have had little or no place in *these* temptations.

The trial (as distinguished from the proof) of the obedience of the Second Adam was, as the Epistle to the Hebrews shows us, made by His sufferings. Every stage of His life on earth had, we cannot doubt, its accompaniment of suffering. And as He passed through each stage, from boyhood to manhood, voluntarily accepting what was laid upon Him, because so to do was the recognized will of God, His obedience must have risen[2] from each successive degree of relative perfection to a loftier height. And all culminated in what the old Litany rightly (as we feel) calls the "unknown sufferings" of Gethsemane and Calvary.

[1] It might almost have been said to *none*, but in the first temptation at any rate there was the trial of hunger. The point is that our Lord rejected the moral evil which was presented to Him, not with effort but with ease, enduring with perfect obedience whatever of suffering accompanied the presentation of it.

[2] "Submission, together with the active principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to His (God's) sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our being as dependent creatures." Butler, *Anal.*, p. 104; cf. Wilberforce, *Incarn.*, p. 222.

Thus our Lord was pleased to undergo for our sakes all that belonged both to the probation and to the perfecting of that nature which He made His own as the Second Adam. By His instantaneous rejection of moral evil in whatever way it was presented to Him, the fullest proof was afforded of His absolutely spotless innocence. And by His cleaving with unshaken steadfastness to the will of God under ever-increasing stress of trial, the obedience of His human will was carried to the utmost point of perfection.

2. Whilst our Redeemer thus condescended as the Second Adam to pass from stage to stage of the perfecting of the obedience of His human will, according to the law by which human nature is conditioned, advancing from one degree of relative perfection to another until the highest possible point of attainment was reached, and so all was "finished," we cannot doubt that He also condescended to be thus "made perfect" in the manner in which alone the capability of attaining perfection has been assigned to human nature by its Creator, that is to say, by maintaining unswerving dependence upon God, and constantly seeking strength from Him. This seems to be an absolute law for man. He is in every respect a *dependent* being. And in regard to the development of his moral nature in particular this is emphatically the case. His capacity for moral perfecting is very great indeed; but in order that He should attain what he is capable of, it appears to be absolutely indispensable that he should renounce the thought of possessing strength in himself, and should perpetually "seek the Lord and His strength."

This truth of human nature did not escape the observant eye of Lord Bacon. "Man," he somewhere remarks, "when he resteth and assureth himself upon Divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain." Probably the law is of much wider application. It seems not improbable that throughout all the orders of finite creatures there is a certain dependence of each upon that which is immediately above it. Lord Bacon, in the context of the passage just quoted, notices "what a

generosity and courage a dog will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, who to him is instead of a God, or Melior Natura. Which courage is manifestly such, as that creature without that confidence of a better nature than his own could never attain." So the angels, as higher beings than man, "minister" to him protection and strength. And these glorious beings, again, as next unto Him Who made them—next, but with all the interval which must be between the Infinite and the finite—depend wholly upon and live by Him.

If it is, then, for human nature at any rate (being probably also for all finite creatures), an absolute law that its development and perfecting should be conditional on its receiving God-imparted strength, we cannot doubt that our Redeemer submitted Himself to be under this law as part of His unspeakable condescension in becoming man. And there is, indeed, ample evidence that He did so. The strain of dependent entreaty which runs through the twenty-second psalm (not to speak of other psalms) can hardly bear any other interpretation. Indeed, those intense first words, which form the fourth of the seven great sayings from the Cross, evidence most strikingly this truth. For do they not show that at this supreme crisis of the Passion the moral strength of the human will of the Second Adam, our Redeemer, had been carried to the height of enduring even that "forsaking"? And how strongly does the cry "My God, my God"[1] witness to the consciously felt need of that which—to teach us so deep a lesson—was then for a brief space withdrawn! Do they not cast a light upon all the life preceding? Do we not hear the burden of our Saviour's constant prayers (so far as they were prayers for Himself), "His strong crying and tears in the days of His flesh,"[2] in the words of the nineteenth verse, "Be not Thou far from Me, O Lord: O My Strength, haste Thee to help Me"? Again, can we help being forcibly taught, when we find Him in Gethsemane submitting to be strengthened by the ministry of an angel,

[1] Matt. xxvii. 46. [2] Heb. v. 7.

not only the wonderful condescension of our blessed Redeemer, but also the inalienable dependence of that nature of ours which He took upon Him?

There were many reasons why our Lord would not do otherwise than submit Himself to this law. His doing so was part of the perfect example which He came to set before us. He laid bare in Himself with unmistakable clearness and force the indispensable need which we, as men, have of strength from without. He illustrated in Himself the true motto of human nature, "When I am weak, then am I strong."[1] But, above all, it was necessary in order to the due accomplishment of His work as Man. For if He had passed through His life of temptation and suffering under a different law than that which is proper to man, He would not have been a true Second Adam. There was, indeed, in His own Person a fount of everlasting strength. But unless He had manifested the dependence of His humanity upon the Father, the truth of that humanity and its identity in nature with ours would have been concealed from view. By His manifestation of dependence we have learnt important lessons both concerning ourselves and concerning the verity of the Incarnation.

3. A third condition seems to be the necessary complement to the two which have been mentioned. It is that our Redeemer, in respect of His work as Man, should not have made use of any assistance which was not in accordance with the law just mentioned. For, if he had done so, the whole character of what He fulfilled as Man would have been changed. If it was necessary and essential to His gracious purpose of redemption, as seems certain from Holy Scripture, that He should go through as Man the entire course of trial appointed for man, that He should pass through the several stages of man's life after the manner of man, that He should be in all points tempted like as we are, and that His obedience should be tried to the uttermost by suffering, it seems equally clear that, on the one hand, His humanity should have

[1] 2 Cor. xii. 10.

and must have received that help from God which it is a law of its being that it should require and should receive; and, on the other hand, that it should not receive any other kind of aid. The law of humanity would not have been kept if our Redeemer had not submitted to be, as to His humanity, dependent upon God; but it would have been equally not kept if He had employed His own omnipotence or omniscience in achieving that moral victory over the tempter of mankind, and in enduring that trial of obedience, which it was all-important to accomplish humanly. It was as the Representative of mankind that He condescended to be tempted and tried; and the law of the conflict required that He should be so tried under strictly human conditions, and with such aid only as the First Adam might, had he continued steadfast, have received in ever fuller measure from God. The conditions of the trial of the First Adam were to be strictly reproduced. Flesh and blood *then*, by the strength proper to flesh and blood, namely, by unswerving dependence and reliance upon God, might have prevailed, but did not. Flesh and blood *now*, in the Second Adam, must strive by the very same means, and no other—and did so strive, and did so prevail.[1]

Thus it appears that our Saviour's merciful purpose of Redemption required (1) that as a true Second Adam He should pass through the entire course of probation, through which the First Adam ought to have passed, without failure unto perfect victory; (2) that He should pass through this course under the same conditions as were assigned to the First Adam, according to the law by which a human will can attain to final superiority over temptation, and to the full perfection of which it is capable, by continued dependence upon God, but not otherwise; (3) that nothing should interfere with His passing through the trial of His obedience

[1] "O wisest love! that flesh and blood,
Which did in Adam fail,
Should strive afresh against their foe,
Should strive and should prevail."
Hymns Ancient and Modern, 172 (Card. Newman).

under these conditions, and, consequently, that His Divine power and omniscience should not enter into the sphere of His human course.

When, then, our subject is considered from the theological point of view, having regard to our Blessed Lord's purpose in becoming Man, we find ourselves conducted to this result. We find that for the accomplishment of one part of our Lord's purpose, that is to say, for His work as Revealer—it was essential that the fulness of Godhead should not only dwell permanently within Him, but that it should be manifested (as it was manifested by act and word) to His disciples. But, on the other hand, for the accomplishment of the other part of His purpose, that is to say, for His work as Redeemer, we find that it was equally essential that He should act and suffer in independence of His Godhead. What is the natural conclusion? Is it not that the conditions of the Incarnation must have been such as to admit of this double state—that the Lord should be verily at the same time, without any restriction upon the proper and natural meaning of the words, "God" and "Man": as God, able, under the veil of His Manhood, to manifest His essential inherent Godhead; and, as Man, able to fulfil, without (if the expression may be permitted) any interference from or intrusion of His Godhead, the work which was proper and peculiar to His Manhood?

And is not this precisely the conclusion to which, in considering the subject in the First Book from a psychological point of view, we found ourselves in like manner led? The Incarnation postulates the union of the Infinite with the Finite, and on such terms that the Infinite should remain Infinite, and the Finite should remain Finite. A special part or aspect of the union of the Infinite Being of God with the finite nature of man is the conjunction of a finite human consciousness with the Omniscient Knowing which is proper to God. It was of precisely the same necessity that the human consciousness in our Lord Jesus

Christ should continue to be strictly human consciousness, as it was that the entire finite nature which He assumed should continue to be finite. The purpose and work of the Incarnation would have been as much overthrown if the human consciousness had not remained within its own proper limits, but had come to partake of Omniscience, as if the Manhood as a whole had ceased to be finite through its union with the Infinite. We should therefore expect *a priori* that *every part*[1] of the Manhood would retain its proper human and finite character; and, on the like grounds, we should expect that the Infinite Godhead would equally remain unchanged. And, on examining the psychological conditions attaching to the conjunction of a human consciousness with Omniscience, we found that owing to the unlikeness—the very great unlikeness—between the human manner of knowing and the Divine manner of knowing, between human consciousness generally and Divine Omniscience, it was *natural* that, however closely conjoined, there should be no interference between them, no confusion of one with the other, but separateness of action on the part of both. And, further, we found that when the essential nature of the *Ego* in man is carefully considered, and especially its distinction in itself from the nature with which it is associated, we could make some appreciable advance towards apprehending (imperfectly, but with some confidence of being in touch of the truth) the manner in which our Lord might be conceived to have lived and acted and thought as Man with a true human consciousness in which was nothing which was not human, whilst He was at the same time knowing omnisciently as God and "working" as God.

The results of considering the subject from a psychological and from a theological point of view appear to be precisely coincident, and confidence in the conclusion obtained is naturally strengthened and confirmed. But here we are met by a different mode of explanation of the relation between

[1] Cf. Chalced. Def. of Faith: *οὐδαμοῦ* [not simply *οὐδαμῶς*] *τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν.*

our Lord's human consciousness and His Divine Omniscience. This, therefore, must now be examined. In the following chapter we shall consider more especially the Scriptural and theological arguments which have been advanced in its favour, and subsequently the views of the Fathers and of later divines bearing upon it.

CHAPTER II.

THE KENOTIC THEORY.

THE first thing which we naturally wish to ascertain respecting the theory which we have now to examine is what is its exact meaning. But this, as regards at least the form of it which has obtained a certain currency in this country, it is by no means easy to ascertain precisely. As regards the Continental form of it, if we may take Professor Godet's views as representative of those of men of the same general school of thought, there is not much difficulty. An account of his views was given with some fulness in the Introduction, and a brief *résumé* of them will be all that is necessary here. He maintained that our Lord, during His life on earth, actually laid aside His Divine omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, holiness, love, consciousness, *exchanging* these Divine attributes for human ones, and especially allowing His Divine consciousness of Sonship to be *extinguished* within Him. According to Godet, then, our Lord, though He was God the Son, was on earth as God without Godhead.

What is intended by this form of the theory is at any rate, whatever else we may think of it, not ambiguous.

But when we turn to the views of English writers on the subject, we by no means find them equally decided in expression. No one seems to have adopted Godet's view in all its naked boldness of statement. Mr. Gore[1] certainly

[1] In his more recent work (*Dissertations*, p. 105), Canon Gore says that "as there is real reason to believe that the apostolic writers did contemplate the continuance of the cosmic functions of the Word, and as the thought of the Church has found it impossible to conceive the opposite, it is right to explain that the real κένωσις within the sphere of the Incarnation must be

has not done so. He does indeed speak of our Lord as having in some sense "abandoned" His Divine attributes. He minimises as much as possible the exercise of Divine power in His miracles. He describes His "illumination" as being analogous to that of Apostles and Prophets, though of much higher degree. But he also speaks of our Lord as "not *habitually* living in the exercise of omniscience," from which expression it seems fair to conclude that, in face of the evidence of the Gospels, he did not see his way to the position that our Lord abandoned His Divine attributes or His omniscience *altogether*. It may be conjectured that if Mr. Gore could have found any support for the view that in all His specially human work—in the general development of His Manhood, in His temptations, and in His sufferings—and in respect of this sphere alone, our Lord abandoned His Divine attributes, and especially His omniscience, he would have been quite satisfied.

There are evidently two questions to which those who felt themselves unable to adopt a statement so defiant of the general tenor of the Gospels as Godet's is, on a subject so especially demanding reverent caution, have desired to find an answer. The first is: To what part of our Lord's life on earth did the abandonment of Divine attributes relate? Was it to the whole? Was it to a part only? Was it to certain "aspects" of it? Was it to a particular "sphere" only? The second is: What was the nature of the abandonment? Was it a total laying aside of the Divine attributes, or some of them? Was it merely a refraining to exercise them?

In regard to this second question, the term "suspended" has apparently seemed to some persons the most satisfactory one that could be employed. It avoids asserting that the Lord ceased to possess the Divine attributes, and it seems at

held compatible with the exercise of Divine functions in another sphere." This seems very nearly equivalent to saying that our Lord did not in any sense "abandon" His Divine attributes. Compare Bright, *Waymarks in Church History*, pp. 392, 393; and *Ch. Qu. Rev.*, Oct., 1891, p. 9.

the same time to secure free scope for action and suffering on the part of the humanity, without either assistance on the part of the Divinity or any change of character in that sphere of work which was required to be strictly human. This term has thus seemed to evade the difficulties of the question, whilst providing for the point required.

There is no doubt much which is convenient in this. But will the idea of suspension, at least as applied to omniscience, bear examination? Suspension of *action* is, of course, conceivable enough. But is suspension of that in the Divine Being which answers to consciousness in man thinkable? Can we suppose suspension of the Divine *Omniscience* to be for a moment possible? We must not be misled by human analogies. Human consciousness, as it exists in us in connection with the bodily organization, is capable of being suspended in many ways—by a violent blow on the head, by a serious illness, by a severe mental shock, even partially by sleep. But nothing of this kind has the least applicability to what is in question in the case of the Uncreated Eternal God. How can that which, as we have seen, cannot in most important respects be distinguished from the Divine Being or Essence be suspended? Is it not self-contradictory to connect such an idea as suspension with the *Eternal* Mind? How can that of which we cannot say less than that it comprehends all the contents of what we call past, present, and future, in a single act of all-embracing intuition, admit of that all-embracing and eternal intuition being suspended? It may be said that with God all things are possible. That is, of course, true. But the idea of suspension in this case is not the less unthinkable, and, that being so, nothing but the most overwhelming evidence could justify the appeal to God's almightiness. And in the present instance the perplexity of those who adopt the idea of suspension is a sufficient proof that the evidence is very far from being all one way.

It may perhaps be pleaded that by "suspension" is not meant anything actually affecting the Divine Mind itself, but rather the shutting off the sphere of human consciousness

from it, or from its influence. If this is what is meant, it amounts to securing, as it were by forcible restraint, what in the preceding book it was shown would in all probability follow as a natural result from the structure of human consciousness, that structure making confusion between the human manner of knowing and the Divine manner of knowing, or blending of the one with the other—a thing impossible. If this, then, is really what is intended, would it not be better to state it in precise terms? What seems really unthinkable is the idea of anything affecting or producing change or suspension of consciousness in the Divine Mind itself. It is not at all unthinkable that the structure of the human mind should be such as to render it incapable of receiving into itself anything of the Divine Mind except such communications from it as were so framed as to be fitted to its comprehension.

These remarks may be sufficient to show that the theory which we have to examine has not received, and seems incapable of receiving, any very clear or definite statement.

The next point requiring notice is the ground on which this theory is supposed to rest, and the arguments or evidence brought forward in support of it. It appears probable that the principal ground for it in the mind of those who have brought it forward, whether in this country or on the Continent, is the supposed impossibility of our Lord's having had free scope for the development of His humanity, and for carrying out the work of the Second Adam, except by divesting Himself in some way or other of His Divine Power, and especially of His Omniscience. It is impossible to read what has been written in favour of this theory without being impressed with the idea that this is the only real ground of it, and that whatever arguments have been urged for it, whether drawn from Scripture, or the Fathers, or any other source, are of the nature of after-thoughts, culled from this or that quarter to support a thesis having its origin elsewhere.

The chief of these after-thoughts—if that is a true description of them—and certainly that on which the greatest

stress has been laid, is the interpretation assigned to two passages in St. Paul's Epistles, namely, Phil. ii. 5—7, and 2 Cor. viii. 9. It has been urged that, in the first of these two passages especially, an assertion is contained of a Self-emptying on the part of our Lord, and that this is to be understood as meaning that at His Incarnation He abandoned or laid aside, or put off from Himself His Divine attributes. The advocates of this theory do not, as was said just now, state precisely whether they understand our Lord to have emptied Himself of all, or only of some of His attributes; whether the emptying extended from the moment of the Incarnation to the Resurrection, or for a portion only of His life on earth, such as the years of His public ministry; or again, whether the emptying was entire, or having relation only to certain parts of His life and actions. But they profess to take their stand on these passages as at any rate showing that the Incarnation was accompanied by some kind of Self-emptying on the part of our Divine Lord.

This being the attitude and profession of the advocates of what has come to be called the *kenosis* theory, it will be necessary to investigate with all care the interpretation of these passages. We must be on our guard against a question-begging interpretation of them. It is distinctly stated that our Lord "emptied Himself." But the whole question is *what* it was that He emptied Himself of and *how*. Was it of that which was *external*, or of that which was *internal* to Him? Was it of the outward glories of Deity, or was it of the internal, essential, attributes of the Godhead?

I.

The two passages stand in the original Greek, and in the Revised Version, respectively as follows :—

Phil. ii. 5—7. *Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν, ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος.*

"Have this mind in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: Who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."

2 Cor. viii. 9. *Γινώσκετε γὰρ τὴν χάριν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅτι δι' ὑμᾶς ἐπτώχευσεν πλούσιος ὤν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς τῇ ἐκείνου πτωχείᾳ πλουτήσητε.*

"Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich."

There are no varieties of reading of any consequence in either passage: their interpretation is therefore free from difficulties arising from that source.

The second of the two passages, not being expressed in such direct and explicit terms as the first passage contains, is clearly of subordinate importance. It is the terms of the first passage which must be submitted to the closest scrutiny. If we can satisfy ourselves respecting the meaning of the *κένωσις*, we shall not hesitate respecting the nature of that in respect of which the Lord *ἐπτώχευσεν*.

Before entering into any exegetical details, it will be instructive to compare Phil. ii. 5—7 as a whole with two other important Christological statements.

The first of these is in the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the Revised Version the first three verses are translated as follows: "God, having of old time spoken unto the Fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son, Whom He appointed heir of all things, through Whom also He made the worlds; Who being the effulgence of His glory, and the very image of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power, when He had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."

In this passage it is the Son *Incarnate* Who is the general subject throughout, not the Son before the Incarnation. This is clear from the clause in verse 2, "hath at the end of these

days spoken unto us in His Son," the subject being the same in verse 3, as is shown by the last two clauses of that verse. Now, between the beginning of verse 2 and the end of verse 3, the clauses intervene which speak of the Son as the Creator, as the expression of the glory and essence of the Father, and as the Upholder and Governor of all things. It is quite possible that these statements were intended to direct attention to the Supreme Majesty of the Son's *Person*, without special reference to His condition as Incarnate. But is it credible that they could have been thus inserted if the supposition which we are asked to accept were true, namely, that the Son, when He became Incarnate, emptied Himself of the Essential Attributes of Deity, in which case He would have ceased for the time to "uphold all things by the word of His power," and would not have been in effect "the very image of the Father's substance"?

The second of the Christological passages referred to is Col. i. 15–20. In the first part of this passage (vers. 15–17), in which the exalted dignity of the Person of Christ is set forth by a detailed description of His relation as Creator to all created things and beings, the reference is to our Lord in His *pre-incarnate* state. In the latter part (vers. 18-20), in which His relation to the Church is described, it is of Him as *Incarnate* that the Apostle speaks. And though it may be that it is the Incarnate Christ *as now glorified* Whom the inspired writer has more especially in view, yet that His incarnate life as a whole (and certainly without any *exclusion* of the period antecedent to the Resurrection) is before his mind, appears to be conclusively shown by the context. In this connection, then, St. Paul makes concerning our Lord this noteworthy declaration, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι—"For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell." In ch. ii. 9 we read that "in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." It is therefore clear that there is here a direct predication that "the totality of the Divine powers and attributes" dwelt—and dwelt *permanently*, for that is the

force of the verb κατοικῆσαι—in our Incarnate Lord. *When*, then, was this so? If it had not been *before* the Cross and the Resurrection, as well as afterwards, how could the reference to the Cross have been immediately subjoined to the statement of the indwelling of the πλήρωμα? For it is *after* this statement that the Apostle proceeds to say, "And through Him to reconcile all things to Himself, having made peace through the blood of His Cross." And if so great a qualification of the statement that "all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt permanently in our Incarnate Lord," as is implied in even the more restricted form of the *kenosis* theory, had really been the fact—if, *e.g.*, our Lord had *not* been "habitually living in the exercise of omniscience"—is it conceivable that, in such a passage as this, so far from any trace of such a thought finding place, the language employed should seem pointedly to exclude any idea of the kind?

When, then, we compare the passage in the Epistle to the Philippians with other passages in the New Testament which bear more or less directly upon the point in question, what we find, instead of confirming the interpretation required by the *kenosis* theory, seems directly to negative it. It seems impossible to suppose that the Apostle who told the Colossians that all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt permanently in our Lord bodily-wise, without giving a hint that a great distinction was to be made between the mode of this indwelling before the Resurrection and after it, could have meant the Philippians to understand that the Lord at His Incarnation emptied Himself of all or of some of the fulness of the Godhead, in such sense that either the totality of the Divine powers and attributes was actually not dwelling in Him until after the Resurrection, or that He was not habitually living in the exercise of them.

But let us now look at the particular expressions used in Phil. ii. 7. The points which are of especial exegetical importance are the following: (1) The emphatic position of ἑαυτόν; (2) the lexical meaning of ἐκένωσεν; (3) the use of an accusative only without a defining genitive with ἐκένωσεν;

(4) the force of the following participial clauses; (5) the bearing of the context upon the interpretation of the passage.

1. The position of ἑαυτόν, *Himself*, before, and not after, the verb ἐκένωσεν, *emptied*, shows that it carries a good deal of emphasis. What is the import of the emphasis? Does it convey that it was Himself, after the analogy of a vessel, that our Lord emptied, and so lend countenance to the idea that He actually laid aside something *internal* to Himself? Or was this position chosen for the pronoun in order to emphasize the *voluntary* character of what He did? The former idea may not improbably have helped to suggest such a theory as that of Godet. But it is as certain as anything can be in such an exegetical point as this that St. Paul's intention was to bring out—as throughout the whole passage it is his aim to do—the thoroughly *voluntary* manner in which our Lord chose of Himself the humiliation which the Incarnation involved. Interpreters, ancient and modern, are entirely agreed upon this point. No one, as far as the present writer is aware, has, *on exegetical grounds*, taken the other view. Ancient interpreters used the expression, as being exegetically beyond dispute, to rebut the idea, derogatory to our Lord's Godhead, that in what He did there was any constraint laid upon Him from without. Thus Theophylact, following, as usual, St. Chrysostom, exclaims, "Where are they who say that He came down unwillingly and as fulfilling a command? Let them be told that he *emptied Himself* as Lord, *as fulfilling His own will*." Among modern scholars, Bishop Lightfoot says, "The emphatic position of ἑαυτὸν points to the humiliation of our Lord as *voluntary, self-imposed*." Meyer points out that the contrast is with ἁρπάζειν—no holding fast to that equality in dignity and glory with the Father which belonged to Him as the Son, but of His own accord emptying Himself of it.

2. The lexical meaning of ἐκένωσεν. In the four other places in the New Testament in which the verb occurs, it is used in a metaphorical sense, the meaning intended being clearly to *make void*. In Rom. iv. 14, the dispensation of

faith (St. Paul says) would be made void by refusing to accept the abrogation of the Mosaic Law. In 1 Cor. i. 17, he speaks of the preaching of the Cross being made void by philosophy. In 1 Cor. ix. 15, and 2 Cor. ix. 3, he says that anything would be better for him than to have his glorying made void, as it would be if it could be shown not to be true. The Revised Version has "made void" in all these places. In the LXX. the word only occurs twice (Jer. xiv. 2, xv. 9); in both as a translation of a Hebrew verb signifying "to languish." Its usage in Scripture, therefore, apart from the present passage, is exclusively metaphorical. In the Classics it is frequently used in the literal sense of "to empty," as opposed to "to fill." This is the proper meaning of the word, in the light of which any metaphorical applications of it must be regarded and measured. But, since its usage elsewhere in the New Testament is metaphorical, it is clearly impossible to press the literal meaning in Phil. ii. 7, as though that were of itself sufficient to determine the precise nature of the "emptying." The Revisers' more literal translation "emptied," in place of the interpretative translation of the Authorized Version ("made himself of no reputation"), has probably contributed in no small degree, if not to originate, at any rate to support the idea that the "emptying" was a removal or abandonment of something actually *internal* to our Lord. But it ought to be distinctly understood that such a construction of the nature of the emptying is just as much an interpretation as the paraphrase of the Authorized Version is. The word ἐκένωσεν might be used with quite as much propriety to express the abandonment, or making void of that which was external, as of that which was internal. In fact all that can lexically and exegetically be got so far out of the passage—that is to say, from the words ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, *emptied Himself*—is that our Lord did in some manner not precisely specified voluntarily divest or empty Himself of something either internal to or external to Himself. We must look beyond these two words to determine *what* it was which our Lord divested Himself of, and

in what manner, and whether *altogether or for a time only*. It ought further to be observed that the more the meaning of ἐκένωσεν is taken as approaching to the strictly literal meaning, the less possible must it be to reconcile the idea of "suspension" with it. Granting, for argument's sake, that an emptying of that which was internal—Divine attributes in general or omniscience—is spoken of in this passage, it is clear that it must mean something much more than a "suspension" of them. "Suspension" and "emptying" are two quite different things.

3. The construction of ἐκένωσεν with an accusative only. Our Lord "emptied Himself." What did He empty Himself of? What it was might have been expressed by a defining genitive. The use of such a genitive (if an example is required) is well shown in the following passage. In the Eighth Book of the Republic, Plato[1] describes the changes of character which take place in young men of unsettled and ungoverned dispositions, in his accustomed vivid manner. Speaking of a certain class of desires, he describes how when they find a young man's soul κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ πιτηδευμάτων καλῶν, "void of good instruction and good purposes," and "when they have emptied and swept it . . . as being now in their power—clean of these," τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν . . . ψυχήν, they seize upon and take possession of its citadel. Here the genitives make it quite clear what it was which these bad desires emptied the young man's soul of, even to the last remains of what was good. A similar defining genitive[2] might obviously have been employed by St. Paul. Why did he not use one? The answer seems to be that

[1] Plato, *Rep.*, p. 560, D. E.

[2] Bishop Ellicott writes, "Would not the logically exact genitive be τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ? This 'æqualiter esse,' He gave up, and in the manner specified in the participial clauses." De Wette (*in loc.*) says, "Nach dem Zusammenhange bezieht sich das κενοῦν nicht auf die μορφή, sondern auf das εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ." So the Bishops of the Council of Antioch, A.D. 269, in their letter to Paul of Samosata, spoke of our Lord as κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ. Routh, *Rell. Sacr.*, iii. 298.

what he meant was made clear in another way, and that therefore a genitive was not required. How was this?

4. The participial clauses which follow do not exactly take the place of a defining genitive, but by explaining the manner in which our Lord emptied Himself, they virtually indicate what it was which He emptied Himself of. The English word "by" renders best the modal force of the participles—"emptied Himself by taking the form of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men"—and thus shows clearly their defining or explanatory character. It would be a mistake to translate them as if the taking the form of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men, were particulars *additional* to the emptying.[1] They simply show the manner in which the emptying took place. This has been fully recognized both by older and by more recent scholars. Bishop Pearson[2] remarks that the rendering of the Authorized Version—"*and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men*"—is misleading. And why? For this reason, that "all the words together are but an expression of Christ's exinanition with an explication showing in what it consisteth: which will clearly appear by this literal translation, *but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.* Where, if any man doubt how *Christ* "emptied himself," the text will satisfy him, *by taking the form of a servant;* if any still

[1] Mr. Gore (*Bampton Lectures*, iv. p. 111) translates, "emptied Himself, and took," thus conveying the idea which his theory requires that the "emptying" and the "taking" were two different things. But in so translating he is at variance with most scholars, certainly, and, if the aorist part. λαβὼν is to be translated as a verb at all, it must be as indicating that the "taking" *preceded* the "emptying." This would supply a kind of foundation to the older Lutheran view that our Lord being made Man, and having had the Divine attributes and powers *communicated to His Manhood*, emptied Himself of these in respect of the Manhood which had received them, for the period of His earthly course. But it would not suit Mr. Gore's view. That there is no grammatical necessity for translating λαβὼν in this manner as a verb has been fully recognized by Winer (*Gr. N. T.*, p. 430, Moulton's translation), and Meyer (*Phil.*, p. 80, Das *Particip. Aor.* bezeichnet nicht das dem ἑαυτ. ἐκέν. *Vorgängige*, sondern *Gleichzeitige*), not to mention others.

[2] *On the Creed*, Art. ii. p. 122 (p. 229, ed. Chevallier).

question how he took the form of a servant, he hath the apostle's resolution, *by being made in the likeness of men.*" Bishop Ellicott quotes Bishop Bull, who says in terms very similar to those of Bishop Pearson, "*Si quæris quomodo Christus seipsum exinanivit? Respondet Apostolus, servi formam accipiens.*" Meyer's view of the construction is given with no less decisiveness, "Die positive *Näherbestimmung, wie* er sich selbst entleert habe, wird durch μορφὴν δούλου λαβών gegeben." Bishop Lightfoot in like manner renders, *by taking the form of a slave*, adding that the action of λαβὼν is coincident in time with the action of ἐκένωσεν.

Now, if the emptying was effected by taking the servant's form, and if attention is directed in the passage emphatically to this point (as it certainly is), this comes very near to a direct assertion that our Lord divested Himself of nothing else than the external glories of Deity. And why? Because, of the three possible alternatives—external glories, internal attributes, or both—the emptying or divesting Himself of the external glories of Deity would be a natural and direct consequence of taking the servant's form. By the very act of doing this our Lord concealed His Godhead. But no emptying of the internal attributes or essence of the Godhead would be a similar consequence. If, therefore, this had been what the passage was meant to teach, it would, we may be sure, have been distinctly and expressly stated that it was so. The passage, as it stands, expresses clearly enough the laying aside of *external* glory. It gives no hint of any *internal* change, of any putting off of anything belonging to the essence of Godhead. On the contrary, there is an indirect exclusion of this supposition (too wild and impossible to require a more direct one) conveyed by the accumulated expressions referring to our Lord's outward appearance as man—ἐν ὁμοιώματι . . . γενόμενος, "in conspectum veniens" . . . σχήματι, "outward guise" . . . εὑρεθείς, not simply ὤν, but "manifested" . . . ὡς ἄνθρωπος—which are protected from anything like Docetism by the previous μορφὴ δούλου asserting for our Lord the full truth of manhood, whilst at

the same time they point forcibly to all the fulness of Godhead which was within.

5. As regards the context, it is only necessary to make one remark. What is insisted upon in it is our Lord's voluntary humiliation; and, obviously, the emptying either of what was external or of what was internal to Himself would be in harmony with this thought. But in one respect the context points to the former, and not to the latter. The humiliation is clearly put before us as being, as Bengel[1] expressed it, *gradatim profundior*. When our Lord became obedient unto death, and that the death of the Cross, He did more than He had done before. This "more" is very intelligible when we view it as a step beyond the first taking the form of a servant, and thereby putting out of sight the Divine glory. It is, so to say, in the same line with this. But if that which preceded had been an emptying of the internal fulness of the Godhead, there would have been no such line of connection. Had this, therefore, been in the apostle's mind, it is difficult to see how he could have expressed himself as he has. There would have been a dislocation between the thought started from and the thought arrived at.

In the next place, it will be right to examine what individual expositors of Holy Scripture have taken to be the meaning of these passages. The chief difference between ancient and modern expositors is that in the mind of the ancients theological considerations had a *relatively* greater influence than exegetical ones, whereas, for purposes of interpretation, modern scholars rightly assign the foremost place to ascertained and accepted principles of exegesis.[2] When, then, we find full agreement between the ancients and the moderns in the interpretation of a particular passage, we have as strong a guarantee as we could have that both theological

[1] Gnom., ii. 292 on Phil. ii. 8.

[2] Compare Arch. Churton's preface to *The New Testament Illustrated*, vol. i.

and exegetical considerations are decisively in favour of that interpretation. And, as will be seen in the present case, the unanimity of expositors of every age is strongly pronounced and unmistakable.

I. We may begin with the *Greek Expositors* as being the earliest.[1] The commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Philippians being no longer extant, the School of Antioch claims attention in the first place, and more particularly St. Chrysostom.

St. Chrysostom: Ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς οὐκ ἐφοβήθη καταβῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιώματος· οὐ γὰρ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὴν θεότητα, οὐκ ἐδεδοίκει μή τις αὐτὸν ἀφέληται τὴν φύσιν, ἢ τὸ ἀξίωμα. Διὸ καὶ ἀπέθετο αὐτό, θαῤῥῶν ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀναλήψεται· καὶ ἔκρυψεν, ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι ἀπὸ τούτου.[2]

"The Son of God feared not to descend from His dignity, for He thought not of His Godhead as needing to be jealously guarded; He did not fear being deprived either of His (Divine) nature or of His (Divine) honour and dignity.[3] Wherefore He even put it (the latter) from off Him, knowing well that He should resume it again; so He concealed it, not looking upon Himself as being lowered thereby."

In another passage St. Chrysostom shows what he rejects: Ἵνα γὰρ μὴ ἀκούσας ὅτι Ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν, μεταβολὴν νομίσῃς καὶ μετάπτωσιν καὶ ἀφανισμόν τινα, Μένων, φησὶν, ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν, καὶ σὰρξ γενόμενος ἔμενε Θεὸς Λόγος ὤν.

"For that on hearing that 'He emptied Himself,' thou mightest not imagine any change in Him or degeneracy or suppression; he says, Remaining what He was, He took what He was not, and being made flesh continued to be God the Word."

Bishop Lightfoot is clearly justified in stating, as a

[1] Only those who have actually written commentaries on *Philippians* or on 2 *Corinthians* are included in this list.

[2] *Hom.* vii. in *Phil.* (Migne, *P. G.*, vol. lxii. p. 229).

[3] In the library of the Fathers ἀξίωμα is translated "right." This is clearly an error. The regular meaning of the word is "honour," "reputation," "dignity," "rank," or "position." See Liddell and Scott, *s.v.* ἀξίωμα. Rost u. Palm give as German equivalents "wurde," "geltung," "ansehn," "achtung."

summary of St. Chrysostom's lengthened exposition, that he understood our Lord to have divested Himself of "the *outward* splendours of His rank."[1]

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA explains ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν thus: ἀντὶ τοῦ, οὐκ ἔδειξεν ἑαυτόν· μορφὴν γὰρ δούλου λαβὼν τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκείνην ἀπέκρυψεν, τοῦτο τοῖς ὁρῶσιν εἶναι νομιζόμενος, ὅπερ ἐφαίνετο.[2]

"That is, *did not manifest Himself:* for by taking the form of a servant He concealed that dignity which was His, being thought by those who saw Him to be what He seemed."

On 2 Cor. viii. 9: "Pauperem Christum dicit factum, quia Deus nasci dignatus est homo, virtutem potestatis suæ humilians, ut hominibus divinitatis divitias acquireret."[3] "He says that Christ was made poor, because God deigned to be born as man, bringing low the excellence of His power, that He might acquire for men the riches of Divinity."

Theodore's comments are important as showing what was regarded in his time and in the Antiochian School (with the traditions of which he, as Professor Swete remarks, was more deeply penetrated than either Chrysostom or Theodoret) as being the literal and correct interpretation of these passages.[4]

THEODORET: Τὴν ἀξίαν κατακρύψας, τὴν ἄκραν ταπεινοφροσύνην εἵλετο.

"Concealing His dignity, He chose the extremest lowliness."[5]

ŒCUMENIUS (10th cent.): ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν, τουτέστιν, ἐταπείνωσε καὶ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, τὸ εἶναι Θεὸς μὴ ἀποβαλών.

[1] *Phil.*, p. 134.

[2] Migne, *P. G.*, lxvi. 924. The passage is given at somewhat greater length in a Latin translation in the Catena of Rabanus Maurus (Migne, *P. L.* cxii. 488). Rabanus cites Theodore in this Catena under the name of Ambrose; but it was conclusively shown by the late Professor Hort that the passages cited were from a Latin version of Theodore's commentary; and the Latin text with some remaining Greek fragments has now been edited as Theodore's by Professor Swete.

[3] Migne, *P. L.*, cxii. 207.

[4] *Dict. Chr. Biogr.*, iv. 947.

[5] Migne, *P. G.*, lxxxii. 569.

"He emptied Himself, that is to say, He humbled Himself and became man, having not put off the being God."

And on 2 Cor. viii. 9: Ἐπτώχευσε γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν σάρκα. Εἶτα κατεδικάσθη, καὶ ἐσταυρώθη, "For He was poor in respect of (His taking) our flesh. Then (in it) He was condemned and crucified." Πλούσιος ὤν. Καθό ἐστι καὶ νοεῖται Θεός, οἷον ἀνέκφραστος, ἀπερινόητος, ἀόρατος, ἀκατάληπτος, δόξαν ἔχων ἀπόῤῥητον, φῶς ἀνεκλάλητον, μεγαλωσύνην ἀνείκαστον. "*Though He was rich.* Inasmuch as He both is and is deemed to be God, seeing that He is unutterable, passing all understanding, invisible, incomprehensible, possessing glory ineffable, light unspeakable, majesty incomparable."

THEOPHYLACT (latter part of 11th cent.):[1] ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν, ἵνα μὴ μεταβολὴν νομίσῃς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μετάπτωσιν, φησί· Μένων ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν. Οὐχ ἡ φύσις μετέπεσεν, ἀλλ' ἐν σχήματι ἐγένετο, τουτέστιν, ἐν σαρκί.

"When he said that *He emptied Himself*, that thou mightest not imagine that a change or degeneration was meant, he says, Remaining what He was, He took that which He was not. His nature underwent no change, but He became in fashion as a man, that is, He became flesh."

EUTHYMIUS ZIGABENUS (about 1110), on Phil. ii. 6, 7: Euthymius first explains that μορφὴ = φύσις, and then goes on to say that our Lord, being by nature God, knew that He was thus and not by seizure equal to the Father, and so feared not κενωθῆναι καὶ καταβῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕψους τοῦ ἀξιώματος τῆς θεότητος, "to be emptied and to descend from the height of the dignity of the Godhead."[2]

On 2 Cor. viii. 9: δι' ὑμᾶς ἐπτώχευσε τὴν πτωχείαν τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν μέχρι θανάτου παθημάτων, πλούσιος ὢν τὸν

[1] On *Phil.* ii. 7; Benedictine edition.

[2] Euthymius Zigabenus, *In xiv. Epist. S. Pauli et vii. Cathol. Epist.* ed. Nicephorus Calogeras olim Archiepisc. Patrensis, Magister Serenissimi Principis Constantini et Universitatis Athenarum Professor honorarius Theologiæ. Athenis, 1887, 2 voll. In the preface to vol. i. the editor remarks (p. 70) that Euthymius has followed a more independent line in his commentary on St. Paul's Epistles than in that on the Catholic Epistles. In the latter he is chiefly a compiler; in the former he has investigated for himself as well.

πλοῦτον τῆς θεότητος. "For your sake He took upon Himself the poverty of the flesh and the sufferings unto death, being rich with the riches of Godhead."

II. We now pass to the *Latin Expositors.*

VICTORINUS (about 360)[1]: Intelligamus autem ipsum se exinanisse, non in eo esse quod potentiam alibi dimiserit, aut se privaverit; sed ad sordida quæque se humiliarit, ad postrema officia descendens.

"Let us understand, however, that His exinanition did not consist in His putting away or depriving Himself of His power, but in His humbling Himself to things sordid, coming down to the most lowly offices."

AMBROSIASTER (a certain Hilary in the latter half of the 4th cent.): Semetipsum exinanivit: hoc est, potestatem suam ab opere retraxit, ut humiliatus otiosa virtute infirmari videretur . . . retinens enim virtutem suam, ne appareret in eo, ut homo visus est et occisus, qui mori nescit . . . quasi homo apparuit, exinaniens se.[2]

"*He emptied Himself:* that is, He withdrew His power from operation, in order that being not in honour through the inactivity of His might, He might appear to be weak . . . for though He retained His power, in order that it might not be seen in Him, He Who knows not death was beheld as man and slain. . . . He appeared as though He were (only) man, emptying Himself."

PRIMASIUS (about 550).[3] Bishop of Adrumetum in North

[1] Migne, *P. L.* viii. 1208. See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 231 *sq.*, and the interesting article by Mr. Gore in *D. C. B.*, iv. 1129 *sq.* The commentaries of Victorinus on *Galatians*, *Philippians*, and *Ephesians* "are probably the first Latin commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles" (*D. C. B.*, iv. 1130). Victorinus was a remarkable metaphysical thinker as well as a commentator. It is probable that his exposition, besides representing the view of the Church of his age, represented also his own metaphysical convictions on the subject, especially as regards the impossibility of any *mutatio* in God. Cf. *Adv. Arium*, Lib. I., xxii.; Lib. IV., xxxi., xxxii.

[2] Migne, *P. L.*, xvii. 408–410.

[3] Migne, *P. L.*, lxviii. 630. No commentaries of Jerome or Augustine on the *Philippians* are extant. That of Pelagius is printed in Migne, *P. L.* xxx. 842–852 (Appendix to St. Jerome's Works). The words *Quod erat humilitate celavit* appear there as explanatory of *semetipsum exinanivit.*

Africa. He compiled his commentary on St. Paul's Epistles from Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Augustine, Pelagius. He says that our Lord Quod erat humilitate celavit . . . *semetipsum exinanivit* assumendo quod non erat, non amittendo quod erat.

"He concealed what He was through humility. . . . He *emptied Himself* by assuming what He was not, not by losing what He was."

Rabanus Maurus (Archbishop of Mentz from 847–856. The most learned man of his age, according to Cave).[1]

His *Catena* includes extracts from such Greek writers as had in his time been translated into Latin, and from Latin Fathers, especially Augustine and Gregory the Great. On Phil. ii. 7 his extracts are from Theodore Mops., Gregory, and Augustine. They are all to the same effect, emphasizing the view that there was no internal change in our Lord's Godhead, and that He put off only His external glory. The passage from St. Augustine describes four possible modes in which change might conceivably have taken place in one nature or the other, and concludes that the human nature assumed was like a garment, which, when fitted on to a person, undergoes a change of shape, whilst the person who puts it on remains unchanged. The same comparison reappears in the twelfth century in Peter Lombard's *Collectanea* on St. Paul's epistles.

Walafrid Strabo (ninth century. A pupil of Rabanus Maurus. The *Glossa Ordinaria*, of which he was the reputed author, was the standard commentary in the Middle Ages).[2]

Formam Servi: Non formam Dei amittens: forma servi accessit, non forma Dei abscessit. *Exinanivit.* Exinanire est ab invisibilitatis suæ magnitudine se visibilem demonstrare.

"*The form of a servant.* Not losing the form of God: the servant's form was added; the form of God was not

But it is impossible to be certain what Pelagius actually wrote, since Cassiodorus, and probably others, corrected and altered his commentary.

[1] Migne, *P. L.*, cxii. 489; Cave, *Hist. Lit.*, ii. 36, *sqq.*

[2] Migne, *P. L.*, cxiv. 603.

removed. *Emptied.* To empty means to pass from the greatness of His invisibility and to show Himself visibly." This explanation of the "emptying" is from Gregory the Great. Herveus (about 1130) also quotes it from Gregory, and more fully. It seems, therefore, to have continued to be the accepted explanation.

III. *Modern Expositors.*

MEYER:[1] Was der göttliche Logos bei der Menschwerdung ablegte, war nach u. St. die μορφὴ Θεοῦ, d. i., *die göttliche δόξα als Existenzform*, nicht aber das seine Natur wesentlich und nothwendig ausmachende εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, welches er behielt, und zu welchem eben so wesentlich und nothwendig das göttliche, mithin im Menschgewordenen das gottmenschliche Selbstbewusstsein gehörte.

"What the Divine Logos laid aside at His Incarnation was, according to our passage, the form of God, that is, the Divine glory as a form of existence; but not the equality with God which constituted essentially and necessarily His Nature: this He retained, and to this belonged just as essentially and necessarily the Divine self-consciousness, and in God Incarnate, consequently, the Divine-human self-consciousness."

Meyer rejects altogether the view of Gess (*Person Christi*, p. 304 f.), that "the Logos laid aside at His Incarnation His self-consciousness."[2] He considers such views as those of Dorner (gradual *ethical* interpenetration of the Divine and human life) or of Thomasius (*self-limitation*, that is, partial self-emptying of the Divine Logos) to be, at any rate, beyond the sphere of exegesis. He also regards the idea of a separation between the *possession* (κτῆσις) and the *use* (χρῆσις) of the Divine attributes as being "unthinkable in itself, and inconsistent with the Gospel history." He will not allow that ἐκένωσε can exegetically be watered down to the meaning of *concealing the use* of the Divine attributes, which seems

[1] *Philipper*, pp. 86, 87.

[2] *Phil.*, p. 87. This view of Gess' corresponds with Godet's. The view of Thomasius seems to be very similar to Mr. Gore's and Mr. Swayne's.

not very different from that of *suspension*. He holds to the proper meaning of ἐκένωσε. He considers that there is nothing in the passage to require or warrant an emptying of that which was *internal* being understood, and refers it to the laying aside of the *external* glories of the Godhead. This is his interpretation on *exegetical* grounds.

De Wette takes the subject of ἐκένωσε to be the Λόγος ἔνσαρκος, and, of course, interprets the clauses in accordance with this view.[1] He says that the three participles which follow ἐκένωσε show what the nature of the κένωσις was, and how it took place. Since the historical Christ was the subject of ἐκένωσε—*i.e.* since it was the Lord, *when Incarnate*, Who emptied Himself—His taking μορφὴν δούλου (which was His "emptying") could only mean His taking a particular human condition, viz. the condition of a servant. De Wette rejects the view of the Greek Fathers, that μορφὴ δούλου means human nature itself. The other participial clauses define and characterize further what the first one—the taking the servant's form—expressed. It is clear, therefore, that De Wette did not understand the Lord to have emptied Himself of anything *internal* to Himself, whether as Λόγος ἄσαρκος or ἔνσαρκος.

Alford:[2] "He emptied Himself of the μορφὴ Θεοῦ—not His *essential* glory, but its manifested possession . . . the glory which He had with the Father before the world began (John xvii. 5), and which He resumed at His glorification. . . . He ceased while in this state of exinanition to reflect the glory which He had with the Father."

Ellicott:[3] "Of what did He empty Himself? Not exactly of the μορφὴ Θεοῦ, . . . but . . . of that which He had *in* that form, that Godlike majesty and visible glories which He had from all eternity."

Wordsworth:[4] "We are not to imagine that He either *lost* His *Godhead*, or that it was *confused* with His Manhood." He also quotes Primasius as given above. And on St. John i.

[1] *Handbuch*, Phil. ii. 6, 7.
[2] *Greek Test.*, vol. iii. p. 168.
[3] *Philippians*, p. 44.
[4] *Greek Test.*, ii. 350; i. 272.

14 he says, "The tabernacle of our humanity became the Shechinah of Deity."

LIGHTFOOT:[1] "'He divested Himself' not of His Divine nature, for this was impossible, but of the glories, the prerogatives, of Deity. . . . He *emptied*, stripped *Himself*, of the insignia of majesty." "He resigned the glories of Heaven."

GWYNN:[2] "The A.V. fairly expresses the sense, which is that He laid aside, not the essence, which is inalienable, of His Godhead, but that which is relative to finite perceptions, its outward manifestation."

WAITE:[3] "He gave up the *circumstances* of heavenly glory; those splendours surrounding the throne of God, which St. John depicts figuratively in the Apocalypse." He adds, "The passage is thought by some to imply that Christ, without ceasing to be essentially God, which He assuredly never did, surrendered also the Divine attributes in the Incarnation. Its parallel, according to this view, is considered to be Phil. ii. 7."

What support, then, can these two passages of St. Paul's Epistles be thought to afford to the Kenotic theory either in its Continental or in its English form? As long as it is taken for granted that the expression "emptied Himself" must mean "emptied Himself of that which was *internal*," Phil. ii. 7 undoubtedly affords a fictitious or question-begging support. But when it is seriously asked whether this is either the necessary or the correct meaning, or whether it be not solely that which was *external* to Himself which the passage states our Lord to have put off, it is at once seen that almost everything which is of weight in determining the right interpretation of a passage is in this case very decidedly in favour of *this* interpretation. It is adopted, as we have seen, by the whole body of expositors ancient and modern. It may be doubted whether any one has ever seriously attempted to maintain, *on exegetical grounds*, that a putting off of that which was *internal* was meant. And, indeed, the more closely the terms employed and the general tenor of

[1] *Philippians*, pp. 110, 132. [2] *Speaker's Commentary*, Phil. ii. 7.
[3] *Speaker's Commentary*, 2 Cor. viii. 9.

the passage are scrutinized, the more clear and certain does it seem to be that the Apostle had no thought in his mind of an emptying or laying aside of anything except the external glories of the Godhead. And when we compare this passage with others in St. Paul's Epistles, this conclusion is still further strengthened. For, in the Epistle to the Colossians especially, it appears to be distinctly asserted that from the moment of the Incarnation, so far from our Lord having emptied Himself of the Divine essence or attributes, all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt thenceforward and permanently in Him bodily-wise.

If it be said that the English form of the Kenotic theory admits this, and affirms only a *suspension* on certain occasions and for certain purposes of the Divine attributes and especially of omniscience, then, besides the difficulty of finding in the passage a reference to anything internal, it must further be asked how the strong term ἐκένωσε, *emptied*, came to be employed, if nothing more was meant than is expressed by the term *suspended*.

II.

It is clear that the Kenotic theory, whatever form of it may be adopted, cannot be grounded on these passages. If it is to be maintained at all it must be on other grounds, and especially it must be shown to be not in contradiction to the Gospel narrative. It must be shown that, according to this narrative, all the fulness of the Godhead was either not dwelling in or was not operative in our Lord during the period of His life on earth. Godet audaciously makes the first affirmation, saying that our Lord exchanged the Divine attributes for human ones *in toto* during this period. Mr. Gore stops a good deal short of this. His affirmation is that the narrative seems to show that our Lord was not *habitually* living in the exercise of omniscience. It is the reconciliation of omniscience with the integrity and freedom of human thought and feeling which is the point of difficulty in Mr.

Gore's eyes. And it is only at certain parts of our Lord's course that this difficulty is very strongly presented. But though almost the entire difficulty is concerned with the attribute of omniscience, Mr. Gore evidently feels that the fulness of the Godhead is a whole. He is uneasy in respect of our Lord's miracles. He would like them to be regarded as having been wrought by Him as Man through the power of the Holy Ghost, rather than as proceeding from His own inherent Divine power. If He was living habitually in the exercise of omnipotence, it is not easy to see how He could have been otherwise than habitually omniscient.

There is a deep truth in this. The Divine attributes are essentially *one*. If our Lord is set before us in the Gospels as omnipotent by reason of His miracles, this affords the strongest possible presumption, even apart from other evidence, of His omniscience also. They who seek to minimise the evidence of the one must seek to minimise the evidence of the other also. But let us at all costs be true to what the Gospels really set before us. We have no right to minimise evidence. It is not difficult to recognize what Mr. Gore was impressed with when he said that our Lord seems in the Gospels to be not habitually living in the exercise of omniscience. But the explanation of that which so impressed him may not be that which he supposed. It may be that the fullest habitual exercise of omniscience was quite compatible with the freest exercise, simultaneously and without any modification of its true character, of human consciousness. If what has been said in the first book is correct, there was this compatibility. At any rate let us accept the evidence of the Gospels fully. And, since we shall have to examine in the next book the evidence respecting our Lord's omniscience, let us consider here by itself the evidence respecting His miracles. The point to be borne in mind is whether what is said concerning them will reasonably admit of any other conclusion than that they proceeded from His own inherent omnipotence. That most of them might have been wrought by Him as Man through the power of the

Holy Ghost is clear enough. The question is whether the narrative gives us to understand that they were so wrought. It is not to the point to say that the Holy Ghost co-operated in this—as, indeed, in other matters—with His Manhood. In all the operations of God there is a joint action of the Three Divine Persons, and the special action of the Holy Ghost unquestionably accompanied all the movements of our Lord's Manhood. But the question is whether this is the whole account of the matter, or whether there was not, besides this, a direct exercise of omnipotence on the part of our Lord Himself as God the Son. If this was the case, it will go far to show that the Kenotic theory—whether as asserting an actual laying aside of the Divine attributes or a "suspension" of them—cannot be true. For if the Lord was omnipotent in either any one particular or at any one time during His earthly course, the strong presumption is that He was so in all things and at every moment of it. The evidence that He was something else besides could be no proof at all (considering Whom and what we are speaking of) that He was not at the same time omnipotent. If the evidence shows that omnipotence was in Him and was the source of any of His miracles, we should require a clear statement that in any respect or at any time He was not omnipotent, and if we find omnipotence in Him during His life on earth, the presumption certainly must be that not only this but all the Divine attributes were as present in Him then as they were before the Incarnation. The question therefore of the miracles is of great importance, and has evidently been felt to be of great importance, to the Kenotic theory.

When the following facts and arguments are duly considered, it would seem to be a matter of great hardihood to dispute the conclusion that the Gospels do represent our Lord's miracles as proceeding from His own inherent Divine Omnipotence.

1. The greatest of all His works of power, viz. the raising Himself from the dead, points directly to this conclusion, and, indeed, could only by a very strained mode

of interpretation be referred to anything but a direct act of Divine power on the part of our Lord Himself. To suppose that He as Man raised Himself through the power of the Holy Ghost would be so far-fetched, and so out of harmony with the purpose of this transcendent "sign," that we may at once set it aside. We have, then, the Lord at the beginning of His ministry announcing in direct terms that when the temple of His body had been given to death, in three days He would raise it up. What an "immeasurable depth" (as Godet truly remarks) does this saying spring from! What a light does it throw for us, what a light did it cast for the disciples (St. John ii. 22), upon our Lord's Person! As illuminating His Divinity, it is in place in connection with the cleansing of the Temple, it is in place as the great sign of what He was, it is in place in St. John's teaching concerning Him. If it could be supposed,[1] as Godet does not shrink from suggesting, that the Lord merely "laid hold in this, as in all His miracles, of the Divine Omnipotence which became operative in Him," there would be no such fitness, no such "sign-power." It would sink almost to the level of what we read of St. Paul in the Acts,[2] who having been stoned and lying as dead, rose up, and entered into the city. However, the act remains, whatever may be the interpretation of it. Even Godet admits that the Lord did raise Himself. And Godet perhaps stands alone in not seeing how strikingly this act of our Lord proclaimed the fulness of Divine power which was inherent in His Person.

2. What we read respecting our Lord's miracles generally points to the same conclusion. Who can suppose that St. John, whose principal object in his Gospel was confessedly to illuminate our Lord's Godhead, could have meant, when he said that in the miracle at Cana He manifested forth His glory and His disciples believed on Him, that this His first miracle simply testified that God was with Him!

[1] Godet, *Comm. on St. John's Gospel*, vol. ii. p. 35 (Clark).
[2] Acts xiv. 19, 20.

Would the word δόξα, which, as used in the New Testament, has seemed to most readers and interpreters to be peculiarly full of the light of Divinity, have been an appropriate term to employ if no more than this had been meant? Would he have said that it was *His* glory which He manifested, if it had not been in a special sense His own? And can we suppose that what St. John says of "this beginning of miracles" he does not mean to be understood of all? The same *creative* power which was so strikingly exhibited in turning the water into wine, was seen also in the miracle of the loaves and fishes, which were made sufficient to feed five thousand and more people, and,[1] as was noticed in very early times, in giving sight to the man who was blind from his birth. Hardly less noticeable is the setting aside the healing agency of the Pool of Bethesda, as being unnecessary for the cure of the thirty-eight years' cripple, when He in Whom was life stood beside him ready to make him whole. And even more forcibly are we taught to see in our Lord, not the *conveyer* of life from the dead, but the very *Source* of life, when in connection with the raising of Lazarus we hear Him saying, "*I am* the Resurrection and the Life." When we set beside this saying the Lord's "I will" in other miracles, we feel that we cannot be wrong in assigning to it also the highest meaning. And in like manner the many unmistakable instances in which we are bidden to notice that His gracious works of healing proceeded from His Person, must surely be meant to make us realize why, as Son of Man, He has in Himself such a well-spring of healing power.

3. Especially striking in conjunction with what in the account of our Lord's miracles points so strongly to His Godhead as their source, is the absence of anything which might fix a different interpretation upon them. For our Lord insists at other times very emphatically and repeatedly

[1] See S. Irenæus, Hær, V. xv. 2: "ut ostenderet manum Dei, eam quæ ab initio plasmavit hominem, . . . quod . . . in ventre plasmare prætermisit artifex Verbum, hoc in manifesto adimplevit."

upon His connection with the Father. He enlarges upon every aspect of this subject. And yet He never brings His miracles into the circle of these affirmations. He speaks of them simply as wrought by Himself. He does not pray for power to work them. Godet, indeed, has the hardihood to assert that our Lord's miracles were "just so many answered prayers,"[1] but he has nothing to bring forward which is in any way adequate to support such an assertion. Our Lord's "Father, I thank Thee that Thou didst hear Me" at the grave of Lazarus, has been (in default of anything else) twisted into a proof that He prayed for power, although He immediately added that it was on account of the people that stood by that He said it, and although He had just before declared *Himself* to be the Resurrection and the Life. Except this, and a look cast by our Lord heavenward on one or two occasions in working His miracles, nothing has been adduced as furnishing proof or indication that He prayed for power to perform them. And what a remarkable fact it is that no more than this can be said in support of what, if it were true, would be a point of such great importance! The New Testament affords very clear evidence respecting two classes of prayers which were offered by our Saviour,[2] viz. intercessory prayers, and prayers for the strengthening of that physical and moral weakness (entirely consistent with sinlessness) which belong essentially to human nature, and which, for our sakes, He condescended to take upon Him. There can be no doubt or question as to the reality of His prayers for Himself in this regard. It belonged to His whole purpose that He should be subject to and should manifest such weakness as this, and should teach us how strength from God might transform it in answer to prayer. But the case was otherwise in regard to His works of power. They were to be evidences not of His humanity, but of His Divinity. Had they been "so many answered

[1] Godet, *St. John's Gospel*, vol. iii. 26, E.T.

[2] Respecting our Lord's Prayers, cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, III. Qu. 21, and above, pp. 226-228.

prayers," they could not have fulfilled this purpose. And whether we regard them in the light of their connection with this purpose, or as they stand in the Gospel narrative giving every token that they proceeded directly from the inherent Divine power of the Worker, or in the light of the absence of any statement that they were not so wrought—an absence which, when it is contrasted with what is said respecting our Lord's other prayers, seems inexplicable if they were wrought in answer to prayer—we cannot but feel that the supposition that they did not proceed directly from our Lord Himself is utterly groundless and untenable.

4. Certainly this is the view which has been generally, not to say universally, taken of them in the Church. To give anything like full proof of this would obviously occupy far too much space. But one instance may be given in which a direct opportunity was offered of taking exception to this as the Church's view of the miracles, when nevertheless those who, if there had been any ground of exception would have certainly brought it forward, not only did not do so, but emphatically declared their own agreement with the statement that was made. The instance is this. Shortly before the General Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431, St. Cyril of Alexandria put forth against Nestorius twelve articles or anathematisms.[1] The ninth of these articles related to the question of our Lord's miracles. The substance of St. Cyril's affirmation in this article was that our Lord wrought His miracles not as the prophets did, by communicated power, but by His own Divine power. If, as He Himself said, He wrought them by the Spirit of God, this was not because the Spirit rested upon Him and wrought through Him as if He had been simply a prophet, but because in all the works of God the Son there is a conjoint operation of God the Holy Ghost, as there is, indeed, of the entire Trinity. The

[1] Migne, *P.G.*, vol. lxxvi. 308, 309 (*Explicatio duod. Cap.*); 353–360 (*Orient. oppositio. Cyrilli defensio*); 429–436 (*Theodor. reprehensio. Cyr. defensio*). As regards the name, Garnier says (*id. ib.*, p. 314, note), "Veteres malebant *capitula* dicere."

anathematism therefore contains distinctly the assertion that our Lord wrought His miracles as God, and virtually denies that He had in any way divested Himself of His Omnipotence. This was emphasized by St. Cyril when at the Council of Ephesus he further explained his meaning in these anathematisms. For, he said, "the Only-Begotten Word of God being made Man, continued still to be God, being all that the Father is, the Fatherhood only excepted; and, having as His own the Holy Spirit Who is of Him and essentially in Him, He wrought the miracles as signs of Divine power."[1] This view of our Lord's miracles was, then, publicly proclaimed before the Church towards the middle of the fifth century at a general council. Was the view challenged? Far from it. St. Cyril's articles were challenged, not by the Council, but previously by a number of Oriental bishops, for whom Andrew, Bishop of Samosata, was spokesman; and also by Theodoret. But—and this is especially to be remarked—both the Oriental bishops and Theodoret made express exception in regard to this point, and declared their agreement with St. Cyril in what he said respecting our Lord's relation to the Holy Ghost in the working of His miracles. They were entirely at one in regarding them as wrought by His own inherent Divine power. As regards the Council itself, it has been largely, but not universally, held that it approved and confirmed not only Cyril's third letter, but the twelve anathematisms with it.[2] Whether this

[1] Migne, *P. G.*, lxxvi. p. 308, *Ἄνθρωπος γεγονὼς ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ἀπομεμένηκε καὶ οὕτω Θεός, πάντα ὑπάρχων ὅσα καὶ ὁ Πατήρ, δίχα μόνου τοῦ εἶναι Πατήρ· καὶ ἴδιον ἔχων τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἐμπεφυκὸς αὐτῷ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, εἰργάζετο τὰς θεοσημίας.* (The latter clause is very remarkable, as bearing upon St. Cyril's view respecting the procession of the Holy Ghost.)

[2] Canon Bright (*Dict. Chr. Biog.*, vol. i. p. 768) says that Cyril's "third letter was received, not with any express approbation, but, as it appears, with a tacit assent, which might be held to extend to the 'articles.'" The view of the Roman Church is thus given by Heinrich in Wetzer u. Welte's *Kirchenlexicon* Art. "Christus" (vol. iii. p. 258). He says that the Council of Ephesus "die sehr genaue Formulirung des Alexandrinischen Synodalschreibens von Cyrill *nebst den beigefügten zwölf Anathematismen* als treuen Ausdruck der wahren katholischen Lehre adoptirt, wie dieses auf's Neue durch das Chalcedonense u. das Constant. II. geschehen ist." And so Card.

recognition amounted to a full and unqualified sanction of the anathematisms as a whole may be open to question. But as regards the particular point now referred to and spoken of in the ninth anathematism, there can really be no doubt whatever. It was unquestionably the deliberate judgment of the Church in the fifth century that our Lord's miracles (Θεοσημίαι, "signs of God," they were significantly named) proceeded from the Divine power which was inherent in Him. And, although a writer here and there may have recently suggested a different view, it may be confidently affirmed that this is the judgment of the Church still.

If, then, it must in all reason be admitted that the Gospel representation of our Lord's miracles is of works "manifestly flowing forth from the majestic life resident in the Worker," [1] it is not easy to see how any form of the Kenotic theory can be maintained in the face of such a fact. The Continental form of it certainly cannot, for that supposes that our Lord divested Himself entirely for the time of all His Divine attributes. But according to the most restricted English form of it, it does not seem easy to make out a much better case. If the Divine attributes belong, as surely they do, collectively to the Being of God, how could one be dropped and another retained? How, if our Lord was throughout Omnipotent, could He have been otherwise than throughout Omniscient also? If there was any time more than another when we should have expected to find evidence of the effects of the *kenosis* (as we are asked to understand it), it would surely be in the intensely human scene in Gethsemane. Yet it was there that the Lord healed Malchus when Peter in his impulsive zeal had cut off his ear. It is impossible to demarcate successive portions of our Lord's life, as though in one He showed Himself simply as Man

Franzelin (*De Verbo Incarnato*, p. 173), "Concilii Alexandrini et totius dein Ecclesiæ confirmantis epistolam synodicam 3^am^ *cum anathematismis*."

The view of the Eastern Church is thus stated by Macaire (*Théol. Dogm. Orthod.*, tome ii. p. 94), "Le concile d'Ephèse *approuva et accepta* les douze chapitres dogmatiques ou anathèmes."

[1] Liddon, *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 156 (6th ed.).

and in another simply as God. It is not thus that the Gospels place Him before us. In them He is throughout at once perfectly human and perfectly Divine. Nor is there any indication of successive states of consciousness, at least as distinguished from *separate* states of consciousness. The Divine manner of knowing and the human manner of knowing appear as co-existing simultaneously, but in separation from one another, in Christ, God and Man. As God He is always Omniscient; as Man He is always non-omniscient. Our being acquainted with only one kind of consciousness, viz. our own, makes it very difficult for us to lay hold of this. But few people, probably, would have any difficulty in assenting to the statement that our Lord was at the same moment omnipotent as God and non-omnipotent as Man. Yet there is the very same ground for the one statement as for the other:—the same ground in the Incarnation, for, in order that our Lord might be perfect God and perfect Man, it was requisite that all that belongs to perfect God, that is, all the Divine attributes, should co-exist in Him with all that belongs to perfect Man, that is, all the human attributes;—and the same ground in the Gospels, for there is as distinct evidence of the constant co-existence in Him of Omniscience with a true and limited human consciousness, as there is of the co-existence of Omnipotence with the limited powers of Manhood. We shall not get rid of perplexity in regard to the record of our Lord's sayings and doings in the Gospels, until we are prepared to accept fully the ἀσυγχύτως of the doctrinal definition of Chalcedon, and to apply it to the human consciousness assumed by our Lord as fully and entirely as to any other attribute of that human nature which He made His own. As there was no confusion between His human affections or His human modes of action and what He was as God, so we must believe there was no confusion between His mode of knowing and thinking as Man and His Omniscience as God. Carry this belief to the study of the Gospels, and it will at any rate be felt that it is in harmony with what they present. A full comprehension

of the mystery we could not expect to have, unless it were possible for us to understand what it is to be omniscient; but we may at any rate perceive that what is before us is a *co-existence* of what is Divine and what is human, and that we have no need to have recourse to so untenable a supposition as that He, Who was and is very God, suspended at any time His thought as God in order that He might think and feel at that time exclusively as Man.

III.

From what has been said it will, it is hoped, be seen how impossible it is to find anything approaching to an adequate foundation for any form of the Kenotic theory either in the Epistles or in the Gospels. If the theory were true it would be found to be in harmony with the phenomena as a whole, just as the right key to a lock will fit all its wards. But both in the Epistles and in the Gospels it is only by much straining, and shutting the eyes to large portions of the evidence, that this theory can be offered with anything like plausibility as a clue to the mystery.

But the theory is open to a further and very weighty objection. It contradicts the principle of the unchangeableness of God. On this point some observations must be made.

In the first place let us note what God's unchangeableness is. It is much more than unchangeableness of character. Thought may be rightly enough detained for a time in the contemplation of the moral unchangeableness of God, His immutability in purpose, in will, in affection; but it will soon be felt that the heart of the truth lies within these outskirts of it, that God is morally unchangeable because He is God, that all other aspects of His unchangeableness are grounded in and one with His eternity, which is in itself the expression of and one with His essential Being. I AM THAT I AM, the Sacred Name which, meaning *He Who is*, bears on its face the thought of God's unchangeableness, is put before

us in Scripture as His *memorial*[1]—that is to say, as bringing before us that characteristic which, as the root of all else which God is, He would have us keep constantly before our minds. Self-existence, Eternity, and Unchangeableness are *the* thoughts which God has put before our minds in naming Himself thus and constituting this Name His "memorial." The Name evidently describes the very heart of the Divine Being and Essence, and as evidently asserts the unchangeableness of that Being and Essence; and it is given to be a remembrancer of these great truths.

In reference to the truth of God's unchangeableness, there are two points especially to be noted. The first is the absence in Him as the One Self-existing Being of anything like composition. Every one will remember Hooker's memorable words, "Our God is One, or rather very Oneness, and mere unity, having nothing but itself in itself, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things."[2] Possibly Hooker had before his mind the saying of St. Bernard,[3] "Si dici potest, *unissimus* est . . . nihil in se nisi se habet." But, indeed, many such passages may be found in the Fathers.[4] They had thoroughly pondered and realized this aspect, as well as that immediately to be mentioned, of the truth of the Unity of God.

The conception of the identity of God's attributes with Himself (which is the second point referred to) is found as early as St. Irenæus.[5] This great Father of the second century speaks of God as being "all Thought, all Will, all

[1] Hos. xii. 5. See Dr. Pusey's note on this passage, and on Mal. iii. 6, and compare Huxtable (in *Speaker's Commentary*) on Hos. xii. 5. See also Ps. cii. 27; Heb. i. 10–12; xiii. 8; St. James i. 17; Deut. vi. 4; St. Mark xii. 29, 30; Zech. xiv. 9.

[2] Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* I. ii. 2. Dean Church (Clar. Press Ed. of B.I., note, p. 109) thinks the "very Oneness" was borrowed from Greek philosophy.

[3] S. Bern., *De Consid.*, v. 7, qu. by Hurter, *Theol. Dogm. Compend.*, vol. ii. p. 32.

[4] See Petav., *Theol. Dogm.*, Lib. ii. c. 2. Gerhard, *Loc. Theol.*, De Natura Dei, c. 6; c. 8, §§ 3, 5.

[5] S. Iren., *Cont. Hær.*, I. c. xii. § 2, qu. by Hurter, *ut sup.* p. 29. He refers also to S. Epiphan., *Hær.*, xxxiii. n. 2.

Mind, all Light, all Eye, all Hearing, all, a Fountain of every good thing." St. Augustine[1] dwells upon the thought, as was his wont with all which he accounted master-truths, again and again. A writer who has studied him carefully, expresses happily and concisely the substance of his varied statements on the subject in the following terms:[2] "Wissen, Wollen, Handeln, Leben, Sein ist in Gott Ein und Dasselbe" —"Knowledge, Will, Action, Life, Being is in God One and the Same." Similar sayings might be collected from other Fathers. The identity of that which in God corresponds to thought and knowledge and consciousness in ourselves, with His essential Being, cannot but on reflection strike one with peculiar force. For if there is a peculiar identity or oneness between *our* consciousness and ourselves, consciousness being in our case not original, but a gift from the Creator—if it is a primary truth for man to say of himself, "I think, that is to say, I am"[3]—how much more must there be identity between the Self-originating Being of Beings and His co-eternal Mind!

Even outside the sphere of revelation it has been felt that the idea of God could be only of a Being who was unchangeable. In the very remarkable ascent of reason towards God which is found in the eleventh Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics,[4] the conception of unchangeableness in the Being of Beings is the very goal towards which his thought continually presses, and which it ultimately gains. Plato's expression of the same thought is hardly less

[1] The *locus classicus* of St. Augustine on this topic is *De Civ. Dei*, xi. c. 10. See also *De Trin.*, vi. c. 6, 7; xv. c. 5.

[2] Dr. A. Dorner, *Augustinus*, p. 17.

[3] The rendering of the *ergo* in Descartes' famous saying, *Cogito, ergo sum*, by *c'est-a-dire*, is due to M. Bartholomèss. See his *Hist. des Doctrines Religieuses*, i. p. 23, as quoted by Mansel, *Bampton Lectures* (note 25 to Lect. iii.), p. 345, where he also refers to Cousin's Essay, *Sur le vrai sens du Cogito, ergo sum*.

[4] Consider the following passages: C. 6. ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιον τινὰ οὐσίαν, ἀκίνητον. C. 7. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τι κινοῦν, αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. C. 8. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων, ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. C. 9. Δῆλον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ θειότατον τὸ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει.

remarkable. "Shall I ask you whether God is a magician" —he inquires in the second book of *The Republic*—"and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another, sometimes Himself changing and becoming different in form, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; *or is He one and the same immutably fixed in His own proper image?*"[1]

Surely Aquinas[2] was fully justified in saying that "quidam antiquorum, *quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti*, posuerunt primum principium esse immobile."

Speaking as it were in the name both of Theology and of Reason, Aquinas lays down on his own part the following as incontrovertible positions:[3] (1) "Quia divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formæ et materiæ, sequitur, quod in divinis *idem est abstractum et concretum, ut Deitas et Deus;*" (2) "Quia divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subjecti et accidentis, sequitur, quod *quicquid attribuitur Deo est ejus essentia.*"

Is, then, the idea of a κένωσις—if by it we are to suppose our Lord to have divested Himself, even temporarily, of any of His Divine attributes—in any way reconcileable with the Divine unchangeableness? Clearly this, the Continental form of the theory, contradicts this principle so plainly that those who hold the one must necessarily abandon the other. And, in fact, this has been recognized plainly enough in Germany. Several writers[4] in that country have opposed the theory as being on this ground an untenable one. And

[1] Plato, *Rep.*, Bk. ii. p. 380, C. *sqq.* The translation is Jowett's. The words in italics are in the original, ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν.

[2] Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I. Qu. ix. 1.

[3] *Summa*, I. Qu. xl. 1 (qu. by Mansel, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 341, *sq.*). Bishop Pearson, in his lectures, *De Deo et Attributis*, maintains as decidedly as Aquinas that the Divine attributes cannot be distinct from the Divine essence either *realiter* or *formaliter*. See his *Minor Works* (vol. i. p. 39, *sq.*, ed. Churton), Lect. iv., and Lect. v. *De Simplicitate Dei*, and Lect. ix. *De Immutabilitate Dei.*

[4] Brömel, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others. Dorner's Papers in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.*, 1856, 2; 1857, 2; 1858, 3, are now included in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1883.

in particular Dorner, the author of the great work, *On the Person of Christ*, vigorously exposed its antagonism to this fundamental principle.

But is the case really any better if we suppose, according to the English form of the theory, that our Lord only *suspended* His attributes, and, in particular, was not, during His earthly course, living *habitually* in the exercise of omniscience? The advocates of this view would, perhaps, maintain that it did not necessarily conflict with the unchangeableness which must be ascribed to God. The attributes, they would urge, were still present in our Lord in all their integrity: only the exercise of them was suspended. This is plausible until we ask more precisely what it is which is meant. The exercise of a *power* may undoubtedly be suspended, whether it be a Divine power or a human one. But omniscience is *a condition of existence*, not simply a power. God exists *in* His Omniscience, and cannot be conceived as existing out of or apart from it. As soon as the attempt is made to think of God as being, even for a moment, not omniscient, it cannot but be felt that the supposition is wholly unthinkable. The truth is we cannot conceive any modification of the Godhead in Christ without at once running counter to the principle of His unchangeableness. In other words, we cannot conceive any modification of the Godhead *after* the Incarnation which was not equally possible *before* it. If our Lord could be conceived as having, before He became Incarnate, suspended His Omniscience, that is, His Divine knowing, so that for the time He was not in conscious possession of all the knowable past, present, and future, then might we conceive of this change—for a change it undoubtedly would be—as taking place in Him after His Incarnation. But if we should at once put away (as we certainly should) any such thought respecting God not Incarnate, we ought as unhesitatingly to put it away respecting God Incarnate. As God cannot ever be more than God (for God is God), so can He not ever be less than God. Pre-incarnate or Incarnate He must be, as God, ever the same. It is not in any supposed change in

the *Godhead* of our Lord Jesus Christ that we must look for a solution of the difficulties which we feel as we try to realize how His human consciousness could have preserved its true human character when it was conjoined in Him with omniscience. The solution must be looked for exclusively *on the human side.* If the structure of the human mind itself is of such a kind as, *ipso facto,* to make it incapable of direct intercourse on (so to say) equal terms with the Omniscient God, the hypothesis of a κένωσις affecting the Omniscient God becomes at once superfluous. In the present Treatise an endeavour has been made to show that this is actually the true account of the matter. In connection with this it has, of course, been requisite to show that the *Kenotic* theory has no real grounding in any statements of Holy Scripture, and is not reconcileable with the evidence of the Gospels. This, it is hoped, has been shown in the present chapter, and also that the theory is liable to other theological and philosophical objections which appear to be insuperable. One thing more remains to be shown, namely, that such support as is claimed for the theory in the writings of the Fathers or of later divines of the Church is claimed erroneously. It is not much which is claimed. It is claimed for the most part in a general way, and without special references or quotations being given. But as far as may be possible, it is desirable that an examination should be made of whatever has been thus claimed or suggested, and that at the same time some account should be given of the various views which have from time to time been entertained in connection with this subject. By this means the origin of the modern *Kenotic* theory will be made more clear. This it will accordingly be attempted to do in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF OPINION IN THE CHURCH RESPECTING THE *KENOSIS*.

THE most convenient division for the kind of survey of the history of opinion on the subject of the κένωσις which it is now proposed to make, will be to take, first, the whole period from the first age of the Church to the Reformation; secondly, the period from the Reformation to the present century; and, lastly, that which may be called, in a rather extended sense, our own age. Each of the two latter periods will be found to be distinguished by a certain change of thought. For whilst in the first period that interpretation of the κένωσις from which the Church as such has never departed was altogether dominant, it happened that at or about the commencement of the second period, under the influence of that general upheaval of thought which accompanied the Reformation, a new direction was given (within a certain area) to the ideas which had been previously prevailing; a new interpretation of Phil. ii. 7 was devised; and the theory thus started held its own, in the area to which it belonged, till the present century. Finally there has taken place in our own time on the Continent, a reversal of those views which, by Lutherans especially, had so long been regarded as "orthodox," with the result of setting on foot a conception respecting the κένωσις which, not at present to say more, differs essentially from those which were held in either of the preceding periods.

I. From the First Age of the Church to the Reformation.

The author of the *Bampton Lectures* for 1891, whilst he admits that from St. Augustine onwards to the Reformation little if any support is to be found for his view of the nature of the κένωσις, claims nevertheless to receive "a great deal of sanction from the best early theologians, from St. Irenæus to Theodoret, and from some of the best theologians of the Anglican Church since the Reformation."[1] He refers, in a note, to St. Irenæus, Origen, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Hilary. The two latter (he says) "supply us with admirable formulas for the 'self-emptying,' though without applying it to the limitation of knowledge." He does not tell us what the formulas are; but he quotes at another time a passage from St. Cyril, which he perhaps considered to contain such a formula; he refers also to a noted passage in St. Irenæus, and to one of Origen's Homilies; he also refers generally to Mr. Swayne's quotations from the Fathers in his essay on *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*.

As regards Anglican theologians since the Reformation something will have to be said later on. At present our concern is with "the best early theologians, from St. Irenæus to Theodoret." Respecting these, as distinguished from later Fathers and mediæval theologians, a somewhat strong expression is made: it is stated that "*a great deal of sanction*" is given by them to the lecturer's view of the κένωσις.

To the present writer, these early theologians do not appear to give any sanction at all, either to the lecturer's view or to any of the modern views on this subject, English or Continental. How is this to be shown? It does not seem quite sufficient simply to examine one by one the passages either actually or presumably referred to as giving this "sanction," and to show that the utmost which can legitimately be extracted from them offers really no support at all to the modern views. Besides this, it seems at any

[1] Gore, *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 163, and appendix, note 48, p. 267.

rate desirable that something more should be shown of the mind of these early Fathers on points closely allied to the question of the κένωσις. It will be remembered that Canon Gore's view of this subject hangs together with a particular view of our Lord's miracles, and of His teaching. He would have us recognize,[1] "at least in some of His miracles . . . a power dependent on the exercise of prayer." He would also have us regard our Lord's[2] "supernatural illumination" as being "if of higher quality, yet analogous to that vouchsafed to prophets and apostles." Now, if it should appear that the early theologians appealed to were very far from looking upon our Lord's miracles or His teaching in any such light as this, it ought to make us weigh very carefully any statements of theirs which at first sight might seem to favour the other part of the modern view. The strong probability in this case will certainly be that they meant nothing of the kind imputed to them. If they not only contend for the reality and integrity of our Lord's Divine nature, but also emphasize their conviction that the totality of the Divine Powers and Attributes was permanently resident in Him; if, so far from describing "the self-sacrifice of the Incarnation," as having "lain in our Lord's refraining from the exercise of what He possessed, or from the Divine mode of action," they uniformly speak of His miracles as proceeding from His own inherent Divine power—then, however they may have conceived of the relation between the Divine and the human in our Lord Jesus Christ (concerning which something will have to be said), it will be clear that their conception of it must have differed widely from that of the Bampton Lecturer, and that they could not have given "a great deal of sanction" to his views.

In the first place, then, let the import of the following series of antitheses, taken up by one writer after another from St. Ignatius in the second century to St. Gregory Nazianzen in the fourth, be duly weighed and considered.[3]

[1] *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 146. [2] *Id.*, p. 147.

[3] The following passages are quoted by Bishop Lightfoot in his notes to

S. Ignatius, *Ephes.* c. vii.: Εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικὸς καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ Θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν.

S. Ignatius begins here with the *humanity*, because that was the point assailed by the Docetic teachers whom he was opposing; but though it is the reality of the humanity of our Lord upon which he is specially insisting, there is no lessening of the Divinity, no curtailing of it to make room for the humanity, no hint that it could be other than it was before the Incarnation.

S. Ignatius, *Polyc.* iii.: Τὸν ὑπέρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς ὁρατόν, τὸν ἀψηλάφητον, τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς παθητόν, τὸν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δι' ἡμᾶς ὑπομείναντα.

Melito, *Fragm.* 13: "Invisibilis videtur, neque erubescit; incomprehensibilis prehenditur, neque indignatur; incommensurabilis mensuratur, neque repugnat; impassibilis patitur, neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondet verbum; . . . tunc intellexit omnis creatura propter hominem . . . . invisibilem visum esse et incommensurabilem mensuratum esse et immortalem mortuum esse," etc.

Melito, *Fragm.* 14: "Quum sit incorporeus, corpus ex formatione nostra texuit sibi . . . . a Maria portatus et Patre suo indutus, terram calcans et cœlum implens," etc.

The last two clauses are especially noteworthy. In another fragment Melito says that our Lord, "being perfect God and perfect Man at the same time, assured us of His two essences—of His Godhead by miracles after His baptism, and of His Manhood in the thirty seasons before His baptism."

S. Ignatius, *Ephes.*, vii. and *Polyc.*, iii. (*Apost. Fath.*, Part II. vol. ii. sect. i. p. 48, and p. 343). Add, as substantially though not verbally illustrating the same line of thought, S. Cyr. Alex., *Quod Unus sit Christus*, p. 753, Ben. ἦν ἄηθές τε καὶ ξένον ἐν Χριστῷ τὸ παράδοξον, ἐν οἰκετικῇ μορφῇ κυριότης, ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ σμικροπρεπείᾳ δόξα θεοπρεπής, καὶ βασιλείας αὐχήμασιν ἐστεφανωμένον τὸ ὑπὸ ζυγόν, τό γε ἧκον εἰς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτρον, καὶ ἐν ὑπερτάταις ὑπεροχαῖς τὸ ταπεινόν.

S. Irenæus, iii. 16, 6: "Hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis," etc.

Tertullian, *De Carne Chr.* 5: "Ita utriusque substantiæ census hominem et Deum exhibuit, hinc natum, inde non natum, hinc carneum, inde spiritalem, hinc infirmum, inde præfortem, hinc morientem, inde viventem."

In another passage (*Adv. Prax.* 27) Tertullian observes that "adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in Illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit."

S. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxxviii. 2 (Migne, *P. G.*, xxxvi. 313): Ὁ ἄσαρκος σαρκοῦται, ὁ Λόγος παχύνεται, ὁ ἀόρατος ὁρᾶται, ὁ ἀναφὴς ψηλαφᾶται, ὁ ἄχρονος ἄρχεται, ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου γίνεται, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς χθὲς καὶ σήμερον ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.

S. Greg. Naz., *Epist.* ci. (Migne, *P. G.*, xxxvii. 177): Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον χωρίζομεν τῆς θεότητος, ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δογματίζομεν, πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ Θεόν . . . ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον, προσληφθέντα ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς ἡμετέρας, παθητὸν σαρκὶ, ἀπαθῆ θεότητι, περιγραπτὸν σώματι, ἀπερίγραπτον πνεύματι, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπίγειον καὶ οὐράνιον, ὁρώμενον καὶ νοούμενον, χωρητὸν καὶ ἀχώρητον, ἵν' ὅλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ.

These remarkable antithetical statements may have been taken up by one writer after another from St. Ignatius, in whose letters the first example is found, or from one another successively; or they may be, though not so probably, the independent expression of each writer's mind. But in any case, whatever their origin may be, they testify to a prevailing mode of thought, a mode of regarding our Blessed Lord in His two Natures which seems quite incompatible with that Kenotic theory which we are invited to regard as having "a great deal of sanction" from theologians of this period, and, in particular, from St. Irenæus, who adopts this very mode of statement.

The mind of these and other "early theologians" comes

out still more clearly when we set beside these antitheses their use of the canon, Μένων ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν, which in the fourth and fifth centuries became a watchword of orthodoxy, but which had its roots much further back than that. With whom it originated it may be impossible to say. It was certainly in use not long after the time of Melito, and his well-known Christological turn of thought favours the idea that he might have been the author of it. There does not seem to be any actual evidence that he framed it. But since it is found in substance in Tertullian,[1] who, as a recent critic[2] has said, "formed himself upon Melito, and probably made not unfrequently silent use of him," it seems not unreasonable to conjecture that Melito, the author of the earliest treatise on the Incarnation, and the fragments of whose writings "emphasize[3] the two natures of Christ in many a pointed antithesis," may have thus tersely expressed a Christological truth which he certainly held, and which was of such comprehensiveness and such importance.

Melito flourished soon after the middle of the second century. In any case the canon was in existence early in the third century. Tertullian's treatise, *De Carne Christi*, in which it occurs in substance, is assigned to the first decade of the third century. In Origen's work, *De Principiis*, written probably before A.D. 220, the canon[4] appears distinctly. And from this time onward it continually reappears.

The point insisted upon by this canon relates, it will be observed, not to our Lord's Person but to His Divine Nature. It emphatically asserts that our Lord, as regards His Essential Godhead, was not changed by the Incarnation. "Remaining

[1] Tertull., *De Carne Chr.*, c. iii. (Migne, *P. L.*, ii. 757): "You cannot suggest the possibility" (he says) "of Christ ceasing to be God *amittens quod erat, dum assumit quod non erat. Periculum enim status sui Deo nullum est.*" Respecting the last clause, cf. the *Libellus Emendationis* of Leporius, § 3 (Migne, *P. L.*, xxxi. 1221).

[2] Harnack, *Altchrist. Litter.*, i. 246.

[3] Bishop Lightfoot, *Contemp. Rev.*, Feb., 1876, p. 481. On Melito's date, see *ibid*, p. 475 *sq.*

[4] Origen, *De Princ.*, i. 4: "Homo factus mansit quod erat Deus."

what He was, He took that which He was not." Or, in the still shorter Latin form, "Mansit quod erat"—"He remained what He was." He was not only the same Person after the Incarnation as He was before it, but He was *in Himself* unchanged. In the following words, addressed by Malchion to Paul of Samosata at the Council of Antioch in A.D. 269, the force of the canon may be very clearly seen, the formula itself having very probably been in the speaker's mind: "You do not consider," said Malchion to Paul, "that the Divine Wisdom as, before It had emptied Itself, It was always the same, so in this exinanition which in mercy to us It underwent, It continued undiminished and unchangeable."[1] In the letter of the Bishops to Paul the same views are expressed. They speak of that which was born of the Virgin as having received all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. Jesus Christ is believed in the whole Church under heaven to be God, Who emptied Himself from His equality (in external glory) with God (κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ), and, according to the flesh, Man and of the seed of David. It was as God that He wrought the signs and wonders recorded in the Gospels, and by His partaking of flesh and blood was tempted in all things like us, without sin. As before the Incarnation He was One, so as Christ He is One and the same τῇ οὐσίᾳ, in respect of His Divine Essence.

One more passage may be given in order to show how much was wrapped up in this short formula or canon. St. Augustine in one of his letters[2] explains that our Lord became Man in such a manner that in so doing "He corrupted not His immortality, He changed not His eternity, He lessened not His power, He abandoned not the administration of the world, He left not the bosom of the Father—that is, the *secretum*, the mysterious manner in which He is with Him and in Him." When the Latin Fathers refused to admit any *mutatio*, or *diminutio*, or *varietas*, or *amissio*, or

[1] Quoted by Petrus Diaconus, *De Incarn. et Gratia*, c. iii. p. 78 (Migne, *P. L.*, lxii. 85, *sq.*). See Routh, *Rell. Sacr.*, iii. 298.

[2] *Ad Volusianum*, c. ii. 6 (Migne, *P. L.*, xxxiii. 517).

alteratio in our Divine Lord in respect of His Godhead; when they insisted that *sua non minuit*, or that *a se quod Deus est nunquam recessit;* or when they affirmed that the Incarnation took place *assumptione inferioris, non conversione potioris*—or when the Greek Fathers denied any τροπή, "change;" or ἀλλοίωσις, "alteration;" or μετακίνησις, "removal;" or μετάπτωσις, "failure;" or ἀφανισμός, "suppression;" or περιγραφή, "circumscription;" or περικλεισμὸς ἐν νεύματι, "limitation of will;"—they were but expressing more fully what was contained tersely but forcibly in the canon ἔμεινεν ὅπερ ἦν, *mansit quod erat.*

Could those who held such views as these have by any possibility "regarded the self-sacrifice of the Incarnation as having lain in our Lord's refraining from the exercise of what He possessed, or from the Divine mode of action?" It is admitted that from the time of St. Augustine very little if any sanction is to be found for such a theory. But surely the evidence which has been adduced shows that "the best early theologians" were substantially of one mind with the later Fathers. Both alike insisted that the totality of the Divine powers and attributes dwelt permanently in our Incarnate Lord; that He was unchanged in respect of His Godhead by the Incarnation; that He wrought His miracles by His own Divine power. The sphere in which they could have conceived Him as refraining from the exercise of what He possessed must therefore have been different from this.

The ground being thus cleared, we may now proceed to inquire in what sense and in regard to what particulars the early as well as the later Fathers did conceive of our Lord as having refrained from the exercise of what He possessed, or, as it would be more correct to express their views, as having permitted His human nature to be and to act and to suffer according to the laws of humanity, without in any way suspending or modifying those laws by His Divine power.

In the first place, it was perceived that our Lord was not in exactly the same position as we are as regards the natural

needs of the body, and also as regards its affections and passions. We are subject absolutely to hunger and thirst and weariness, and heat and cold and the like. Our Lord, being God as well as Man, was manifestly subject to these not absolutely, but because He willed to be so. St. Clement of Alexandria[1] expressed this in words not perhaps sufficiently guarded but which are substantially true. "It would be ridiculous" (he said) "to suppose that the body of the Saviour, as a body, required necessary sustenance for its preservation. He ate, but not for the body, which was held together by a holy power; but lest His companions should be induced to think otherwise of Him than as Man, as afterwards some supposed that He was a Man only in appearance. He was altogether exempt from passion, subject to no impulse of passion, neither of pleasure nor pain."

As regards human affections and passions, to which in the last sentence Clement refers, St. Augustine[2] says, "Thou art troubled unwillingly; Christ was troubled because He willed to be so: Jesus hungered; it is true, but because He willed: Jesus slept; it is true, but because He willed: Jesus was sorrowful; it is true, but because He willed: Jesus died; it is true, but because He willed: it was in His power to be affected in such and such a manner, or not to be." And he expresses the reason and principle of this in these words, *Ubi summa potestas est, secundum voluntatis nutum tractatur infirmitas.* "Where that Power which is highest is present, weakness is dealt with according to the determination of the will." In accordance with the same principle St. Hilary said, speaking of our Lord's fasting in the wilderness, that the hunger did not steal upon Him unawares or against His will, but that the Power which by the forty days fast had been unmoved, finally *naturæ*[3] *suæ hominem dereliquit,*

[1] *Strom.*, vi. 9. See Kaye, *Clement of Alex.*, p. 345. Cf. the more guarded words of St. Justin Martyr (*Trypho*, 88), αὐξάνων κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, χρώμενος τοῖς ἁρμόζουσιν, ἐκάστῃ αὐξήσει τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπένειμε.

[2] *In Joan.*, Tract xlix. 18; cf. *Contra Faust.*, Lib. xxvi. 8; *De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 9.

[3] S. Hil. Pict. *in Matt.* iv. 2 (Migne, *P. L.*, ix. 929).

"permitted the body to become subject to its own natural laws."

Secondly, as regards His sufferings, whether in respect of their origin from without—from men or devils—or in respect of the pain of them as inwardly experienced, it was clearly seen that our Lord was not, except as He Himself willed, at the mercy of His enemies, or incapable of keeping suffering at a distance, or of changing its bitterness into spiritual sweetness. There was a wonderful voluntariness about all this side of our Divine Lord's life. It was a twofold voluntariness, belonging to Him as He was Man, and as He was God. He could have as Man avoided everything, not by human power, but by the power of prayer. He could at any time have summoned thus as Man more than twelve legions of angels. The consent of His human will was throughout required. Without this consent—in which we can easily see the very heart of the Atonement on its human side—nothing would have been laid upon Him. And again, as God, there was a voluntary refraining from the exercise of power which might have at all times either removed Him from the midst of His enemies, or rendered them powerless, or changed the sense of pain into inward joy and peace. All such relief or protection as His martyrs have at various times received from His Presence with them, or from what His tender mercy has bestowed, was in His own power as regards Himself whilst He moved amongst bitter foes, or entered into Gethsemane, or bore the long hours of the Cross. The words of St. Hilary are just as applicable here as before. *Naturæ suæ hominem dereliquit.* He suffered most voluntarily.

Thirdly, as regards our Lord's temptations. It was solely as Man that He was tempted, and it was solely as Man that He resisted and overcame temptation. But in resisting temptation as Man, and overcoming the Tempter, He sought and obtained strength from outside His Manhood. Man must do this or fail; it is the law of his being. Our Saviour submitted Himself to this law for man. In regard to His temptations, therefore, He, as God, took a double part. On

the one hand He permitted Himself to be tempted as Man, when He might have dealt with temptation and the tempter in the same way as it was in His power to have dealt with suffering and with His enemies. On the other hand He, as being One in operation with the Father and the Holy Ghost, afforded to His Manhood that help in regard to temptation which manhood, as such, cannot do without. There was a restraint of His Godhead, and there was an exercise of it.

We may now form a tolerably complete and fairly accurate estimate of the mind of the early Fathers on this subject. They, beyond doubt, believed that our Lord was Perfect God as well as Perfect Man. They believed that as God He was absolutely unaltered (except as regards the external manifestation of the Divine glory) by the Incarnation. They believed that He manifested His Divine power and glory from within by means of His miracles. It follows that they could not have believed in any kind of κένωσις which involved either the laying aside of any of His Divine attributes or any modification of them.

On the other hand, they recognized that the Godhead of our Lord occupied a permissive attitude in relation to His humanity. They realized that there was what might be described (though not, perhaps, with perfect accuracy) as a restraint of the Divine action in certain particulars.

But in regard to their conception of this "restraint" there are two very important points to be observed.

The first is that they did not consider it as having anything to do with the *relation* between the two Natures of our Lord which was brought about by the Incarnation. It had relation wholly and solely to the twofold *work* which our Lord came to fulfil as God and as Man. In that which was to be performed or suffered by Him exclusively as Man, His Godhead was inactive. In that which it was necessary for Him to do as God, His Godhead was active. The reason in all this was not that the bringing of the two Natures together required that one of them (the Godhead) should be curtailed

of some of its powers in order to give free play to the Manhood. It was not so. Both Natures were whole and perfect. But *the economy of redemption required* that in some things the Manhood should act alone. In those things, therefore, our Lord refrained from acting as God. His will was then to act simply as Man, and there was nothing in the relations between His Godhead and His Manhood which forbad this, or made it otherwise than easy and natural for Him to do so. The principle which determined our Lord's action was not a necessity arising from His Incarnate Being, but an exigency of His Incarnate Work. This was recognized of old by the Father Who perhaps most fully realized the *balance* in their integrity of the two Natures of our Lord, and in more modern times by the great English theologian who endeavoured especially to search out how God was in Christ. St. Leo,[1] commenting upon the scene in Gethsemane when the soldiers came to take our Redeemer and fell to the ground before Him, remarks that it was *sola verbi virtute* that they fell, but (he adds) since "*salvando humano generi alterius operis ratio congruebat* . . . admisit in se impias manus, et cohibita est potentia Deitatis." And elsewhere he says,[2] "Continuit se ab impiis Crucifixi potestas; et *ut dispositione uteretur occulta, uti noluit* virtute manifesta." Hooker's expression of the principle is no less distinct and precise. "As"[3] (he said) "the parts, degrees, and offices of that mystical administration did require which He voluntarily undertook, the beams of Deity did in operation always accordingly either restrain or enlarge themselves."

The second point is that in all that the earlier or later Fathers said about "restraint" in connection with our Lord, what they were referring to was restraint of His Divine *action*, not at all to the relation between His Omniscience and His human consciousness. This, it will be noticed, is a very material distinction. Canon Gore speaks of St. Cyril

[1] *Serm.* lxv. 14, 2.

[2] *Serm.* lxviii. 17, 2. Cf. Coustant, *Præf. Gen. in S. Hil. Pict. Opera*, § 173, who quotes this passage.

[3] Hooker, *E. P.*, V. liv. 6 (vol. ii. p. 236, ed. Keble).

and St. Hilary giving "admirable formulas for the 'self-emptying,' though *without applying it to the limitation of knowledge,*"[1] as though this omission were quite immaterial and accidental. But in reality the whole gist of the matter lies here. The Fathers might say, and did say, much about that which they described sometimes as "restraint," sometimes as the "inaction" of our Lord's Godhead. What they had in view in saying this was the principle of action and inaction which has been just described. This principle could have had no application to the limitation of knowledge, or to the relation between omniscience and human consciousness. Restraint, which in this case is the same thing as cessation, of *omniscience* is simply unthinkable. How far the early Fathers did make any approach towards thinking out the difficulties of this subject will be considered in its proper place in the Fourth Book. It is enough to point out here that it was not the mystery of our Lord's consciousness which was before them when they spoke of the action and inaction of His Godhead. It was not the sphere of thought, but the sphere of action, which they were contemplating. What they said in regard to the latter sphere would not be applicable to the former, nor could anything be inferred from it respecting their views in regard to the former sphere; nor, consequently, could a theory respecting the κένωσις be extracted from it. *That*, in any case, would have to be looked for elsewhere.

What has been said will, it is hoped, make it not difficult to see what is the real drift of those statements of the Fathers in which Canon Gore thought that he found his view of the κένωσις sanctioned. He refers first to St. Irenæus. The passage referred to, which follows a paragraph in which the true Manhood and true Godhead of our Incarnate Lord had been spoken of, is thus translated by Keble: "For as He was Man, that He might be tempted, so was He also the Word, that He might be glorified: the Word remaining inactive in His temptation and dishonour and crucifixion

[1] *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 267.

and death, but going along with the Man in His victory and endurance, and works of goodness, and resurrection and ascension."[1]

Observe how St. Irenæus here contemplates our Lord as being, throughout His Incarnate Life, Perfect God and Perfect Man; how he points out that the counsel of the Incarnation required that He should be on earth both God and Man—Man that He might be tempted and so fulfil His part as the Second Adam, God that He might be glorified and fulfil His work as the Revealer; how he regards the Divinity (and that surely in its totality) and the humanity—the Word and the Man—as being alike present in every part of our Lord's life and work; how he describes the Divinity as being inactive—ἡσυχάζοντος meaning not exactly "restraining itself," but simply "taking no part"—in those things which belonged exclusively to the Second Adam's part, but at the same time rendering that help to "the Man" which man must always obtain from God if he is to be victorious over evil, as well as putting Itself forth in that which was Its own proper sphere, *i.e.* in "the works of goodness" or the miracles.

What sanction does this passage give to Canon Gore's theory, or any other theory, of the κένωσις? The relation between the Divine and the human in our Lord as constituted by the Incarnation is not referred to in it at all. What is referred to is the relation between them in the sphere of action. Both are evidently presupposed to be subsisting in their integrity in our Incarnate Lord. There is no trace of an idea of the Divinity having been modified on account of Its conjunction with humanity, and the difficulties connected

[1] S. Iren., *Cont. Hær.* III. xix. 3. The Greek, preserved by Theodoret, *Dial.* III. p. 232 Ben. (Migne, *P. G.*, lxxxiii. 284), is as follows: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα πειρασθῇ, οὕτω καὶ Λόγος, ἵνα δοξασθῇ· ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι, καὶ σταυροῦσθαι, καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· συγγινομένου δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν, καὶ ὑπομένειν, καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀνίστασθαι, καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. The old Latin translation of this work of St. Irenæus against heresies, which was older apparently than Tertullian, but by an unknown author (see Beaven's *Irenæus*, p. 40, and Massuet as there quoted), shows that some word has dropped out after πειράζεσθαι. It is represented in the Latin translation by "inhonorari," and in Keble's by "dishonour."

with the relation of omniscience as conjoined with human consciousness do not seem to have been, at this time at any rate, present to the mind of St. Irenæus at all.

The next early theologian referred to by Canon Gore is Origen. It is not very safe to attempt to determine the opinion of Origen on any subject from a single passage in his writings; and with regard to the present subject, it will be shown presently that his writings exhibit distinctly two different lines of thought. But as regards, in the first place, the homily on Jeremiah x. 14, in which Canon Gore thinks that "Origen[1] speaks of a self-humiliation of the Son to a 'Divine folly,' *i.e.* to a human mode of wisdom," and Mr. Swayne,[2] that he expresses distinctly the view of "a self-limitation in communication of the Logos," it appears to the present writer that they have misapprehended what was really in Origen's mind. For he[3] refers expressly to 1 Cor. i. 25, quoting the very words; and that which Canon Gore and Mr. Swayne render as a "Divine folly" is in reality the expression in that verse—τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, "*the foolishness of God.*" Origen seems to be intending to say much the same as St. Paul said to the Corinthians. He does not seem to be speaking of our Lord personally, but of the revelation made in and by Him through the Cross. This was the κένωμα; this was Divine wisdom emptied, that is, not showing itself as it really was (for to the Greeks it seemed mere foolishness). There is certainly nothing in any way stated distinctly in the passage about our Lord's humbling Himself to a human mode of wisdom. If "the foolishness of God" in 1 Cor. i. 25 can be so understood, then Canon Gore may be justified in understanding Origen's use of the expression in the same way; but this is obviously not St. Paul's meaning, and no interpreter has so understood him. The latter part of the passage of Origen's homily does, indeed, refer to our Lord personally. But it does not seem

[1] Gore, *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 267.
[2] Swayne, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, p. 48 *sq.*
[3] *Hom. in Jerem.*, viii. 8 (Migne, *P. G.*, xiii. 345).

to be any personal change in Him which is spoken of. So far from contemplating our Lord as having come down *in Himself* from being Divinely wise to "a human mode of wisdom," Origen speaks expressly in his concluding words of the "wisdom" (σοφία) and the "might" (ἰσχύς) which were in Him, and to which men were to be lifted up.

How very improbable it is that Origen could have intended to convey that our Lord, in consequence of the Incarnation, was in any manner or degree less wise than before, or descended from Omniscience to a human mode of wisdom, may be seen from the following very definite statement, which he makes in his commentary on St. John's Gospel. "If it be asked" (he says) "whether our Saviour knows absolutely everything which the Father knows, or if, with the idea of glorifying the Father, it should be suggested that some things which the Father knows are not known by the Son, let such a querist remember that the Saviour is the Truth, and, moreover, that if He is the absolute and perfect Truth (εἰ ὁλόκληρός ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια), He cannot be ignorant of any truth (οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀγνοεῖ)."[1] And, again, Origen's firm grasp of the truth of the immutability of God would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for him to accept the idea, supposing it to have presented itself to his mind, that our Lord could, as God, have in any way laid aside His Omniscience in order to possess and exercise a wisdom which was simply human. For example, in his work *Against Celsus* he speaks as follows: "Though, therefore, the God of all should by His power descend with Jesus into human life, and though the Word Who was in the beginning with God, Himself also being God, should come to us, He does not become absent from His home, nor does He leave His seat, so that one place holds Him not, and another place where before He was not now holds Him: but the Power and Divinity of God passes wheresoever It wills."[2]

[1] Origen, *In Joann.*, tom. i. 27 (Migne, *P. G.*, xiv. 73).

[2] Origen, *Contr. Cels.*, iv. 5. Cf. S. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII. ii. p. 831, ed. Potter (Migne, *P. G.*, ix. 408, *sq.*). Cf., on the other hand, Gore, *B. L.*, p. 266.

In truth, Origen's writings exhibit, as was just now mentioned, two different lines of thought respecting the κένωσις.

When he had in view our Lord descending from heaven as God—when he had His Godhead especially in view—the self-emptying was understood by him (as we have seen it was by the Fathers generally, early as well as later) as the laying aside solely of the *external* glories of Deity. He says that our Lord "novissimis temporibus seipsum exinaniens homo factus incarnatus est cum Deus esset, et homo factus *mansit quod erat Deus.*"[1] He speaks of Him as "exinaniens se *de æqualitate Patris,* or *de statu majestatis.*"[2] He assigns as the reason of His doing so the necessity of so presenting Himself in the world as to bring the Godhead in Himself within the power of men to behold it and to comprehend it.[3] He explains in this manner the purpose of his famous illustration of the two Statues[4]—one being of such vast magnitude that it could not be seen or comprehended, by which was represented the infinity of the Godhead; the other corresponding in every respect with the larger, but being on a smaller scale of proportion, by which was represented the Son as Incarnate —as being to show how the Son "per ipsam sui exinanitionem studet nobis *deitatis plenitudinem demonstrare.*" In Origen's conception the *plenitudo deitatis* was manifestly the same in both statues; the only difference was in their respective proportions.

But at other times Origen followed another line of thought, which was connected with and based upon his well-known tenet that the soul of our blessed Lord was existent previously to the Incarnation; and this line of thought led him to a different interpretation of Phil. ii. 7, and a different view of the κένωσις. According to this view it was our Lord's human soul, not Himself as God, which was the

[1] Origen, *De Princ.*, i. 4.

[2] *De Princ.*, i. 8.

[3] *Contr. Cels.*, iv. 15, διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν 'ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν,' ἵνα χωρηθῆναι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δυνηθῇ.

[4] *De Princ.*, I. ii. 8.

subject of the κένωσις; it was in respect of this that He emptied Himself.

That this was one of Origen's fancies does not seem to have been always clearly perceived; but the evidence that it was is really too clear to admit of doubt. Theophilus, the predecessor of St. Cyril in the see of Alexandria, charged him distinctly with it in two letters,[1] written in A.D. 401, and the year following. "He dared to say" (wrote Theophilus) "that the soul of the Saviour emptied itself, and took the form of a servant." Huet, in his *Origeniana*,[2] complains that Theophilus does not make this charge good by any citations from Origen's writings, and seems inclined to treat it as a malicious accusation devoid of any real ground. And, indeed, if the charge had rested solely on the authority of Theophilus,[3] without any evidence for it being producible from the writings of Origen, and without any other writer having noticed that Origen held this view, Huet's explanation might have been regarded as disposing of it. But it has been noticed by a writer not less learned than Huet; and there is distinct evidence of it in Origen's writings. In his Moyer Lectures on the Divinity of Christ Waterland remarks that Origen appears to have understood the whole passage in the Epistle to the Philippians in this manner.[4] He refers to his commentary on St. John's Gospel, and to his work against Celsus. And in his commentary on St. Luke Origen speaks even more plainly than in those works. When the three homilies[5] in which he discusses our Lord's appearance among

[1] *Synodica ad Episc. Palæst.*, A.D. 401; *Altera Paschalis*, A.D. 402. Both were translated by St. Jerome, and form Epp. xcii., xcviii., in his Works (Migne, *P. L.*, xxii. 767, 802).

[2] Huet, *Origeniana*, Lib. II. c. ii. Qu., iii. 8.

[3] On Theophilus and his charges against Origen, see Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, Appendix ix. pp. 246–251.

[4] Waterland, *Moyer Lect.* V. (*Works*, vol. ii. 109, ed. Van Mildert). His references are to Orig. *In Joan.*, p. 34, Huet (perhaps p. 38, Ben.), and p. 413, Huet (per. p. 446, Ben.), and to *Contr. Cels.*, pp. 167, 168, 172, Spencer (perhaps Lib. iv. 14–18, pp. 510, 511, 513, Ben.).

[5] *Hom.* xviii., xix., xx. (Migne, *P. G.*, xiii., 1847–1854). St. Luke ii. 46–52.

the doctors of Jerusalem at the age of twelve are carefully read, it will be seen that he can hardly be speaking of anything but the human soul of our Lord. This, he says, first emptied itself—that is, at the Incarnation, previously to which Origen supposed it to have existed in fulness of wisdom—and was again filled with wisdom. "*Humiliaverat enim se, formam servi accipiens, et eadem virtute qua se humiliaverat, crescit.*" And he bids us specially notice that it was before He was twelve years old that "*sapientia Dei et cæteris, quæ de eo scripta sunt, replebatur.*" Again he says, "*Jesus proficiebat sapientia, sapientior per singulas videbatur ætates. Nunquid sapiens non erat, ut sapientior fieret? An quoniam evacuaverat se formam servi accipiens, id quod amiserat resumebat, et replebatur virtutibus, quas, paulo ante assumpto corpore, visus fuerat relinquere?*"[1] When we recall the language which, as was shown, Origen used in speaking of our Lord's absolute knowledge and wisdom as God, we cannot but feel that such a description as is contained in these homilies on St. Luke ii. 40, 52, could only be meant to apply—as, indeed, seems all but certain when it is read by itself—to our Lord's human soul. Replying to the objection of Celsus that the Incarnation implied change in God, Origen says that in answering this regard must be had on the one hand to the nature of the Divine Logos, seeing that He is God; and, on the other hand, to the soul of Jesus.[2] This shows that He was accustomed to contemplate them separately. He then proceeds to admit a change in the soul of our Lord, though He denies that it was a change of substance; and, for an explanation of what the Lord's soul did, he refers to and quotes Phil. ii. 5–9. Add to this his emphatic previous statement, that the Logos, remaining what it was, did *not* suffer anything of what the soul and the body underwent—in saying which he is not referring, as the context

[1] *Hom.* xx. (Migne, *P. G.*, xiii. 1853).

[2] *Contr. Cels.*, iv. 18 (p. 512, Ben., Migne, *P. G.*, xi. 1049), πρὸς τοῦτο λέγοιτ' ἄν, πῆ μὲν περὶ τῆς τοῦ θείου Λόγου φύσεως ὄντος Θεοῦ, πῆ δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἰησοῦ ψυχῆς.

shows, to the endurance of pain—and the proof seems complete.[1]

St. Cyril of Alexandria is Canon Gore's next authority. Canon Gore explains his own view as being that, "in order to set the example of a true human life . . . the eternal Son so far restrained the natural action of the Divine Being as, in St. Cyril's phrase, 'to suffer the measures of our manhood to prevail over Him.'"[2] It will be seen that a good deal depends in this quotation upon the two last words. If St. Cyril *had* said that our Lord suffered His Manhood to prevail "*over* Him," this would have been equivalent to saying that His Divine Nature was affected—voluntarily indeed, but still really affected—by its conjunction with manhood in the Incarnate Lord. But if Canon Gore had looked more closely at St. Cyril's words, he would have seen that the Greek Father did not say this. What he really said was that our Lord suffered the measures of our manhood to prevail "in Himself" (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ), *i.e.*, in His own case. This gives quite a different sense. What St. Cyril means clearly is that our Lord permitted His Manhood to fulfil its law, unhindered and unaided by His Godhead, whensoever and in whatever particulars the purpose of the Incarnation ("οἰκονομικῶς") required this.[3] In this St. Cyril was quite in agreement with St. Irenæus. There was much, especially in regard to His temptations and sufferings, which our Lord had to fulfil solely as Man. Intervention of the Godhead in these things would have changed their character, and taken away from them the value which they had as being strictly human acts and sufferings. Here, therefore, in the phrase of St. Irenæus,

[1] *Contr. Cels.*, iv. 15 (p. 511, Ben., Migne, *P. G.*, xi. 1048), μανθανέτω, ὅτι ὁ Λόγος τῇ οὐσίᾳ μένων Λόγος, οὐδὲν μὲν πάσχει ὧν πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἢ ἡ ψυχή.

[2] *B. L.*, p. 162. St. Cyril's words are (*Quod Unus sit Christus*, p. 760, Ben., Migne, *P. G.*, lxxv. 1332), Ἠφίει δὴ οὖν οἰκονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν. The Latin translator in Migne's edition renders, Humanæ itaque naturæ leges œconomice etiam *in se* valere voluit. See also Bright, *Waymarks in Church Hist.*, p. 179, and Appendix G.

[3] Cf. *Apol. cont. Theodoret. pro xii. cap.* p. 234, Ben. (Migne, *P. G.*, lxxvi. 441), ἐδειλίασεν οἰκονομικῶς ἐφιεὶς τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ πάσχειν ἔσθ' ὅτε τὰ ἴδια κ.τ.λ. The whole passage illustrates St. Cyril's mind on this point.

the Godhead was inactive. St. Cyril expresses the same thought in other words, when he describes our Lord as permitting the law of manhood to take its proper course in His case. He most assuredly believed that our Lord fulfilled in a strictly human manner and under the conditions and law of humanity all that the counsel of Redemption required to be fulfilled by Him as man. But, whilst he held this, he held also most firmly that in respect of His Godhead our Lord neither was nor could be in any way changed by the Incarnation; that His Godhead was in essence and operation just what it was before; that He wrought His miracles as God; that He taught as God; that the *κένωσις* meant nothing more than that He descended from the manifested glory of God to that which was not glory, viz. to the poverty and ignominy of His life on earth in the form of a servant.

These positions are all capable of being proved from the writings of St. Cyril. It would probably be no exaggeration to say that he employs the canon *ἔμεινεν ὅπερ ἦν* to express his own conviction, and to rebut false views, more than a hundred times. That he attributed our Lord's miracles to His own inherent Divine power has been already pointed out.[1] The following expressions in the same treatise from which Canon Gore's quotation was taken sufficiently show how far St. Cyril was from sanctioning any such view of the *κένωσις* as we are now invited to adopt. Our Lord, St. Cyril says,[2] "thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but came down in a manner to that which was not in glory, in that He appeared as Man. Therefore also He said, 'The

[1] Above, Book II. Ch. ii. pp. 261–263.

[2] *Quod Unus sit Christus*, p. 770, Ben. (Migne, *P. G.*, lxxv. 1348 *sq.*), *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, καταπεφοίτηκε δέ πως ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν δόξῃ, καθὰ πέφηνεν ἄνθρωπος. Τοιγάρτοι καὶ ἔφασκεν· "Ὁ Πατὴρ μείζων μού ἐστι·" καίτοι μετὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνυπάρχοντι ἀεὶ καθὸ νοεῖται καὶ ἔστι Θεὸς καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγέννηται κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἔχειν πρὸς πᾶν ὁτιοῦν καὶ τῇ τῆς θεότητος ἐναβρύνεσθαι δόξῃ. Ἔδει δὴ οὖν τὸν καταφοιτήσαντα δι' ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτρον οὐκ ἀπολισθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῆς ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κατὰ φύσιν λαμπρότητος καὶ ὑπεροχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν κενώσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ πλῆρες ἔχοντα θεϊκῶς, καὶ ἐν ταπεινώσει τὸ ὑψηλὸν, καὶ τὸ φύσει προσὸν ὡς δοτὸν διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, προσκυνεῖσθαι πρὸς ἁπάντων.* Cf. p. 753, Ben.

Father is greater than I,' although it was His right, as being always God—as He is regarded and is, and is naturally begotten of Him—to abide unchanged under all circumstances, and to rejoice [lit. *plume Himself*] in the glory of the Godhead. It was therefore imperative that He Who for our sakes descended to the level of humanity, should be seen not to have slipped out of the splendour and excellence which were His essentially by nature, but—as possessing Divinely in His exinanition the plenitude of the Godhead, and in His humiliation its loftiness, and that which pertained to His (human) nature as bestowed and received for the sake of mankind,—should be worshipped by all."

This is an important passage. In it we plainly see what St. Cyril regarded the κένωσις as affecting, viz. the external manifestation of Divine glory; and what he regarded it as not affecting, viz. the essential attributes and powers of the Godhead—all that was *in* Christ our Lord as God. In another passage, in answer to the question, What was the κένωσις? he says, "The assumption of flesh and of the servant's form, the taking our likeness by Him Who in His own nature is not of us, but is above every creature."[1] The "permission" which he described our Divine Lord as giving to His humanity to do and to suffer certain things, was nothing more than His willing in these things to act and to suffer simply as man. It was not a "permission" by which His Godhead was in itself affected at all. Into the question of what those relations between the Godhead and the manhood were which rendered this possible, St. Cyril entered very little. He contented himself for the most part with speaking of them as a mystery beyond our comprehension. He nevertheless saw that the clue to the mystery lay in the difference and unlikeness to one another of the two natures. Thus he said, "The Godhead is one thing and the Manhood

[1] *Quod Unus sit Christus*, p. 742, Ben., Migne, *P. G.*, lxxv. 1301. Τὸ ἐν προσλήψει γενέσθαι σαρκὸς καὶ ἐν δούλου μορφῇ, ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁμοίωσις τοῦ μὴ καθ' ἡμᾶς κατ' ἰδίαν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ὄντος τὴν κτίσιν.

is another, as regards at least the laws and conditions of each. But in Christ they concurred in unity, after a manner strange and above our comprehension, without confusion and without alteration. But the manner of their union is altogether above us."[1]

St. Hilary of Poitiers is the one Latin Father to whom Canon Gore appeals as sanctioning his views. And undoubtedly there are to be found in the writings of this profoundly interesting theologian, passages which at first sight do seem to supply exactly such "formulas for the self-emptying" as not only Canon Gore, but even Professor Godet, might desire. Thus, for example, St. Hilary says, "*Haurienda fuit natura cœlestis, ut exinaniens se ex Dei forma in formam servi hominisque decideret.*"[2] This statement would seem exactly to coincide with the Continental view of the κένωσις. But even in the words themselves, when they are closely examined, there is sufficient proof that this first impression is a mistaken one. For it has been conclusively shown by the Benedictine editor of Hilary, that by the word "forma" this Father does not mean the internal essence of the Godhead, but its external semblance or manifested glory.[3] And, indeed, St. Hilary states frequently and in express terms that our Lord laid aside nothing but this. Thus in one place he says, "*Demutationem Deus nesciens, nihil ex substantiæ bonis caro factus amisit.*"[4] In another, "*Evacuatio formæ non est abolitio naturæ: quia qui se evacuat, non caret sese; et qui accipit, manet.*"[5] And of the κένωσις he says that it took place *non virtutis naturæque damno, sed habitus demutatione.*[6]

In other places St. Hilary insists that our Lord's miracles

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 736, Ben. (Migne, p. 1292), "Ετερον μέν τι καὶ ἕτερον Θεότης καὶ ἀνθρωπότης, κατὰ γε τοὺς ἑνόντας ἑκατέρῳ λόγους· ἀλλ' ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ ξένως τε καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν εἰς ἑνότητα συνδεδραμηκότα, συγχύσεως δίχα καὶ τροπῆς. Απερινόητος δὲ παντελῶς ὁ τῆς ἑνώσεως τρόπος.

[2] *In Psalm.* lxviii. 4 (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, ix. 472).

[3] See Dom Coustant's Notes to *De Trin.*, ix. 14, 38, 51, and Bright, *The Incarnation as a Motive Power*, p. 291, note.

[4] *De Synodis*, 48. [5] *De Trin.*, ix. 14. [6] *De Trin.*, ix. 38.

were wrought by Him as God the Son,[1] and not by power communicated to Him as Man. He dwells upon His being in heaven whilst He was on earth.[2] On the subject of His Omniscience as a fact he is very emphatic and distinct, the whole drift of his examination of the question respecting the day and hour of the Judgment being to rebut the supposition of ignorance.[3]

St. Hilary, therefore, is wholly opposed to the supposition of our Lord having laid aside either the substance of the Godhead, or its powers, or the exercise of them. His whole mind is plainly against any idea of the kind. Whatever, therefore, he says respecting the relation of the higher nature to the lower must be understood in a manner consistent with what were evidently his fixed convictions.

Nor is there any real difficulty in so understanding him, though expressions sometimes occur which we should not have expected to find. Perhaps the passage which has the most (superficial) resemblance to Canon Gore's theory is the following.[4] "In forma enim Dei manens formam servi assumpsit, non demutatus, sed *se ipsum exinaniens, et intra se latens, et intra suam ipse vacuefactus potestatem: dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani,* ne potentem immensamque naturam assumptæ humilitatis non ferret infirmitas; sed in tantum se virtus incircumscripta moderaretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis obedire. Quod autem *se ipsum intra se vacuefaciens continuit,* detrimentum non attulit potestati;

[1] *De Trin.*, vii. 21. "In eo ergo quod operatur Filius, opus Patris est: et *opus Filii, opus Dei* est." Cf. ix. 20. "Et cum operatio Filii Patris testimonium sit, *eam necesse est operari in Christo naturam intelligendam esse, per quam testis et Pater est.*" Cf. ix. 45.

[2] *De Trin.*, x. 54. "Vagit infans, sed in cœlo est: puer crescit, sed plenitudinis Deus permanet." Cf. x. 16. "Spiritus virtute ac Verbi Dei potestate in forma servi manens, ab omni intra extraque cœli mundique circulo cœli ac mundi Dominus non abfuit."

[3] *De Trin.*, ix. 58–75. In speaking of St. Peter's denial he says, as a matter of course, "Dominus *per naturam Dei non ignarus gerendorum,* ter eum negaturum se esse respondit" (x. 37).

[4] *De Trin.*, xi. 48.

cum intra hanc exinanientis se humilitatem, virtute tamen omnis exinanitæ intra se usus sit potestatis."

In the words italicised in this passage, Canon Gore would perhaps claim that there was given an "admirable formula for the self-emptying." But before assenting to the supposition that St. Hilary held a view at all really resembling Canon Gore's, there are several points to be considered which seem not easily reconcileable with that supposition. For, besides the express affirmation which even this passage contains that our Lord not only possessed absolutely all His Divine power, but used it—an affirmation quite contrary to Canon Gore's view that "our Lord was not habitually living in the exercise of omniscience"—it is very much to be noted that St. Hilary had before him a question of a very different complexion from that which Canon Gore attempts to solve. St. Hilary was thinking solely of the difficulty presented by the conjunction of the infirmity of humanity with the infinite power of Deity. How could our Lord have felt those things in which the weakness of our nature shows itself—not only hunger and thirst and weariness, but pain and sorrow and anger and fear—when there was in Him that which certainly could have prevented all such things being felt, and it might be thought must have done so? His answer was that the *virtus* in our Lord which was in itself *incircumscripta*, "*infinite*," restrained itself from affecting these weaknesses of the humanity, permitting them to have place but not dominion. Hilary has in contemplation solely or mainly the Divine power of our Lord and His human weakness. No doubt the relation between Omniscience and human consciousness *is* here concerned. But, as far as appears, Hilary does not perceive that it is. He does not "apply his formula to the limitation of knowledge," because it was not that aspect of the subject which would have made it necessary for him to consider this point, which was before his mind. In truth one cannot read what Hilary has written in treating of the position occupied by the natural affections of grief, anger, fear, and the like, in our Blessed Lord, as compared with the

position occupied by them in ourselves, without feeling that his main object is to vindicate the supreme ascendency of the Divine Nature over the human in Christ,[1] far more than to investigate the difficulties connected with their mutual relations. Incidentally much is said which is of high interest in connection with the latter subject; but this is because otherwise the writer's principal subject could not have been presented as he desired to present it. A full and adequate discussion of the relations between the Divine and the human generally in our Incarnate Lord, and, more particularly, of the relation between His Omniscience and His human consciousness, is not to be found either in St. Hilary or in any other of the Fathers. The time for such an investigation had not in their age arrived, nor did it arrive for many centuries.

It does not seem necessary to carry any further this examination of the views of the Fathers on the subject of the κένωσις, since it appears to be admitted that from the time of St. Augustine at any rate, that is to say, from the latter part of the fourth century onward, sanction for the modern view is not to be found. That there should be any great and marked difference of opinion between the earlier Fathers and the later on a matter so closely touching the Person of our Lord, was *a priori* improbable, and it has (it is hoped) been shown in this chapter that in point of fact, as regards the principal points of importance in the conception of the κένωσις, such difference did not exist. It is true that, as will be shown later on, the views of the earlier and of the later Fathers respecting our Lord's human knowledge were not precisely the same; but as regards the nature of the κένωσις there was, to speak quite guardedly, in the present writer's opinion, substantially entire agreement.

Prior to the Reformation there does not appear to have been put forward, by any one having any pretence to be considered a Catholic theologian, such an explanation of the κένωσις as has been suggested in our time. From the

[1] See especially *De Trin.*, Lib. x.

repeated and emphatic repudiation of the thought that our Lord as God could have been in any way changed in Himself in consequence of His becoming Man, or could have laid aside anything belonging inwardly and essentially to His Godhead, it seems certain that statements must have been made which were regarded as having a dangerous tendency in this direction. But they do not seem to have taken generally the form of a definite theory on the subject. In one instance, however, such a theory was propounded. The author of it was a certain Beron, of whom personally nothing is known. His views are known only from portions of a treatise written to confute them which happen to have been preserved. Who the author of the treatise was is a matter of uncertainty. That he was an orthodox writer is plain from the agreement of his views with those of the Fathers generally, and from the fact that the treatise was commonly attributed to St. Hippolytus. This opinion held its ground to the time of Bishop Bull, who adopts it, and even to the present century, for Dorner, writing in 1845, seems to have been unconvinced by any arguments advanced up to that date in favour of a different authorship, and assigns it still to St. Hippolytus. But since the publication of Dr. Döllinger's *Hippolytus und Kallistus* in 1853, this opinion seems to have been almost universally given up.[1] Dr. Döllinger showed that both external and internal evidence pointed to a much later time than that of St. Hippolytus.[2] The treatise is not mentioned until the seventh century. Even the compilers of lists of heresies make no mention of the heresy of Beron. Again, the language of the fragments belongs so entirely to a later age, abounding in expressions which betray the fuller Christological thought of the Monophysite period, and by no means agreeing with the simpler

[1] Bishop Lightfoot (*Apost. Fathers*, ii. 403) speaks of the defence of the Hippolytean authorship as "a hopeless cause." It is given up, he says, "by most recent critics, *e.g.* Haenell, Kimmel, Fock, Döllinger, Overbeck, Caspari, Dräseke, and Salmon." To these may now be added Harnack, *Altchrist. Litt.*, p. 644.

[2] Döllinger, *Hippolytus und Kallistus*, pp. 318–324.

terminology of Hippolytus, that to ascribe the treatise to that writer or to any writer of the third century, seems to be wholly uncritical and unreasonable. Döllinger himself supposes it to have been written in the sixth or the seventh century. Dräseke, who has more recently investigated the subject, assigns it to the fifth century.

In any case, it seems pretty certain that the publication of the treatise followed very soon after the putting forth of Beron's views. And it is highly improbable that anything so completely formulated on the subject as Beron's theory, as gathered from the fragments, appears to have been, had ever been propounded before.

Only eight fragments of the treatise remain.[1] But they are of sufficient length to show both what Beron's views were, and how they were regarded by the writer who undertook to confute them. It is unnecessary here to enter into any lengthened examination either of Beron's theory or of the reply of his antagonist. It is sufficient to say that Beron's main position was directly contrary to that which was laid down as the judgment of the Church at the General Council of Chalcedon, viz. that the union of the two natures in our Lord Jesus Christ did not involve any confusion of one with the other. But, connected with and forming part of his main contention that there was a complete intermixture or fusion of the two Natures with one another, he combined the following view, which, it will be seen, has a very strong resemblance to the modern κένωσις theory. This view is thus described by Dorner: "As Beron held that an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, a limited personality (περιγραπτός), was thus brought into being, so also did he conceive the act of incarnation *to introduce limits into God Himself*—that is, by His own act, a limitation and circumscription was introduced into God, which had not previously existed. *In Christ, therefore, God was self-emptied, and had acquired an* ἰδία περιγραφή."[2] To this the writer of the treatise replied that our

[1] They are collected in Migne, *P. G.*, x. 832 *sqq.*

[2] *Person of Christ*, Div. I. ii. 33, E. T. Cf. p. 30.

Lord, as God, ὥσπερ ἦν δίχα σαρκὸς, πάσης ἔξω περιγραφῆς μεμένηκε, "remained after the Incarnation as unlimited as He was before." He was at the same time ἄπειρος Θεός, "Infinite God," and περιγραπτὸς ἄνθρωπος, "circumscribed man." And, in saying this, he expressed accurately the doctrine of the Church. Nor can we help seeing from this instance how very important it is to keep strictly to the Chalcedonian ἀσυγχύτως. The difficulty of conceiving how human modes of thought, and what must be called (for want of a proper term to express what is like and yet unlike that which is in ourselves) Divine modes of thought, could subsist and act together without confusion of one with the other, no doubt offers a strong temptation to relax the principle of the ἀσυγχύτως in this one particular. But, if the temptation is yielded to, it is not easy to see where a stand can be made. Neither Beron in ancient times nor Godet in our own have found any halting-place on the inclined plane on which they placed themselves when they abandoned the ground taken by the Church at Chalcedon. And, though the English theory of the κένωσις may at first sight seem less exposed to this danger, it is hard to see how, in any sound judgment, it can really be so regarded. For it rejects the integrity of the ἀσυγχύτως as much as the Continental form does. It would in all probability never have seen the light if its advocates had been able to believe that the ἀσυγχύτως could apply as truly to the point of contact of Omniscience and human consciousness as to any other point at which the two natures touched one another. They could not conceive how this could be, and therefore they framed this hypothesis as a means of getting over the difficulty. But in so doing they clearly gave up the principle of the ἀσυγχύτως; and, the principle being once given up, how and when are you to stop?

II. From the Reformation to the End of the Eighteenth Century.

At the epoch of the Reformation new departures were made in this subject, as they were in most branches of theology. The new conceptions which were now formed respecting the κένωσις were, however, confined to the Continental reformers. Amongst these there were considerable differences of view, which it will not be necessary here to notice in detail. It will be sufficient to point out the general character of the views which now began to be entertained, the antagonism between Lutherans and Calvinists respecting them, and the contrast presented by them to those which the Church had maintained previously, and which still continued to be held in the Roman, the Anglican, and the Eastern communions.

1. *The Continental Reformers.* It was amongst the Lutherans that a new theory of the κένωσις was now struck out, which held its ground in substance amongst them until the present century. This theory stands distinguished not only from that which, as we have seen, was the only one sanctioned by the Church in the centuries preceding the Reformation, but also from those which have been recently adopted by Continental divines, both Lutheran and Reformed. According to this new theory, the κένωσις was referred not to our Lord's Divine Nature, but to His Humanity. This view has now been entirely changed. The subject of the κένωσις is now represented both by Lutherans, as, for example, Gess or Delitzsch, and also by Reformed divines, such as Godet or Pressensé, as having been the Divine Nature of our Lord. This may probably be due in some degree to the progress of exegesis. Exegesis[1] has clearly shown that the subject of the verb ἐκένωσεν in Phil. ii. 7 must be our Lord as pre-incarnate,

[1] Meyer, *Phil.*, p. 69, 4th edit., "Da der irdische Jesus nie in Gottesgestalt war, so ist es unrichtig, weil textwidrig und unlogisch, *obwohl der Lutherischen Orthodoxie und ihrem Gegensatze gegen die Kenosis des Logos entsprechend*, den menschgewordenen historischen Christus, den λόγος ἔνσαρκος, als das mit ὅς gemeinte Subject zu betrachten." De Wette kept to the old Lutheran view, making the Λόγος ἔνσαρκος the subject.

and not as incarnate. Thus Meyer, the well-known Lutheran critical expositor, says plainly that the idea that the Incarnate Christ is the subject of ἐκένωσεν, however consonant to Lutheran orthodoxy and Lutheran views, must be abandoned as exegetically untenable. But, whatever it may be due to, the change is sufficiently striking. Before the present century Lutherans as well as others condemned "as a monstrosity" the thought of the unchangeable Godhead having at the Incarnation of the Son of God undergone in Itself any change. *Now*, this is the very thesis which many Lutherans (Meyer is not one of them) attempt to maintain.

The new views originated with Luther himself. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that he originated ideas which led to the formation of new views, for the conception which, subsequently to his death, came to be accepted by his followers, differed in some considerable respects from his own. At any rate, he gave prominence to the following ideas in connection with this subject.

(1) He laid great stress upon our Lord's Humanity. He was intensely impressed with the reality of His temptations, of His victory as Man over Satan, of His sufferings. He was anxious to accentuate the stamp of humanity on all this side of our Lord's life. In one of his sermons on the conflict in Gethsemane he said, "The Humanity was left alone, and the devil had free access to Christ: the Deity had secluded and concealed itself, and left the Humanity to fight the battle alone."[1] This is very much the same as what St. Irenæus said about the "Quiescence of the Logos," only he was careful to add that the Logos "went along with the Man in His victory." Luther seems ready to isolate the Humanity from the Divinity for the moment altogether.

At another time, apparently with the idea of representing our Lord's humanity as subject in all respects to conditions similar to our own Luther said: "The humanity of Christ did not at all times think, speak, will, remark all things; though

[1] See Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 93 *sq.*, and the note on p. 94.

some try to make an almighty man out of Him, unwisely mixing up the two natures and their work together."[1] Luther also laid stress upon the true gradual development of our Lord's Manhood, as well as upon its substantial and actual verity.

In all this, together with much that was true, there was a characteristic want of caution and balance in the manner in which it was expressed. Luther's course of thought was no doubt due in great measure to a recoil from the almost exclusive emphasis which had been previously laid upon our Lord's Divinity. Dorner describes the views held of our Lord's Manhood in the later middle ages as Docetic.[2] This may be too strong a description. But it is sufficiently correct to enable us to understand how a man like Luther would be impelled, in opposition to such views, to indicate as strongly as possible the human character of our Lord's moral conflict and victory. And these views—what was exaggerated as well as what was true in them—were influential in more ways than one in the after-development of the thought not only of Luther's followers but of Luther himself.

(2) Luther devised a new interpretation of Phil. ii. 7. He made the subject of ἐκένωσεν to be the Incarnate Son of Man, not the unincarnate Son of God.[3] He supposed the expressions, "Form of God," and "Form of a servant," to be descriptive of two different conditions of our Lord's *Humanity* —the first being its original and glorious condition, the second that which our Lord was content to adopt during His life of humiliation on earth. The first condition, described as the "Form of God," was not merely one of external glory, but there belonged to it also qualities which do not belong to ordinary humanity. "Christ was as Man free, powerful,

[1] Quoted by Dorner, *ibid.*, p. 92 note.

[2] *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 133. Cf. p. 248.

[3] This recalls the view described above as originated by Origen. But neither Luther nor his followers appear to have held, as Origen did, that our Lord's soul was existent prior to the Incarnation. They were indeed charged with something like this, but, as it would seem, without any real ground. See on this Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 431 *sqq.* Note 42.

wise, subject to no one."[1] The giving up of the "Form" to which these qualities belonged and taking instead the "Form of a servant" constituted the κένωσις. It is not quite clear whether the "qualities" which Luther had in view as belonging to the higher form, were simply such perfections as humanity, when it was the humanity of our Lord, was as such capable of, or whether there were included also qualities strictly Divine.[2] But it seems probable that he meant only human qualities. It is also not quite clear in what sense he supposed our Lord as an Infant to have possessed these qualities, and, consequently, in what sense He divested Himself of them. But there is no doubt that he supposed our Lord to have been as Man, or in regard to His Manhood, possessed of certain qualities far above the level of ordinary humanity, and that as Man He emptied Himself of these.

It was pointed out to Luther that this interpretation of Phil. ii. 5–7 was quite opposed to that which the Fathers had sanctioned. His reply was characteristic. "The Fathers," he said, "have often enough erred; it is enough that we do not cause them to be pronounced heretics; the Scripture is not to be interpreted and judged through them, but they through the Scriptures."[3]

(3) Closely connected with these views on the one hand, and, on the other, with the doctrine of consubstantiation which it was intended to "help out,"[4] was Luther's theory that the Human Nature of our Lord was interpenetrated gradually by the attributes of His Divinity. The word "gradually" marks the very considerable difference between Luther's doctrine on this subject and that of his followers. Luther, says Dorner, never once says, in the passages of his writings which relate to the official life of Christ, that our Lord had, as to His humanity, absolute possession of Divine

[1] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 391, note 8.

[2] See Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 96, compared with p. 95.

[3] *Werke*, ed. Walch, tom. xviii. 622 *sqq.*, 656. Quoted by Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 391, E. T.

[4] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II., vol. ii. 390, note 7.

majesty and powers from the very beginning. This was, however, a fundamental principle of the later Lutheran Christology.[1]

There was a superficial resemblance between this view of Luther's and what was called by the Fathers and, notably, by St. Athanasius, the "deification" of our Lord's human nature in consequence of its having been assumed by the Son of God. But there was this important difference between the two. According to the Lutheran doctrine the Manhood of Christ had the attributes of Deity actually imparted to it—according to Luther himself, gradually; according to the later Lutherans, from the first—so as to make it in itself omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. According to the Fathers our Lord's Manhood was "deified" because it became the Manhood of God the Son. It was quite foreign to their view to regard that holy Manhood as having had Divine attributes imparted to it, although certainly they believed that it would be difficult to set a limit to what it received in consequence of that ineffable union, but yet under proviso that the limits with which our nature is "bordered withal" were not thereby set aside or overpassed, which proviso the Lutheran doctrine overthrows. There were three important qualifications, accurately indicated by Hooker in a well-known passage, which the Fathers kept constantly in view as properly limiting what our Lord's Manhood received.[2] These were (1) that the essential properties of Deity were not imparted to it; (2) that those perfections which were imparted to it were such only as it was capable of receiving without having its own proper nature thereby changed; (3) that what was or was not imparted to it was ruled by "the exigence of that economy of service for which it pleased Him in love and mercy to be made man."

(4) Luther had a theory of his own respecting the *Person* of our Lord. He regarded it as the result of the union of the two Natures. Instead of saying that "the Person of the Son

[1] *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 96. See p. 95.
[2] Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, V. liv. 6. Vol. ii. 236, ed. Keble.

united within itself the two natures,"[1] he preferred to say that "the Divine and the human natures were so united with each other, that Christ was but one single Person." In Dorner's words, "he looked to the full actual existence of the Divine-human person as resulting from the completion of the growth of the Divine-human life." There was apparently some confusion in Luther's mind between "Personality" in the strict sense of the term as meaning that which, *without including character*, forms the centre of each individual spiritual being, and "Personality" as popularly used, according to which usage *character* forms a principal part of its meaning. That this confusion should have existed in Luther's case is not surprising: for it has in all ages hung like a cloud over the realm of Theological and Philosophical thought; and even now it is a fruitful source of difficulty and error; so that any one who should express clearly and decisively all that Personality is, as distinguished from all with which it is either in thought or in fact associated, would render a service both to Philosophy and to Theology the value of which it would not be easy to over-estimate.

These four new forms of thought upon which Luther laid stress were all of them influential in different degrees and at different periods upon the course of speculation amongst his followers with regard to the κένωσις. That which was at the time and in its after-effects most important was his new interpretation of Phil. ii. 6, 7, according to which he made our Lord to be not as God, but as Man, the subject of the verb ἐκένωσεν. This interpretation was not accepted at once by all Lutherans. Melancthon, in particular, did not accept it.[2] But in the end Luther's view on this point prevailed;

[1] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 79, cf. 99.

[2] See his *Loci Theologici*. De Filio (*Opera*, i. 156. Witebergæ, 1580.). He refers to the saying of St. Irenæus respecting the "Quiescence of the Logos," and then proceeds as follows: "Convenit hoc dictum ad illud Phil. ii. Qui cum esset in forma Dei, id est, sapientia et potentia æqualis Patri, non rapuit æqualitatem Dei, id est, cum missus esset ut obediret Deo in passione, non fecit contra vocationem, non est usus sua potentia contra suam vocationem, sed seipsum exinanivit, id est, non exeruit potentiam suam, et humiliavit se, formam servi accipiens, id est, induens cum humana natura

and from the middle of the sixteenth century until perhaps fifty or sixty years ago, it continued to be the orthodox Lutheran view that it was our *Incarnate* Lord Who divested Himself of prerogatives which had come to be His as Man.

It was otherwise as regards Luther's theory of a *gradual* communication of the Divine attributes to our Lord's humanity. In whatever way it came about, it certainly did become the established Lutheran belief that these attributes were communicated to our Lord's Manhood not gradually but from the very first. And, whilst they still agreed with Luther in regarding our Lord as being, in respect of His Manhood, the subject of the κένωσις, they now held that what He emptied Himself of was *the Divine attributes* which His Manhood had received from the beginning. But, as regards the manner and degree in which the Divine attributes were laid aside, opposite views very speedily took shape. Luther's death took place in 1546, and within thirty years disputes relating to our Lord's Person and the κένωσις had become, together with other differences, so prominent that it became necessary to take some means, if possible, to heal them.

This was the design of the *Formula Concordiæ*. It was begun in 1577 and was made public on June 25, 1580, that day being the fiftieth anniversary of the Augsburg Confession. It is unnecessary to enter into any details respecting this *Formula*. It entirely failed to put an end to the disputes. Its language indeed on the points in question was so halting and inconsistent that it was little likely that it should do so. There are, however, certain points of Lutheran belief to which it bears decided testimony, and which, in view of their present doctrine, it may be advisable to notice here.

(1) As regards our Lord's Divine Nature. The *Formula* states clearly and decidedly that this was in no way changed or lessened, as regards its essence and attributes, by the Incarnation.[1] Until the present century the idea that it

mortalitatem, habitu inventus ut homo, id est, affectibus pavore, tristicia, dolore." Cf. i. 442, and see Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 134, E. T.

[1] *De Persona Christi*, § 49 (*Libri Symbol. Eccles. Evang.*, ed. Hase, p. 773),

could be so changed seems not to have entered into the domain of Lutheran thought. In the seventeenth century no less than in the sixteenth, the idea, says Dorner, was repudiated by them, as by the Church in all ages, as a monstrosity.[1]

(2) The *Formula* states also decidedly that the communication of Divine majesty and power was made to our Lord's human nature from the first and completely.[2] This also, though not Luther's view, nor yet that which is now held by Lutherans, seems to have held its ground amongst them unshaken until the present century.

(3) Following upon this, the *Formula* explains the κένωσις as consisting in our Lord's laying aside of what had been thus communicated to His humanity, for the whole period of the state of humiliation.[3]

(4) The failure of the *Formula* arose from its inability to explain or to give any consistent account of the manner in which Divine attributes were or could be communicated to the human nature of our Lord, and of the manner and extent of their being laid aside. For, as regards the first point, it had to be shown how the human nature could have had Divine qualities really and not merely verbally communicated to it, without thereby being changed from its own nature. And, as regards the second point, it had to be shown how our Lord could have abandoned and yet not have abandoned what had been communicated to His human nature. It was naturally found impossible to explain what in fact involved plain contradictions. No wonder that, in Dorner's words, "the antagonisms . . . which had been merely concealed, or pronounced but not really conciliated, in the *Formula Concordiæ*, burst forth again in bright flames in the second generation afterwards."[4]

"divinæ Christi naturæ per incarnationem nihil (quoad essentiam et proprietates ejus) vel accessit, vel decessit."

[1] *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. 425, E. T.

[2] *De Pers. Chr.*, § 13, "tum, cum in utero matris conciperetur et homo fieret." Cf. § 26.

[3] Compare, *De Pers. Chr.*, Epitome, Affirm. xi. (Hase, *ubi sup.* p. 608); *De Pers. Chr.*, § 26, Hase, p. 767; *ibid.*, p. 779.

[4] *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 281.

This refers to the once celebrated controversy between the divines of Giessen and Tübingen, which broke out in the second decade of the seventeenth century. It raged hotly from 1616 to 1624, and then came to an end, partly on account of the troubles of the Thirty Years War, partly, as Dorner remarks, "because the several parties had nothing more of consequence to say."[1]

The question in dispute was formulated, Dorner tells us, as follows: Was Christ present with all creatures, *as to His humanity*, in the "status exinanitionis"? And did He govern the universe whilst on the cross and in the grave? Both parties, it must be remembered, were agreed that the entire fulness of the Divine majesty communicated itself to the humanity of Jesus in the very first moment of His life. We may, therefore, put the question at issue in another form: Did our Lord hold in possession but *conceal* the Divine attributes which had been communicated to His humanity? Or did He actually *divest* Himself of the use of them while the "status exinanitionis" lasted? The first was the Tübingen view. The Giessen divines maintained the latter.

Now, since the whole controversy was carried on within the circle of the hypothesis that the Divine attributes were communicated to our Lord's humanity, it might seem as if it could no longer be in any way interesting or instructive. But this is not so. For the examination of the Gospel narrative must be of much the same kind, whether the Divine attributes should be regarded as His in respect of His Godhead alone, or as communicated also to His humanity. The question of their having been, in fact, exercised or not exercised, and of the qualifications attending their exercise, remains not very different under either hypothesis. This discussion,[2] therefore, still retains a value in reference to our present subject, since it shows decisively that the Gospel

[1] *Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 298.

[2] The fullest account of the Giessen and Tübingen controversy is to be found, according to Dorner, in Thomasius' "*Dogmatik*," ii. 391–450. For the Literature see Dr. Philip Schaff's art. "Christology," *Schaff-Herzog Encyclop.*, vol. i. p. 461.

record resists in every way attempts to show that our Lord either abandoned His Divine attributes, or — except as regards a certain reserve of action carried on under ascertainable limits, and upon a definite principle—concealed their possession. For both the Giessen and the Tübingen divines found themselves compelled to make concessions leading towards this result.

This discussion[1] is also interesting in another respect, namely, in regard to the degree of coalescence and of mutual participation of the Divine and Human Natures of our Lord, in the period of His humiliation, and since His Resurrection and Ascension. But this is a question which does not bear directly upon the subject before us now.

Just towards the close of the Giessen and Tübingen controversy the learned and able Lutheran professor, John Gerhard, published at Jena in 1625, in its enlarged and final form, his standard theological work, entitled, after the custom of his time, *Loci Theologici*. Some of his positions are deserving of notice.

In the first place,[2] he distinctly acknowledges that the Lutheran doctrine of the *Exinanitio*, which he adopts and defends, is different from that of the Ancient Church. He distinguishes between what he calls the *sensus Ecclesiasticus* and the *sensus Biblicus*. By the former he means to describe the Patristic view; by the latter, the Lutheran. He fully acknowledges that the Fathers did not understand Phil. ii. 6, 7 as the Lutherans did; but he claims for the Lutheran interpretation that it gives the *sensus Biblicus*.

In the next place, he repudiates strongly the idea of anything like change in our Lord's Godhead. He urges that even *humiliatio* could not be ascribed to Deity by Itself, *infert enim quandam mutabilitatem naturæ humiliatæ*. He thus seems to think that the laying aside even of *external* glory would infringe upon the principle of God's unchange-

[1] See the Bishop of Salisbury's remarks in his Preface to Mr. Swayne's "*Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*," p. xx. *sqq*. Compare Dr. Thomas Jackson, *Comment. on the Creed*, Book xi. ch. iii. (*Works*, vol. iii. 320–324, fol. 1673).

[2] Gerhard, *Loci Theol.*, vol. i. 592, ed. Preuss, Berlin, 1863.

ableness. He apparently supposes that he can thus obtain an argument in favour of the Lutheran view that the subject of ἐκένωσεν is the Λόγος ἔνσαρκος. For, describing the Patristic view in the words of St. Athanasius, ἡ κατάβασις τοῦ Λόγου ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἀσωμάτου μεγαλοπρεπείας εἰς τὸ τοῦ σώματος εὐτελὲς ἐπίδοσις, "the condescension of the Word consisted in His voluntarily passing from His pre-incarnate majesty to the mean estate of His bodily existence"—he appears to think that even this could not be in the case of the Λόγος ἄσαρκος, and that therefore that could not be the subject of ἐκένωσεν. He seems not to have perceived the essential difference which there is between change as regards *nature* and change as regards *external condition*. By the former the Word would have been altered *in Itself:* the latter implies no *internal* change at all.

Gerhard then supposes that St. Paul attributes to Christ an exinanition exclusively in respect of His human nature, which from the first moment of the Incarnation had had the Divine attributes communicated to it. As regards the manner[1] in which the exinanition took effect, he considers that there was a *retractio usus et intermissio* of the Attributes, but in no way whatever a removal or abandonment of them.

It is sufficiently striking to contrast these views, which fairly represent Lutheran orthodoxy from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, with those which, as we shall see, have now taken their place with the majority of Lutheran divines.

In the year 1631, seven years after the close of the Giessen and Tübingen controversy, there was a conference held at Leipzig,[2] which is interesting as having been an attempt to bring about an agreement between Calvinists and Lutherans on the chief Christological point of difference between them, namely, the question of the communication of the Divine attributes to our Lord's humanity. Other points—the Eucharist especially and Election—were discussed at this conference; but the question of the attributes

[1] *Loci Theol.*, i. 597. [2] Augusti, *Lib. Symb. Eccles. Reform.*, pp. 386–410.

occupied most time, and seems to have been the chief subject.

Calvin interpreted Phil. ii. 6, 7 in accordance with the Lutheran view as far as the subject of ἐκένωσεν was concerned. He, like them, took it to be our Lord as incarnate Who emptied Himself. But neither he, nor the Calvinists after him, would ever assent to the position, maintained by the Lutherans, that the Divine Attributes were imparted to our Lord's Humanity. Adhering steadily to the maxim *Finitum non est capax Infiniti*, the Calvinists conceived that this was wholly impossible.

The object of the Leipzig Conference was, then, to bring about a reconciliation, if possible, on this point. The initiative was taken by the Calvinists. The theologians on their side were Johann Bergius, court preacher to the Elector of Brandenburg, Theophilus Neuberger, court preacher to the Landgrave of Hesse, and Professor Johann Crocius. On the side of the Lutherans were Matthias Hoe von Hohenegg, court preacher to the Elector of Saxony, and Doctors Lyser and Höpffner. The Confession of Augsburg was taken as the basis of the Conference, and the method proposed was to set down first the points on which they were agreed, reserving those on which there was not agreement for after-discussion. The third Article is the one which concerns us here. Both sides accepted it according to the letter, but understood it differently. After much discussion, twelve statements were drawn up on which both sides professed agreement. The drafting of them seems to have been the work of the Calvinistic theologians. In the third of them, in which the force and logical consequence of the Chalcedonian *inconfuse* was drawn out, a very plain statement was made that the Divine Attributes remained attributes of the Divine Nature,[1] and never became attributes of the humanity; and that in like manner the humanity

[1] Augusti, *Lib. Symb. Eccles. Reform.*, p. 393, "Sind die göttlichen Eigenschaften der göttlichen Natur Eigenschaften geblieben, und niemalen der Menscheit Eigenschaften worden."

preserved its own attributes, which did not become attributes of the Divine Nature. And in the sixth statement the same conclusion is expressed in connection with the true distinction between what belonged to our Lord *personally* as being both God and Man in one Person, and what belonged to each nature separately. If this point of view could have been clearly maintained, the Conference might have resulted in a real agreement. But when each side came to express more fully their minds, it appeared that the Lutherans were not prepared to give up their favourite dogma that our Lord was truly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent according to His Human Nature, as well as according to His Divinity. All they would admit was that the Divine Attributes were imparted to the human nature through the personal union, and that they belonged to it accordingly as it exists in the Person and not in separation from it.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no real or lasting agreement resulted from the Conference. Its acts retained a position of importance, however, as a Standard Document on the Calvinistic side,[1] forming with two others (the Confessio Marchica of A.D. 1613 and the Declaratio Thoruniensis of A.D. 1645), the Standard of Faith for the Reformed Communion in Brandenburg and Prussia until A.D. 1817. On the Lutheran side also there was not much change, as regards this subject and the nature of the κένωσις, until the new movements of the present century.

2. *The Eastern Church.* As regards the history of doctrine,[2] writers of the Eastern Church are accustomed to make two principal divisions. These are the middle of the eighth century, and the middle of the seventeenth. The writings of St. John Damascene (730–754) are recognized as having collected and systematized the theology of the Fathers who preceded him. And, as but few writers of importance appeared in the Eastern Church from his time

[1] See Augusti's *Dissertatio Histor. et Liter.*, p. 640 *sqq.* of the *Lib. Symb. Eccles. Reform.*

[2] Macaire, *Théologie Dogmatique Orthodoxe*, Introd. § 6, p. 43.

until the seventeenth century, his Exposition of the Orthodox Faith continued to be regarded as a standard work of especial authority. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Confession of Peter Mogilas, Metropolitan of Kieff (1630–1647), endorsed as it was by two Councils, that of Kieff in 1640 and of Jassy in 1643, and afterwards by the four œcumenical Patriarchs and by the Patriarchs of Russia, formed a distinct epoch. This Confession, which was the first authoritative statement of doctrine which was put forth by the Eastern Church, was followed by a second, namely, the Confession of Dositheus, Patriarch of Jerusalem, promulgated at the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672, and endorsed by it.

What therefore is found in these Confessions,[1] and in other writings of the same period in agreement with these Standard Confessions or Expositions of Faith, represents beyond doubt what the Eastern Church regarded as doctrine received from the Fathers, and also as the truth in contradistinction to Reformation novelties.

The Eastern Church has always paid especial attention to objective doctrines, and to questions of Christology in particular. This is exemplified in a rather remarkable manner in the present instance. It was of course the reforming movements of the West, and especially the connection of Cyril Lucar, Patriarch of Constantinople from 1621 to 1638, with them, which called forth in the way of protest the Confessions of which mention has been made.[2] Cyril Lucar put forth his Confession of Faith at Geneva in 1629 in Latin, and in 1631 in Greek. The Confession of Peter Mogilas, drawn up shortly before 1640, was undoubtedly intended to counteract the influence of this Calvinistic document, although, being in the form of a Catechism, its language is positive and not directly polemical.

[1] See Kimmel, *Lib. Symb. Eccles. Orient.*, p. 56 *sqq.*, and p. 425 *sqq.*

[2] The protest extended also to Roman doctrines and Roman pretensions, but the Calvinism which was favoured in Cyril Lucar's Confession was chiefly in view.

At the Synod of Jerusalem which promulgated the Confession of Dositheus, Cyril Lucar's Confession was examined clause by clause, what in it was consonant to sound doctrine being approved, and what was not agreeable to it being condemned. The Synod indeed professed to regard the document as a forgery, foisted upon the Church under Cyril Lucar's name; but they did not think it the less necessary to examine and to condemn it.

Now the VIIth article of Cyril Lucar's Confession refers expressly to the κένωσις.[1] This article is that in which the writer begins to speak of our Lord Jesus Christ and of the Incarnation; and he chooses the language of the well-known passage in the Epistle to the Philippians as the vehicle for enunciating this point of doctrine, expressing himself as follows: "We believe that our Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God underwent an emptying (κένωσιν ὑποστῆναι, Lat., *se exinanisse*), that is, that He assumed human nature in His own Person (ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σάρκα προσειληφέναι, Lat., *in sua hypostasi humanam assumsisse naturam*)."

It will be remembered that this was not the Calvinistic interpretation of this passage. But it was that of the Greek Fathers,[2] who frequently speak of the κένωσις and of the Incarnation as equivalent expressions. It is noteworthy that Cyril Lucar should have expressed himself thus. He would hardly have done so unless this had come to be a customary manner of speaking of the Incarnation. And this impression receives strong confirmation when we find that this one article of Cyril's Confession was expressly excepted from condemnation and pronounced free from Calvinism by the Synod of Jassy.[3] Nor is this all. At the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672, when the articles of Cyril's Confession were examined *seriatim*, and the faith of the Eastern Church

[1] Kimmel, *ubi supra*, p. 28.

[2] Suicer, *Thesaurus*, *s.v.* κένωσις, refers to S. Cyril Alex. *De Trin.*, Dial. V. p. 571 *sq.* (Migne, *P. G.*, lxxv. 976). One of the fullest explanations will be found in St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Adv. Apollin.*, xx. (Migne, *P. G.*, xlv. 1163).

[3] Kimmel, *ubi supra*, p. 409.

was set forth in successive paragraphs in contrast with his Calvinistic views, no alteration was made in this VIIth Article. On the contrary, the Synod repeated the terms of it,[1] embodying them in the Declaration of Faith known as the Confession of Dositheus, the Patriarch and President of the Synod, as rightly expressing what the Church believed.

The Confession of Mogilas, though it does not refer in direct terms to the κένωσις, contains statements which imply that our Lord remained in essence and nature unaltered by it.[2] Thus under *Quæstio* 38, which relates to the third Article of the Creed, our Lord's coming down from heaven is said to have involved no change of place, "seeing that as Very God He is everywhere present, and fills all things;" but "it so pleased Him in His Majesty to humble Himself by taking human nature." And again, "each nature remained entire, *with all its own attributes.*"

Soon after he became Patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril Lucar sent Metrophanes Critopulus, a Greek theologian and friend of his own, who afterwards rose to be himself Patriarch of Alexandria, to study the new movements of thought in different countries of Europe. During his stay at Helmstädt, some German divines requested Metrophanes to draw up for them a statement of the doctrines of the Eastern Church. This request he complied with in the year 1625. The treatise is known as the Confession of Metrophanes Critopulus. It is printed in the Second Part of Kimmel's Collection. It is not an authoritative document, but expresses the views of a man of learning.

Some emphatic statements occur in this Confession of Metrophanes, which show how strongly the Eastern Church repudiated the idea of the Divine Nature having been in any way modified or changed by the Incarnation. Thus it is said that the "coming down" had no relation to place, but was a matter of the Divine condescension only:[3] "For whence and whither could the uncircumscribed Word of God pass, Who

[1] Kimmel, *ibid.*, p. 433.
[2] Kimmel, *ibid.*, p. 105 *sq.*
[3] Kimmel, *Lib. Symb. Eccles. Orient.*, Part ii. p. 68 *sqq.*

fills all things and is over all?" And again, the idea of change is rejected as blasphemous, "for Deity is unalterable and incapable of any sort of change." Christ preserved the properties of each nature intact. It is true the Godhead imparted of Its prerogatives to the Flesh; but not, as Lutherans supposed, in such a manner as to make it omnipotent or omnipresent. It was by reason of the oneness of His Person, not on account of the union of the Natures, that our Lord could say, whether as God or as Man, "all things that the Father hath are Mine." It could not be said of His human nature that it possessed all that the Father hath.

Metrophanes[1] is careful to state that, in taking the *πάθη* of our nature, our Lord did not become subject to them, but had them in subjection. Only when He willed was He hungry, or athirst, or weary. The mode of expression recalls that of St. John Damascene;[2] but, as was pointed out above, the same thought occurs in St. Justin Martyr, St. Irenæus, St. Clement of Alexandria, and other Fathers.

Even when addressing Mahometans, who would be unlikely to be interested in or to comprehend such matters, Gennadius, a Patriarch of Constantinople in the sixteenth century, dwells with emphasis upon the absolute fulness of the Godhead which was in Christ, the reality and integrity of the Manhood, and its non-participation in the Attributes of the Godhead. Especially he insists that God was in Christ with all His power (*μετὰ πάσης αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως*), apparently more from anxiety to express fully the faith of the Church, than having in view the needs of those to whom he was explaining the nature of Christianity.

All this seems to show very clearly that the Eastern Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries recognized no limitation of the Godhead as possible, and still less supposed that Phil. ii. 7 was a warrant for assuming any such

[1] Kimmel, *Ibid.*, p. 71, *ἰθύνων αὐτὰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν, καὶ κυριεύων τούτων, οὐ κυριευόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Θέλων γὰρ ἐπείνησεν, κ.τ.λ. ἅπερ ἠδύνατο μὴ παθεῖν.*

[2] See *De Fide Orthod.*, Lib. iii. c. 5 (Migne, *P.G.*, xciv. 1060), *Τοῦ Λόγου θέλοντος καὶ παραχωροῦντος οἰκονομικῶς πάσχειν αὐτὸ καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια.*

limitation in our Incarnate Lord. A limitation of will in relation to bodily needs and infirmities, to suffering and temptation—a voluntary restraint of the Godhead from entering, as it were, into this sphere, and hindering, as it might have done, the natural course of these affections of the body—this, with the Fathers of old, the Eastern Church evidently did recognize. But they at the same time insisted that, in regard to the power and knowledge and the other perfections of God in Christ, there was not and could not be any limitation at all.

3. *The English Church.* Mr. Gore considers his views on the subject of the κένωσις to be in some measure supported by English divines. "We receive," he says,[1] "a great deal of sanction from . . . some of the best theologians of the Anglican Church since the Reformation." He does not say what English theologians he is referring to, nor does he specify the point or points on which, as he conceives, they support his views. We are therefore left to conjecture as regards both. He can hardly have meant that any English divine interpreted Phil. ii. 7 in any other way than the Fathers did—which is fairly enough represented by the paraphrase of the Authorized Version, "made Himself of no reputation": for, until the present century, it would be hard to find, as will be shown, even one of any note who did not maintain the Patristic view; and, up to the present day, they are few indeed who, in England, have taken up the Continental one. Nor can he have meant that he was supported by English theologians in his *general* view of the relation between the Divine and the Human in Jesus Christ, though not specifically in his interpretation of Phil. ii. 7; for our great English divines give, to say the least, as little support to such views as they do to the modern interpretation of the passage in the Epistle to the Philippians. It seems probable that Mr. Gore refers to the line of thought indicated by the phrase, "Quiescence of the Logos," which, as we have seen, was recognized and adopted by many of the

[1] *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 163.

Fathers. This line of thought had a recognized position in the Eastern Church at the period of the Reformation, as has been shown. Whether it held as definite a place in English thought may perhaps be doubted; but, at any rate, its correctness was not disputed. But it ought to be remembered that this "quiescence," or "voluntary restraint," or "permission"—which terms are all expressive of the same thing from different points of view—was strictly limited to the sphere of *action*, and had nothing to do with the sphere of *knowledge*. And, therefore, whether English theologians do or do not repeat what the Fathers of old said from the "quiescence" point of view, no inference can justly be drawn from their doing so, in favour of their supporting a limitation in the sphere of, or in relation to, knowledge.

It will be right, however, to see what our greatest English theologians do say as bearing upon these points. Let us begin with the truly great man—great alike in erudition and in judgment—whose life extended over the latter half of the sixteenth century, to whom, therefore, the new views of the Continental reformers could not have been unknown.

HOOKER, without actually referring to Phil. ii. 7, shows very plainly how he must have understood it. Of the three questions which he handles in such a masterly manner, and with such solemn dignity, in the fiftieth and following chapters of the Fifth Book of his Ecclesiastical Polity, viz. How God is in Christ, How Christ is in us, and How the Sacraments do serve to make us partakers of Christ, the first question is one which naturally led him to show how he would have answered had he been directly questioned about the passage. For he insists[1] that "this admirable union of God with man could enforce in that higher nature no alteration;" that the Word being made flesh continued "in all qualities or properties of nature the same it was, because the incarnation of the Son of God consisteth *merely in the union* of natures, which union doth add perfection

[1] *Eccles. Pol.* V. liv. 4, 5, vol. ii. p. 233 *sq.*, ed. Keble.

to the weaker, to the nobler no alteration at all;" that "our nature hath in no respect changed His"; that "the Son of God, by His incarnation, hath changed the manner of that personal subsistence which before was solitary, and is now in the association of flesh," but that "no alteration thereby accrued to the nature of God." And whilst he speaks in this manner himself, he refers[1] to the language used by Tertullian, St. Leo, Theophilus of Alexandria, St. Hilary, and Theodoret, in support of his statements, evidently meaning to identify himself with the general Patristic view to which their words refer.

It is impossible to suppose that he who could so speak could have thought that any internal self-emptying was intended by St. Paul, such as, with a rather question-begging application of the words ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, we are now invited to believe.

Hooker refers a little further on to the words of St. Irenæus respecting the "quiescence."[2] He speaks of the beams of Deity at times restraining, at times enlarging, themselves. He explains the principle determining this as being the requirements of the parts, degrees, and offices of the mystical administration which our Lord voluntarily undertook to fulfil. He therefore recognizes that the "quiescence" had a real place in the sphere of action. But he says not a word from which it could be inferred that he thought that the "quiescence" had anything to do with the relation of the natures to each other in the sphere of their union, so as to produce a "limitation" of either in itself. Nor could he have thought — and he certainly does not say—that the "quiescence" did or could apply to the sphere of knowledge, since he expressly ascribes to our Lord's soul knowledge approaching to universal as nearly as the structural limits of a finite nature allowed. Infinite knowledge peculiar to Deity our Lord's soul, because it was a human soul, was, he said, incapable of. But he saw no limit to what it received, except the limit of its own capacity.

[1] Note 17, p. 234, Keble. [2] *E. P.*, V. liv. 6, note 23, p. 236, Keble.

Bishop ANDREWES (1555–1626) shows in various passages of his sermons what he took the κένωσις to be. Speaking of the greatness of our Lord's love shown in the Incarnation, he says, "Love only did it. *Quid sit, possit, debeat, non recipit jus amoris,* 'That only cares not for any *exinanivit,* any *humiliavit se,* any emptying, humbling, loss of reputation.'"[1] It is clear that he considers *humiliavit se* to be equivalent to *exinanivit,* and "humbling, loss of reputation," to express the nature of the "emptying." In another place he says that by our Lord's "emptying Himself" the measure of His *abasing* was pressed down.[2] In another he contrasts our Lord's ἐκένωσε with the puffing up of our first parents.[3] In another he quotes St. Leo's *nostra auxit, sua non minuit; nec Sacramentum pietatis detrimentum Deitatis.*[4]

Dr. THOMAS JACKSON (1579–1640), the learned and profound President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and Dean of Peterborough, deals expressly with Phil. ii. 7 in the opening chapter of the VIIIth Book of his Commentaries on the Creed.[5] The object of the chapter is to show "in what sense the Son of God is said to have humbled Himself," and the author takes Phil. ii. 5–7 as a passage in which the Humiliation of our Lord, as he was and is the Son of God, is the matter explained. For, he says, "that *exinanition,* or nullifying of Himself, mentioned by our Apostle (Phil. ii. 7), did not take its beginning from or in the manhood, but in and from the Divine Person of the Son of God. For it was no physical passion, or natural affection, no passion at all, either natural, or supernatural, yet a true and proper Humiliation more than civil, *though better resembled by Humiliation civil than by natural.*" (The words italicised show plainly enough what kind of humiliation Dr. Jackson has in mind.) In the next paragraph he says, "He was so in the *form* of God, or so truly God, *that He thought it no robbery* (no

[1] Sixth Serm. on the Nativity: *Works,* vol. i. p. 93, Anglo-Cath. Lib.
[2] Serm. iv. on the Nativ., vol. i. 52, A. C. L.
[3] Serm. xii. on the Nativ., vol. i. 206.
[4] Serm. vi. on the Nativ., vol. i. 91.
[5] *Works,* vol. ii. 764, fol. ed., 1673.

usurpation of any dignity which was not His own by right of nature) to account Himself equal with God. It was no robbery so to account Himself, because He knew Himself so to be. Yet, saith the Apostle, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, *He did* (as it were) *empty* Himself, or sequester this His greatness, and became less, or lower than the sons of men, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, by taking upon Him the essential state or condition of a servant: being first made substantially man, that He might be for a time essentially and formally a servant."

When with this passage is compared what Dr. Jackson says in Book xi. ch. ii.,[1] it becomes perfectly clear that he contemplated no emptying of the internal glory or attributes of our Lord's Godhead, but of its external glory only. For in the latter place he says that the humiliation and exaltation of our Lord were really such and were really attributed to Him, but "without any real alteration, or internal change, either in His Divine nature, or Person. His Divine Person was not lessened *in itself* by His humiliation; nor was it augmented *in itself* by His exaltation. And yet it was really humbled, and really exalted." With this absence of alteration or internal change in our Lord's *Divine* nature, he proceeds to contrast the true and real change in itself which His *human* nature underwent in His exaltation, when it was covered with immortality and with endless glory and majesty. This was a "real alteration and internal change." The other was not.

Bishop HALL (1574–1656), in his paraphrase of Phil. ii. 7, says that our Lord "voluntarily humbled and abased Himself."[2] Speaking on the same subject in another place, he adds these cautionary words: "Not leaving what Thou hadst, and what Thou wast."[3] And again:[4] "O the height and depth of this super-celestial mystery; that the Infinite Deity and finite flesh should meet in one subject! Yet so,

[1] *Works*, vol. iii. 319.
[2] "Paraphrase on Hard Texts," *Works*, vol. iv. 403. London, 1808.
[3] "The Soul's Farewell to Earth," § vi. *Works*, vol. vi. 407.
[4] "Great Mystery of Godliness," § ii. *Works*, vol. vi. 427 *sq.*

as the Humanity should not be absorbed of the Godhead, *nor the Godhead coarcted by the Humanity.*"

HAMMOND (1605–1660), in his paraphrase of Phil. ii. 7 and in his notes upon the passage,[1] uses several different words to express the meaning of ἐκένωσε, his intention being clearly to convey that by that word was meant an external humiliation, not an internal change. For although he says that κενόω means to *lessen, diminish*, yet, since he gives as synonyms to *humble*, and to *vilify*, it is clear that what he contemplated was what alone these verbs could properly be applied to, that is to say, the emptying or laying aside of external glory and reputation.

FRANK (1613–1664), in a sermon on 2 Cor. viii. 9, interprets that text and Phil. ii. 7 as follows: "πλούσιος ὤν for all that it is, he continued rich still, though he was poor; he could not lose his infinity of riches, though he took on his poverty; quitted not his *Deity*, though he covered it with the rags of his humanity."[2]

"Indeed the riches of the Godhead, that is, all riches indeed dwell all in him; though he became man, he left not to be God, our rags only covered the Robes of the Divinity, his poverty only served for a veil to cover those unspeakable riches. . . .

"He that being in the form of God thought it no robbery to be equal with God, even whilst he was so, made himself of no reputation, of as low a rank as could be; and being the brightness of his Father's Glory, the express image of his person, and upholding all things with the word of his power, veils all this glory, darkens all this brightness, conceals all this power under the infirmities and necessities of flesh and poverty, yet only veils all this great riches, hides and lays it up for us, that through his poverty we might be rich."[3]

Bishop PEARSON (1612–1686) observes that our translation of Phil. ii. 7 "is not only not exact, but very

[1] *Works*, vol. iii. 638, 640, fol. London, 1689.
[2] *Sermons*, p. 111, fol. London, 1672. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

disadvantageous to that truth which is contained in it. For we read it thus: *He made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men.* Where we have two copulative conjunctions, neither of which is in the original text, and three distinct propositions, without any dependence of one upon the other; whereas all the words together are but an expression of *Christ's* exinanition, with an explication showing in what it consisteth: which will clearly appear by this literal translation, *But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.* Where if any man doubt how Christ 'emptied himself' the text will satisfy him, *by taking the form of a servant . . .* so *his exinanition consisted in the assumption of the form of a servant,* and that in the nature of man."[1] The words italicised in the last clause, following upon the previous explanation of the text, make it abundantly clear that Bishop Pearson thought any other explanation of the κένωσις than its being simply a mode of expressing the act of incarnation, so as to bring out the lowliness of the Incarnate Saviour, was contrary to the terms used by the Apostle.

Bishop BULL (1634–1710) speaks about the meaning of the κένωσις in more than one passage of his *Defence of the Nicene Faith concerning our Lord's Consubstantiality with the Father,* and in his *Primitive Tradition* on the same subject. He compares[2] Phil. ii. 7 with a remarkable passage in St. Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthian Church.[3] St.

[1] *On the Creed,* p. 122 (229 *sq.*, ed. Chevallier, Cambridge, 1849). Cf. p. 187: "The conjunction with humanity could put no imperfection upon the Divinity; nor can that infinite nature by any external acquisition be any way changed in its intrinsical and essential perfections." And p. 188: "For although the human nature was conjoined to the divine, yet it suffered as much as if it had been alone; and the divine as little suffered, as if it had not been conjoined; because each kept their respective properties distinct, without the least confusion in their most intimate conjunction."

[2] Bull, *Def. Fid. Nic.* II. iii. 4, vol. v. P. I. p. 136 *sq.*, ed. Burton, Oxford, 1827.

[3] S. Clem. Rom., *ad Cor.* c. xvi. Bishop Lightfoot also says (note *ad loc.*) that "this application of our Lord's example bears a resemblance to Phil. ii. 5 *sq.*, and may be an echo of it." The translation given in the text is his.

Clement is exhorting to humility, and points to our Lord as the great pattern of it. "The sceptre [of the majesty] of God, even our Lord Jesus Christ, came not in the pomp of arrogance or of pride, though He might have done so, but in lowliness of mind, according as the Holy Spirit spake concerning Him." He then proceeds to quote Isaiah liii. Bishop Bull takes the expressions of St. Clement one by one, and shows their correspondence with the expressions used by St. Paul. "*Denique*," he says, "*Pauli ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν idem manifeste est, quod Clementis ἐταπεινοφρόνησε.*" Bishop Bull therefore was of opinion that St. Paul meant to say that our Lord emptied Himself of His *external* glory (not of anything internal to Himself), and so came "in lowliness." Together with the passage from St. Clement's Epistle, Bishop Bull also compares a passage of St. Justin Martyr with the expressions of St. Paul.[1] In this passage Justin, after describing in lofty terms the majesty and creative power of the Saviour Who was sent, goes on to describe the manner in which He, being in majesty such as He was, came to us. Was it, as might have been expected, *ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, καὶ φόβῳ, καὶ καταπλήξει; οὐ μενοῦν· ἀλλ' ἐν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ πραΰτητι.* Just as St. Clement contrasts our Lord's real manner of coming with the "pomp" with which it would have been, as it were, natural for Him to have appeared, so does St. Justin contrast the fear and astonishment with which His appearance in the awful majesty of the Godhead would have been witnessed, with the reception accorded to His actual appearance in lowliness and meekness. St. Paul's meaning, Bishop Bull says, is in accordance with that of both these early Fathers.

In a passage in another work[2] Bishop Bull weighs carefully each clause of Phil. ii. 6, 7. Respecting the meaning of *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*, he says it is equivalent to "*eam cum*

[1] Bull, *Def. F. D.*, II. iv. 7, vol. v. P. I. pp. 190–194, quoting S. Just., *Ad Diogn.*, § 7.

[2] *Prim. Trad.*, vi. §§ 19–22. *Works*, vol. vi. 346-353. The passages quoted are on p. 347 and p. 349, and the extract from Jackson on p. 352 *sq.*

Deo æqualitatem sibi non assumpsit, non ut Deum sese gessit, non id palam patefecit, ab ostentatione et gloria alienus; sed sua sponte se demisit humiliavitque servi formam assumens." And again, "*Si quæris, quomodo Christus seipsum exinanivit? respondet apostolus* 'servi formam accipiens.'" Further, Bishop Bull quotes in this connection, and with great approval, what Dr. Thomas Jackson says in the Eleventh Book of his *Commentaries on the Apostles' Creed*, part of which has been cited above.

Not only, therefore, is the opinion of Bishop Bull quite clear, but, by his linking it with the views of St. Clement of Rome and St. Justin Martyr among the Early Fathers, and with Dr. Thomas Jackson amongst English divines, it is evident that he regarded this interpretation as *the* one which was sanctioned by both, and that he knew no other which was sanctioned by either.

Bishop BEVERIDGE[1] (1638–1708) expresses his own opinion respecting the nature of the κένωσις in the words of the Fathers. There are in them, he observes, many expressions showing that our Lord was "as perfectly both God and Man after, as He was God and not man before, His Incarnation." And he quotes St. Basil, St. Athanasius, and St. Epiphanius amongst the Greeks, and St. Augustine, St. Hilary, and St. Leo amongst the Latins, to this effect. He expresses his mind somewhat more fully on this point in his *Private Thoughts on Religion*,[2] and an important observation which he makes shows emphatically in what light he regarded our Lord after the Incarnation. For, he says, "to speak precisely, it was not the Divine Person *abstracted or distinct from the Divine nature*, but it was the Divine nature in that Person which thus took upon it the human."[3] That which is indicated in this observation shows how impossible it was for our Lord as God to be in any respect

[1] Beveridge, *On the Articles*. *Works*, vol. vii. 85 note. Oxford, 1845.

[2] *Works*, vol. viii. 170.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 168. This form of expression reminds one of St. Cyril's μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη. Compare, as furnishing a necessary qualification, what has been said above, p. 168.

different after the Incarnation from what He was before. Because, whilst in our composite being separation between nature or parts of the nature and the Person is quite possible, in the uncompounded Godhead no such thing can be. To say that God *possesses* what in our thoughts we regard as His, is an inadequate mode of expression. God *is what He is.* And that "*is*" excludes altogether the possibility of separation or change or limitation.

Waterland (1683–1740) furnishes evidence of especial value, not only on account of his extensive learning, but also because of the very deliberate and careful examination which he bestowed upon this subject. The fifth of his Moyer Lectures is devoted to the consideration of Phil. ii. 5–11. The sixth and seventh lectures contain much which bears more or less directly upon the question of the κένωσις. And in other parts of his writings there is ample material to show not only his own opinion, but also what he regarded as being the judgment of antiquity, and of the Church in more modern times, upon it. What his own opinion was, the following words sufficiently prove: "When our Lord is said to have 'made Himself of no reputation,' or to have *emptied Himself*, which signifies much the same, we are not to suppose that He lost anything which He had before, or that He ceased to be in the *form of God* by taking on Him the *form of man.* No; He had the same *essential* glory, the same *real* dignity, He ever had, but among men concealed it; appeared not in majesty and glory like to God, but divested Himself of every dazzling appearance, and every outward mark of majesty and greatness. . . . In this sense it is that our Lord *emptied* Himself. He came not with any pomp and ostentation of greatness; He laid aside His Godlike majesty, and disrobed Himself, as it were, of all outward glories."[1] The stress laid in this passage on the word "*outward*" is unmistakable. Waterland utterly rejects the idea of our Lord's having emptied Himself of anything internal to His Being. He

[1] Waterland, *Works*, vol. ii. 111, 112, ed. Van Mildert, 3rd ed., Oxford, 1856.

emptied Himself indeed of something; but when it is asked whether that something was internal or external, he answers unhesitatingly, "It was the external glory, the visible manifestation of His Divine majesty, and it was nothing more."

What Waterland would have thought and said of any such theory as that which has been put forth in recent times on the Continent, and which, in a less offensive form indeed, has received some countenance even in England, may be seen from the following observation:[1] "A late writer acquaints us, in the name of Dr. Clarke and the Arians, (I presume, without their leave,) 'that the Word really emptied itself, and became like the rational soul of another man, which is limited by the bodily organs, and is, in a manner, dormant in infancy; and that the Word may be deprived of its former extraordinary abilities—in reality, and grow in wisdom, as others do.' This" (continues Waterland) "is making the Λόγος, that greatest and best of beings, (upon the Arian scheme,) next to God Himself, become a child in understanding, though once wise enough to frame and govern the whole universe. The author calls it, (I think very profanely,) 'the true and great mystery of godliness, God manifest in flesh.' One would think, instead of *manifest*, it should have been *confined*, *locked up* in flesh, which is the author's own interpretation of this mystery."

If, then, these ten divines, whose opinions upon the nature of the κένωσις and the interpretation of Phil. ii. 7 have now been recited, may be regarded as truly representing the mind of the Church of England, and as trustworthy witnesses of what doctrines had and what had not any place in the Church Catholic during the times in which they successively lived, it is clear that for two centuries following the epoch of the Reformation the views which have come into fashion in our own later times were either unknown or, if anywhere suggested, were utterly repudiated.

[1] Waterland, *Works*, vol. i. 332, note *m*.

It may possibly be said that the divines chosen belong chiefly, if not altogether, to one school of theology. As witnesses they are not, however, the worse for that. And they were men of such extensive learning and observation that no views which obtained any currency anywhere were at all likely to have escaped them. If theologians of another school had interpreted Phil. ii. 7 differently, or if they had suggested that the κένωσις implied some sort of limitation of our Lord's Godhead, or that Irenæus's principle of the "Quiescence of the Logos" must or might be stretched to imply restraint of knowledge as well as restraint of action, it is in the highest degree improbable that men like Hooker, or Andrewes, or Pearson, or Bull, or Waterland, would not have taken note of it.

But, in point of fact, it would be easy to enlarge the list of witnesses from writers belonging to other schools. Bishop Jewel, for example, whose name will always be venerated in the Church of England for his *Apologia*, translates ἐκένωσεν, or the Vulgate *exinanivit*, by "made Himself of no reputation."[1]

Bishop Latimer, a little earlier, in a sermon on St. Luke xxi. 25–28, shows, in very clear and definite terms, what his view was. Speaking of the hour or moment of the Great Day, he says, "Neither did Christ Himself know it as He was Man; but as He is God He knoweth all things; nothing can be hid from Him, as He saith Himself: *Pater commonstrat mihi omnia*, 'The Father sheweth Me all things.' Therefore His knowledge is infinite, else He were not very God. But as concerning His Manhood, He knew not that time; for He was a very natural man, sin excepted: therefore like as He was content to suffer heat and cold, to be weary and hungry; like as He was content to suffer such things, so He was content, as concerning His Manhood, to be ignorant of that day. He had perfect knowledge to do

[1] See, for example, *Treatise of Holy Scripture*, p. 42; *Sermons*, p. 257; and compare *Reply to Harding*, p. 246, and p. 301 (fol. 1611), which will be found to place Bishop Jewel's meaning out of doubt.

His Father's commission, to instruct us, and teach us the way to Heaven; but it was not His commission to tell us the hour of this day. Therefore He knew not this day, to tell us of it anything, as concerning when it should be. For as far forth as ignorance is a painful thing unto man, so far forth He was content to be ignorant; like as He did suffer other things."[1] It is evident that English Divines, in the sixteenth century, had neither adopted the Lutheran view, nor any resembling the recently propounded construction of Phil. ii. 7.

Archbishop Tillotson, who, as a forerunner of what is now known as the Broad School of Theology, was more likely perhaps than any other English Divine to have caught up a new idea of this kind, speaks in fact of Phil. ii. 7 in much the same way as his contemporaries, Beveridge or Waterland, did.[2] In short, if there have been any English Divines previous to the present century who have given any sort of sanction to theories maintaining any limitation whatever of the Godhead itself in Jesus Christ our Lord—as distinguished from restraint of the Divine action or voluntary withdrawal of protection in certain respects and for certain purposes—the present writer can only say that he cannot guess who they can be.

III. The Nineteenth Century.

Before the middle of the present century a theory respecting the κένωσις had appeared in Germany which presented as its main principle that which heretofore had been regarded as impossible and even monstrous. The theory had many forms, and was shaped very differently in the hands of its various advocates. But these numerous modifications had one feature common to them all. They all moved, as it were,

[1] *Remains of Bishop Latimer* (Parker Soc.), p. 45.

[2] Tillotson, *Serm.* xliv., "Concerning the Divinity of our Blessed Saviour." *Works*, p. 525, fol. Lond., 1701.

round one centre. This was the idea that the "self-emptying" spoken of in Phil. ii. 7 was concerned with that which was *internal* to the Divine Being and Godhead of our Lord, and not with His *external* glory only. Hitherto this idea had never obtained a footing in any part of the Church. It had always been condemned, as was remarked by Dorner, as a monstrosity. Now, however, it began to be regarded differently. The idea was taken up by writers belonging both to the Lutherans and to the Reformed. On the Lutheran side the principal advocates of it were Thomasius, Liebner, Gess, Von Hofmann, Kahnis, Delitzsch, Schöberlein, Kübel. On the Reformed side there were Lange, Ebrard, Godet, and Pressensé. Others there were belonging to other countries, Goodwin and Crosby in America, and even Martensen in Denmark, though his views were characterized by more caution.[1]

It is not easy to say how so great a change of thought came about. That it was due to some extent to the Pantheistic philosophy of Hegel there can be no doubt. The philosophic and rationalizing movements of the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth had a double effect. They contributed largely towards the collapse of much which had been regarded as Orthodox Lutheranism and Orthodox Calvinism: and, on the other hand, they opened the way for new constructive efforts. Besides these influences there was another of a different kind, traceable principally, as Dr. Schaff points out, to the writings of Schleiermacher and of Rothe, the effect of which was to throw a very strong light upon our Lord's Humanity—upon its ideal perfection, and its manifestation (not, however, personal, but moral) of God in that ideal perfection. It was not the unique Being, the Very God and Very Man of the Gospels; but a man of ideal perfection, presenting in himself

[1] See Schaff's Art. "Christology:" *Schaff-Herzog Encyclop.*, vol. i. 463. The latter part of this article gives an excellent summary of modern Kenotic views, and several facts and particulars have been derived from it, for which the writer desires to express his obligations.

a moral manifestation of God, whom these writers depicted. Whatever else this representation included, it threw a vivid light upon our Lord's moral perfection, and directed attention strongly to it.

Thus these combined influences seem, besides breaking down previous conceptions, to have had these results: they led the way, on the one hand, to a tampering with the unchangeable and absolute oneness of the Divine Nature, which had never before been attempted; and, on the other hand, to an exaggerated estimate of what was required in order to give free and unfettered scope to the perfect development of our Lord's Humanity.

Consideration of the various theories which were framed upon the hypothesis that some emptying of the Godhead was required in order to make the union of God with man in Christ possible, or in order to allow sufficient scope for the development of the Humanity, seems to show that this description of the genesis of the theory is not without justification. Thus *Thomasius* supposes that our Lord, as God, ceased to be omnipotent, omnipresent, and especially omniscient. For he thought that the infinite consciousness and the human consciousness were incompatible; that the former would transcend and outreach the latter, and that from this a double personality would result. But Thomasius supposes that our Lord retained the Divine attributes of truth, holiness, and love. *Gess* goes further. He "carries the Kenosis to the extent of a suspension of self-consciousness and will." *Delitzsch*[1] stops short of will. He regards "the primitive ground of the Godhead" as being "a will originating by nothing, infinite, and conceiving itself." He thinks that the Eternal Son, "without foregoing Himself, might withdraw Himself to this lowest basis—this radical potentiality—this all-determining ground and origin of His nature." *Godet* makes the abandonment of the Divine consciousness essential to the abandonment of other Divine attributes.

It must not be supposed that all this passed without

[1] Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, p. 384 *sq.*

protest. Brömel, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others, and especially Dorner, strongly opposed these views. The unchangeableness of God was the ground taken by Dorner. In 1856 and 1858 he published in the periodical founded by himself, the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, essays[1] on this subject which were felt to be of great weight. Delitzsch, for example, though he did not answer them, admitted that they required full examination.

The theory which was put forward by Dorner himself —since, without being a theory of the κένωσις, it stands in close connection with it—must not be passed over altogether without notice. In the concluding paragraph of the Introduction to his *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Dorner indicates what he conceived to be the still unsolved problem connected with this subject. "The *third* epoch," he says, "which begins with the present century, has to do with the problem—to cognize the Person of Christ as the unity of the Divine and the human, in the equipoise and distinction of both sides."[2] Dorner, here as elsewhere, seems to use the term "person" not in its strict sense, but according to the looser meaning of the more general term "personality." Dr. Schaff describes Dorner's view as being "the theory of a GRADUAL or PROGRESSIVE incarnation." If such terms are to be used at all, it is obvious that they must be used with reference to the Personality of Christ, meaning thereby all that Christ, as God-Man, is; and that they cannot be applied, strictly speaking, to His Person. For it was no other Person than the Son of God Who became Man, and His Person, as such, was and is always and absolutely the same, after as well as before the Incarnation. He was made Man at the moment of the Incarnation, and He could not be made more so by any development of the nature which He assumed to

[1] They were afterwards included in his *Gesammelte Schriften auf dem Gebiet der Systematischen Theologie, Exegese, und Geschichte.* Berlin, 1883. See *Supplement to Schaff-Herzog Encyclop.*, p. 58.

[2] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. I., vol. i., Introd., p. 84. E.T.

Himself. What Dorner seems to have in contemplation is the relation of the human nature towards the Divine, and of the Divine nature towards the human, in Him Who as Christ is God and Man. There are few but will be ready to admit that the relation between the humanity and the Divinity of our Lord at the time of the Ascension was not the same precisely as it was at the time of His birth. He was indeed as perfectly God and perfectly Man at His Birth as He was at His Ascension. But between these epochs there was not only place for the natural and proper development of His Manhood in itself, but there was also place for that Manhood's receiving from the Godhead, with which in an ineffable union it was joined in the Person of our Lord, the communication of all such supernatural gifts and privileges as, without ceasing to be Manhood perfect and true, it was capable of receiving. During the period of humiliation, the work which the Incarnate Saviour came to fulfil may have prevented that communication being as complete and full as, on the first condition alone (viz. of the Manhood's continuing in its essentials unaltered), might have been possible. But even within the limits prescribed by these two conditions, it is evident that what the Humanity may have received may well have been far beyond what our feeble understandings can comprehend; and this implies that, although the Person in itself was absolutely unaltered, the mutual relation of the Natures towards each other and, consequently, towards the Person, had been the subject of a gradual and progressive change. And after the Ascension one of the limiting conditions would no longer have place at all. The work of our Saviour, so far as it belonged to the period of humiliation and was conditioned by its laws, was finished. The other condition still remains, viz. that the Humanity of our Lord, however glorified, should not cease to be Humanity. But if that Humanity, whilst subject to the conditions of this life, was capable of receiving from the Godhead with which it was united more than we can measure, how much more may it not be capable of receiving now that it is set at the Right

Hand of God, in the glory which the Son had with the Father before the world was!

Such seems to be the line of thought which Dorner had in contemplation. Whether it is one in which it is possible to arrive at definite conclusions seems doubtful. But at any rate one condition seems to be indispensable if we are to do so. And that is that a really precise and definite conception of the term "Person" should be framed. Until this is done we may wander in vague mazes of thought without end; and, what is more, premisses may be laid down and conclusions drawn from them, as has often been the case before now, which will land him who follows them in serious error, and yet the reasoning may appear to be without flaw. The Fathers of Chalcedon did not, we may be sure, suppose that, in their definition of faith respecting our Lord's Person and Natures, they had solved entirely the Christological problem. But, probably, we should not be wrong in saying that the Holy Spirit, by Whom, as we believe, according to our Lord's promise, the mind of the Church was at that crisis (as at others) ruled and guided, did intend the broad lines of doctrine which were there laid down to serve for ever as guiding lines, not to be effaced or set aside, but to remain as and how they were drawn, howsoever in later times it might be found possible to fill in, consistently with their preservation, other details of the dogmatic picture.

It does not seem necessary to follow any further the ramifications of Continental Kenotic theories. What it especially concerns us to observe is that the principle upon which those which Hengstenberg and Dorner opposed was based, was one which, since it was first mooted by Beron in the sixth or seventh century, the Church had always with one voice rejected as untenable or even blasphemous. In the controversies of the seventeenth century the idea of an internal self-emptying was indeed suggested, but the subject of it was then supposed to be our Lord in respect of His Manhood. In the nineteenth century it has been for the first time seriously suggested that our Lord was

the subject of the self-emptying even in respect of His Godhead.

Thus there have been three different views taken on this question respecting the nature and meaning of the κένωσις. There is, first, the view which has been always held by the Church, that our Lord, by the very act of becoming Man, emptied Himself of the *external* glories of Deity, His Godhead remaining *in itself* wholly unchanged. There was, secondly, the view that an emptying of what was internal took place—an emptying of Divine attributes and prerogatives, but of these *as supposed to have been bestowed upon our Lord's Humanity* at the time of the Incarnation, His Godhead remaining in itself according to this view, as well as according to that of the Church, wholly unchanged. This was the view held within the Lutheran Communion, but not elsewhere, from the sixteenth until the present century. Lastly, there is the view which, until the present century, has never been seriously entertained, that our Lord emptied Himself as regards His Godhead, not of its external glories merely, but of its internal attributes—according to some, of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Omniscience only—according to others, of Divine Holiness, and Divine Love also—according to some, even of Divine Consciousness and Divine Will. Reformed as well as Lutheran divines have adopted these views, and they have to a certain extent been taken up in America and elsewhere.

In England a few writers appear to have been feeling their way towards some modification of the third view, which, without utterly shocking Christian feeling, would allow of the conclusion that our Lord abandoned some of His Divine attributes, or at least something of their fulness. The writers are not many. No commentator upon the Epistle to the Philippians has adopted that interpretation of the passage upon which the theory is mainly based. The bulk of English theologians, it may be safely said, continue to hold, with the Church in all ages, that the self-emptying was of external

glory only. And one cannot but suspect that those writers who have adopted the other view—and, still more, that far more numerous body of readers and students who have been led to think that "there is something in it"—have done so without having fully faced the facts of the case—the facts of exegesis, of the Gospel record, of history, of philosophy, and of theology, and last, not least, the further conclusions which are sure, sooner or later, to be insisted upon if once a breaking in upon the integrity and immutability of the Godhead should be admitted as in any sort or way a not impossible supposition. The theory is surely of far too important a character to be laid hold of as a buttress to other views. Having regard to its far-reaching consequences, it ought to be tested independently, and tested in every way possible. If it is true, it will abide these tests. If it will not abide them — and to the present writer, at least, it appears to break down under every one—then the sooner this is recognized, the better will it be both for the present and for the future of English theology.

BOOK III.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE GOSPELS.

Preliminary.

In the first book of this Treatise an endeavour was made to investigate the relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His human knowledge, from a psychological point of view. In order to ascertain what this relation might be, we necessarily had to examine and bring into view as fully and clearly as possible the characteristic features, on the one hand, of that manner of knowing which belongs to God only; and, on the other hand, of that circumscribed and limited manner of knowing to which man by his very nature is confined. As regards the Divine manner of knowing, the conclusions which it is possible to form must, from the nature of the case, be mainly negative; but one point of the greatest importance appears to be matter of something like demonstration, viz., that the Omniscience of God differs from knowing after the manner of man, not simply because it is without limit as regards compass and without flaw as regards perfection, but because it is a knowing which is *different in the manner of it* from human knowing. As regards the human manner of knowing, we found it to be demonstrably certain that it is necessarily and structurally subject to limitations, and we found it also possible to ascertain with approximate accuracy what the limitations are. Such being the character of the one and of the other, it becomes apparent that the relation between them might, not improbably, be one of coexistence without coalescence,

and (taking into account the oneness of the Personality of Him in Whom they coexist) of union in separation.

The point of view in the second book was Theological. The psychological examination of the subject in part prepared the way (which was indeed one main purpose of it) for a just estimate of the evidence of Holy Scripture. It did so, at least, so far as this, that it demarcated Divine Omniscience from human knowledge, and gave an approximately definite form to the conception of each. It also showed in what manner the two would coexist if these conceptions of them were correct. But a certain modern theory asserts that they did not coexist, that our Lord laid aside His Divine Omniscience and Consciousness when He became Man. The advocates of this theory endeavour to interpret the statements contained in the Gospels in accordance with their views. It was, therefore, clearly advisable, before placing the theory beside those statements and testing it finally by them, to subject it to examination in other ways, and so to ascertain its real meaning and bearings. In the first book it was shown to be psychologically unnecessary. But had it any theological claims to attention? What was its historical position? Did its roots reach back to the soil of primitive Church antiquity? Or was it a plant of altogether modern growth? If it was not psychologically necessary, and if it had no historical claim to respect, yet was it theologically defensible, was it a possible theory? Until these questions had been answered the way could not be wholly clear. There was also another point requiring investigation from the theological point of view, viz., whether from this point of view any *modification* would be required of the psychological view previously arrived at respecting the relation between Divine Omniscience in our Lord and His human knowledge. Would that view be strengthened when theological as well as psychological considerations were taken into account, or would it have to be in any respect remodelled? These questions have been accordingly dealt with in the second book. What

has been thereby gained as regards the appeal to the evidence of the Gospels—which is, of course, the ultimate test, and which now lies immediately before us—is that we now know better what conceptions we have to deal with, and what is their real character. The psychological investigation conducted us to a certain view. We have not found any reason for setting that view aside in favour of what is called the *kenosis* theory. On the contrary, we have found that this theory has no sound basis—psychological, theological, or historical,—to rest upon. And, on the other hand, the view of the first book has been found to be distinctly confirmed on being looked at from the theological point of view. Having, then, contemplated the whole subject in these various ways, we ought now to be able to see clearly what the Gospel statements are in accord with, what views they exclude, and what conclusions they require. Do they, or do they not, constrain us to conclude that both Divine Omniscience and human consciousness and knowledge were coexistent and present in our Lord during the whole time of His life on earth? Or are they consistent with the view that His consciousness, although embracing, as far as a human consciousness could do so, what was Divine, was a human consciousness only? And, if they constrain us to accept the alternative that our Lord manifested Divine Omniscience as well as human consciousness, are they consistent with that view of the relation between His Divine Omniscience and His human consciousness which has been explained and maintained in this Treatise?

It is the object of the present book to examine the evidence of the Gospels in reference to these particulars. We shall, for clearness sake, consider in successive chapters our Lord's knowledge of God—of Man—of Facts and Events past, present, and future—and of the Old Testament. We shall have to consider also, in a separate chapter, the unique Saying respecting the Day and Hour of the Final Judgment. The points to be kept in view in the three first chapters will evidently be the following. First, whether the knowledge

attributed to our Lord is in such sort unique and beyond the knowledge possible to man, as to make it impossible to regard it as anything but in the strictest sense the knowledge proper to God. Secondly, whether this Divine knowledge or consciousness (if it should be found that the Gospels do give evidence of this) is described in such terms as to prove that it was *present* with our Lord during His earthly life, and could not be regarded as having suffered any sort of interruption in consequence of the Incarnation. If the evidence of the Gospels should be found to establish clearly and decisively these two points, it is manifest that they would then assert a coexistence in some manner of the Divine and the human consciousness or knowledge. It would therefore only remain, thirdly, to determine what light is thrown by their statements upon the nature of that coexistence.

CHAPTER I.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

Two modes of expression are employed in the Gospels in speaking of our Lord's relation of consciousness towards God: it is described as *Knowledge*, and it is expressed also under the figures of *Seeing and Hearing*. The reason of this twofold manner of expression seems sufficiently obvious; for each supplies something which is lacking in the other. To know does not necessarily imply direct and immediate contact with that which is known: but this is exactly that which does belong to seeing and hearing. On the other hand there is not necessarily implied in seeing and hearing, that full comprehension of an object which belongs to the knowledge of it. Thus the two forms of expression supplement each other: the one lays stress upon the immediateness of the relation of consciousness; the other upon its intelligent grasp of that which is before it. The absolute closeness of contact of mind with its objects without the interposition of any medium, could not be more clearly or more directly conveyed—since human forms of speech had of necessity to be employed—than by the images of sight and hearing; and, since there may be seeing and hearing without that mental interpretation and comprehension which is necessary to knowledge, this term is also set beside the figures. And thus we cannot doubt that the consciousness described is both immediate, and complete in comprehension—immediate as sight, complete in all that constitutes knowing.

The chief passages from which we have to ascertain the true character of our Lord's knowledge of God are the following. There is the great passage, contained in St. Matthew[1]

[1] St. Matt. xi. 27; St. Luke x. 22.

and in St. Luke, in which our Lord makes the declaration of this knowledge the foundation of His invitation to all the weary and heavy laden to come to Himself as the One Giver of Rest. He and He alone can give Rest, because He and He alone can reveal the Father; and it is His revelation of the Father which, when we receive it in obedience and humility (ἄρατε τὸν ζυγόν μου ἐφ' ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.), imparts to us our present refreshing, and discloses the vision of the future perfect Rest. The declaration is therefore of the weightiest import; for it is the foundation of the greatest invitation ever made to burdened humanity. Accordingly there is nothing omitted which might add to its weighty significance. It is a knowledge bound up with the delivery of all things by the Father to the Son. It is an incommunicable knowledge belonging to the Father and the Son only—and, of course, to the Holy Spirit with them—which can be shared in its fulness by no created being, but can only be received, through the Son's revelation of it, in proportion to the capacity of each receiver. The connection of the whole passage in St. Matthew (xi. 25–30) is very close; but it is the 27th verse which contains what is of especial importance in reference to the present subject. "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." In the parallel passage of St. Luke (x. 22) there are two significant points of difference. One is "No one knoweth *Who the Son is*, save the Father; and *Who the Father is*, save the Son." The "*Who*" shows that it is not knowledge *about* the Son or the Father, but knowledge of the *essential being* of Each which is intended. The other point is that in St. Luke the word for "*knoweth*" is γινώσκει, whereas in St. Matthew it is ἐπιγινώσκει, "*fully knoweth.*" This shows that the knowledge spoken of differs from what man may have, not in degree only — this might have been concluded if ἐπιγινώσκει had been used in both cases—but in kind.

In the Gospel of St. John our Lord's knowledge of God

is most frequently described as *seeing*. Our Lord does, however, sometimes in St. John speak of His knowledge. In one place He speaks of His knowledge of the Father and the Father's knowledge of Himself as equal—His statement being in this respect similar to and parallel with His declaration in St. Matthew. "As the Father knoweth Me and I know the Father." "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son."[1] The knowledge is in both cases expressly or implicitly described as unique and equal—unique, as confined to the Father and the Son; equal, as being without any difference in the One and in the Other. In two other passages our Lord contrasts His knowing God with the absence of knowing Him on the part of others.[2] And the form of expression which He uses intimates that not only His knowledge in itself, but His manner of knowing is different from that of others—"Ye," He says, "have not *come to know* (ἐγνώκατε) Him. I *know* (οἶδα) Him, because I am from Him," eternally and essentially.

But more frequently in St. John our Lord's knowledge of God is described as a seeing—sometimes of God or of the Father Himself personally, sometimes of the Truth revealed by the Son from Him, sometimes of the works of the Father, which are also the works of the Son: and in place of the seeing, the same fact is sometimes more forcibly expressed by a statement of a *presence with God* from which *seeing*, and that with a perfect vision, must necessarily result. The passages are:—

i. 18. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared *Him*."

iii. 12, 13. "If I told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you heavenly things? And no man hath ascended into heaven, but He that

[1] St. John x. 15; St. Matt. xi. 27.

[2] St. John vii. 28, 29: ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε· ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδα αὐτόν, ὅτι παρ' αὐτοῦ εἰμι. viii. 55: οὐκ ἐγνώκατε αὐτόν, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδα αὐτόν.

descended out of heaven, *even* the Son of Man, which is in heaven.[1]

iii. 31, 32, 35. "He that cometh from heaven is above all. What He hath seen and heard, of that He beareth witness. . . . The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand."

v. 19, 20. "The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing: for what things soever He doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner. For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth."

vi. 46. "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save He which is from God, He hath seen the Father."

vi. 62. "*What* then if ye should behold the Son of Man ascending where He was before?"

viii. 28. "As the Father taught Me, I speak these things."

viii. 38. "I speak these things which I have seen with *My* Father."[2]

viii. 58. "Before Abraham was, I am."

xii. 49, 50. "I spake not from Myself; but the Father which sent Me, He hath given Me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak. And I know that His commandment is life eternal: the things therefore which I speak, even as the Father hath said unto Me, so I speak."

xiii. 3. "*Jesus*, knowing that the Father had given all things into His hands, and that He came forth from God, and goeth unto God."

xiv. 9–11. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father . . . Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? the words that I say unto you I speak not from Myself; but the Father abiding in Me doeth His

[1] On the reading see Westcott, Addit. Note *in loc.* Even if the words "which is in heaven" are a gloss, "the thought which they convey is given" (Westcott observes) "in i. 18."

[2] In his note on this passage Bishop Westcott writes: "The perfect revelation through the Son rests upon perfect and direct knowledge. He speaks to men in virtue of His immediate and open vision of God, which no man could bear (i. 18)." See also his note on iii. 32.

works. Believe Me that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me."

xv. 15. "All things that I have heard from My Father I have made known unto you."

xvi. 15. "All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine: therefore said I, that He [the Holy Ghost] taketh of Mine, and shall declare *it* unto you."

xvii. 7, 8. "Now they know that all things whatsoever Thou hast given Me are from Thee: for the words which Thou gavest Me I have given unto them; and they received *them*, and knew of a truth that I came forth from Thee, and they believed that Thou didst send Me."

xvii. 10. "All things that are Mine are Thine, and Thine are Mine."

xvii. 14. "I have given them Thy word."

xvii. 24. "Father, I will that they also, whom Thou hast given Me, be with Me, where I am."

xvii. 25, 26. "I knew Thee; and these knew that Thou didst send Me; and I made known unto them Thy Name, and will make it known."

It will be seen that *some* of the statements contained in these passages are consistent with the supposition that what is spoken of as being in our Lord, was not Divine Omniscience, but human consciousness only of Divine Omniscience. But it must also be observed that none are inconsistent with the coexistence of both Divine Omniscience and human consciousness: there is nothing in them which negatives or is opposed to this. If, then, some of the statements are inconsistent with any supposition except that of the presence of Divine Omniscience in our Lord, it is evident that the other statements which are not inconsistent with this view but which, taken by themselves, would not have required it, must be interpreted in accordance with it. If, indeed, the supposition could have been admitted that our Lord was at certain times or in certain respects Divinely Omniscient, and at other times or in other respects, not so, it would be admissible to

interpret each class of statements separately, the one class as relating to Divine Omniscience coexisting with human consciousness, the other as relating to human consciousness standing alone. But if it should appear that this supposition is wholly inadmissible, it will then be quite clear that those statements which do not by themselves require the supposition of more than human consciousness, but are quite consistent with the coexistence of Divine Omniscience with human consciousness in our Lord, must be interpreted according to this view, and not as affording evidence of any other, or as placing any difficulty in the way of its acceptance.

Now there are three points which are prominent in these passages, and which seem to enforce with absolute conclusiveness the conviction that what is asserted by or for our Lord is in the strictest sense such knowledge of God as God only has or can have of Himself, that is to say, Divine Omniscience, and that as present in Him—not laid aside, or suspended, or in any way affected or altered by reason of the Incarnation—during his whole earthly life. These points are each, taken separately, of great weight: but when taken together their evidence seems to be irresistible.

The first point is that there is *a marked contrast drawn between what man, as man, cannot see or know, and that which our Lord did see and know.* "No one knoweth the Father, save the Son." "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save He which is from God, He hath seen the Father."[1]

In order to see the full force of this contrast we must note what we are elsewhere told respecting the sight or knowledge of God which *is* possible for man in this life or hereafter. That man may know much *about* God is evident. An intelligent comprehension of all the direct statements contained in Holy Scripture respecting God's nature, His

[1] St. Matt. xi. 27 (St. Luke x. 22); St. John i. 18; vi. 46.

attributes and character, and His relations with His creatures, is plainly within man's power: as far as these statements can be grasped by the understanding, he may evidently take them into his mind; and so far as they can give him knowledge of God, he may know God. And this applies to all God's revelations of Himself either in nature or in His Word. Man may also have to a certain extent *personal* knowledge of God. "The Lord," we read, "spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend."[1] Yet even after this Moses desired much more. He desired the direct and complete vision of God. It was concerning this that God said to him, "Thou canst not see My Face; for there shall no man see Me, and live."[2] This expression, according to Bishop Pearson, does not mean that the sight of God would necessarily bring death to man; but that it is not possible for man *in this life* to see God's face.[3] As far then as the present life is concerned we seem to have the limit of what is possible thus set before us. Bishop Pearson, in what his editor, Archdeacon Churton, truly calls his *lectio aurea* on *The Invisibility of God*, maintains that a comparison of these and other passages of Scripture proves that, whilst much knowledge of God and much which falls short of seeing His Face (in the deepest sense of that expression) is possible for man even here, the direct and complete vision of Him, either through the outward or the inward eye, is in this life not possible. As regards the future life, Bishop Pearson, in common with St. Augustine and other Fathers, and with Aquinas, considers it certain, from the promises made in the New Testament, that a clear vision of God—not by the bodily eye, a supposition which he rejects, but—by the eye of man's inner being, will be granted to the pure in heart. Some difficulty arises from the apparent contradiction between the two classes of passages, the one promising, the other, as

[1] Exod. xxxiii. 11. [2] Exod. v. 20.

[3] Pearson, *Minor Works*, ed. Churton, vol. i. p. 119; "Nemo homo *dum vivit* me videre potest; oculi quibus utuntur vivi, ad me non pertingunt." So St. Augustine, *Epist.* cxlvii. c. 13, says, "hoc modo significante Deo alterius potioris vitæ illam esse visionem."

it seems, denying the possibility of such vision. On the one hand we have these: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." "Now we see in a mirror, darkly: but then face to face." "When He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." "Follow . . . holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord." "They shall see His face."[1] On the other hand these: "Whom no one of men hath seen or can see." "No one hath ever yet (πώποτε) seen God (Θεόν, *i.e.* God in His essential being, the Divine Nature: not τὸν Θεόν)."[2] There are two possible ways of reconciling these apparently opposed declarations. We may either take those which deny the possibility of seeing God as intended to refer wholly to the present life—to which view the use of the word πώποτε in St. John i. 18 may be taken to lend some countenance. Or we may take the seeing which is denied to man to be such seeing as is peculiar to the Persons of the Eternal Trinity, whilst the seeing which is promised is indeed a seeing God as He is, and a seeing which goes beyond anything which is possible in this life, but yet is such only as belongs to created beings, falling indefinitely short of that Vision which the Uncreated Three have of their own Divine Nature.[3] This latter view seems more in accordance with the very express statement in 1 Tim. vi. 16: "Whom no one of men . . . can see." Petavius discusses the subject at length, and believes that in this latter way the similar apparently contradictory statements found in the Fathers may be cleared and reconciled.[4] Bishop Pearson breaks off his Lecture rather abruptly without explaining his mind clearly on this point. From a hint which he drops we

[1] St. Matt. v. 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 St. John iii. 2; Heb. xii. 14; Rev. xxii. 4.

[2] 1 Tim. vi. 16; St. John i. 18.

[3] Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I. xii. 6. Cum dicitur, *Videbimus eum sicuti est;* hoc adverbium, *sicuti*, determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visæ; ut sit sensus, videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est; quia ipsum esse ejus videbimus, quod est ejus essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex parte videntis; ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus vivendi [? videndi], sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.

[4] Petavius, *Theol. Dogm.*, VII. i. 1 *sq.* esp. cc. vi. vii.

may gather that if he had given us his thoughts on the Beatific Vision, as he speaks of intending to do, we should have learnt more of his views not only on this but also on some other points of great interest connected with the subject.

Such being the facts respecting man's sight of God, it will be seen that the contrast which our Lord draws between Himself and others in regard to this matter, might be taken as grounded upon the distinction between Himself, as Man, and all other men, if we were to consider only the seeing God by itself, without regard to the particular manner in which it is spoken of. Our Lord might then have been taken to mean that the Vision of God which was promised to the pure in heart after this life was His already in this life. And, of course, it must be not merely admitted, but maintained, that whatever sight or knowledge of God is any way possible for man under the conditions of the present life, *that* our Lord, as Man, must have had. But the question is whether, besides this, He had not a Divine Vision and knowledge of God such as man, as man, cannot have, and which our Lord Himself could only have as God. And it is to the conclusion that He had this exclusively Divine Vision and Knowledge that the expressions used by or of our Lord, in speaking of the contrast between His vision and His knowledge, and that of others, seem undoubtedly to conduct us. For these expressions seem chosen to *exclude* the idea of human consciousness. It is not said, "No one hath seen God at any time except the Son of Man," or "except Jesus Christ." Had this form of expression or any similar one been employed, it would have been clear that the consciousness intended was human consciousness. But from what is actually said, it seems just as clear that what is meant is a Divine seeing. "The only begotten Son" (or according to a reading of much weight, "the only begotten God") "which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."[1] And so our Lord, speaking at another time of the same fact, instead of using any words which might indicate His

[1] St. John i. 18.

Manhood, describes Himself as "He which is from God," saying, "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save He which is from God, He hath seen the Father." The expression *ὁ ὢν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which could only be used of God the Son,[1] seems to intimate our Lord's being still with (*ὤν*), as well as His having come from, God. And, in like manner, *ἑώρακε*, "hath seen," seems to be equivalent to "hath seen and still sees." Again, He rests His claim to declare "heavenly things" on His descending out of heaven. Now it was not as Man, but as God that He descended out of heaven. Again, in connection with the statement that our Lord's testimony was of what He had actually seen and heard, it is significantly remarked that "He which cometh from above is above all." Why is this said in this connection? Evidently to point out the difference between our Lord's testimony as being that of a Divine witness, Who had seen and heard in that "above" from which He came, and the testimony of one whose seeing and hearing, like that of the Baptist, was received below. Again, why is it so often repeated that all things which the Father hath are the Son's, and were delivered to Him by the Father,—and that in connection with His sayings about His knowledge of God, and about His teaching,—unless it is to show that whatever was in the Father as the Source and Fountain of all—and therefore, of course, of all knowledge—is equally in the Son? All these additional statements are in entire accord with that one in which our Lord points to the impassable chasm which separates the sphere of mutual knowledge in which the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit, dwelling in the Light not to be approached, behold each other with an all-perfect comprehension, from ought in which men or angels can have part. And all seem to show very clearly that, in the contrast which He draws between His sight of God and the absence of such sight in others, the kind of seeing which He means is not a human endowment, but a Divine possession.

[1] Compare the comments of St. Chrysostom and St. Cyril *in loc.*

The second point is the express declaration which our Lord makes that His knowledge of the Father is *commensurate* with the Father's knowledge of Him. This is more than implied in the saying, that "No one knoweth Who the Son is, save the Father; and Who the Father is, save the Son;" and it is expressly stated, being referred to as an established point, when our Lord likens[1] the mutual knowledge of Himself and His sheep—likens, that is to say, not in regard to fulness of comprehension (for this would be contrary to "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father"), but in regard to its reciprocity—to that subsisting between the Father and Himself, in the words, "as the Father knoweth Me, and I know the Father." The fact that our Lord does not seem to be putting forward at the moment the point of equality in knowledge cannot take the statement of this equality out of His words, especially since His previous declaration, that the reciprocity in knowledge between the Father and Himself was such as no created being could share or enter into, had already virtually asserted the equality. At any rate the two statements together place the point out of doubt. Our Lord plainly shows that His knowledge of the Father is equal to the Father's knowledge of Himself. But such knowledge as this is wholly beyond the capacity of human faculties as such, beyond therefore the human consciousness of our Lord Himself as Man.

The third point is *the manner in which our Lord bases His claim that His revelation should be received and believed, upon the character of His knowledge.* His words in St. John xvii. 7, 8, show how much He had at heart to convince the disciples that His whole revelation flowed as it were out of the very fountain-head of the Godhead. "Now," He declares, "they know that all things whatsoever Thou hast given Me are from Thee: for the words which Thou gavest Me I have given unto them; and they received them, and knew of a truth that I came forth from Thee, and they believed that Thou didst send Me." Again and again He

[1] St. John x. 14, 15.

insists that all which He declared He had "*seen with* the Father;"[1] that He spoke only "as the Father taught"[2] Him, only "as the Father gave Him commandment;"[3] that He testified what He had "seen and heard;"[4] that He "could do and say nothing of Himself, but only what He saw the Father doing."[5] Now every Prophet or Messenger from God must take means to convince his hearers that he has been sent by God, and that the message which he brings is a message from God. But Jesus Christ did more than this: He insisted upon His *connection* with God. And why? Plainly because the connection in His case was, as regards both His Person and His Revelation of Truth, unlike theirs. It was more vital, more fundamental, more a part of the Truth itself, instead of being simply a guarantee of it. It was all this because it was more immediate. *His* message was drawn directly and continually, as no other was or could be, out of the very "bosom of the Father." Of none but Jesus Christ could it possibly be said, "The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." His unbroken presence with the Father; His unbroken vision of all that the Father is, and has, and does; His unbroken community both of action and of speech with the Father, so that His words were the words of the Father, and His works the Father's works;—it was this which was the real foundation, as well as a most important part, of all which He revealed; and therefore it was that He laboured so earnestly to bring this home to the minds and hearts of the disciples, since in gaining conviction of this they would virtually receive all, and in His light see light.

These three features of the evidence respecting our Lord's knowledge of God, seem to place it entirely beyond doubt that it is that knowledge which is exclusively Divine, and not such as a human mind may have, which is spoken of. For (1) it is expressly marked off from that which is creaturely; (2) it is declared to be commensurate

[1] St. John viii. 38. [2] St. John viii. 28. [3] St. John xiv. 31.
[4] St. John iii. 32. [5] St. John v. 19, 30.

with the knowledge which God the Father has; (3) it is shown to flow as a Revelation out of the very bosom of the Father.

But it is urged that our Lord may have been referring to a Divine knowledge which was His before the Incarnation, and was then laid aside. He is, we are told, *humanly* conscious only of all which He is, of His Deity and Sonship and office as Messiah. He knows that, previously to His Incarnation, His knowledge was equal to that of the Father, that it was no creaturely knowledge but Divine, that the unseen source whence the Revelation which He makes flows into His human mind, is that eternal Wisdom which was *then* His own. In short, it is urged that the Divine knowledge which the Gospels evidence as belonging to our Lord is not a present fact but one upon which He looks back. He is humanly conscious of His Divine knowledge, and so speaks *of* it; but He does not speak *out* of it.

This is the last resort which the advocates of the Kenotic theory have to fall back upon. That our Lord does speak of Divine knowledge as His is so evident, that it is absolutely necessary to represent it as not being a present knowledge, if the theory is to be in any way maintained.

But how does the case stand? There is, in the first place, the fact that our Lord is very definitely described, and also speaks of Himself, as being, whilst He was upon earth, in heaven. It is not said, "the only begotten Son, which *was* in the bosom of the Father," but "which *is* in the bosom of the Father," ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός. Our Lord does not say, "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man, which *was* in heaven," but "which *is* in heaven." Something may be made of the slight doubtfulness respecting the reading. The last words may be, as Bishop Westcott thinks, a gloss of the second century. But if so, they are, as he also says, a true gloss, conveying what is really in the passage, which, even without these words, states indirectly the presence of the Son of Man, that is, of our Incarnate Lord, in heaven. And when

this and the former passage are taken together, it will be seen that to eliminate this statement from the Gospels is impossible. They plainly assert that our Lord, during His Incarnate life on earth, was still in heaven.[1] Nor can this be referred to the oneness of His Personality, as though He might be said to be in heaven in virtue of that oneness, without being *consciously* present there. For He quite as clearly asserts His conscious presence there. If He says at one time, "I speak the things which *I have seen*[2] (ἑώρακα) with My Father," He says also, "the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He *seeth* (βλέπῃ) the Father doing. For the Father *sheweth* Him (δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ) all things that Himself doeth." Nor can this be regarded as a present tense describing the Divine relation of the Son to the Father without reference to His Incarnate life: for it is added, "and greater works than these will He shew Him;" the word "these" certainly referring to what our Lord did on earth.

This is moreover evidenced very forcibly by our Lord's insisting so strongly, as has been already noticed, upon the *continuity* of His revelation of the Truth with its Source. "All that I reveal to you comes," He virtually says, "*directly* from the bosom of the Father." The whole stress of His argument lies in the revelation resting upon a *present* sight of God. An *interpretation*, indeed, it necessarily was—such seems to be the force of the verb ἐξηγήσατο in St. John i. 18—an interpretation, because that Divine Truth which was declared was such as no mortal could directly look upon, which therefore had to be conveyed through our Lord's human consciousness, and expressed and shown in such ways and such language as man could comprehend, but an interpretation deriving both its vital reality and its force of conviction from the fact that He Who gave it was all the while "in the bosom of the Father," and Who being on earth could still

[1] Cf. St. John xiv. 3: "I *will* receive you unto Myself that where I *am* (ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγώ), there ye may be also."

[2] Bishop Westcott, on St. John iii. 32, remarks that ἑώρακεν there belongs to the *existence*, as ἥκουσεν to the mission, of the Son.

say—thus revealing plainly the plenitude of His Divine consciousness—"before Abraham was, I AM."

Respecting our Lord's knowledge of God we are, therefore, not only justified in maintaining that it was such knowledge as God only can have of Himself; but, if we would be faithful to the Gospel record, we *must* maintain that this, and nothing less than this, is what that record asserts as being His. And, moreover, we must on the same ground maintain that this knowledge was present with our Lord all through His earthly life. Like everything belonging to our Lord's Godhead, it was concealed behind the veil of His humanity. It could not be openly revealed, though it could be and was openly asserted by our Lord. That it could not be openly revealed is evident, for the human mind can neither receive into itself the fulness of the Divine mind, nor enter into or comprehend that manner of knowing which is proper to God. It has been before pointed out that the Divine knowing includes the comprehension (1) of all that God is in Himself, (2) of all that He has called into being, (3) of all His counsels with regard to all His creatures, (4) of all which is in the consciousness of any of His creatures, (5) of all which, not having been called into being, might exist, if He willed it—that is to say, all which could possibly exist, or be known. Each of these divisions contains, as will be seen, a vast deep unfathomable by any but God. And as the sum of what God knows is thus utterly and wholly beyond the grasp of the mind of man, so too is that all-embracing intuition with which God sees all at once (His gaze being above, and beneath, and around, all eternally, and penetrating the whole in every part to the minutest detail), no less removed, as regards the manner of knowing, from any thing of which man has experience.

This was indeed "light not to be approached."[1] That it was in our Lord, behind the veil of His humanity and encompassing it, could only be proclaimed in words. Consequently, what the Gospels give us is the expression of the fact as

[1] 1 Tim. vi. 16.

realized by our Lord's human consciousness, and stated in human language. This has been construed by Godet and some advocates of the *kenosis* theory, as though *all* that was put before us in the Gospels was our Lord's human consciousness of Divine Omniscience as a reality of His pre-incarnate, not of His earthly, life. They thus endeavour to rid themselves of what is, of course, a fatal obstacle to their theory. Careless readers may perhaps be content to accept the interpretation thus suggested. But when the expressions of the sacred text are fully considered, it does seem simply impossible to doubt that our Lord solemnly claims Divine Omniscience in the fullest sense as His own *present* possession. And if it was His at the time when He gave His invitation to all the weary to receive His revelation and promise of Rest, it was His certainly all through His Incarnate Life. For what reason—except the exigencies of the *kenosis* theory—could possibly be assigned for its being otherwise? It was not *a part of*, but stood *apart from*, His human consciousness. It coexisted with that consciousness, but did not interfere with any of its natural stages of development and growth. What the human consciousness at any period of our Lord's earthly life received from it, was only what a human consciousness might receive without its essential nature and structure as *human* consciousness being in any way touched or impaired thereby.

This, it will be remembered, is what seemed to be a true psychological explanation of the coexistence of Divine Omniscience and human consciousness when, in the first book, we examined each in detail. And we now see that the Gospel record does corroborate this view. It does so because it bears distinct testimony to the coexistence of both Divine Omniscience and human consciousness in our Lord at each moment of His earthly life. For the knowledge and sight of God which he asserts as His is, if the expression may be permitted, Divine Omniscience at its highest. Not of course that Divine Omniscience can ever be less than the highest. It must be for ever perfect and

unchangeable—neither to be added to nor taken from. But the knowledge of which our Lord speaks—knowing the Father with a knowledge equal to that with which the Father knows Him, into the sphere of which knowledge no created being can enter—is, as it were, writ large, as being, in the fullest sense, Divine Omniscience.

Confining ourselves, then, as we have been doing in this chapter, to one province only—the knowledge of God—we find that the Gospels do distinctly testify to the coexistence separately, yet in union (since they belonged to one undivided Person), of Divine Omniscience with a consciousness which was purely and truly human, in our Lord Jesus Christ. Respecting the mode of coexistence, we could not expect to find—at any rate, we do not find—any explanation. What we do find is evidence, clear evidence, of the existence of each in its integrity and completeness. It remains for us to see whether what has been thus ascertained will be found to be corroborated when we examine our Lord's knowledge in the provinces yet untouched, and whether any further light will be thrown upon the whole subject by the evidence of the Gospels respecting them.

One further remark must, however, be made: and it is this. Such knowledge of God as we have found that the Gospels do assert for our Lord—a knowledge which is not such as might find place in a supremely exalted human mind, but which is in the strictest sense proper to God and peculiar to God, being such as no created being can possibly attain to—must, by reason both of its nature and of its object—that object being none other than the Infinite Being, God Himself—be an absolutely all-including knowledge. To know God as God knows Himself must be to know all things. When, then, it has been demonstrated that our Lord, during His life on earth, possessed wholly and at all times that knowledge of God which God alone can have, it at once follows, *ipso facto*, that He was—not in His human mind indeed, but in Himself—in the strictest and most absolute sense of the word, Omniscient. To know God

is to know the Mind of God; and in the Mind of God must be all things without exception whatsoever. If, therefore, there was any particular, such as the Day and Hour of the Judgment, which was not in the possession of our Lord's human mind, it was so simply because He Himself had not communicated it to His human mind. We cannot palter with the word "Omniscience." Omniscience is knowing, and knowing perfectly, and knowing always, *all* that is knowable. Exceptions to it are impossible. If Jesus Christ, being God, knew whilst He was on earth, as He says He did know, God the Father, then He was Omniscient whilst He was on earth; and being Omniscient, *nothing* was hidden from Him as God. The nature of the relation between His Omniscience and His human mind may be a matter of doubt. Respecting the character or the perfection of His Omniscience itself there can be none.

CHAPTER II.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF MAN.

THE gift of insight into character is by no means an uncommon one. Few men who have had to take any considerable part in the world's affairs, or to exercise authority on a large scale, have been devoid of this gift. At any rate few, if any, of the world's greatest have been without it. It might rather be deemed part of the necessary equipment of a great man, a condition essential to success and to a great career.

As a natural endowment, however, the gift of insight into character lies within certain not very wide limits, whose bounds may be easily traced. There is nothing very mysterious about it. It consists mainly in a capacity for interpreting correctly and rapidly the indications of character which are being continually manifested by every one, which, indeed, it is impossible altogether to conceal. It is not the character as a whole which can be thus interpreted; it is only certain features of it. General faithfulness and integrity or trustworthiness, capacity for action of a particular kind, special forms of ability as yet undeveloped, may be discerned by what seems an instinctive, inexplicable intuition, but which is, in reality, probably dependent on the detection of very slight hidden indications, which to the majority of people are indiscernible. But, except as regards these special features, the character remains unknown. No eye of man may penetrate its deeper recesses, in which the real springs of action and of motive are concealed. A large part of the moral environment of every human being consists of what is to him merely matter of habit. Nationality, rank,

social position, mode of life, contribute from without elements which are taken up into the character of each individual. Character has its national folds, its social folds, its professional folds, its family folds. All habitual influences contribute something to it. But the real man is not to be found in these externals of character. Much respecting these may be understood by others—better, perhaps, than by the man himself; much, derived from observation of these externals, may be predicted respecting his probable conduct under given circumstances. But the man is not really seen in these external casings. The shrine is far more inward, where no eye of man can penetrate.

Again, besides the natural gift of insight into character, the Bible shows us instances of a supernatural gift. This resembles the natural gift in some particulars, but in the most important feature it is different. For, unlike the natural gift, it has nothing of the character of inference. It does not gather conclusions from external indications. What is known or revealed by it is not collected from anything; it is known by direct vision. The supernatural gift thus makes some approach towards that which is described as the especial and peculiar prerogative of God—the reading of the heart. "Thou only," it is said, "knowest the hearts of all the children of men."[1] Yet, when the instances recorded in the Bible of the exercise of this supernatural gift are examined, we find that it falls very far short indeed of what belongs peculiarly to God. The gift seems in all cases to be limited to particular occasions, and to the discernment of particular facts or states of mind and heart. God seems never to have given to any a general power of discerning the hearts of all men. Elisha was enabled, on a particular occasion, to follow Gehazi in spirit, and to overwhelm him with the revelation of his baseness. St. Peter, in like manner, was enabled to read the hearts of Ananias and Sapphira. But there is no evidence that either Elisha or St. Peter could read the hearts of those in general

[1] 1 Kings viii. 39 and reff.

with whom they came in contact. If St. Peter had been able to do this, his vacillating conduct, as described in the Epistle to the Galatians, would be inexplicable.[1] The gift of διακρίσεις πνευμάτων, *discernings of spirits*, which St. Paul speaks of[2] as being one of the spiritual gifts which attracted so strongly the wonder and attention of the Christians at Corinth, was, as the plural διακρίσεις shows,[3] not a general power of reading the heart, which could be exercised at will by the possessor on all occasions, but a gift for use solely or chiefly in the assembly, when the gift of προφητεία was being exercised: and its object was to discern those who manifested a true προφητεία, that is to say, who spoke by the Holy Ghost, from those who spoke out of their own heart. It was evidently given for a particular purpose, and its exercise was limited to the occasions when it was needed for that purpose. And, in like manner, the particular exercise of the gift of προφητεία, by which the secrets of the heart of some individual who, not being a Christian, might have come into the Christian assembly, were really laid bare, was not an instance of the προφήτης himself knowing what was in man, but of the Holy Ghost Who spake by him.

These observations respecting whatever among men has at any time shown any approach to a knowledge of the human heart, whether as the result of a natural or supernatural gift, may help us to appreciate what the Gospels show respecting our Lord's knowledge of man. It will be seen that His knowledge was at any rate unlike anything of which an example is presented in the Bible or elsewhere. This will clearly appear if we examine separately the characteristics of it which the Gospels bring before us.

In the first place, let its *universality* be noted. This is stated in express terms, and it appears also in the general course of the Gospel narrative. St. John states[4] expressly that the reason of our Lord's conduct on a certain occasion,

[1] Gal. ii. 11–14.
[2] 1 Cor. xii. 10.
[3] See Bishop Ellicott's note on 1 Cor. xii. 10, and Meyer's.
[4] St. John ii. 23–25.

under circumstances which he describes, was *διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν γινώσκειν πάντας, because He knew all men.* It was on the occasion of our Lord's first Passover (*i.e.* the first of His ministry) at Jerusalem. His miracles made a great impression on those who assembled for the Festival. And in consequence of this many "believed on His name," by which expression seems to be intimated that they recognized Him in some sense as the Messiah, but without any deeper trust in His Person. At any rate, whatever was the exact state of their thoughts and convictions, it was naked and open to the eyes of Him with Whom they had to do. And so the Evangelist goes on to tell us that "Jesus did not commit Himself" (did not trust Himself) "to them, for that He knew all men, and because He needed not that any should testify concerning man, for he of Himself knew habitually what was in man,[1] *αὐτὸς ἐγίνωσκε τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.*" What a picture is this which the Evangelist sets before us! It is quite early in our Lord's ministerial life, at the beginning of what has been called His Early Judæan Ministry. He had not long come forth from the retirement of Nazareth. He is in Jerusalem at the Paschal Festival, "the period[2] at which the city was the theatre on which the whole nation assembled." He is surrounded, therefore, by a large and miscellaneous multitude. And what is His attitude towards them? It is one grounded upon a perfect knowledge of the hearts and motives of all—nay, not merely of all these, but of all mankind, for He knew *τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, in man as man.* This knowledge was not, in Him, an inspiration of the moment, nor a knowledge possessed or exercised at one time and not at another, but an habitual and abiding knowledge (*ἐγίνωσκε*) which was His always. It was not received as a gift, either once for all or on each separate occasion, but it was of Himself and His own—*αὐτὸς ἐγίνωσκε.* What are we to think of a knowledge of man which is so universal in its range, so inwardly penetrating

[1] Cf. St. John vi. 61, *εἰδὼς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅτι γογγύζουσι.*

[2] Godet, *St. John's Gospel*, ii. p. 39, E.T.

in its intuition, so habitual and abiding as to be always available, so independent of inference as to make the word "sight" alone proper to describe it, and so independent of any external aid, whether from heaven or from men, that it could be said that "He of Himself knew habitually or always what was in man"? Godet[1] thinks fit to say that "this higher knowledge of Jesus is the highest degree of the gift of the *discernment of spirits* (1 Cor. xii. 10; 1 John iv. 1)." But the description of it precludes the idea that it was a gift at all. Whether it belonged to our Lord's Manhood or not, it certainly belonged to Him personally, as His own, and not as received from without—*αὐτὸς ἐγίνωσκε*. In no one single point does the description of the one answer to the description of the other. In both cases there is a discernment of spirits; but with this verbal likeness the resemblance ends. What was discerned in the one case and in the other was quite different. In the one it was whether a man was speaking or prophesying by the Spirit of God, or out of his own spirit, or by an evil spirit; in the other it was the inmost character, the springs of action and of motives; not the spirit by which a man spoke, but what was *in* himself. Had it not been that his theory obliged him to shut his eyes to all evidences of Divine Omniscience in our Lord, it is incredible that so acute an observer as Godet should not have seen how wholly unlike this which we read of our Lord is to what is related respecting the spiritual gift and its exercise.

The general statement which St. John makes in this passage respecting the universality of our Lord's knowledge of man receives continual illustration in all the Gospels. Respecting the whole body of our Lord's disciples we read that He knew them from the beginning[2]—knew "who they were that believed not, and who it was that should betray Him." And, again, St. John emphatically repeats on a later occasion that our Lord "knew him that should betray Him."[3]

[1] *Commentary on St. John's Gospel*, vol. ii. p. 41, E.T.
[2] St. John vi. 64. [3] St. John xiii. 11.

The whole narrative of the washing the disciples' feet reveals throughout our Lord's complete knowledge of His Apostles —both of St. Peter and the rest who were true, and of "the traitor Judas." And with this ample proof before us that our Lord was from the first fully acquainted with the character of all who attached themselves to Him as disciples, it is clear that when He continued all night in prayer before appointing the Twelve, it was not for guidance in selecting them that He prayed, but that His prayers were in behalf of those upon whom the weighty responsibility of the Apostolic Office was to rest.

Respecting others than the disciples, respecting the people generally, and more particularly the Pharisees, Sadducees, Priests, and Scribes, there is ample evidence, direct and indirect, that our Lord moved among them knowing and looking into their hearts and thoughts. Sometimes our attention is especially directed to this fact, as, for example, in the account of the healing of the Paralytic who was let down through the roof before Him.[1] There was a particular reason for bringing forward our Lord's knowledge prominently in this instance, viz., because in the narrative the secret cavillings and reasonings of the Scribes and Pharisees "within themselves," "in their hearts," respecting what they deemed our Lord's presumptuous blasphemy in claiming to forgive sins, were described as a principal feature of the whole occurrence. Over against these secret thoughts of theirs is set our Lord's clear and accurate reading of them. St. Matthew says that He *saw* them (ἰδὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν); St. Mark, that He knew *in His spirit* (ἐπιγνοὺς τῷ πνεύματι αὐτοῦ) their reasonings;[2] St. Luke

[1] St. Matt. ix. 2–8; St. Mark ii. 1–12; St. Luke v. 17–26.

[2] Archbishop Trench remarks (*Miracles*, p. 205) that "it is not for nothing that the Lord is said to have perceived '*in his spirit*' what thoughts were stirring in their hearts (Mark ii. 8). His 'soul' was human but his '*spirit*' was Divine; and by this Divine faculty He penetrated, and then laid bare to them, the secret meditations of their hearts." Whilst entirely agreeing with the Archbishop that our Lord did manifest on this, as on other occasions, a power belonging exclusively to Himself as God—He virtually describes it as such when He says (St. Luke xvi. 15), "God, *i.e.* God only, knoweth your

says simply that He knew them. And, as Archbishop Trench observes, our Lord, in His answer to the thoughts which He read, "indicates the exact line in which these were travelling." Similar to this narrative is the account of Simon the Pharisee's thoughts within himself respecting our Lord and the woman that was a sinner. Only, there, St. Luke more succinctly says that He "answered" the thoughts of Simon. Lord Bacon's observation, so often quoted, that our Lord, knowing men's thoughts, answered their thoughts rather than their words, was derived from many similar examples. The Gospels in fact habitually describe our Lord as answering men's thoughts. Together with this must be set His full and accurate delineation of the "hypocrisy" of the Scribes and Pharisees, and His terrible revelation and denunciation of the evil of their inward motives and character, which was so unsuspected by the people generally, and so unknown even to themselves. Had we been reading of any ordinary shrewd judge of character, these denunciations might have been taken as resting upon only unusual acuteness of observation. But, when we look at them in the light of the many express testimonies that our Lord's knowledge was not simply knowledge of mankind, but knowledge of men individually, and such knowledge of the heart as is elsewhere ascribed to God, we cannot but see that His unveiling of the hypocrisy of the Pharisees is rightly to be classed with the other proofs which the Gospels furnish that in the strictest sense He "knew all men."

In the next place observe the *completeness* of our Lord's knowledge of man. The contrast in this respect with natural

hearts"—it seems at least doubtful whether "*in His spirit*" ought to be taken as referring to our Lord's Divinity. He had a human "spirit" as well as a human "soul." It seems, therefore, most probable that His *human* spirit is here meant: but a reference (which is still more clearly marked in the cognate expression *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, *in Himself*), seems to be also made to the very source of the knowledge being in Himself, viz., in His Divine Omniscience, from which communications were made to His human *spirit*—His *spirit*, not His *understanding*, because the *spirit* is, as has been noted above (p. 169), the shrine of the personality, and the nearest of all that is within us to God.

insight or with the restricted perceptions attending upon any supernatural endowment of the like kind of which we have account, is in every way most striking. What we find manifested by our Lord was no partial knowledge; it was not confined to special aspects of character, or to particular facts belonging to single occasions. On the contrary, it was a knowledge of the whole character, embracing both its roots and first beginnings and its growth in the past, and also what it was going to be, not generally only but particularly, in the future. Nothing approaching in completeness to such knowledge as this is to be found elsewhere.

We have already had occasion to observe that it is said respecting our Lord's knowledge of the whole body of His disciples, that it was a knowledge which He had of them "*from the beginning*" (ἐξ ἀρχῆς).[1] The "beginning" may perhaps be the beginning of our Lord's public ministry, the time when the disciples first attached themselves to Him, and when He first accepted and chose them. It was unnecessary to go back further than this. The expression may or may not be meant to refer to our Lord's knowledge of the disciples previous to their coming to him. This was for them "the beginning." Mention is made specially of Judas the traitor, that it might be made clear that our Lord's choice of him as one of the Twelve was not due to any ignorance either of what he was then or of what he would become. That there was a deep mystery in this choice we cannot but feel, but it is a mystery standing altogether apart from the supposition of ignorance on the part of our Lord. Whatever may have been his reasons for choosing Judas, the choice was made with full knowledge from the first of all the fearful evil to which in the end he would give himself up.

Respecting Judas, comparison is naturally suggested with the narrative in the second Book of the Kings about Elisha

[1] St. John vi. 64. ἐξ ἀρχῆς occurs only here and xvi. 4; elsewhere we find ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (St. John xv. 27; 1 St. John ii. 7, 24; iii. 11). May it not be that ἐξ ἀρχῆς refers to the beginning of the disciples' *existence*, and ἀπ' ἀρχῆς to the beginning of their outward association with our Lord as His disciples?

and Hazael.[1] Some correction is required in the renderings of the Authorized Version before we can set before our minds a true picture of what Hazael really was and of what Elisha saw in him and of him. Hazael did not at all shrink, as our Version represents him as doing, from the wickedness which rose up before him at Elisha's words, on account of his steadfast gaze. He only felt that he was but a dog, too insignificant for this great thing—this great good fortune, as it appeared to him. He was even then ripe for the crime. There is no comparison therefore to be made, except in the way of contrast, between Hazael's motives and character, and those of Judas at any early period of his life as one of the Twelve. The contrast is between what Elisha saw at that time in and of Hazael, and what our Lord knew from the beginning about Judas; and, again, between the sources from which the knowledge in each case proceeded. Elisha saw that Hazael was *at that time* capable of the wickedness which he described, and that he would actually do it. What our Lord knew of Judas, at a time when in all probability he had it in him to be a true Apostle, and long before the rest of the Twelve had any suspicion that he was otherwise, was the then all undeveloped mystery of one who would become "a devil." Elisha more than once repeats "the Lord hath showed me:" all that he knew was revealed to him from above. Our Lord, on the contrary, knew and saw all of Himself and in Himself.

The fact is not to be omitted that our attention is somewhat pointedly called to our Lord's fore-knowledge of what His disciples individually would be in the future. In more than one instance He announced this at their first presentation to Him. Thus when Andrew brought his brother Simon, our Lord at once declared what he would be. "Thou[2] shalt be called Cephas," the Rock or Stone. Before he became what this title intimates (and what this was is seen perhaps most clearly in the deep steadfast tone of his Epistles), how much intervened—impulsiveness corrected,

[1] 2 Kings viii. 7–15. See *Speaker's Commentary, in loc.* [2] St. John i. 43.

weakness strengthened, repented falls made the seed plot of deeper and truer love, discipline and reproof and praise all employed to rivet the chief Apostle more firmly on Him in Whom he believed! The help was repeatedly given to St. Peter of learning that what had been unsuspected by himself had been known to his Master—his weakness when he desired to come to Him on the waves of Gennesaret, his faith which was not of flesh and blood and which yet was so far from having at the time of his confession that rocky solidity which afterwards it had, his capability of even denying Him in Whom he professed this faith, and for Whom he believed himself ready to die—at each fit moment the Lord revealed His own clear knowledge of these different elements of his character. One cannot but feel that more was taught by this revelation of knowledge than by any other means, and that the cry of the Apostle, overflowing with penitence and chastened love, "Lord, Thou knowest all things; Thou knowest that I love Thee,"[1] was the outcome not of the moment, but of convictions which had been long working within him. And still once more the same kind of help was set before him when our Lord declared beforehand, though in terms of veiled import, by what death he should glorify God. It is not to be mistaken not only that our Lord had full and perfect knowledge of what was in his servant from the first, but that the revelation of this knowledge was employed by Him as a powerful instrument of training. In fact we are here face to face with no accidental accompaniment or occasional feature of our Lord's ministerial work, but with a fixed principle, which was from first to last operative in His dealings not only with the Twelve but with all with whom He came in contact—the principle, namely, of making what He really was, to be gradually felt, by causing the conviction of His superhuman knowledge to penetrate more and more deeply into the minds of whose who lived continually with Him, or who even transiently saw and spoke

[1] St. John xxi. 17.

with Him. Until this is realized no true estimate can be formed of the very important position which our Lord's knowledge occupies in the entire portraiture which the Gospels give of His Person, and more especially of the influences through which the truth of His Person made its way into men's souls. It may be doubted whether any other influence, even that of His miracles, was of such potent force in winning conviction. All the influences no doubt wrought concomitantly; but this influence had a special and peculiar power of penetrating and touching the conscience, and it was on this account, we may presume, that our Lord saw fit to let it blend so constantly with others. "Now are we sure that Thou knowest all things!"[1] said the Apostles to the Lord on the Eve of the Passion, and the exclamation illustrates at once how much their thoughts must have been dwelling upon this point, and also our Lord's purpose in allowing continual evidences that this was indeed the truth to come before them, and to do their work in bringing them to this conviction.

The instances which have been just mentioned were of knowledge reaching onward into the distant future. But our Lord's knowledge embraced alike the past, present, and future of the lives and characters of men. When Nathanael, who was probably St. Bartholomew, first came into our Lord's presence, the words "Behold an Israelite indeed in whom is no guile!"—that is to say, "one who, like Jacob, is as a Prince with God, but without that which was the faulty weakness of Jacob's character"—whilst they actually

[1] St. John xvi. 30: *νῦν οἴδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα, καὶ οὐ χρείαν ἔχεις ἵνα τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ. ἐν τούτῳ πιστεύομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἐξῆλθες.* The acknowledgment of what they now feel that they know assuredly (*οἴδαμεν*), is very ample and unreserved. It is that the Lord's knowledge was unlimited (*οἶδας πάντα*), and especially had no need that people (*τὶς*) should express to Him what might be in their minds or hearts, since He knew it all beforehand. (*Cf.* St. John xvi. 19, and the Collect at the end of the Communion Office in the Book of Common Prayer, "Almighty God, the fountain of all wisdom, Who knowest our necessities before we ask.") In this (*ἐν τούτῳ*) they found, not merely an argument, but a proof of vital and convincing force. (See Westcott's note.) Our Lord's revelation of Divine *knowledge* certainly seems to have been mightier to work conviction than His revelation of Divine power.

describe what Nathanael then was, intimate, though they do not express, a glance reaching back into the past. This is more clearly evidenced in what follows. For the effect produced upon Nathanael by our Lord's proving to him that He had seen him under the fig-tree, was too great to be due to anything but a conviction that He Who had read his thoughts there — this seems to be most probably what Nathanael understood—was One to Whom the secret past of men's lives lay open, and Who, by that token, could be none other than the Messiah, the Son of God and King of Israel.

Again, the narrative of the woman taken in adultery (which, whether it is in its proper place in St. John's Gospel or not, must belong to the Gospel record)[1] strikingly illustrates how clearly the past of men's lives and the book of their conscience lay open before Him. For here, again, we must judge of the cause somewhat by the effect. What was it which produced so great a force of conviction in the accusers of this woman, that they should have one by one, without exception, admitted the truth of a charge which He had not preferred against all, and had not actually pronounced against any of them? It could have been only an irresistible conviction that the records of their consciences were open to Him, and that, if He saw fit, He was able to bring the sin of each home to him. And, again, what was the reason why the Lord spoke as He did to this woman? Was it not that His purpose was to show her that He knew her also, and that, knowing her guilty past, He knew also that in her which would lead to repentance?[2]

[1] St. John viii. 1–11. It is perhaps most probable that its proper place is at the end of St. Luke xxi., where it is placed in MSS. 13, 69, 124, 346. See Ellicott, *Hist. Lect. on the Life of our Lord*, p. 253, and Westcott, *St. John's Gospel*, p. 142. "No reasonable critic," says Bishop Ellicott, "throws doubt on the incident." Bishop Westcott remarks upon our Lord's action of writing on the ground, that "the very strangeness of the action marks the authenticity of the detail." Miller, *Bamp. Lect.* (1817), p. 121, speaks of this narrative "having maintained its station in the canon of Scripture through severe questioning."

[2] See the interesting remarks of Alexander Knox on this narrative. *Remains*, vol. iv. pp. 360–364, esp. p. 362.

Once more, in the account of our Lord's conversation with the Samaritan woman at Jacob's Well, it is the past of the woman's life and character upon which the light of our Lord's supernatural knowledge is thrown.[1] This was, of course, that which, in her case, it was important to reveal, just as in the case of the Apostles it was important to show that the Lord fully knew from the first what each was then, and what in the future he would become. In the case of the Samaritan woman, it is impossible to mistake how the light of this knowledge of her past became the instrument of conviction to her. "He told me all that ever I did. Is not this the Christ?" There was evidently no doubt in her mind that He with whom she had spoken knew *all*, and from this conviction she passed, almost as of course, to looking upon Him as the promised Messiah.

There is yet a third feature which the Gospels make known to us respecting our Lord's knowledge of man, which is certainly of not less importance as showing the real character of that knowledge than those features which have been mentioned. This is that His knowledge embraced not only the actual character, motives, and conduct of any individual, but also *what would have been* the conduct of any under given circumstances in which they were never actually placed. The Gospels furnish one example only of this truly superhuman knowledge; but it will be felt that in such a case one example is enough to lift our thoughts very high respecting the knowledge of Him of Whom we read such things. Reference is, of course, intended to our Lord's saying respecting the ancient inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon and of Sodom. "Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. . . . And thou, Capernaum . . . if the mighty works had been done in Sodom which were done in thee, it would have remained until this day."[2]

Various shifts have been resorted to, especially by

[1] St. John iv. 5, *sq.* [2] St. Matt. xi. 21–23; St. Luke x. 13.

Socinians, to evade the conclusions necessarily to be drawn from this saying. Bishop Pearson reduced them to two heads, and gave a complete answer to each.[1] Some were not ashamed to suggest that our Lord was not making a serious assertion, but only used this mode of speech to heighten the hardness of heart of the people of Chorazin and Bethsaida. To this Bishop Pearson's reply seems, in its simple dignity, amply sufficient, even as addressed to Socinians: "How, if this were so, the words spoken could have been worthy of the Word of God, I do not understand." He points out further that there is a distinctness in the expressions used by our Lord, which quite forbids such a supposition as this. And, indeed, there is a peculiar solemnity in the whole chapter, which should make us feel—what, of course, is always true, but which is especially prominent in these sayings—that our Lord is assuredly speaking as the Very Truth. We cannot, indeed, be sure that the connection between the sayings of this chapter is a directly chronological one, but what we may venture to call the connection of solemnity between them is very marked. Our Lord speaks in the earlier part of the chapter about the real greatness of the Baptist. And, as regards his office, from what does this greatness spring? It is from his relation as the Forerunner to God Incarnate. The latter part of the chapter contains the great Invitation based upon the relation of the Son to the Father, as having had all things delivered into His hand, and as knowing the Father with a knowledge equal to that with which the Father knows Him. Between these two great sayings stands our Lord's solemn denunciation of the impenitence and hardness of heart of the cities of Galilee, and His declaration of what would befall them at the Day of Judgment. All His words are on the loftiest level, befitting both the subject and the Speaker. It is plainly impossible that anything should have fallen from His lips at such a time (Who at no time ever did or could speak lightly, or

[1] Lect. xix., De Deo et Attributis. *Minor Works*, vol. i. p. 198–205, ed. Churton.

without regard to the real import and consequences of His words) which was not on the same plane of seriousness—to say no more—as the rest of what He uttered.

Our Lord, then, we cannot possibly doubt, meant what He said. And what He did say plainly rested upon a real knowledge of what the people of Tyre and Sidon and of Sodom would have done had they witnessed, as the cities of Galilee did witness, His own mighty works. The knowledge of what was contingent in the future, which our Lord is thus shown to have possessed, exactly resembles that of which we read in the Old Testament, when David inquired of God about Saul and about the people of Keilah.[1] David did not ask what would actually take place in the future; he asked whether Saul would come to Keilah *in case of* his staying there, and if the people of Keilah would deliver him up to Saul *if* Saul should come and demand him. And God revealed to him not what was actually in the future, but what He knew would be the conduct of Saul and of the people of Keilah if David stayed there. It was not a question of probability; it was a matter of certain knowledge with God. In like manner, what our Lord stated respecting the Phœnician cities and Sodom was not a matter of probability or of conjecture, but of His own certain knowledge.

It thus appears, by clear and ample evidence of the Gospels, that our Lord's knowledge of man was distinguished by differences of a very marked character from any kind of natural insight, or any supernatural gift of discernment or of vision, recorded to have been bestowed upon any of God's servants. Our Lord's knowledge possessed a universality and a completeness wholly unlike anything of which we read elsewhere. Respecting this there can be neither doubt nor mistake. The words of the Evangelist, coupled with the proof derived from the individual instances which are described, and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, fully justify us in concluding that all the hearts of all the

[1] 1 Sam. xxiii. 10–12, cf. Hooker, *E. P.*, Book V., Appendix No. 1, vol. ii. p. 562, ed. Keble, 1845.

inhabitants of the land in which Jesus Christ lived and moved, were alike naked and open to His eyes. And His was, as we have seen, no partial knowledge: it was a knowledge of character in its most hidden tendencies, a knowledge embracing alike its growth in the past and its development in the future—and, as regards this last, embracing its possibilities so completely as to enable Him to declare with certainty what, under given circumstances, the manner of conduct would be or would have been. Add to this that the source of this wonderful knowledge is described as being in our Lord Himself, and there seems nothing wanting to raise it to the same level as His knowledge of God, that is, to show it to have been strictly and properly Divine.

The facts and the statements of the Gospels relating to our Lord's knowledge of man—to which we are at present limiting our attention—must at any rate be fairly faced and considered. They must not be ignored, or thrust out of sight, or explained away. And when they are looked at plainly and fully, it really seems impossible (for any one who is determined not to bend the Gospel record to any favourite theory, but to take it in full as it presents itself) not to allow that in what concerns the knowledge of man there is a background to the picture which can only be described as a background of Divine Omniscience. It seems a fitting description to speak of it as a *background*, for in each separate instance what met the eyes and ears and perceptions of those who were present with our Lord, must have passed through the medium of His human consciousness and have been manifested by means of the organs of His humanity, reaching them *thus only* from God. On any view of the facts this must have been so. The question, therefore, is whether the evidence on this subject does or does not go to prove that the altogether unique knowledge of man which He manifested, or which is ascribed to Him, proceeded from *His* Divine Omniscience. That it was the effect of Omniscience is absolutely beyond dispute. But since in each separate instance it was certainly given to His

humanity, further proof is required that the Omniscience from which it proceeded was absolutely present in Him. And such proof there certainly does seem to be, if not absolutely demonstrative, yet so strongly tending towards demonstration that one does not see how it can honestly be resisted or set aside. It lies in the combination of evidences that what we have before us were not occasional manifestations but the outcome of a power inherently possessed. There is a great difference between being on any number of occasions the mouthpiece of Omniscience, and sending forth knowledge from the very self. The human spirit is capable of receiving and of handing on to others from God very much which it could not receive the power of originating. The power of knowing what is in man, and making known concerning this or that man what has been revealed to one by God, are evidently two very different things. Things which must be hidden from anything but Divine Omniscience may, especially as it were in parcels, be revealed to any of God's servants, and by them proclaimed to others. Even the knowledge of contingent future events, which seems to be in an especial manner a divine prerogative, may be conferred upon man, not indeed as a general power, but in reference to some particular matter. Thus Elisha was able to say to Joash,[1] when the king, taking the arrows from him, struck the ground with them, but struck three times only, that if he had struck five or six times he would have consumed Syria. Yet Elisha had no such knowledge of the contingent future at other times. It is something more than probable that human nature, being what it is, is not capable of even receiving such a power. If, therefore, there is evidence that our Lord's knowledge of man was not merely a knowledge which might have been communicated to Him on each separate occasion, but was an inherent possession, this comes very near to demonstration that His own Divine Omniscience was the source of it. And this is exactly what the evidence does point to. How otherwise can we account

[1] 2 Kings xiii. 19.

for the universality of our Lord's knowledge? How can we account for its extraordinary comprehensiveness, and its grasp of character from its very roots to its incalculable development in a distant future? How can we account for the absence of anything in the record which might lead us to conclude that it was received by communication from without? How can we account for the very precise expressions which speak of "*Himself*" knowing and of His knowing "*in* Himself"? *He Himself knew all men. He Himself knew what was in man*—not this or that man, but what was in *man* — human nature in all its mysterious depths and capabilities.

Putting these evidences all together, what conclusion can we come to but that the knowledge of man which our Lord manifested was something quite different from anything seen elsewhere in Prophet or Apostle, quite different from any gift of discernment of spirits—Godet's explanation that it was the highest degree of this gift being in every way inadequate to account for the facts—that it was in fact the manifestation of a power emphatically described elsewhere as belonging only to God; and that since, as is probable, this *power* is one which humanity is incapable of receiving, it must have pertained to the Godhead and not the Manhood of our Lord, the manifestation of it only being made through His Manhood?

In regard to our Lord's knowledge of man, as in regard to His knowledge of God, the evidence seems thoroughly conclusive against the *kenosis* theory. It seems also to be fully in harmony with the view which has been advocated above, that the relation between Divine Omniscience and human consciousness or knowledge in our Lord was a relation of union without confusion or blending of the one with the other, a relation in which the human received communications from the Divine without thereby having any of its own essential features disturbed or changed.

CHAPTER III.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND EVENTS.

It is worthy of note that almost all the arguments in favour of a supposed ignorance in our Lord belong to the division of the subject upon which we are now entering. Nothing counter to the statements of the Gospels respecting our Lord's knowledge of God or His knowledge of man has been brought forward, or, indeed, could be. Attempts have been made to reconcile those statements with the particular form of the *kenosis* theory which this or that writer may have undertaken to maintain; but it has not been denied that the tenor of the evidence is towards the conclusion that our Lord had perfect knowledge of God and perfect knowledge of man. There is, however, one partial exception to this. In regard to one point, it is urged that the evidence respecting our Lord's knowledge of man is not entirely uniform. And, as the same objection is urged in regard to His knowledge of facts, this seems to be the right place to examine it.

The point is that our Lord, as is asserted, expressed *surprise* on certain occasions. In Mr. Gore's[1] words, "He expresses surprise at the conduct of His parents, and the unbelief of men, and the barrenness of the fig-tree, and the slowness of His disciples' faith.[2] He expresses surprise on many occasions, and therefore, we must believe, really felt it."

Mr. Gore speaks here of our Lord expressing surprise on "*many*" occasions. But there is *only one* amongst the passages which he refers to in which a word indicating surprise is

[1] *Bampton Lect.*, p. 147.

[2] St. Luke ii. 49; St. Mark vi. 6, xi. 13, iv. 40, vii. 18, viii. 21, xiv. 37.

actually used. This is in St. Mark vi. 6, where it is said that our Lord ἐθαύμαζε διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν αὐτῶν, *i.e.*, of the people of His own country. The word θαυμάζειν (which most commonly does express surprise, though this is not its only meaning) is not used in any of the other passages cited. The surprise which Mr. Gore finds in *them* is a matter of inference only, and of by no means necessary inference. Indeed, the probability seems to be very strongly the other way. Four of the passages relate to occasions in which the Apostles were concerned. Now, with all the evidence before us which the Gospels furnish that our Lord had the most thorough knowledge "from the beginning" about the Apostles collectively and individually, and with the express statement concerning their faith in particular that "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray Him"[1]—is it to be believed that He was on any occasion in any uncertainty about "what was in" *them*, and especially about their faith? Is it to be believed that when He said to them, after He had stilled the storm on the lake, "Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have not faith?"[2] He spoke in surprise at what He had not fully known, and was not rather reproving a weakness of faith which He knew full well? Or, when He had been speaking of the difference between what entered into a man and what proceeded from him, that His question addressed to the disciples, "Are ye also yet without understanding?"[3] was due in any sort of way to ignorance? Or, again, when He said to them, "How is it that ye do not understand?"[4] about the miracle of the loaves, are we to suppose that He did not know how it was? Surely it is abundantly clear that our Lord habitually put in the form of a question reproofs and exhortations which could not have been conveyed so gently, and at the same time so effectually—since thus His hearers were obliged to think for themselves—in any other way! Is it to be thought that when our Lord returned to the three

[1] St. John vi. 64.
[2] St. Mark iv. 40.
[3] St. Mark vii. 18.
[4] St. Mark viii. 21.

chosen disciples in the garden of Gethsemane, the word "findeth" (εὑρίσκει)[1] was intended to intimate that it was a surprise to Him to find them so, or that His question, "Simon, sleepest thou?" contained anything more than a rebuke, a reminder of eager professions, and a warning of temptation now near at hand? It is surely little less than wilfulness to insist upon reading into questions which are so perfectly consistent with the most complete knowledge in the Speaker, indications of His being taken by surprise. Should we not rather say that the fulness of His knowledge, which it was not His purpose to manifest openly on every occasion, shows itself all but openly beneath the delicate veil of His questioning? Was it not so in that other instance which Mr. Gore brings forward as evidencing surprise, when His mother and His foster father, after their three days' fruitless search, came at last to the Temple to look for Him? Was He not gently turning their thoughts from the quarter in which they had been moving to that in which the truth was really to be found, when He said to them, "How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"[2] Or when He went up to the barren fig-tree, "if haply He might find" (εἰ ἄρα εὑρήσει) "anything thereon,"[3] was not this, as being part of an object-lesson, thoroughly consistent with the knowledge that there was no fruit on it?

But there is one passage[4] amongst those cited by Mr. Gore in which the use of the word *θαυμάζειν* places that passage, at any rate, in a different category from the others. And if the word *θαυμάζειν* is never used except as indicating surprise, then it is clear that on one occasion, at least, our Lord did express surprise. And there is another passage[5]

[1] St. Mark xiv. 37, cf. St. John xi. 17, and see below p. 393, note.

[2] St. Luke ii. 49.

[3] St Mark xi. 13. The more common opposite objection that our Lord, knowing that there was no fruit on the tree, ought not to have acted as if He thought there was, is discussed and answered by Archbishop Trench, *Miracles*, p. 436, *sq.*

[4] St. Mark vi. 6.

[5] St. Matt. viii. 10; St. Luke vii. 9.

besides, which Mr. Gore does not quote, in which *θαυμάζειν* is similarly used in reference to our Lord. It is in the account of healing the centurion's servant. Our Lord, we read, when He heard what the centurion said, *ἐθαύμασε*, or, as St. Luke says, *ἐθαύμασεν αὐτόν*. Now it is beyond question that, in the majority of passages in which the verb *θαυμάζειν* is used in the New Testament, it is used to indicate surprise, or, at any rate, to indicate feelings growing out of or accompanied by surprise. But is it never used to indicate feelings which have nothing to do with surprise? And if it is so used elsewhere, in classical authors and in the New Testament, may it not be that in these passages relating to our Lord, what is intended is not surprise, but something else?

That *θαυμάζειν* is used in classical authors to indicate feelings with which surprise has nothing to do, will be seen clearly from the following instances. In Herodotus iii. 80 Otanes is maintaining the superiority of democratic government to monarchy. Amongst other faults to which he declares the single possessor of power to be liable, he says that he is the most inconsistent of men, *ἤν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν μετρίως θωυμάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται· ἤν τε θεραπεύῃ τις κάρτα, ἄχθεται ἅτε θωπί.*—"*Pay him court* in moderation, and he is angry because you do not show him more profound respect—show him profound respect, and he is offended again, because (as he says) you fawn on him."[1] Here *θωυμάζῃς* is used of *feeling and expressing admiration or respect, paying court* in short, where surprise could have no place.

In Thucydides i. 38 the Corinthians, speaking of their Corcyræan colonists' attitude towards them, say, *ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι.*—"We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted by

[1] Rawlinson's Translation. Cf. Eur., *Med.*, 1144, *δέσποινα δ' ἦν νῦν ἀντὶ σοῦ θαυμάζομεν.* In Æsch., *Sept. c. Theb.*, 772, there is another shade of meaning: *τίν' ἀνδρῶν γὰρ τοσόνδ' ἐθαύμασαν θεοί*, "for whom of mortals did the gods so *praise?*" Similarly in Soph., *Ajax*, 1093, *οὐκ ἄν ποτ', ἄνδρες, ἄνδρα θαυμάσαιμ' ἔτι, ὃς . . . ἁμαρτάνει.*

them, but to be their head, and to be regarded with a proper respect."[1] Here, again, the idea of *surprise* is quite foreign to the passage.

The following passage from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* shows very clearly that the feelings intended to be expressed by the verb θαυμάζειν have no necessary connection with the unexpected or unknown, and do not arise from that cause only. Socrates, distressed at the impiety of Aristodemus, (the Little, as he was called), is leading him, in his usual way, by questions, to the point he wishes to bring him to see. "Tell me, Aristodemus, are there any amongst men whom you *admire or respect* (τεθαύμακας) for their wisdom?" "Certainly there are." "Tell us their names." "Well, for my part, I admire Homer especially for epic poetry, Melanippides for dithyrambic, Sophocles for tragedy, Polycleitus for sculpture, Zeuxis for painting."[2]

Now, unless it be said that in continued study of a work of art fresh beauties may always be found, and that in this sense admiration is allied to surprise, it is evident that to the Greek mind θαυμάζειν was a word fitted to express feelings which were quite independent of surprise. The root from which the word comes leads to the same conclusion. It is a root (θαF)[3] indicating simply *sight*. Many feelings are connected with sight, arising spontaneously and varying according to the character of the object seen. Some are feelings of approval and admiration, some of disapproval. The feelings of surprise and wonder when anything unexpected or inexplicable is presented are especially keen and pronounced. It was natural, therefore, that these should become associated very closely with a verb springing from this root, and employed to express a good many of the different shades of feeling to which the sight of objects gives rise. But the passages quoted prove that the verb was never confined in its use exclusively to the feelings of astonishment and surprise.

Still, unless there were in the New Testament itself some

[1] Crawley's Translation. [2] Xen., *Mem.* I. iv. 2, 3.

[3] See Liddell and Scott, *s. vv.* θαῦμα, θάομαι; Rost u. Palm, *s. v.* θαῦμα, "vom Stamme, θάω, *schauen.*"

evidence of the verb being used in this less usual sense (for "wonder" seems to be the prevailing meaning), some hesitation might be felt in assigning this meaning to it in a particular passage. But such evidence is not wanting. In the Epistle of St. Jude[1] there is a very clear instance. One trait in the portrait of the ungodly whom St. Jude describes is that they are men who "shew respect of persons for the sake of advantage" (*θαυμάζοντες πρόσωπα*). The only way in which the idea of "surprise" could come in here would be if it were supposed that these persons *pretended* amazement. But this would be very far-fetched. Another passage in which it seems very probable that *θαυμάζειν* is used without any intention of asserting surprise is St. Luke xi. 38. A certain Pharisee who had invited our Lord to a meal *ἐθαύμασεν* that He had not first washed. Now, it is of course possible that the Pharisee was genuinely surprised, but it seems at least as likely that *ἐθαύμασεν* here means simply "looked with disapproval" upon this omission. Disapproval seems the prominent idea also in St. John vii. 21, where our Lord says to "the Jews," "I did one work,[2] and ye all *θαυμάζετε*." Just below He says, *ἐμοὶ χολᾶτε* — "are ye *wroth* with Me?" showing that there was more of disapproval than of surprise in their feeling. Such was also, no doubt, the chief element in St. Paul's *θαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτω ταχέως μετατίθεσθε*[3] addressed to the Galatians.

In the two passages relating to our Lord, there can be no doubt that approval in the one case, and disapproval in the other, was actually His feeling, and that this is expressed by *θαυμάζειν* as used in the two passages. The doubtful point is whether these feelings were in either case

[1] St. Jude 16. See the Revised Version. Cf. Thuc., i. 38, and Hdt., iii. 80, as quoted above.

[2] The "work," it must be remembered, was healing the impotent man at the Pool of Bethesda *on the Sabbath* (St. John v. 9). It was this which stirred the feeling of the Jews. It could not have been a *surprise* to them that our Lord should work a miracle, or that He worked one on the Sabbath.

[3] Gal. i. 6. See Ellicott's note. Rost u. Palm, *s. v. θαυμάζω*: "*zuw. mit dem Nebenbegriff der Missbilligung, des Tadels.*"

combined with a feeling of surprise. In favour of this view must be set the fact that in most instances where θαυμάζω is used in the New Testament it does indicate surprise. This, however, seems the only argument in favour of it. On the other hand, the context does not in either case require this meaning. And it has been shown that the verb θαυμάζω does not either in itself, or by universality of usage, necessarily indicate surprise. And, especially, the strong and plain statements of the Gospels respecting the universality and completeness of our Lord's knowledge of man, seem to render it imperative to suppose θαυμάζειν to have a meaning in harmony with these statements, if the rules of exegesis will permit—and in this case they do seem to permit—of our doing so.

It is, of course, open to Mr. Gore or any one else to adopt the other interpretation; for all that has been *demonstrated* is that θαυμάζω does not necessarily or always express surprise. But, since this has been demonstrated, Mr. Gore must allow that it is open to others to adopt an interpretation different from his own. There is clearly no grammatical or lexical reason why we should not understand our Lord to have looked (simply and without any preceding ignorance) with *approval* upon the centurion because of his faith, and with *disapproval* upon the people of his own country because of their unbelief.

But suppose that Mr. Gore's view is taken—suppose that these are instances of "surprise"—what follows? We have then an exception given in the Gospel record itself to its otherwise constant proclamation of our Lord's perfect knowledge of man. How are we to reconcile the exception with those very plain and decided statements? There seems to be only one way in which this can be done, namely, by taking those statements to relate exclusively to our Lord's Divine Omniscience, and the exception (or, if the point is pressed, the two exceptions) to mean that on these occasions our Lord's human mind did not have communicated to it the knowledge which would have made surprise impossible. But, in this case, what becomes of Mr. Gore's theory that our

Lord's knowledge of men and of facts was "not necessarily Divine consciousness"? If the statements respecting our Lord's knowledge of man in particular were not so distinct and express as they are, he might have urged that his view of a "supernatural illumination analogous to that vouchsafed to prophets and apostles, though of higher quality,"[1] was one which admitted of such exceptions as these. But it is not with his view only that the exceptions (if they are such) have to be reconciled; it is with the very direct statements of the Gospels. And it does not seem possible to do this except on the supposition (which Mr. Gore declines to entertain) that the statements and the exceptions relate to two different things—the statements to our Lord's Divine Omniscience; the exceptions to the communications made—and which therefore might be withheld—from His Omniscience to His human mind. Even if, then, these are to be taken as real instances of "surprise," the *kenosis* theory seems to be once more found to be quite incapable of reconciliation with the Gospel facts. If they are not instances of "surprise" at all, then we have the fact placed definitely before us that Divine Omniscience did coexist, without exception as regards our Lord's knowledge of man, with His human knowledge, and we have only to determine, if we can, the mode in which this took place.

The upshot is this: in St. Matt. viii. 10 and St. Mark vi. 6 we must either take *θαυμάζω* to have a meaning (according to a not uncommon classical usage, which is not without countenance elsewhere in the New Testament) unconnected with "surprise"; or if, on the ground that *θαυμάζω* does usually imply surprise in the New Testament, these are to be regarded as instances of it, we must find a way in which these exceptions to the general tenor of the Gospel record can be fully and fairly reconciled with it.

It has seemed worth while to give full examination to this point for two reasons: first, because it does present a

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 147.

real difficulty; and, secondly, because it serves to bring into notice a fact of great importance, viz., the immense disproportion between what the Gospels say in exaltation, so to say, of our Lord's knowledge, and whatever can be found in them bearing really or apparently the other way. The fact is beyond all contradiction that the Gospels do very highly exalt our Lord's knowledge, and in very marked ways call attention to it. Would this be so, if it were only on the same plane with that of prophets and apostles, though of greater extent and higher in quality than theirs? Surely not. The facts on *both* sides ought at any rate to be fully faced. And when the evidence on the one side is confronted with that on the other, it will certainly be acknowledged that there is nothing less than an immense disproportion between them. As regards the knowledge of God, the Gospels claim for our Lord (not indeed as Man but as God the Son) absolute Omniscience. As regards the knowledge of man, they certainly seem to claim for Him such knowledge as is elsewhere ascribed to God only. Both as regards universality and as regards completeness it is hard to find anything in the description of our Lord's knowledge which falls short of the description of Divine knowledge. What is there, in fact, on the other side? What there is may be seen in Mr. Gore's Bampton Lectures, pp. 147–150. If *all* that he enumerates as evidence of limitations of knowledge would bear the test of examination, it would be, both as regards quantity and quality, little indeed in comparison of the multiplied statements and varied forms of proof which the Gospels contain establishing the reality of Divine knowledge as present in our Lord whilst He was on earth, and also establishing apparently the conclusion that there was (with one exception) little, if any, limit to the communications made to His human mind from his boundless Omniscience, except such limit as was necessitated by the structure of His human mind itself. But, in point of fact, we find that, when the particular heads of evidence enumerated by Mr. Gore are examined, *there are absolutely only two which are of the least*

real weight, one of these being at least quite capable of a different interpretation, the other being that respecting the day and hour of the Judgment which we shall have to examine presently. The disproportion, therefore, between what is found on the one side and on the other is very great indeed. And the point now insisted on is that this disproportion ought to be taken fully into account. If there is evidence of limitation let it by all means be brought forward and sifted. But let also all that there is on the contrary side be as fully brought forward, and, if it cannot reasonably be denied, let it have its full weight. The less must not be made the standard to which the greater is to be conformed, but on the contrary the greater must rule the less. It must not set the less aside, but it must rule it. We must find a theory which will account fairly for the facts on both sides (if there are facts on both sides); we must reject any theory which ignores or which distorts the facts on either.

These remarks will not be thought out of place or unnecessary by those who are acquainted with the manner in which the evidence of the Gospels has been dealt with by some writers on this subject. But we must now return to our present subject of examination, viz., the evidence respecting our Lord's knowledge of facts and events.

For convenience' sake we may take first that which concerned His own life on earth. When we read, as we do,[1] that when our Lord, after the Agony in Gethsemane, stepped forward to meet those who came to take Him, it was "knowing all the things that were coming upon Him," we cannot help feeling not only that all the circumstances of the Passion were then clearly before Him, but that we are invited to realize and dwell upon the fact that it was so. And this statement follows closely in St. John (who omits the account of the Agony) upon the Prayer of Dedication in the 17th chapter, which, more than any other chapter in the Bible, presents to us a view of the Incarnation and its issues

[1] St. John xviii. 4: Ἰησοῦς οὖν εἰδὼς πάντα τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἐξελθὼν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς.

as seen, if we may venture to say so, from heaven. Our thoughts are carried back to the glory which the Son had with the Father before the world was. They are carried onward to the return of the Son to the bosom of the Father, and to the consummation of all the counsel of His Incarnate Life, Passion, Death, Resurrection, Ascension, and of all the work of His High Priesthood and Kingly Rule, in that distant future when all His Redeemed "shall be one" with the Father in Him for ever. Who, reading this chapter, can doubt that the whole counsel of the Incarnation was then before the soul of our Redeemer? In a vision of such wondrous compass the inclusion, in the description given, of minuter details was not to be desired, perhaps was not possible. Perhaps these were not, *at that moment*, before the human mind of our Saviour Himself. But if at that or at any other moment anything relating to the Passion remained in the background of His human mind—for only Omniscience can have all things at once and always before it—the expressions in St. John especially, dropped here and there in these chapters, show us convincingly that the Lord knew throughout all the things that were coming on Him even in their minutest details. In the 13th chapter he reminds us that our Lord "knew[1] that the hour was come that He should depart out of this world unto the Father," and "that[2] the Father had given all things into His hands, and that He came forth from God and goeth unto God;" and, through all the doings and sayings of those solemn chapters, there is not only manifested the deepest consciousness of what was coming in general, but also by particular expressions we are made to feel that the time and circumstances were all exactly known. The treachery of Judas, the denials of St. Peter, and that far-off day when he would be able to lay down his life for Christ, His own departure to prepare a place for His disciples, His coming again to receive them unto Himself, the coming of the prince of this world, the persecutions which His disciples should undergo, the "little while" during which

[1] ver. 1. [2] ver. 3.

only they should not see Him, the rejoicing of the world and their sorrow during that "little while," the after joy which none should take from them, the imminence of the hour when they, who did not know themselves or their own weakness but were known to Him, should be scattered and leave Him alone[1]—all these minuter touches reveal unmistakably the accuracy, the fulness, and the certainty of our Lord's foresight of all that was then impending on that night and the morrow, the victory of the Resurrection morn, and the glory that should follow.

How, then, can it be said respecting the Agony in Gethsemane and our Lord's prayer, "It was only because the future was not clear that He could pray: 'O My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from Me'"?[2] That the future was clear before Him when He talked with His disciples in the sacred Upper Room, and on the way to Gethsemane, is too plain to admit of doubt. It was also certainly[3] clear immediately after the Agony. Was it then overclouded just during the Agony itself? Is this what is meant? There is nothing to justify such a conclusion. What is natural in human feeling and entirely compatible with, or even requiring perfect knowledge, is fully sufficient to explain the tenor of our Saviour's prayer. For it is not to be supposed that our Lord *felt* at all times all that He felt in the hour of the Agony, though He *knew* it all beforehand. It was in full accordance with the truth of human nature that all which the Passion meant should be felt by Him, when the hour was actually come, with a vividness and intensity very much greater than had ever before been the case. And surely it is plain that the clearer His vision of the Passion was, the more intense would be the agony when the hour of it was indeed come! Was it then the purpose of it and its results which were not clear to Him? Yet the Evangelist shows us that up to the moment of His entering

[1] St. John xiii. 18, 19, 21–27, 37, 38, 36; xxi. 18; xiv. 2, 3, 30; xv. 18–21; xvi. 16, 20–22, 32.

[2] Gore, *B. L.*, p. 148.

[3] See St. John xviii. 4, and compare xiii. 1.

into Gethsemane they were perfectly clear. And does not the Epistle to the Hebrews show that the joy that was set before Him was fully clear in His sight, when it assures us that for that He endured the Cross and despised its shame?[1] In truth, when all idea of anything being not clear to the mind of our Lord at the time of the Agony is set aside, we seem to be quite able, not indeed to fathom that mystery of suffering, but at least to see that it was a mystery of feeling and not of ignorance. There is nothing in His words which contradicts this. He permits us to see the strain which was put upon His human will. And what was it which made that strain so unspeakably great? Was it not that all which lay before Him *was* so fully known, and was accepted and embraced, not as that which could not be avoided, but wholly of His own will? Do not His words, as recorded by St. Mark, show us what the "If it be possible," of St. Matthew's account, really meant?[2] It was not that either present or

[1] Heb. xii. 2.

[2] Comparison of the three records seems to make this clear. St. Matthew's εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι (observe the indicative!) does not by itself imply uncertainty. (See Donaldson, *Gr. Gram.*, § 502, where, speaking of εἰ with the indicative, he describes it as denoting "possibility, *without the expression of uncertainty.*") Compare St. Matt. xiv. 28; St. Luke xi. 13; xii. 26; xxiii. 31; St. John vii. 23; xviii. 8; Acts iv. 9; xiii. 15,—in all of which places that which is stated in a conditional form is assumed to be a fact, and εἰ approaches in meaning to "*since.*" See also Phil. i. 22, with Ellicott's and Meyer's notes. The εἰ, Ellicott says, "is not problematical . . . but . . . virtually assertory." In Acts v. 38, 39, the contrast of ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἡ βουλὴ αὕτη, which expresses what Gamaliel does *not* think to be the true explanation, with εἰ δὲ ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐστιν, which expresses what *is* his opinion, is very instructive. It thus appears that our Lord's words, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι, are quite capable of meaning, "if it is possible, *as it is.*" And St. Mark's account shows that this meaning is the correct one. For, after saying that the Lord prayed ἵνα, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι, παρέλθῃ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ ὥρα, he adds, evidently in explanation, καὶ ἔλεγεν, Ἀββᾶ, ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι, thereby plainly expressing what was all but expressed in εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι. St. Luke, in his abbreviated account, concentrates attention entirely upon the point of the will. "Father, if Thou be willing, remove this cup from Me: nevertheless, not My will, but Thine, be done." Plainly there is no doubt here that the Father could remove it, and of course consistently with all that He is. What is presented to us, therefore, is that our Saviour, knowing that it might have been otherwise, but that the Father's will was that it should be thus, voluntarily accepted the cup of the Passion, simply because this was

future was not clear to Him—both were only too clear;—nor was it that He had any doubt respecting the certainty that by enduring the Passion He would accomplish the purpose for which He had come unto the world;—but it was that He knew also that to God all things were possible, that therefore that purpose might be accomplished, if God willed, in other ways than by this awful suffering, that consequently in accepting the cup He was accepting what was not of necessity even for the purpose of procuring our salvation, but that which His human will was called upon to accept by no obligation except this only, that it was God's will that that purpose should be accomplished in *this* way. Our Lord's human will, therefore, chose this with a full voluntariness of choice, since He chose it, not because there was no escape from it, but solely because it was the will of the Father. What we have set before us, when it is strictly weighed, exhibits no trace of ignorance or doubt. It is, on the contrary, the depth and perfection of voluntary obedience *intensified by fulness of knowledge.*

There can then be no reasonable doubt respecting our Lord's perfect knowledge of all the circumstances of the Passion, and of its depths, and of all that was to follow, at the beginning of it, or during it, or after it. There is no evidence to show that this perfect knowledge was at any time interrupted. The relation of the Agony and Prayer in Gethsemane shows no overclouding of our Saviour's mind, but, on the contrary, it shows obedience tried to the utmost and made perfect just because He did know all—including this, that to the Father all things, even the removal of the cup, were possible—so well.

And when we go back to earlier periods of His life on earth, is there any reason to think that our Lord's vision of the Passion was at any time less clear or less complete? Surely not. He repeatedly foretold to the disciples the

(St. John vi. 38) the will of Him that sent Him. The idea, therefore, that "the future was not clear to Him," seems to have no countenance at all from the accounts of the Prayer in Gethsemane.

external circumstances of what was to befall Him. And if He did not begin to do this until the latter part of His ministry, the reason was solely because they were not till then prepared for this disclosure.[1] There is no trace of any *gradual* revelation of these things having been made (at least, during His ministry) to our Lord's human mind. The evidence is all the other way. It all goes to show that everything was clear to Him from the first. It was quite at the beginning of His ministry that He made to the Jews that solemn declaration in which was virtually expressed both the Passion and Cross, and the Resurrection—"Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up"[2]—in which we see Divine Power alike and Divine Knowledge, blended with the obedience of a human will and the acceptance of human suffering.

Nor are there wanting intimations that our Lord's foresight of His whole earthly course extended to *every detail* of time and place and action. Thus he showed that the precise moment when by miracles He should manifest His glory was perfectly clear to Him, when He said to His mother at Cana, "Mine hour (ὥρα) is not yet come," there being then but a few minutes to pass before the working of the miracle. Again, when His brethren urged Him to go up to the Feast of Tabernacles at Jerusalem, He answered, "My time (καίρος) is not yet come;" and, yet more precisely, afterwards, "My time is not yet fully come" (οὔπω πεπλήρωται); and very shortly after He went up. This comes out very strikingly in the account of the days preceding the raising of Lazarus. After the tidings of the sickness of Lazarus had reached our Lord, "He abode," we read, "two days still in the same place where He was." Why did he do so? To finish, as Bishop Westcott[3] notes, the work which He had to do there. All that was passing at Bethany was before Him; He saw Lazarus first dying and then dead: but He saw also that which was appointed for Him to do where He was. The

[1] See St. Matt. xvi. 21, ἀπὸ τότε ἤρξατο ὁ Ἰησοῦς δεικνύειν.

[2] St. John ii. 19.

[3] On St. John xi. 6

crises of our Lord's several manifestations were absolutely fixed in a Divine order; and so in like manner all the details of His earthly life were appointed in the Divine counsels "by measure, and number, and weight."[1] These appointments might have been *successively* communicated from our Lord's Divine Omniscience to His human apprehension, as the occasions successively presented themselves. But, if there were such successive communications, they must have been of details only, since the evidence shows unmistakably, as we have seen, that all the broader features of His Life, and Death, and Resurrection, were clearly known to Him from the first. And the mention of the exact particulars of time as known to our Lord, on what have no appearance of being isolated occasions, seems to agree better with the view that the lesser as well as the greater features of His Ministry, from its beginning to its close, were foreknown and foreseen by His human mind.

There are two passages in which it is said that our Lord took action "when He knew" (ὡς ἔγνω), or "when He heard" (ὡς ἤκουσεν). And both of these, especially when we contrast them with the frequent statements of our Lord's (not coming to know, but) knowing with an absolute knowledge (εἰδώς), throw light upon the present point. The first is in St. John iv. 1, and relates to the Pharisees hearing "that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John." No supernatural knowledge was required in order to become acquainted with the fact that the Pharisees had heard this, and the Evangelist speaks of the matter in terms which, while they do not exclude such knowledge, do not necessarily imply it. The other instance is in St. John xi. 4, 6. It relates to the tidings of the sickness of Lazarus. In this case we know that our Lord had supernatural knowledge of what was taking place at Bethany. He needed not the information which was brought to Him. Yet the Evangelist speaks of the matter in terms fitted to the ordinary receiving of information. This seems to show that where

[1] *Wisdom*, xi. 20.

information was really brought and received, the inspired writer does not always call attention to the supernatural knowledge which our Lord *also* had.[1] In fact, since our Lord had, of course, the powers of perception naturally belonging to man, it might have given rise to suspicions of Docetism, if these had been on all occasions superseded by His supernatural powers. And so we read on many occasions of His "perceiving" things in the same manner as other persons, the same expressions being used concerning Him and concerning them. It is not always by the word γνούς, or εἰδώς, which is used for "perceiving" or "knowing," but by the context, that we have to determine whether the knowledge spoken of was supernatural knowledge or not.

This seems to be the proper place to examine whether, as is urged by Mr. Gore, it is true that our Lord, on certain occasions, asked for information.[2] That our Lord put questions is certain: but is there no other purpose for which questions are put, except to obtain information? Can it be always safely inferred, from a question being put, that the questioner is himself ignorant of that about which he puts a question? And, if it is perfectly certain that the method of questioning is frequently employed for other purposes than that of obtaining information—for the benefit (for example), not of the questioner, but of the person questioned, or of the bystanders; or, again, because a question, rather than any other form of speech, is most convenient to convey or suggest exactly what the speaker desires;—it is plain that the whole point lies, not in our Lord's asking or putting questions, but in the context, viz., whether in each case that gives any ground for thinking that He asked because He did

[1] This may be the explanation of the statement that when our Lord arrived at Bethany He "found" (εὗρεν) that Lazarus had been four days in the grave (St. John xi. 17). It seems the more probable because the Evangelist had already made it clear (ver. 15) that the Lord knew of his death whilst He was still in Peræa. Cf. St. Mark xiv. 37, and see above, p. 379. In xii. 14 St. John writes, "And Jesus, having *found* (εὑρών) a young ass." Yet this was the very animal which He sent His disciples to fetch, telling them where and how they would find it.

[2] See above, pp. 378, 379.

not know. Mr. Gore does not attempt to show this. He refers to five instances, as if it were unnecessary to do more, describing them as "occasions" on which our Lord "asks for information and receives it."[1] But, when they are examined, we find that they were indeed questions that were put, but that in some of the cases we *cannot* reasonably suppose that they were asked in ignorance, and that in others the probability seems to be strongly in favour of another purpose than this having been in the Speaker's mind. In no one of the cases is there anything like certainty that the Lord was asking for information.

All five instances are connected with miracles of our Lord. They do not belong to ordinary occasions, but to occasions of great moment, when our Lord's Divine *power* was "*present*,"[2] and when we may reasonably conclude that all besides would partake of the Divine. They were not occasions when we should expect our Lord to be acting simply as Man.

The first was when our Lord asked the man with the legion of devils in the country of the Gadarenes, "What is thy name?"[3] In this case, as Archbishop Trench[4] has remarked, in all probability the purpose of the question was to calm the man, to bring him to recollection, and to the consciousness of his personality. How much more probable, to say the least, is it that He Who "knew all men," Whose eye, in the case of one who was just as much (or as little) a stranger to Him, viz., the impotent man at Bethesda, took in the thirty-eight years of his impotency and the years preceding that affliction, should have known all about this poor demoniac whom (not by chance, we may be sure, but of set purpose) He had crossed the lake to heal?

The next two occasions referred to are the two miraculous cases of feeding, in one instance five thousand and more, in the other four thousand. On both of these occasions our

[1] *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 148. The passages to which he refers are St. Luke viii. 30; St. Mark vi. 38; viii. 5; ix. 21; St. John xi. 34.

[2] St. Luke v. 17. [3] St. Luke viii. 30. [4] *Miracles*, p. 170.

Lord put the question to the disciples, "How many loaves have ye?"[1] In relating the first of these miracles, St. John is careful to tell us, in reference to a previous question put by our Lord, that it was not on His own account that He put it, "for He Himself knew what He would do."[2] Does not this statement include *everything* connected with the miracle? The performance of the miracle depended in a manner on the fewness of the loaves. This was a material point. Our Lord must have known what, or upon what, He was going to work. And if it was His purpose on this occasion to direct the disciples' attention not to His supernatural knowledge, but to the manifestation of Himself by the exercise of Divine power as the One "Who giveth food to all flesh," how easily intelligible it is that He should have preferred to send them to see what there was, by a direction cast partly in the form of a question. (And Who was it that provided that there should be a lad there with five loaves and two fishes?) In the second miracle, it seems not unlikely that the purpose of the question, "How many loaves have ye?"—put when the disciples had shown by *their* question, "From whence can a man satisfy these men with bread here in the wilderness?" how little they had laid to heart the teaching of the former miracle—was to recall to them, by the repetition of the very same words, what had then taken place.

The next occasion was the healing of the lunatic child on coming down from the Mount of Transfiguration. The question was addressed to the father of the child. "How long is it ago, since this came to pass?"[3] Once more it is difficult to repress astonishment that any should think it credible that our Lord, Who showed that the past and future of the lives of others was open to Him, should not have known this in the case of one whom He had determined to heal! And that, too, when the question was one so exactly calculated to unlock the secret springs of faith in the father's breast—*his* faith being all-important for the performance of the cure—

[1] St. Mark vi. 38; viii. 5. [2] St. John vi. 6. [3] St. Mark ix. 21.

by reminding him, as the narrative shows it did, of all the sad history of his son's life.

Lastly, there is the question which in all ages has attracted notice, the question put at Bethany to the weeping sisters of Lazarus and those who were with them, "Where have ye laid him?" Respecting this question, Bishop Westcott observes[1] that it "is remarkable as being the single place in the Gospel where the Lord speaks as seeking information." But is He, even here, seeking information? Is it not quite sufficient to regard this question as being the most natural mode of bringing to an end a scene of sorrow the tension of which was becoming insupportable, and passing on to that spot where comfort and joy were already awaiting the mourners? If it was not our Lord's will to manifest at this time His miraculous *knowledge*, if He purposed in other ways than this just now to penetrate hearts and awaken faith, what could be more natural than that He should make a move at this point just in the way that any one else would have done? There could, of course, be no shade of untruthfulness in His doing so. No one is obliged at all times to show all that he knows. There was entire truthfulness in the intention, if our Lord used this form of speech with a view to passing on gently and naturally to the grave; nor could He be precluded from using it, knowing Himself where the grave was, because the words were capable of a construction which He did not intend. So manifold are the variations of thought and of feeling which language is required, as the necessary instrument, to express, that it is obviously impossible to find a form of words to be used for each separately of these many shades.

Further light is thrown upon the probability or otherwise of our Lord's having ever put questions because He was in need of information from other persons, by the proofs which He gave from time to time that things about which He had not received information, and which could not have been seen, or which He had not seen with the bodily eye, were

[1] Westcott, *in loc.*

seen and known by Him. Besides those frequent instances of His "*seeing*" (ἰδών) the thoughts and secret communings of those who were about Him, there are four remarkable examples in which we are shown that plain matters of fact were equally clear and known to Him. This may seem not a large number, not large enough for us to draw from it the conclusion that all things about Him were at all times equally open to our Saviour's view. But when we consider that these instances are related just because there is in them something more than the simple manifestation of supernatural knowledge; and when we consider further that in this, as in regard to the knowledge of men and of events generally, what are exhibited are the tokens, not of revelations from without, but of an inherent power of vision resident within our Lord—we shall probably be disposed to think otherwise. This last particular is indeed that which, on whatever side we look at our Lord's knowledge—whether it be His knowledge of God, or of men, or of facts—seems convincingly to prove that—humanly expressed as it necessarily was, and having passed, as it necessarily must have done, through His human consciousness—all came direct (though not of necessity at the moment on each particular occasion) from the Divine Omniscience which belonged essentially to Him as God. Not only is there no mention of things being revealed to Him, but the freedom, the familiarity, the ease with which He speaks, all show that His knowledge was utterly inherent, utterly His own.

Observe this in the first of these instances. "Before that Philip called thee," [1] our Lord said to Nathanael, "when thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee." Both the reason why our Lord did on this occasion manifest His knowledge, and the supernatural character of it, are plainly shown in the narrative. Nathanael certainly had no doubt about the latter point, and the effect produced shows us *why* our Lord was pleased to cast this lightning-like flash of insight upon him. But, besides this, the words of our Lord, "I saw thee" (εἶδόν

[1] St. John i. 49.

σε), in their very simplicity reveal the directness of His vision as proceeding from an inherent power. And a *power*, whether instances of its exercise are mentioned or not, *abides*. Elisha went in heart or spirit with Gehazi, and saw, as if he had been present, how Naaman "turned again from his chariot to meet" him.[1] He had a vision of this in his spirit, because it was at that time revealed to him. On another occasion Elisha declares that he does not know, because, as he says, "the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me."[2] If he had had a *power* of such vision, he would have been at all times able to see, and would not have needed separate revelations on each occasion. What is recorded of our Lord indicates that His vision of the unseen around Him was constant. The word *power* is not quite adequate to express what seems to be the truth. It suggests the idea of something conferred, as well as that of a constant faculty. We have no word to express the latter idea without the former. Our Lord's power of vision was not a gift. It did not come to Him from without, as the vision which was granted to prophets and apostles came to them. It was *in* Himself, and if (which may have been the case) on each separate occasion of the kind we are now noticing, His human spirit required to have that which to His Divine Omniscience was always in view, placed, as it were, before it, this was only analogous to what in our case would be the placing in the left hand what might be in the right. All was equally His: the Divine as well as the human. If He saw Nathanael under the fig-tree with the vision of His human spirit, He saw him also with the vision of His Omniscience. To Nathanael assuredly there was conveyed a sense that something had encompassed him which was not of man but of God.

Look at the next instance, that of the *stater* or *shekel* in the fish's mouth. "Go to the sea,"[3] our Lord said to St. Peter, "and cast a hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up; and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou

[1] 2 Kings v. 26. [2] 2 Kings iv. 27. [3] St. Matt. xvii. 27.

shalt find a shekel: that take, and give unto them for thee and Me." In this instance also there was a special reason for letting His supernatural knowledge be seen. It was His Divine Sonship which He was leading St. Peter to see. Hence His manifestation in this striking manner of Divine power combined with Divine knowledge. As the lesson was to be a lesson of Divinity, the proofs and mode of teaching it must be Divine. And how entirely there is about the whole the air of bringing these treasures of knowledge and of power out of an inexhaustible store within, from which, had He willed, He might with equal ease have revealed the invisible on any occasion whatsoever!

Again, when our Lord sent the two disciples to bring to Him the ass and the colt,[1] and described to them so precisely how they were to be found and how the owners would behave, there was reason for His doing so. It was a great occasion full of meaning, a great fulfilment of prophecy, an event therefore which it was fit should be accompanied with Divine tokens, and about which it was well that all the details should be memorable. And so they were. What the disciples said and did, what the multitude said and did, what the Pharisees said and did, if they were spontaneous sayings and doings, as they were, on their part, were also instinct throughout with traces of a Divine ordering. And so, as St. John tells us, though the disciples did not at the time enter into the deeper meaning of this typical act, prophesied of and itself prophetic, the time came, when Jesus was glorified, that they "remembered that these things were written of Him, and that they had done these things unto Him."[2] And, doubtless, the tokens of a Divine insight which He gave when He sent for the ass and colt, and which must have impressed them at the time, contributed not a little both to quicken their remembrance of what had been done, and to point out its true interpretation.

Once more, it was fit that the most solemn Act of all, the keeping of the Last Passover and the institution thereat of

[1] St. Luke xix. 30-32. [2] St. John xii. 16.

the greatest Sacramental Ordinance of the New Kingdom should be accompanied with similar outward tokens of Divinity. Perhaps, as has been suggested,[1] when our Lord sent the two disciples to prepare,[2] and declared to them with such particularity what they would see, part of His purpose in so ordering the matter was that there might be no intrusion upon them in the Upper Chamber. But, if so, was it not also especially fitting that the externals of this most memorable evening should exhibit proofs that nothing of what was passing around was unknown to our Redeemer—not the consultings of the Pharisees, not the treachery of Judas, not the request to the governor for the band of soldiers? The tokens of the supernatural insight of our Lord were surely meant to be proofs to the Apostles that "God was with them," just as tokens[3] not wholly dissimilar were employed on a certain important occasion to impress on him whom God first chose to be ruler of His people that he was being guided by an unseen Presence.

Thus it appears that, as regards everything great and small connected with our Lord's life on earth, His knowledge was not simply unique—that would be little to say—but all-comprehending. Not only in its main outlines, but in its details also, the future was always clear before Him. And it was no otherwise as regards the present. Whenever He would, He had no need that any should testify to Him either concerning man or concerning what might be taking place near at hand or far off. He saw, or at all events could if it were His will see, all that was in man and all things else.

We now turn to the horizons of the Past and of the Future, wider than those encompassing His life on earth, and ask what evidence the Gospels give concerning our Lord's vision of things belonging to these.

In looking towards the Past it is impossible not to be struck with the measureless vista implied in our Lord's

[1] See the note in the *Speaker's Commentary*, on St. Mark xiv. 13.
[2] St. Luke xxii. 8–12.
[3] See 1 Sam. x. 3, 4, 7.

reference to the Glory which He had with the Father before the world was.[1] It may be that the conception of this Divine Glory which the human mind even of our Lord was capable of receiving, fell greatly short of that which belonged to His Omniscience. And this, being so, would naturally affect the expression which could be given to it. Words are the correlative of human thought, and cannot at most go beyond what human thought can grasp. What is expressed in the words of the 17th chapter of St. John gives us some measure of what was in the human thought of the Lord. But behind this, or rather encompassing this, was His Divine Omniscience. With the words of this sublime chapter before us, we cannot deem less than that as far as a human mind could receive it, our Lord's human mind had received from His Omniscience a vision of the illimitable past before the world was. And there are not wanting some hints which go to show that as regards all the past history of the world our Lord's knowledge was not merely of that kind to which we give the name of *acquired*, but that which results from and belongs to *sight*. Thus it is observable that when our Lord has occasion to refer to any period of the old world's history or to any events in it, He does not speak of what was written about it in the Old Testament, but speaks of it directly as of that which He had seen. It is thus that He speaks of the days that were before the Flood, and of the days of Lot, describing in His own manner what took place in those days.[2] What He speaks of were indeed common features of life which could not have been wanting. What is striking is that He should describe these things for Himself and in His own way, instead of quoting from the Old Testament. And indeed what He describes was not written there. Moreover, in the description which our Lord gives of the days before the Flood, and of the days of Lot, respectively, there are little differences which show—if indeed we could have needed any

[1] St. John xvii. 5.

[2] St. Matt. xxiv. 38; St. Luke xvii. 26, 28. Cf. Gen. vi. 1–4; xiii. 10, 12, 13.

such assurance—that He is not speaking conventionally, but describing from His own knowledge. To the particulars of eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage—the hardly more than animal life of those before the Flood—He adds, in speaking of the days of Lot, touches indicating a more advanced civilization, though with no higher aspirations—"they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded."[1] And indeed we have other testimony, as we have seen,[2] to our Lord's knowledge of the people of Sodom. He knew not only what they actually were, what their life was, what their thoughts were, but also what under other circumstances they would have been. Knowledge of this latter kind is obviously based upon or rather includes (as the greater includes the less) complete knowledge of what people are. And this again is not separable from complete knowledge of their surroundings and of everything connected with their life or influencing their character. Such knowledge as this can come from nothing but direct vision. And all the evidence we have goes to show that, when our Lord spoke of these scenes and these people of ancient times, He spoke out of His human consciousness indeed, but a consciousness which drew or had drawn that which was communicated through it, directly from the Omniscience which was in Him. The human mind of our Lord had, if we may say so with reverence, been made to participate, in the manner and degree in which it was possible for a human mind to do so, in that absolute and direct vision of our Lord's Omniscience in which the entire contents of Past, Present, and Future were eternally seen.

And, when we turn from the Past to the Future, the conviction that this was indeed so is assuredly not lessened, but increases, as the fuller evidence which meets us here is pondered over. What our Lord was pleased to reveal concerning the Future was necessarily given in the form of prophecy. And of course both the contents and the form of His prophecies depended upon and were determined by our

[1] St. Luke xvii. 28.

[2] Above, pp. 371–373.

needs and not by His knowledge. He has not told us all that He knew. On the contrary, as we seat ourselves with the Apostles beside Him on the Mount of Olives, we cannot help feeling, as they evidently felt, that He Who is with us is not like one of the Prophets, who could indeed reveal what had been shown them, but withal were fain to search "what, or what manner of time"[1] the Spirit that testified within them might be signifying in the visions on which they looked; but that He is One Whose Vision is unlimited, reaching in time to the End of the World, and including all things that should be even until the End—and beyond the End. The depth of the Apostles' conviction of this may be measured by the fact that our Lord's saying respecting the Day and Hour of the Judgment was evidently understood by them as meaning that *they* were not to know this matter. Their conviction that He knew all things does not seem to have been at all lessened. For when our Lord said to them after the Resurrection, that "it was not for them to know the times or seasons which the Father had appointed"[2] and concealed, the impulse leading them to put the question which was thus answered, clearly rested upon a conviction still in their mind that, if the Lord willed, He certainly could tell them.

And when we consider the prophecies themselves, we find that they bear clear tokens that the impression which we cannot help sharing with the Apostles is a true one.

In the first place, there is a marked contrast between the manner in which the Prophets describe the visions of the future which are set before them, as things apart from themselves, and the manner in which our Lord speaks of all as being in His own hand, directed and controlled by Himself, and in which He is throughout present, though unseen, and at last to be manifested suddenly—manifested in a moment to all the world, coming in the clouds with power and great glory. When He speaks of the tribulation, He speaks of it as that which is His own appointment,[3] and which He, for

[1] 1 St. Pet. i. 11.

[2] Acts i. 7.

[3] St. Matt. xxiv. 22: κολοβωθήσονται αἱ ἡμέραι ἐκεῖναι. In St. Mark xiii. 20 it is still more specifically said—εἰ μὴ Κύριος ἐκολόβωσε τὰς ἡμέρας.

His elects' sake, will shorten. When He tells them how they will be brought before kings and rulers, He bids them not to be troubled or anxious beforehand as to how they should then answer for themselves—"For I (ἐγώ emphatic) will give you a mouth and wisdom."[1] A thoughtful writer,[2] whose loss is much to be regretted, has drawn attention to the striking resemblance which the Apocalypse bears in its general structure to this discourse of our Lord on "the last things." He points out the correspondence between the sections of the Apocalypse which describe severally the opening of the seals, the sounding of the trumpets, and the pouring out of the bowls, with successive portions of our Lord's discourse. In the Apocalypse, the substance of the discourse is, as he shows, amplified. Jesus Christ is, as we know, the Revealer by St. John as well as the Revealer to the Apostles. But whilst there is a correspondence in the substance, there is a marked difference in the manner of the two revelations. St. John, by whom our Lord reveals in the Apocalypse, bears witness of all things which are presented to him in vision, and which he sees. We look upon the visions through him. They are set before his spirit, and he interprets for us in the forms of human speech what he has seen. But his visions are quite apart from him; he himself is no part of them. It is quite otherwise in the Discourse. We cannot separate our Lord Himself from the things which He declares. His coming, the things which shall precede and prepare for His coming—the ἀρχὴ ὠδίνων —the possibility of His coming at any moment, are the burden of the whole discourse. Our Lord declares not what He sees in vision, but what He is, as it were, in the midst of. No one would ever dream of St. John being able to answer questions as to what had not been revealed to him; no one could ever doubt that the Lord upon the Mount of Olives could have answered any questions whatever.

[1] St. Luke xxi. 15.

[2] The late Professor Milligan; see his *Lectures on the Apocalypse*, pp. 42-59.

In the next place, it is to be observed that, though our Lord's purpose in these prophecies obliged Him to give for the most part only broad and general outlines, and to impress certain points strongly indeed but with a certain amount of disguise, His particularity of detail, where this obligation did not press, is quite as marked a feature in them as their otherwise enigmatical character. His general purpose cannot be mistaken. It clearly was to give such an answer to the questions of the Apostles as would convey the information, the warnings, and the encouragement which they and the Church in all time would require, but at the same time to convey this in such a form as not to take away from Christians of all ages the necessity of watchfulness. The condition of enlightenment from His words, in which each successive generation was to find itself, was to be such as to make it possible for them to expect His coming in their own time. But, without interfering with this general purpose, there were some points on which He could be, and on which (as we may presume to think) it was important that He should be, explicit. Nothing could be more definite than the picture which our Lord gave of the siege of Jerusalem; and the special sign which He gave,[1] warning the Christians who should be in the city, or in any part of Judæa, to flee at once to the mountains when it appeared, was, we know, recognized,[2] and the Lord's direction obeyed. In like manner the description of the signs of the End, and, more particularly, of the Coming of the Lord in glory with all the holy angels, and of the gathering of all the nations before Him, and the decisive separation of them into two companies—the company of the blessed on the right, and of the goats on His left hand

[1] St. Matt. xxiv. 15.

[2] Eus. *H. E.*, iii. 5. The difficulties of interpretation which are *now* felt by commentators do not touch the fact that a sign *was* given, and *was* seen and acted upon. It may have been that, as the words of Eusebius (*κατά τινα χρησμὸν τοῖς αὐτόθι δοκίμοις δι' ἀποκαλύψεως δοθέντα*) seem to imply, the attention of the heads of the Church in Jerusalem was *at the time of danger* divinely directed to the sign and the prophecy of it, in order that through them the whole body of the Christians in Judæa might be warned.

—could hardly have been more vividly given or with more distinct particularity, had that which is spoken of been actually present. One point only is reserved—the day and hour of the End—just as the exact time when Jerusalem would be encompassed with the Roman armies is not told; but what shall immediately precede that decisive point of time—even that sign of the Son of Man, which, when it shall appear, will assuredly be unmistakable—and what shall immediately follow, is all set before us, not in the dim outlines of prophetic vision, but, as it were, *in presenti*—in the clear light of day.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SAYING RESPECTING THE DAY AND HOUR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT.

THIS saying presents a remarkable contrast in one particular to any sayings of our Lord recorded elsewhere in the Gospels. In this one instance, and in this one instance only, He states that there is a matter—the matter of which He is speaking—which He does not know. In what sense our Lord makes this statement we must, of course, carefully examine. But the very fact of His making it at all is strikingly significant. If He had been—as some have not shrunk from affirming that He was—"ignorant of many things," is it likely that He would have called attention, in the very pointed manner in which He does so here, to the fact that there was one matter which He did not know? Did He not, by so doing, all but declare that this was the only particular of which He could speak of Himself as being in any way ignorant? The very least that can be said is that, as regards any other supposed instances of ignorance, we ought to be very sure indeed that we have not mistaken their meaning, before we venture to affirm anything of the kind respecting One Who could speak as our Lord speaks here. And we have already seen that, in most of the instances which have been brought forward, the arguments for interpreting them as proofs of ignorance are of very little weight. In some they are hardly even plausible; and in no one instance is there anything like proof of the intention of the passage being to affirm ignorance.

However, in the passage now before us, our Lord distinctly states that, in some sense or other, He did not know,

at any rate at the time when He was speaking, the Day and Hour of the Final Judgment. On account, therefore, both of the importance of the Saying itself in reference to our present subject, and on account also of the great diversity of views which have been held as to what our Lord did precisely mean—a diversity which is all the more remarkable when it is contrasted with the unanimity of judgment as to what He did *not* mean—it is clearly indispensable that we should examine as carefully as possible the precise import of the terms which the Lord was pleased to employ in making this statement.

The Saying is recorded by two of the Evangelists, St. Matthew and St. Mark. It will be well to give their respective texts first, with the Revised Version of each, and then to notice any differences of reading.

St. Matt. xxiv. 36: Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης καὶ ὥρας οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι τῶν οὐρανῶν, [οὐδέ ὁ υἱός,] εἰ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ μόνος. R.V.: "*But of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven, neither the Son, but the Father only.*"

In the margin of the R.V. it is stated that, "Many authorities, some ancient, omit "*neither the Son.*"

St. Mark xiii. 32: Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἢ τῆς ὥρας οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι ἐν οὐρανῷ, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ. R.V.: "*But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.*"

There are no variations of reading in the text of St. Mark. In that of St. Matthew the following require notice:—

1. It cannot be said that there is certain evidence respecting the words οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός, *neither the Son*, in that Gospel. Westcott and Hort speak of the "documentary evidence" in favour of them as "overwhelming." But it has not appeared so to all critics. Alford, for example, judged of the evidence differently. The marginal note of the Revisers shows that it did not appear so to them, although they felt justified in placing the words in the text. In the

Bishop of Salisbury and Mr. White's valuable edition of the Vulgate the words *neque filius* are not read. They are also absent in the recently discovered Sinaitic palimpsest.[1] On the whole, the evidence seems to be insufficient to found any argument upon.

2. The *Textus Receptus* and the A.V. both have "*My* Father," in the last words of the verse. But the word μου, *My*, has certainly no claim to a place in the text. This is a point of some importance. For "My Father" and "the Father" have not precisely the same meaning.

3. The word μόνος, *only*, appears in the text of St. Matthew, but not in that of St. Mark. The fact is of importance not as a variation of reading, but as a help towards seeing what our Lord meant by the expression "the Father," as will be noticed presently.

The meaning of the Saying obviously depends, in the first place, upon the sense in which the designation "the Son" is used, and, in the second place, upon the qualifying force of the terms in which the statement about "the Son" is made. It is evident that a statement made as it is here made by our Lord, is a very different thing from a plain, unqualified, declaration that He knew not this particular. The mode of the statement is not less remarkable than the statement itself. We can only arrive, therefore, at the true meaning of the statement by investigating the form, carefully chosen as we cannot doubt by our Lord, in which it is presented.

I.

The title "the Son" stands in contrast on the one hand with our Lord's not infrequent use of the first person, and on the other hand with His designation of Himself on particular occasions as "the Son of Man," or as "the Son of God." All these designations are so introduced as to place it beyond doubt that each is employed with a definite intention. When

[1] See Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 84, note 1.

the first person is used, attention is concentrated (of course more emphatically when the ἐγώ is expressed[1]) upon the Person: when the third person is used, it is not to the Person exclusively or even principally that attention is called, but to some character or relation belonging to the Person. Thus in the great question addressed by our Lord to the disciples in the neighbourhood of Cæsarea Philippi, "Whom do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?" there seems to be half disclosed in that "I"—expressed in the Greek objectively by με—the whole mystery of His Divine Personality, whilst the contrasting words, "the Son of Man," point in their turn to His "taking of the Manhood into God," and so becoming God Incarnate. Light is thrown in the one case upon His very Self, and in the other upon that Self as being Incarnate.

Again, when at one time the Lord speaks of Himself as "the Son of God," at another as "the Son of Man," at another as "the Son," we cannot doubt that it is His intention to direct our thoughts on each occasion to *different* truths about Himself. When He speaks of Himself as "the Son of God," He leads us to think of His consubstantiality with the Father; and, in like manner, of His consubstantiality with us, when He uses the title "the Son of Man"; —this latter title also marking Him out as a Second Head and Representative of Mankind.

What, then, is the title "the Son" intended to denote? What does it lead our thoughts to? Is it not to our Lord's character as the One Mediator between God and man, which had for its foundation His being consubstantial with both? It must be primarily to what He became in virtue of the double consubstantiality, not primarily to the underlying Personality itself, though of course there is always a tacit reference to that, and sometimes may be a more distinct reference to it. *Primarily* the reference must be to the

[1] "In no instance do we find these pronouns (ἐγώ, σύ, ἡμεῖς, etc.) expressed where no emphasis rests upon them." Winer, *Gr. of N.T.*, p. 190 (Moulton).

character, since we cannot suppose that "the Son" is simply equivalent to "I." When our Lord says "I," He speaks out of the fulness of His Person as God Incarnate: when He speaks of Himself as "the Son," the Speaker is the same, God Incarnate; but He then directs attention not to His Person as God Incarnate, but to what through the Incarnation He has come to be, viz., God Incarnate present with men as the Mediator. And this reference may very well be to any of the functions of His Mediatorial office—to His function as the Revealer, or the Reconciler, or the High Priest and King. To which of these He is referring must be determined from the context.

The way was prepared for this use of the title, "the Son," as expressive of our Lord's Mediatorial character and Office, by its usage in the second Psalm, which, perhaps for this reason, is so often referred to in the New Testament.[1] Whatever may be the proper rendering of the words translated "Kiss the Son" in ver. 12, there can be no doubt that the basis is laid of the prophetic picture which is given of the Mediatorial Kingdom of our Lord, and of His Intercession as Priest upon His Throne, in the words of ver. 7, "Thou art My Son; this day have I begotten Thee." And, indeed, such a Mediatorial Title was evidently required—a title which, embracing both the Godhead and the Manhood of our Redeemer, should exhibit the latter in its union with the former, and so point Him out as constituted to be all that we understand when we speak of Him as our Mediator. "By the use of the absolute term *the Son*" (says Bishop Westcott),[2] "St. John brings out distinctly what is involved in the fact that the Christ and Jesus are personally one. There is no passage in the mind of the Apostle from one

[1] See St. Luke iii. 22, according to some MSS.; Acts iv. 25; xiii. 33; Heb. i. 5; v. 5. Probably there is a reference to it in St. John i. 49; in St. Matt. xvi. 16 by St. Peter; xxvi. 63 by the High Priest. Cf. St. John vi. 69; Apoc. ii. 27; xii. 5; xix. 15. And see Westcott on Heb. i. 5, and Dean Johnson (in *Speaker's Commentary*) on Ps. ii., and Kirkpatrick, *The Psalms*, vol. i. p. 7 (Cambridge Bible for Schools).

[2] On 1 St. John ii. 22.

personality to another, from the human to the divine, nor yet from the conception of 'the man Christ Jesus' to that of 'the Word:' the thought of 'the Son' includes both these conceptions in their ideal fulness."

The title "The Son" is found (1) in the Synoptic Gospels in three passages,[1] (2) in six passages of the Fourth Gospel,[2] (3) in six passages of the Epistles.[3] There are besides important passages[4] in which the designation "My Son" occurs, which throw light upon the sense of "The Son;" and still more numerous ones in which "His Son" is found,[5] sometimes alone, sometimes with the addition of an emphatic word, *e.g.*, Rom. viii. 3, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱόν; or τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ, Rom. viii. 32; or τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ, Col. i. 13; or, again, with the fuller "Jesus Christ His Son." The passages, moreover, not very numerous, in which "A Son" occurs, are useful for comparison.[6]

With these passages before us, we may with confidence make the following statements:—

1. The meaning of the indirect expression "The Son" is never simply equivalent to that of the directly personal "I." It would be contrary to the natural usage of language if it were. This may be seen in any of the passages in which our Lord passes from the one form of expression to the other. For example, in St. John v. 17–30, He begins and ends with the directly personal and emphatic "I." In the intermediate verses the "I" is dropped and "the Son" is introduced. What can be clearer than that the intention of the

[1] St. Matt. xi. 27 (St. Luke x. 22); St. Mark xiii. 32; St. Matt. xxviii. 19.

[2] St. John iii. 17; iii. 35, 36; v. 19 *sqq.*; vi. 40; viii. 35, 36; xiv. 13.

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 28; Heb. i. 8; 1 St. John ii. 22, 23, 24; iv. 14; v. 12; 2 St. John 9.

[4] St. Matt. ii. 15 Quot.; iii. 17 (St. Mark i. 11, St. Luke iii. 22); xvii. 5 (St. Mark ix. 7, St. Luke ix. 35); 2 St. Pet. i. 17; Acts xiii. 33 Quot.; Heb. i. 5 Quot.; v. 5 Quot.

[5] St. John iii. 16, 17, 18; Rom. i. 3, 9; v. 10; viii. 3, 29, 32; 1 Cor. i. 9; Gal. i. 16; iv. 4, 6; Col. i. 13; 1 Thess. i. 10; 1 St. John i. 3, 7; iv. 9, 10; v. 9. 10, 11, 20; 2 St. John 3.

[6] St. Matt. i. 21, 23 Quot.; St. Luke i. 32, 35; St. John x. 36; Heb. i. 2, 5 (LXX.); iii. 6; v. 8; vii. 28.

Speaker in these intermediate verses is to bring forward truths concerning Himself which were not expressed by the "I"?

2. By this title, "The Son," is designated God Incarnate the Mediator and, indeed, all that God the Second Person of the Eternal Trinity has by His Incarnation come to be to men. In one passage, it is true, namely, in the solemn words of the Baptismal Formula, the expression appears to denote God the Son simply in His eternal relation to the Father. But in every other instance our Lord appears to be speaking of Himself, or to be spoken of, not simply in reference to His Eternal Sonship, but in reference to what was in Him and belonged to Him as God the Son Incarnate, present among men and one with them as their Mediator. This is generally indicated clearly enough, either by some expression applicable only to the *Incarnate* Son, or by its being evident that what is said applies more properly and with more force to the Son as Incarnate than simply to the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. Thus, in St. John vi. 40, when our Lord says, "This is the will of Him that sent Me" [R.V. *of My Father*] "that every one that beholdeth the Son, and believeth on Him, should have eternal life," it is plain that the sight of faith which is spoken of has for its object our *Incarnate* Lord, with all the fulness of life and salvation which is in Him as Incarnate. If additional proof were required, it would be found in such passages as Rom i. 1–4, where the Apostle unfolds the meaning of εὐαγγέλιον περὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ (see Liddon, *Epist. to the Rom.*, p. 3 *sq.*), as having relation both to the Manhood, and to the Holy, superhuman Being of "Jesus Christ our Lord."

3. To what part of the whole contents of meaning covered by the title "The Son" reference is intended in each passage where the title is used, we must ascertain from the context. It is not always the whole contents, personal and official, which the use of the title is intended to bring before the mind. In one remarkable instance, viz., 1 Cor. xv. 28, what is personal is almost wholly dropped, and the Lord is spoken

of almost exclusively as Mediator, and in respect of His Mediatorial sovereignty. For it is only in respect of His Mediatorial sovereignty that He will deliver up the Kingdom to God, even the Father, and be subject unto Him. His Kingdom, as far as it has a Mediatorial character, and was established for Mediatorial purposes, will, when these purposes have been completely fulfilled, come to an end. But, otherwise, "He shall reign for ever and ever,"[1] and, as the Fathers at Constantinople expressed this truth as an addition to the Nicene Creed to guard against the heresy of Marcellus of Ancyra, His "Kingdom shall have no end." What is to be observed most frequently as intended by the title "The Son," is that the Speaker declares what He is stating to be true of Himself as being the Son, that is to say, *as being God Incarnate,* present among men as Saviour, Revealer, Lawgiver. Thus, in St. John v. 17–30, the statements concerning "the Son" both explain and justify the saying which offended the Jews, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." They explain it as being true of Himself as God the Son Incarnate. It is not only in His eternal relation to the Father within the Godhead that He has life in Himself, but also as the Incarnate Saviour present among men. They justify and exhibit the ground or reason of what He affirmed, by showing the unspeakably close connection and union of Himself as Incarnate with the Father, a connection including equality of knowledge and equality of power. There is a like undercurrent of thought in St. Matt. xi. 27–30. The ground of the great invitation "Come unto me, and I" (ἐγώ) "will give you rest," is given in ver. 27, in which the power of the Speaker, the *Incarnate* Son, to reveal, and by revealing to lead men into that knowledge of the only True God which is life eternal, is made known. It is as if He said, "I, Who am amongst you visibly, I, Whom you behold as Man, can indeed give you what I promise, and why? because My Being as Son is not only such as you see, but in its

[1] Rev. xi. 15. See Pearson *On the Creed*, pp. 283, 284, with the note (ed. Chevallier, p. 530).

innermost reality has Its seat in the very heart and depth of the Godhead." It is putting in another form what we read in St. John i. 18, "The only begotten Son, Which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."

It seems, then, that the title "the Son" is used principally in these two ways, each of which may include certain minor modifications of meaning. It is used, first, to connect what is affirmed, with God the Son *as Incarnate*. It is used, secondly, when an affirmation is meant to be made concerning Him in respect of what, by His having united manhood with the Godhead in Himself, He has come to be.

Turning now to St. Mark xiii. 32, let us see what light is thrown upon the intention of our Lord in speaking of Himself as "the Son" in that passage, by what we have ascertained respecting the usage of the title on other occasions.

In the first place it is abundantly clear that His intention could not have been the same as if He had said, "I do not know the Day and Hour." This is clear not only because there is no instance in which, where "the Son" is used, we can regard it as simply equivalent to "I," but also because in this very passage our Lord passes from the first person, in which He had been speaking, to the third, a change which we cannot possibly doubt was not made without a distinct purpose and intention.

Can we then — since the personal reference must be regarded as not being that which our Lord chiefly intended — can we, bringing into comparison the remarkable statement concerning "the Son" in 1 Cor. xv. 28, suppose that our Lord meant to say that in His Official character as Mediator, and in that character only, He knew not this secret? There is much which is plausible in this view. But when it is thoroughly weighed it will be seen that it cannot be maintained. In the first place the two passages are in one important particular not quite parallel: the one is a statement made by the inspired Apostle concerning our Lord; the other is a statement made by Himself. In the second place the conviction recurs with ever fresh force that our Lord

would not have used a mode of expression which, though far from equivalent to saying "I do not know," does nevertheless intimate that in some way or other He was really ignorant of this secret, unless it had been at least part of His purpose to declare this.

We seem, then, so far, to arrive at this conclusion, that the sense in which our Lord predicates ignorance here, lies somewhere between two extremes. It is not on the one hand *simply* official ignorance: it is not on the other hand such *unqualified* personal ignorance as would have been conveyed if He had said in direct terms "I do not know this." Further than this it seems that the examination of the title "the Son" will not by itself carry us. We must now look to the terms which accompany this remarkable declaration, and by which it is guarded and qualified.

II.

The first point to be noted in these accompanying terms is the use of εἰ μή and not ἀλλά in the statement respecting the Father. "Neither the Son," our Lord says, "but (εἰ μή) the Father." There is a good deal of difference in the meaning of these two prepositional forms, though both must have been translated here by the same English word "but." There is an exceptive and qualifying force in εἰ μή, which is altogether wanting in ἀλλά. "Ἀλλά," says Winer,[1] "expresses proper and sharp opposition, annulling something which has gone before, or indicating that no attention is to be paid to it." If ἀλλὰ had been used here, the affirmation of ignorance on the part of all those previously specified would have been absolute. "The Son" would then have been excluded from any kind of knowledge of this secret. On the other hand, the use of εἰ μὴ gives room for the supposition, if it does not actually require it, that some qualification of the foregoing statement is in the Speaker's mind. "The gloss εἰ μὴ =

[1] *Gr. of N. T.*, p. 551 (Moulton).

ἀλλά (says Bishop Ellicott[1]) can be distinctly impugned in even what seem the strongest passages, *e.g.*, Matt. xii. 4, 1 Cor. vii. 17. . . . The first *distinct* evidences of this interchange appear only in very late writers."

To what, then, and to whom, does the exceptive force of εἰ μή relate? In regard to the second of these questions, it is to be observed that the use of the negative particles οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ and not οὔτε . . . οὔτε in the preceding part of the verse points to the fact that those who are specified as not knowing are not regarded as closely connected members of one class (which would have been intimated if οὔτε . . . οὔτε had been used), but on the contrary as quite loosely connected together.[2] This leaves it open to us to regard the εἰ μή as having a special reference to the last of those who are mentioned as not knowing, that is to say, to "the Son."

In order to see to *what* the exceptive force of εἰ μή relates, we must consider what is intended by the title "the Father." Except where, as in the Baptismal Formula, there is particular mention of the Three Persons of the Eternal Trinity, it seems doubtful whether "the Father" is ever used to denote the First Person *as distinguished from* the Second and the Third. It is employed to denote the Triune God, partly, as it would seem, because the Father as the ΑΡΧΗ of the Godhead naturally includes the Second and the Third Persons together with Himself, partly because the Triune God is, in the New Testament revelation, set before us in the fulness of the Fatherly relation. At any rate the fact is clear that this title, "The Father," does frequently denote the Triune God. Thus in St. John iv. 21–23, where our Lord speaks of the time being come for true worship, He does not say that the

[1] On Gal. i. 7. Compare Lightfoot on this verse and on i. 19; Meyer on St. Matt. xii. 4 and 1 Cor. vii. 17, as well as on Gal. i. 7; Evans (in *Speaker's Com.*) on 1 Cor. vii. 17; and Winer, *Gr. of N. T.*, p. 566 (Moulton). All these scholars maintain that in the N. T. εἰ μή is never simply equivalent to ἀλλά. But see also Mayor, *Epist. of St. James*, p. xii. *sq.*

[2] See Winer, *Gr. of N. T.*, p. 613, and the words of Franke ("non apte connexa, sed potius fortuito concursu accedentia") quoted there in note 3.

true worshippers shall worship *God* in spirit and in truth, but that they shall worship *the Father*—His meaning being, we may presume to think, that true spiritual worship shall henceforth be offered to God, now revealed as Triune, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and as standing towards men in all the blessed relation of Fatherhood. He, of course, cannot mean that worship should be offered to the First Person of the Eternal Trinity only. Again, when our Lord says that no one knoweth the Son but the Father, He cannot possibly be understood as meaning the Father as distinguished from the Holy Ghost. If by "the Son" He means Himself as God Incarnate, and so, *as an object of thought*, distinguished from the Triune God, the sense of that passage (St. Matt. xi. 27) comes out with perfect clearness. And there is ample justification for so taking it, for in the Epistles this distinction is frequently made. "To us," says St. Paul, "there is but One God, the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ"[1]—evidently setting before us first the Triune God, the Father, including our Lord as the Second Person of the Eternal Trinity; and, as a second object of thought, the Same as Incarnate and in a special sense our Lord. Many more instances might, if it were necessary, be given.[2]

We seem, then, to be quite at liberty to take "the Father" in the passage we are examining, as meaning the Triune God. "The title 'my Father' as used by the Lord marks the special relation of God to the Son Incarnate."[3] This special relation it is evidently not our Lord's object here to give prominence to. The contrast, which is not explicitly stated but which does seem to be indirectly conveyed, is between Himself the Incarnate Son as Man, and the Triune God with Whom as God He is one. The addition of the word "only" in St. Matthew, since it cannot be taken as meaning that the knowledge of this matter was confined to the First Person of

[1] 1 Cor. viii. 6.

[2] See the Apostolic salutation 1 Cor. i. 3 and parallels. Compare 1 Cor. iii. 23 with xii. 12, Tit. ii. 13, and 2 St. Pet. i. 1. See also 1 Tim. ii. 5, and the remarkable passages, 1 Thess. iii. 11, 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17.

[3] Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, p. 30.

the Holy Trinity, appears to emphasize the contrast between our Lord's not knowing it as man and knowing it as God.

As pointing in the same direction, our Lord's placing Himself on a line of comparison with angels and with men should not be overlooked; for only in respect of His Manhood could such comparison be possible. And, again, though He did not say to the disciples on this occasion as He did on a later one, "It is not for you to know," He did say to them "Watch, for ye know not." The "ye" is not emphatic, the ὑμεῖς being not expressed, but it is impossible not to feel that there is a tacit contrast conveyed between them and Himself. And that the disciples felt this seems to be shown not only by their putting to our Lord after His Resurrection the question which drew from Him the reply, "It is not for you to know," but also from that express statement which they made very shortly after the Saying about the Day and Hour, in which the conviction which had evidently been long growing up in their minds, and which as evidently had not been changed or shaken by this Saying, was unmistakably declared, "Now are we sure that Thou knowest all things."[1]

On the whole the conclusion seems fully justified that both by the terms employed, and by the manner in which our Lord was pleased to make this declaration, He did convey, and probably was understood to convey, that though in a certain sense He was really at the time ignorant of this secret, He was not so ignorant absolutely. It may be asked, Why, if it was our Lord's intention to signify that it was solely as Man that He knew not this matter, did He not use the title "the Son of Man" instead of "the Son," and so intimate that He was speaking of Himself in respect of His humanity only? The answer seems to be very clear. The title "the Son," especially in connection with the terms which accompany and guard it, does intimate a human ignorance only, but it also conveys something more, viz., that the communication of this secret was not included in the revelation which as the Son (the Mediator, and Revealer)

[1] St. John xvi. 30.

He was commissioned to impart. This double purpose was fulfilled by the use of the title "the Son;" it would not have been if our Lord had said "the Son of Man."

A question has been raised respecting the reconciliation of this statement with our Lord's perfect truthfulness. It ought to be remembered that the fact of the truthfulness of a statement not appearing at once upon the surface, but lying somewhat concealed beneath it is, even in other cases, no impeachment of the truthfulness. And in the case of our Lord's deep Sayings (in which, as in this instance, His exact meaning, not being probably capable of being explicitly expressed, is in itself hard to grasp,) it is no wonder that the perfect truthfulness which we know there must be in them, should not be manifest at once, as it is in utterances concerning plainer matters. And here, in a Saying in which the mystery of the relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His human mind was necessarily involved, it can be no matter of surprise that our Lord did not state in explicit terms what, if it had been so stated, could not have been comprehensible to His hearers. But, if the view of the relation between our Lord's human mind and His Omniscience which has been maintained in this Treatise is accepted as correct, it will be found that His perfect truthfulness in this Saying may be quite clearly seen. For, according to this view, He at every moment of His earthly life both knew after the (to us unknown) manner which belongs only to God, and also after that manner of knowing to which every human mind is by its structure confined. The two modes of knowing were coexistent in Him without any confusion or amalgamation of one with the other. In His personal appropriation of human consciousness our Lord did not carry with Him into that sphere the Omniscience which was nevertheless inseparable from Him as God. Therefore, though at that very moment, as always, His Omniscience embraced all things, He could with perfect truth declare that this secret was not then present to His human consciousness. It was simple fact that it was not.

One other point requires notice. Why, it may be asked, was the communication of this matter withheld from our Lord's human mind? It is just possible that it is a matter the knowledge of which a human mind is by its very structure incapable of receiving.[1] This, however, does not seem a very probable supposition. It seems more likely that our Lord willed in this one instance to give proof that, as in all other points his human nature was true human nature, corresponding in all respects (except that sin had no place within it) with ours, so His human consciousness also was strictly, as regards its structure and any limitations entailed thereby, on a level with, and of the same character as, ours. The actual knowledge which His human mind possessed was indeed far beyond ours. The perfect truth of His Manhood was not affected by this. But if His mind had been *structurally* different from our minds, if it had been capable of Omniscience, if the distinctive barriers between Omniscience and human consciousness had in our Lord been broken down, if the essential difference between God's Knowing and man's knowing had not been maintained in Him Who was both God and Man, then the truth of the Incarnation would have been as effectually overthrown as if His whole human nature had been unreal. Therefore, we may suppose, our Lord withheld the communication of this one particular from His human mind in order that its human verity might be thereby conclusively manifested. One instance was quite enough to establish this, just as the one statement that He increased in wisdom was enough to show that the law of growth, the essential law of human nature, was followed in Him as it is in us. If there had been many instances of the like kind, an impression might have been conveyed that the Lord was in very truth "ignorant of many things." If there had been no instance, the contrary supposition

[1] See Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.*, p. 426. Compare, in the *Ch. Quart. Rev.*, vol. xxxiii. p. 30, the concluding words of the article on "Our Lord's Knowledge as Man." But, from Acts i. 7, it has generally been thought that our Lord had then at any rate received the knowledge of this particular into His human mind.

that He was not only Omniscient as God, but practically omniscient even in His human mind—a supposition towards which in mediæval times there was a strong leaning—would have had nothing effectually to confute it. As it is, this one instance is sufficient to establish the verity of His human mind as not going beyond the laws by which human minds are controlled and limited, whilst the general Gospel picture leads us to suppose that all which a human mind is capable of receiving may have been actually communicated to the mind of our Incarnate Lord.

The conclusion, then, to which exegetical examination of this mysterious and carefully worded statement of our Lord appears to lead is that He intended by it to convey, in the manner best suited to the condition of thought of those whom He was addressing, two truths, which He was pleased to connect and blend together in one form of expression. These truths were (1) that the knowledge of the actual Day and Hour of the Final Judgment was not part of the revelation which, as "the Son," He was commissioned to make; (2) that—on this account, as we may venture to suppose, and perhaps also for the reason just mentioned—the knowledge of this particular had not been communicated to His human mind, and therefore at that time He, humanly, did not know it, although, as one with the Father, He knew it Divinely and eternally, after that manner of knowing from which human knowing stands quite apart and separate, since it is the manner of knowing which can belong to none but God.

III.

As has been already remarked, the interpretations which have been suggested of this unique Saying have been very numerous. No one of them can be regarded as being exclusively the Church's interpretation, either on account of formal sanction having been given to it, or on account of its having been tacitly accepted throughout the Church in every age. Only in regard to one point can there be said to be

unanimity of judgment, viz., this, that our Lord could not possibly have meant to say, and that His words cannot be interpreted as meaning, that He was absolutely, not only as man, but also as God, ignorant of this secret, since He is equally with the Father Omniscient, and Omniscience must be both all-inclusive and eternal. On this point there has always been entire unanimity in the Church. Indeed the most prominent feature in the interpretations which have been suggested is that they are all evidently framed with a view to explaining our Lord's words in some manner which would involve no infringement upon His Divine Omniscience.

A detailed discussion of the interpretations which have been proposed would occupy considerable space and cannot be given in this chapter. In the volume which, as has been mentioned in the Preface, the writer hopes to publish before long, the object of which will be to exhibit the mind of the Church concerning the subject of this Treatise, the approaches which at different times have been made towards comprehending the relation of our Lord's human mind to His Omniscience, and the points of view from which this difficult question has been successively regarded, a full description of the interpretations of this Saying will be properly in place. Here, however, it may be useful to give a short account of these interpretations, classified in a summary form, if only in order to show that the explanation which has been given in this chapter is not out of harmony, but on the contrary is in substantial agreement, with at least the general mind of the Church on this subject. This is perhaps as much as could be expected, either as regards the interpretation of this passage, or as regards the whole subject of the relation between our Lord's Omniscience and His human consciousness. The saying of St. Bernard, "Si quid dictum est præter Patres, quod non sit contra Patres: nec Patribus arbitror, nec cuiquam displicere debere," seems in a matter which has never been fully thought out or authoritatively determined, to give the full measure of what should reasonably be required.

Taking them in chronological order the explanations of

St. Matt. xxiv. 36, and St. Mark xiii. 32, which have been successively proposed, are the following[1]:—

I. *Our Lord's intention in this saying was not to affirm that He Himself did not know this secret, but to assign to the Father pre-eminence in knowing it, seeing that the Father communicates eternally to the Son all knowledge as well as all Being.*

S. Irenæus. *Cont. Hær.*, II. xxviii. 6, 8. Migne, *Patrol. Græc.*, vii. 808 c, 811 a, b.

This is most probably the view of St. Irenæus. See esp. Waterland, *Defence of Queries*, Qu. vii. (*Works*, vol. i. 332–337, ed. Van Mildert). Others have thought that he meant that our Lord did not know this as Man.

S. Basil. M. *Epist.* (Ad Amphiloch.) ccxxxvi. 1. Migne, *P. G.*, xxxii. 876, 877 a. See Nos. II., VI., VIII.

S. Amphilochius. *Sentent. et Excerpt.*, vi. *P. G.*, xxxix. 194 a.

Didymus. *De Trin.*, III. xxii. *P. G.*, xxxix. 920 b.

S. Greg. Naz. *Orat. Theol.*, iv. § 16. *P. G.*, xxxvi. 124 c.

St. Gregory puts this explanation second. See below, No. II.

S. Greg. M. *Epist.*, Lib. x., Ep. xxxix. *Ad Eulogium.*, *P. L.*, lxxvii. 1097 b.

"Unde et pater solus dicitur scire, quia consubstantialis ei filius, ex ejus natura qua est super angelos, habet ut hoc sciat quod angeli ignorant." See Nos. IV. and IX.

Photius. *Ad Amphiloch.*, Qu. cxlv. *P. G.*, ci. 672 c.

Photius mentions this explanation, but prefers No. II.

[1] The writer is indebted for the reference to Sozomen (p. 430) to the Rev. H. De Romestin's *Letter to Canon Carter*, "How knoweth this Man letters?" p. 27; and for that to St. Greg. Nyss., *De Deit. Fil. et Spir. S.*, (p. 426) to Macaire, *Théol. Dogm. Orthod.*, ii. 110.

Walafrid Strabo. *Gloss. Ord. in Marc.* xiii. 32. *Patrol. Lat.*, cxiv. 228 c.

"(Hilar.) Filius et Spir. S., quia non sunt a se, de die illa nesciunt a se: Pater autem, quia a se est, scit a se." This is not an explanation given by St. Hilary of Poitiers. Perhaps the Hilary intended is Hilary the Deacon.

Maldonatus, *in Matt.* xxiv. 36.

Maldonatus refers the knowledge of the Day to the Father especially, because the appointments of Providence are in an especial manner His.

II. *Our Lord knew this as God, but not as Man.*

Tertullian. *Adv. Prax.*, c. xxvi. *P. L.*, ii. 189 d.

This is probably Tertullian's view. See Waterland, *Def. of Qu.*, Qu. xxvi. *Works*, vol. i. 516, *sq.* ed. Van Mildert.

Origen. *Comm. Ser. in Matt.* § 55. *P. G.*, xiii. 1686 c.

"Nihil ergo mirum est," says Origen, "si hoc *solum* nescivit ex omnibus." He proceeds to point out that *post dispensationem* our Lord seems to know it. See Nos. III., IV.

S. Eustathius *apud* Facund. *Def. Tr. Capp.*, xi. 1. *P. L.*, lxvii. 795 a, b.

S. Athanasius. *Orat.* iii. c. *Ar.* § 43. *P. G.*, xxvi. 413 c.

ὡς μὲν Λόγος, γινώσκει, ὡς δὲ ἄνθρωπος, ἀγνοεῖ.

S. Hilar. Pict. *De Trin.*, ix. *fin.* (*P. L.*, x. 342 *sq.*); x. § 8 (*P. L.*, x. 348, 349, note j).

This view is found in these passages, at least in some MSS.; but it does not seem to be St. Hilary's own view. See No. VI.

S. Basil. M. *Epist.* ccxxxvi. 1 *fin.* *P. G.*, xxxii. 877 c.

S. Greg. Naz. *Orat. Theol.*, iv. § 15. *P. G.*, xxxvi. 124 b.

S. Greg. Nyss. *Adv. Apollinar.*, xxiv. (*P. G.*, xlv. 1176 a, b); xxviii. (*Ib.* 1185 a); *De. Deit. Fil. et Spir. S.* *P. G.*, xlvi. 564 b.

S. Hieron. *Adv. Pelag.*, ii. 14. *P. L.*, xxiii. 550 b.

St. Jerome's words here are remarkable. "Carnis infirmitas Deo habitatore gaudebat, et tamen mensuram fragilitatis suæ excedere non potuit, ut non τῷ δοκεῖν, juxta veteres hæreticos, sed vere Dei Filius hominis Filius crederetur." He is generally quoted as holding another view of the Saying. See No. VI. But he must have regarded this as at least a tenable explanation. The Rufinus whose "Fides" is mentioned just below was in all probability his pupil. Petrus Comestor (*Hist. Schol. in Evang.*, *c.* cxlii. *P. L.*, cxcviii. 1611 d) says, "Hieronymus respondit in minori breviario super Psalmos: Humanitas Filii dicit se ignorare finem mundi." This *breviarium* is probably not St. Jerome's, but may very well contain what he said.

Rufinus. "*Fides Rufini*," *apud. Append. Prim ad Prim. Part. Op. Mar. Mercat.* *P. L.*, xlviii. 247 a.

S. Cyril. Alex. *Com. in Matt.* xxiv. 36 (*P.G.*, lxxii. 445 a); *Thesaur. Assert.*, xxii. (*P. G.*, lxxv. 377 b).

St. Cyril wavers, evidently because he found it difficult to reconcile the plain statement of the Gospels with his view of the unity of our Lord's Person. Contrast his comment (*P. G.*, lxxii. 445 a), ὅσον δὲ ἦκεν εἰς ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ψευδομυθήσει οὐδαμῶς ὅταν λέγῃ καὶ μή εἰδέναι, with the following (*P. G.*, lxxv. 377 d): οἰκονομεῖ γάρ τοι Χριστὸς, μὴ εἰδέναι λέγων τὴν ὥραν ἐκείνην, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῶς ἀγνοεῖ. Compare also *Adv. Anthrop.*, c. xiv. (*P. G.*, lxxvi. 1101 b); *Ad. Reg. Orat. Alt.*, § 17 (*Id. ib.*, 1356 b); *De Trin.*,

Dial. vi. *fin.* (*P. G.*, lxxv. 1069 d, 1073 d). See also No. VI.

Theodoret. *Repr.* xii. *Capp. Cyr.*, c. iv. *P. G.*, lxxvi. 412 a, b.

Theodoret's words here are very remarkable. *Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἡ ἄγνοια, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ δούλου μορφῆς, τῆς τοσαῦτα κατ' ἐκεῖνο τοῦ καίρου γινωσκούσης, ὅσα ἡ ἐνοικοῦσα θεότης ἀπεκάλυψε.* Cf. *in Ps.* xv. [xvi.] 7 (*P. G.*, lxxx. 961 c): *παρὰ τῆς ἐνοικούσης θεότητος ἐσοφίζετο. Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ὢν καὶ Θεός, ἐσοφίζετο μὲν ὡς ἄνθρωπος, πηγὴ δὲ σοφίας ἦν ὡς Θεός.*

Leontius Byzant. *De Sectis*, Act. x. 3. *P. G.*, lxxxvi. 1264 a, b.

Leontius refers to those who explained this *κατ' οἰκονομίαν*, but evidently does not adopt this explanation. He regards the question as one concerning which *οὐ δεῖ πάνυ ἀκριβολογεῖν. Οὐδὲ ἡ σύνοδος* [Chalcedon] *τοιοῦτο ἐπολυπραγμόνησε δόγμα.* Yet *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Πατέρων, σχεδὸν δὲ πάντες, φαίνονται λέγοντες αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν.* And to this opinion he clearly inclines himself.

Photius. *Ad. Amphiloch.*, Qu. cxiv. *P. G.*, ci. 669 c, d; 677 b.

Photius gives other explanations, but evidently prefers this one. See Nos. II. and VII.

S. Bruno Ast. (*circ.* A.D. 1087) *Com. in. Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. L.*, clxv. 274 c.

He does not read *neque Filius* in St. Matt., but refers to St. Mark xiii. 32, and proceeds: "Magnum est igitur hoc secretum, quod nemo scit nisi Pater, id est virtus et sapientia Patris, quæ simul una et eadem est et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Sola ergo Trinitas, unus Deus, scit hoc secretum, quod ipse quoque Filius ignorat, secundum hoc quod homo est et filius hominis.

Si enim secundum hoc quod homo est, omnia sciret, nequaquam dictum esset 'Jesus autem crescebat sapientia et ætate coram Deo et hominibus.'"

III. *The Day and Hour could not be known as fixed, because they are not fixed, but determined conditionally only.*

Origen. *Comm. Ser. in Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. G.*, xiii. 1687 a.

Origen throws this out as a suggestion, not as a deliberate exposition.

IV. *As long as the Church, which is Christ's Body, knows this not, so long also may the Son, as Head of the Body, be said not to know it.*

Origen. *Comm. Ser. in Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. G.*, xiii. 1687 b, c.

Origen calls this exposition "*famosior.*"

Eulogius Alexand. Patr. *Apud Phot. Bibliothec.*, Cod. 230. *P. G.*, ciii. 1081 c.

κατὰ ἀναφοράν . . . οἷα τῆς κεφαλῆς οἰκειουμένης τὰ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος. See No. VI.

S. Greg. M. *Epist.* Lib. x., Ep. xxxix. *Ad. Eulogium. P. L.*, lxxvii. 1097 a.

"Omnino recte vestra sanctitas sensit quoniam non ad eumdem filium, juxta hoc quod caput est, sed juxta corpus ejus quod nos sumus, est certissime referendum."

S. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Qu. x. ad. 1.

Aquinas refers to this view of Origen's as a second possible explanation. See Nos. V., VI.

V. *By "the Son" is here meant not our Lord personally, but the whole Christian people as adopted in Him.*

S. Greg. Turon. *Prolog. ad. Hist. Eccles. Franc. P. L.*, lxxi. 163 a.

Rabanus Maurus. *In Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. L.*, cvii. 1078 c.

Rabanus quotes other explanations from different

Fathers, and then continues: "Legi quoque in cujusdam libro [possibly in Gregory of Tours] filium . . . non unigenitum, sed adoptivum, hoc est populum Christianum velle intelligi."

S. Thomas Aquinas. *Sum. Theol.*, Qu. III. x. ii. ad. 1. "Intelligendum de filio Dei adoptivo, non de Filio naturali." This is his third possible explanation.

VI. *Our Lord knew this both as God and as Man, but would not reveal it, because He was not commissioned to declare it, and because it was not expedient for us to know it. His saying that He knew it not meant that it was not amongst the things which He was commissioned to reveal.*

S. Hilar. Pict. *De Trin.*, ix. §§ 58. *P. L.*, x. 327–342.

S. Ambros. *De Fide*, Lib. v. cc. xvi., xvii., xviii. *P. L.*, xvi. 687–695.

S. Ephrem. Syr. *Select Works* (Oxf., 1847), *Rhythm* lxxvii. 5, 6; lxxviii. 4.

St. Ephrem's meaning is not quite clear. He may have understood the Saying according to No. II., but the translator (note d, p. 350, note t, p. 359) thinks it more probable that he took our Lord to mean that He knew, but would not declare it.

S. Basil. M. *Adv. Eunom.*, Lib. iv. *In illud. Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. G.*, xxix. 696 c.

Didymus. *De Trin.*, III. xxii. *P. G.*, xxxix. 917 b. His expression is that it was *προνοητικῶς ἀρνηθέν.*

S. Hieron. *In Matt.* xxiv. 36 (*P. L.*, xxvi. 181 c); *in Hos.* iii. 4, 5 (*P. L.*, xxv. 845 a).

S. Augustin. *Enarr. in Ps.* vi. i. (*P. L.*, xxxvi. 90); *in Ps.* xxxvi. 1 (*Id. ib.*, 355); *Serm.* xcvii. 1 (*Id.* xxxviii. 589); *De Trin.*, i. 12 (*Id.*, xlii. 837); *De Div. Quæst.*, Qu. lx. (*Id.* xl. 48).

Leporius. *Libell. Emend.*, § 10. *P. L.*, xxxi. 1229 c.

Since this Libellus was written under the direct influence of St. Augustine, the definiteness of the statement which Leporius made in it on this subject is remarkable. "Formerly," he said, "I answered objectors by saying that the Lord *secundum hominem ignorare.* Sed nunc . . . *anathematizo prolatam in hac parte sententiam:* quia dici non licet etiam secundum hominem ignorasse Dominum prophetarum."

Cassiodorus. *In Ps.* ix. 40. *P. L.*, lxx. 91, 92, a, b.

S. Chrysostom. *Hom. in Matt.* xxiv. 36. *P. G.*, lviii. 703 *sq.*

Fritzsche (*ad Marc.* xiii. 32) gives St. Chrysostom's view as "Jesum rem ignoravisse ut *hominem.*" Field, correcting this, says: "Fallitur. Nam Chrysostomi sententia hæc est: *Οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκονομίαν τινὰ ἀπεσίγησε.*"

Isidor. Pelus. *Epist.* Lib. i. 117. *P. G.*, lxxviii. 261 a.

S. Cyril. Alex. *Apol. cont. Theod. pro.* xii. *capp.* c. iv. *P. G.*, lxxvi. 416 c.

οἰκονομικῶς οἰκειοῦται τοῦτο . . . καί τοι . . . ἠγνοηκῶς οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ἅπαντα μετὰ τοῦ Πατρός.

Sozomen. *Hist. Eccles.*, vii. 17. *P. G.*, lxvii. 1465 a.

Eulogius. *Apud. Phot. Bibliothec.*, Cod. 230. *P. G.*, ciii. 1084 a.

τινὲς μὲν κατ' οἰκονομίαν εἰρῆσθαί φασιν.

Ven. Beda. *In Matt.* xxiv. 36 (*P. L.*, xcii. 104 d); *in Marc.* xiii. 32 (*Id. ib.*, 264 c, d).

S. Joan. Damasc. *De Hær.*, 85 (*P. G.*, xciv. 756 a, b) compared with *De Fid. Orthod.*, iii. 21 (*Id. ib.*, 1084 b).

Julianus Toletan. *Prognosticon*, Lib. iii. i. *P. L.*, xcvi. 497 b.

Alcuin. *De Fid. S. Trin.*, II. xii. (*P. L.*, ci. 31 c); *Adv. Felic.*, V. ix. (*P. L.*, ci. 196).

Theophylact. *In Matt.* xxiv. 36; *in Marc.* xiii. 32.

Meyer (*Kom. über Mark.* xiii. 32) writes: "Vict. Ant. u. Theophyl.: Er habe es als weiser Lehrer den Jüngern verschweigen wollen, obwohl er es gewusst habe."

Walafrid. Strabo. *Gloss. Ord. in Matt.* xxiv. 36 (*P. L.*, cxiv. 162 c); *in Marc.* xiii. 32 (*Id. ib.*, 228 b, c).

Haymo. *In* 1 *Thess.* v. 1. *P. L.*, cxvii. 773 c.

Petrus Lombard. *In Rom.* viii. 26. *P. L.*, cxci. 1447 c.

Gerhohus. *In Ps.* ix. 1. *P. L.*, cxciii. 753 c.

S. Thomas Aquinas. *Sum. Theol.*, III. Qu. x. ii. ad. 1. "Quia non facit scire." This is his first explanation.

VII. *The Father knows both when the Day and Hour will be, and knows also the Judgment itself practically, since He has already appointed the execution of it by the Son: but the Son, though He knows when the Judgment will be, does not know it also practically, since He has not yet executed it.*

S. Epiphanius. *Ancorat.*, §§ xix.–xxii. (*P. G.*, xliii. 51–59); *Adv. Hær.*, ii. §§ xliii.–xlvii. (*P. G.*, xlii. 269–276).

Cæsarius. *Dial. Quat.*, Qu. xv.–xxi. *P. G.*, xxxviii. 851 *sqq.*

Didymus. *Enar. in* 1 *Joan.* ii. 3, 4. *P. G.*, xxxix. 1780 b, c.

Didymus here explains the Son's *ignoratio judicii* as being a practical ignorance only. See No. VI.

S. Bernard. *De Grad. Hum.*, iii. 10. *P. L.*, clxxxii. 947 a, b.

"Etsi suæ divinitatis intuitu æque omnia . . . diem quoque illum palam habebat; non tamen ullis carnis suæ sensibus experiendo agnoverat." St. Bernard based this view originally upon the supposition (due to a slip of memory) that

the reading in St. Mark was "Filius hominis." He corrected the mistake of memory in a *Retractatio*, but maintained the explanation, saying, "Ex eo quod non veraciter posui, veram conatus sum approbare assertionem." It is remarkable that with "Filius hominis" (as he thought) before him, he should not have supposed our Lord to mean that He knew this not as Man, though He knew it as God.

Photius. *Ad Amphiloch.*, Qu. cxiv. *P. G.*, ci. 672 d, 673 a, b.

Photius says that he had heard from an old man an explanation which, according to his description of it, seems practically identical with that of Epiphanius. Photius does not mention Epiphanius, and does not himself adopt this explanation. See Nos. I. and II.

VIII. *By the Day and Hour is signified that absolute and final blessedness which consists in beholding God as He is. This vision and knowledge belongs only to God—to the Word as well as to the Father. In and by the Word we may at last attain it. The Saviour as Man does not possess this knowledge.*

S. Basil. M. *Epist. Class.* I., Ep. viii. 6, 7. *P. G.*, xxxii. 255–260.

St. Basil calls this a προσποιητὴ ἄγνοια (§ 6, p. 256 b). He also says that this was his second attempt to penetrate the meaning of the Saying, and invites any one who can to suggest a better interpretation (p. 260 b). See Nos. II., VI.

IX. *Our Lord knew this in His human mind, but not by the powers of His human mind.*

S. Greg. M. *Epist.* Lib. x., Ep. xxxix. *P. L.*, lxxvii. 1097 c.

"In natura quidem humanitatis novit diem et horam judicii, sed tamen hunc non ex natura humanitatis novit. Quod ergo in ipsa novit,

non ex ipsa novit, quia Deus homo factus . . . per deitatis suæ potentiam novit." . . . Diem ergo et horam judicii scit Deus et homo, sed ideo, quia Deus est homo;" (p. 1098 a). It is difficult to say which of the three interpretations which he gives (see Nos. I., IV.), St. Gregory thought the best. Perhaps this one. It is frequently referred to by later writers as *his* explanation. It will be seen that it very closely resembles the view of Theodoret (quoted above under No. II.), in making an ἀποκάλυψις to our Lord's human mind from His own Godhead necessary, though Theodoret concludes from our Lord's words that this revelation was *not* made, and Gregory assumes that it was.

The first thing that strikes one, on reviewing this remarkable series of explanations of the Saying, is that no one of them has attained anything like universal recognition or been authoritatively stamped with the approval of the Church. How far we are from having any real *consensus Patrum* in respect of any of the interpretations proposed may be easily seen from this one fact, that throughout the centuries we find Fathers and theologians constantly putting forward two or more interpretations as having an almost equal claim to acceptance. At the present time in our own Anglo-Catholic Communion there is probably a very general agreement in one point, viz., that our Lord meant to affirm and did affirm that as Man He did not at the time when He was speaking know this secret. There is certainly not less general agreement that in His Omniscience our Lord most assuredly did at that time, as always, know it. Respecting this point, indeed, there is now and always has been a real *consensus* in the whole Church. But, as regards the point that our Lord as Man knew not this particular, it is probably felt by most theologians that though this is certainly true, and certainly forms one element in the exposition of the passage,

nevertheless more than the acknowledgment of this is required to fulfil the conditions of a thoroughly satisfactory interpretation.

As regards the Roman Communion and the condition of opinion within it on this subject, it may be sufficient to refer to the comparatively recent Treatise on the Incarnation by a distinguished theologian, Cardinal Franzelin. In this treatise the conclusion of the writer—and it may be presumed that he is expressing what he believes to be the accepted view in the Roman Church—is stated briefly in these words:[1] "Explicationes . . . verborum Christi revocantur ad tres." He proceeds to describe these three as being (1) the view that our Lord knew but was not commissioned to declare this secret, and meant no more than this when He said that He did not know it; (2) that it was a thing which no created mind, as such, could comprehend, and that therefore our Lord's human mind, *secundum meram suam essentiam*, did not know it; (3) that His knowledge of it, both as God and as Man, was by communicated not by uncommunicated knowledge, and that this knowledge was therefore spoken of as belonging to the Father only.

The Eastern Church in like manner has no one recognized interpretation of the Saying. If the views of that Communion may be taken as being correctly represented in the able and learned theological *compendium* of Macarius,[2] Bishop of Vinitza and Rector of the Ecclesiastical Academy of St. Petersburg, it would seem that great weight is attached to the authority of those numerous Fathers who, prior to the fifth century, understood our Lord as saying that He, as Man, knew not the Day and Hour. But the view of Eulogius of Alexandria is also regarded as correct, that, had these earlier Fathers been confronted with the developments of later Christological controversy, they would have expressed themselves more fully, and, it is hinted, in a manner accordant

[1] Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarnato*, p. 426. Editio Tertia. Romae, 1881.
[2] Macaire, *Théologie Dogmatique Orthodoxe*, vol. ii. p. 110.

with that conception of the unity of our Lord's Person which was adopted by later theologians.

A second striking feature is that in most if not in all of these explanations exegetical considerations have occupied a distinctly secondary position. The explanations have been framed to meet the theological difficulties which were at the time most pressing. Remarks on points of exegesis certainly occur from time to time in this or that Father. Some of them are remarks of great acuteness and value. But it is impossible to regard them otherwise than as brought in to support the theological explanation. A good many of the suggested explanations have evidently no claim whatever to be regarded as serious attempts to satisfy the exegetical requirements of the Saying. They are too far-fetched, too subtle, for this. They are simply ingenious attempts to account for the *littera scripta* without infringing upon our Lord's Omniscience.

That this is, indeed, an absolute *sine quâ non*, a condition with which any interpretation which should claim either to be satisfactory in itself, or to deserve recognition by the Church, must fully comply, is most certain. For one passage of Scripture cannot be in real contradiction with others. And it has been repeatedly shown that such *real* contradiction would exist if our Lord were here taken to mean that in His Godhead He knew not this secret. The evidence for this is so ample and so clear that the Church from first to last has always unhesitatingly affirmed that whatever our Lord's meaning may be, it is most certain that He did not mean this.

This is certainly one indispensable condition of a true and satisfactory interpretation of the Saying. But are there not other conditions which are also essential? Could any interpretation be regarded as fully satisfactory which did not take account of, and, as far as possible, account for all the salient features both of the Saying itself and of the context in which it is placed? One of these features is the direct statement that in some sense or other "the Son" knew not

this matter. The supposition that He knew not as God is excluded on the grounds already stated. Is the supposition of His not knowing as Man excluded on any like grounds? Does *this* supposition contradict any definite statements of Scripture as the other one does? Surely not. On the contrary it is in harmony with such a statement as that our Lord's human mind "increased in wisdom," for that statement implies that it was governed by the law of gradual development to which our minds have been made subject. Here, therefore, the literal construction will stand, and Hooker's rule that in this case the furthest from the letter is commonly the worst is fully applicable. One cannot but suspect that those Fathers who, like St. Athanasius, understood our Lord as meaning that He knew this not as Man, and did not suggest any other explanation, felt sure that this was at any rate part of the truth, and would not have abandoned it even in face of the difficulties which were suggested in the succeeding period. And this conjecture receives strong confirmation from the fact that St. Cyril, who recognized and strongly felt the force of those later difficulties, found in the directness of our Lord's statement an element which it was impossible to overlook. Clearly any exposition aspiring to be satisfactory must take full account of this element of directness, and if the plain meaning of the words is not accepted, must explain why terms so plain and direct were employed to express another meaning which is not obvious, and which they do not naturally convey. And, in like manner, full account would have to be taken of the remarkably guarded terms which accompany the central statement.

Once more. Must it not be an essential condition of a fully satisfactory interpretation that it should be in thoroughly substantial agreement with all ascertained and sealed doctrine of the Church—not with all doctrine which might possess even considerable currency, but certainly all which possessed the certificate of a General Council's judgment and approval? The distinction is of very considerable importance. The

Augustinian view—according to which the supposition, that our Lord knew not as Man what He knew as God, was thought to conflict with a true conception of the unity of His Person—certainly obtained considerable currency. The conception of Personal unity with which this view was bound up was that our Lord's Omniscience and His human consciousness, though *formally* different (the one being finite, the other infinite), were so far identical and—if the expression may be allowed—interfused with one another, that it was impossible for His human mind to be ignorant of a matter of fact of which His Omniscience, of course, was not ignorant. This conception gained in the Western Church in the fifth century considerable currency, and has had a good deal ever since—though never universal currency—in the East as well as in the West. But it has certainly never been approved by a General Council. On the contrary, the principle in relation to this subject which was affirmed at the Council of Chalcedon, when it is carefully weighed, seems distinctly to exclude it. Respecting the distinction of the natures in relation to the unity of our Lord's Person, the Council laid down that the distinction of natures was *in no part* (οὐδαμοῦ) taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature was preserved, and concurred in one Person. The expression here employed—οὐδαμοῦ not οὐδαμῶς—is of great significance. It cannot be thought to have been inserted otherwise than advisedly. It directly excludes confusion in any part—confusion as regards Will, or as regards Consciousness, as well as regards any other part of that composite human nature which our Lord condescended to make His own. The remark of Leontius of Byzantium that the Council of Chalcedon did not concern itself particularly with the question of our Lord's knowledge may very well be true. The Council may have considered that, since the question had not been fully thought out nor its depths sounded, it was better not at that time to open it. But they evidently saw clearly that the principle which they were laying down as ruling the relation of the finite nature as a whole with

the infinite Godhead of our Lord, must equally rule the relation of *every part* of the one with the other, whether the details of the relation had been thought out or not; and this conviction seems to have had expression given to it by the use of the word οὐδαμοῦ *nowhere* or *in no part*, instead of the less definite οὐδαμῶς *by no means*.

If this is correct, the interpretation of the Saying which has been given in this chapter, and that view of the relation between our Lord's Omniscience and His human consciousness which it has been the object of the whole Treatise to explain and justify, must be admitted to be more in accordance with the authoritative teaching of the Church as given by the definitions of a General Council, than is either the Augustinian interpretation of this Saying, or the Christological theory which was supposed, in spite of the apparent plainness of our Lord's statement, to render that interpretation necessary. It may be asked what is the "confusion" which the Council of Chalcedon excluded? And what is the "distinction" which the Council declared must be preserved? These questions do indeed touch the core of the whole subject; without a satisfactory answer to them its difficulties cannot be unravelled. It is in the conviction that this is so, that so much space has been given in the present work to an examination of the structure of human consciousness. With what success this has been carried out others must judge. But all must at any rate admit that until that structure has been investigated and the consequences involved in its being what it is have been traced out, it must be impossible to define with any approach to accuracy what is or what is not confusion between Omniscience and human consciousness, and what points of distinction on either side of this relation must certainly have been preserved when our Lord was pleased to unite them under the conditions of the Incarnation in His own Person.

CHAPTER V.

OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

It has been shown in the four preceding chapters that to describe our Lord's human consciousness as "extraordinary," as if that description covered sufficiently the whole of the phenomena, is altogether erroneous. Such a description falls in reality far short of the evidence which the Gospels furnish. They give full and clear proof of much more than human consciousness, however "extraordinary." They give unmistakable evidence, both direct and indirect, of the presence of Divine Omniscience. Omniscience, indeed, lies in its own proper nature beyond the ken of human faculties. The Infinite in every relation is beyond them. That our Lord should have shown forth His Omniscience, therefore, in any direct mode of manifestation, was not possible. Tokens of it could reach those who "companied" with Him, and have witnessed of Him to us, only through the channels of that finite human nature which He was pleased to make His own. No manifestations of Omniscience—as distinguished from statements affirming it—could be looked for except such as might be given in this manner. But such tokens as these did proceed from Him continually. He willed that neither His Divine Power nor His Divine Omniscience should be altogether hidden. Both belonged to the manifestation of "glory" which it was necessary that He should make. Moreover, besides the continual indications of indwelling Omniscience which proceeded from Him as He moved amongst men, the Gospels give us further evidence. They contain direct assertions made by our Lord Himself on

certain weighty occasions, and also others of a similar purport made by the evangelists concerning Him, which are plainly incompatible with any supposition but that His Omniscience was always actually present with Him and in Him.

To this evidence of the Gospels respecting our Lord's Omniscience no material addition can be looked for from an investigation of the subject which we have now to consider. It is to another point that attention has to be turned. The extent and character of the knowledge of the Old Testament which our Lord possessed in His *human mind* have been of late called in question. It has been suggested that though the knowledge which He thus had of the *spiritual* contents of the Old Testament Scriptures must have been full and complete, this knowledge need not have been accompanied with an equally full and complete acquaintance with matters of *critical* detail connected with the several Books, with the history of their composition and authorship, and the order of time in which they respectively appeared. This suggestion has not been supported by any positive evidence in favour of it. No attempt has been made to show that our Lord did *not* possess what is now called critical knowledge of the Old Testament. The suggestion is wholly of a negative character. The Lord, it is said, "shews no signs of transcending the history of His age."[1] It is not contended that there is any proof that He did not transcend it. It might have seemed, therefore, unnecessary to meet a suggestion of so gratuitous a character and so entirely unsupported. Nevertheless, since the conclusions sought to be recommended in this manner cut indirectly at the root of any real belief in our Lord's Omniscience, it is important to deal with it, and to show that "signs," and more than signs, are by no means wanting to prove that our Lord's historical knowledge of the Old Testament did emphatically transcend that of His age. The investigation of the subject will be useful also in another respect. It will throw additional light upon the relation

[1] *Lux Mundi*, p. 360.

between our Lord's human mind and His Omniscience. It has not been contended in this Treatise that our Lord would necessarily know as Man all which He knew as God. On the contrary it has been contended that the relation between His human mind and His Omniscience was, under the conditions of the Incarnation, of such a kind that the human mind would be able to participate in the treasures of Omniscience *only* in so far as they were actually placed before it in a form in which it was capable of receiving and apprehending them; and that without such communications it would not have perceived at all what was within the eternal purview of the Omniscience to which in Christ it was brought so near.

We are, therefore, quite in agreement with the author of the suggestion just referred to on this point, that our Lord would not necessarily have possessed in His human mind every kind of knowledge relating to the Old Testament. If he did possess it not only omnisciently and divinely, but humanly also, it was because He had either acquired it in the ordinary way in which human knowledge is acquired, or because it had been communicated to Him. But it will not be contended that His human mind could not have become possessed of it in these ways. The question is therefore one of probability and of fact, and it is in regard to these that it must be considered. It is a question of no small importance, not only in itself but also on account of the inferences which have been connected with it. For, on the assumption that our Lord's knowledge of the Old Testament might have extended only to its spiritual contents, we have been invited to regard the ground as quite clear for even the most advanced theories of higher criticism. It will be right, therefore, to give it careful consideration, first, by itself; and, secondly, in its connection with higher critical theories.

I.

Although, as will be shown presently, there is considerable evidence of fact respecting the extent and character of the knowledge of the Old Testament which our Lord's human

mind possessed, the probabilities of the case are in this instance of more than usual interest and importance. For, since it is not contended that there is any positive evidence proving that our Lord's knowledge in regard to the Old Testament was limited, it is clear that the probabilities of its having been so, or not having been so, must retain their full weight. What, then, are the probabilities ?

In the first place let us call to mind what was the relation of the Eternal Word towards the Old Testament. Let it be remembered that He, the Second Person of the All-holy Trinity, was in a special sense the Revealer—the Giver, that is to say, of the Revelation contained in it. Something has been said on this subject in an earlier part of this Treatise,[1] and what was there said need not be repeated here. What concerns the present point more especially is that it was the function of the Word Incarnate to carry on that work of revelation which was initiated in the ages before the Incarnation by Himself. It was the office of the Word in those ages to give the Revelation which is enshrined in the Old Testament: it was the office of the Word Incarnate to interpret what He had Himself revealed, and to enlarge the Revelation to the full extent which was purposed in the counsels of God.

Nor is this all. The principal subject of the earlier Revelation which the Word gave was Himself, together with all which, as the Word Incarnate, He was to fulfil. The New Testament contains the fulfilment of "all that was written of Him."[2] Pondering over this fulfilment as the Gospels place it before us, we cannot help seeing that it was very far from being merely the embodiment of a few leading features traced in the writings of the Prophets, or delineated under providential guidance in the history of particular persons or in that of the people whom God chose. It was indeed very very much more than this. The picture of the Christ in His Person and His Work, in His life of mercy and

[1] Book II. Ch. I. Sect I., Christ the Revealer.
[2] Acts xiii. 29.

of love, in His actions and in His sufferings, in His teaching and in His example, in His outward and in His inward trials, in all the controlled yet deeply felt movements of His human heart and spirit through which He identified Himself so truly with us in our afflictions,—this picture in its manifold richness of detail, as well as in its prefiguration of the whole counsel of God for the redemption and salvation of mankind, lies embedded in the very structure of each sacred book of the ancient Scriptures, and interwoven with its warp and woof. The Scriptures containing this minutely complete and perfect delineation of Himself as, when Incarnate, He should be seen on earth, and of all which He should suffer and do—these Scriptures of the Old Covenant, which are so full of the promise of the New Covenant, and of which the counterpart and fulfilment is presented in the second part of the Divine Word—these Scriptures, given by Himself concerning Himself, formed, we cannot doubt, the fore-appointed chart by which the Son of Man shaped and moulded all His life on earth.

Once more. The Scriptures of the Old Testament were appointed to be not only the chart by which the Son of Man should shape His course, but also the instrument by which He was to train His disciples to full comprehension of the whole counsel of God as fulfilled by and in Himself. Until the New Testament was given, the Scriptures of the Old Testament were "the word of or concerning Christ;" and it was what was in these, irradiated by the living Presence of Him Who interpreted and fulfilled them, that has passed, under the direct teaching of Christ first, and afterwards under the inspiring and enlightening touch of His Spirit, through the minds of Christ's Apostles and Evangelists, into the heart of the Church, and into the volume of the New Testament.

The relation of the Word Incarnate, therefore, towards the Scriptures of the Old Testament was a threefold relation: they were those which He Himself, as the Word, gave to those holy men of old who from time to time spoke as they

were moved by the Holy Ghost; they were those of which He Himself came to be the fulfilment, translating them in every particular into those blessed realities from which we derive our redemption and our life; they were those through which the disciples whom He chose were led step by step, when He had opened their understandings, to comprehend the mystery of God and of Christ which they have delivered from Him to His Church.

How, then, can we think that anything should be wanting to the Son of Man's complete knowledge and possession of these Scriptures! If it was requisite, as we may reverently believe that it was, that, not indeed from man (for what we now speak of no man could have given), but from the Father and from Himself as the Word through the Eternal Spirit, His human mind should receive its due equipment for that work which it was fore-ordained that He should perform, what else but these Scriptures could furnish that equipment? What else than the study of these can we suppose to have been the chief employment of Him Who remained subject to His Blessed Mother and His Foster Father for those eighteen years which He passed in the secrecy and silence of God in the quiet retirement of Nazareth?

But here we are met by the suggestion that it was the spiritual contents only of the Old Testament Scriptures which our Lord drew into His mind or had communicated to it. Is the distinction, however, that is thus suggested between the spiritual contents of the Old Testament and their historical setting at all a tenable one? Is the relation of the spiritual contents of the Revelation to the various times and various forms and modes in which it was given, of so lax a kind, that a mind might become fully possessed of the enshrined substance whilst it continued to hold views which were altogether inadequate and might even be erroneous respecting its setting? Surely it is not so. Surely the Bible, above all other books, requires to be studied in connection with those "sundry times and divers manners" in which its several portions were given. The Revelation

which the Old Testament contains is verily a spiritual temple of the Incarnate Word, reared through many ages upon deep foundations. If it is possible—and it surely is possible—to follow the stages of its uprearing as it advanced in ordered proportion and beauty in close connection with the successive fortunes of God's people, it must be not only desirable but necessary to do so in order to obtain a true and complete conception of it. "Higher critics" at any rate ought to feel themselves precluded from suggesting that our Lord's study of the Old Testament Scriptures might have been a study of their spiritual substance only, apart from that of their history and mode of composition, seeing that at other times they are perpetually urging the importance of the latter study in relation to the former,[1] in justification of the insistence with which they press upon us the value of their own labours. And in the principle of this contention they are undoubtedly right. The manner in which the Revelation which the Old Testament contains has grown out of historical roots, and is interwoven at every turn and in every part with the facts of history, has never yet, it may be admitted, been adequately realized. The ordeal of criticism through which the Old Testament Scriptures are now passing may in this point of view be heartily welcomed. It may be confidently expected that, when the truth has had time to prevail, great benefit, under the good Providence of God, will accrue from the searching examination of all that concerns the authorship and the history of the Books of the Old Testament which is now in progress. Such an examination was much needed. The final result may be yet far off. But that the examination will tend to bring by degrees into clearer light the great features of God's primary revelation of Himself and of His counsel towards us in Christ, by enabling us to contemplate them more distinctly in their historical relations, seems too clear to admit of doubt. Only, if it is so necessary that we now should comprehend fully the relation of these Scriptures

[1] See, for example, Prof. Robertson Smith. *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Lect. i.

towards their history, with what show of reason can it be suggested that the human mind of our Blessed Lord was only furnished with what, it is agreed, could be but an incomplete and imperfect knowledge of them? The suggestion, though it was assuredly not intended to be so, really seems to be not only untenable and unnecessary but positively dishonouring to our Master.

All probability, then, seems to be very decidedly on the side of our Lord's human mind having been completely furnished with everything bearing directly or indirectly upon the perfect comprehension of the Old Testament Scriptures. Let us now see what actual evidence there is in the Gospels respecting the fact.

And, first, let us note how clearly it is intimated that the knowledge which our Lord manifested was a knowledge minutely comprehensive and minutely accurate, embracing not only the entire substance but also the smallest details of the ancient Scriptures. They occupied a very prominent place in His teaching, and in the manner in which He referred to and spoke of them it is not difficult to recognize the Word Incarnate dealing with them as a Master, as One to Whom they were subject and not He to them. "He taught as One having authority and not as their Scribes."[1] Could it be reasonably thought that, besides all else which was implied in that august "authority" of the Master, there was not also underlying it completeness of knowledge? The fact is not without significance that, as has been shown,[2] on a careful computation, excluding parallel passages, our Lord either cites or refers to particular places in the Old Testament probably more than four hundred times. Every one will recall how continually His answer was "It is written." But there is much more than this. When He declared plainly that He was come to fulfil the Law and the Prophets, and showed what the scope of that fulfilment was in the

[1] St. Matt. vii. 29.

[2] See Archd. Denison's *Speech in Convocation*, pp. 33–39 (London, 1891), as referred to by Bishop Ellicott, *Christus Comprobator*, p. 91.

Saying, "Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law, till all things be accomplished"[1]—who can but feel assured that in the fullest sense the Law and the Prophets in their substance and in all their bearings must have been known to Him and comprehended by Him with a perfect mastery? It may be that the fulfilment of which He spoke included more than His own personal fulfilment of what was written. But the fact that this was so by no means lessens the testimony which this Saying bears to the perfection of our Lord's knowledge of that which was to be fulfilled. Whensoever and by whom and in whatever manner the fulfilment was to come, it was evidently in every jot and tittle beheld by Him. And who will venture to affirm that this was possible except to one who had traced that which was written through all the stages of its growth and in all the relations of its historical development?

The closeness with which our Lord watched His own translation into act of that which He came to fulfil in all its totality, receives continual illustration in the Gospel record. Especially towards the end is attention drawn to the fact that fulfilment was drawing step by step nearer to its close. What a flood of light is thrown both upon what had already passed into fulfilment and upon what yet remained to be fulfilled by that Saying on the Eve of the Passion, "This that is written must yet be accomplished in Me, 'And He was reckoned among the transgressors:' for the things concerning Me have an end!"[2] And still more what completeness and perfection of knowledge is manifested in that last great sealing Word "It is finished."![3] Who but one to whom all that was in the volume of the Book was wholly clear and known could have declared this? To no doctor or teacher of the Law, to no Scribe or Pharisee, to no Hillel or Gamaliel, to none of the Master's disciples, were the Old Testament Scriptures thus open. He only Who fulfilled them knew what was to be fulfilled. He only, to

[1] St. Matt. v. 18. [2] St. Luke xxii. 37. [3] St. John xix. 30.

Whom every jot and tittle was known, could have proclaimed that at length every stroke of the prophetic portraiture had been copied and filled in, that now nothing was wanting, that all was wholly, perfectly, absolutely, "finished." If any will affirm that the knowledge to which this Saying bears witness might have been compatible with a knowledge of history not transcending that of the age, let him affirm it —but to do so seems to savour not a little of hardihood.

Once more. No one, except only the Fulfiller, knew what lay behind that "It is finished." To all others, even to His disciples, the Scriptures were to a great extent a sealed book. The disciples, indeed, might have understood more, but they did not. And the Lord did not think fit, till after He was risen, to open their understandings in an especial manner to perceive what was really in them. But then He did. All along, those Scriptures had been to Himself as a mirror in which was reflected all which, partly by His own action, partly by the action of others, was gradually translated into fact. And the time was fully come for the eyes of those who were to witness to the world of Him to be opened to behold this. And let it be well marked what method our Lord took in order that they might come to a right comprehension of that which it was so important that they should fully know. It was *historically* that He taught them. "Beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself."[1] This was the method of his discourse to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus. On the same evening when He met the Eleven, He spoke to them after the same manner, telling them that, though they had not understood Him, He had spoken of these things to them. They were, He said, the things which were written concerning Him "in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms."[2] When, then, upon this He opened their understanding that they might see more, at any rate, than they had hitherto done, of what had been all along present to His own view, we can

[1] St. Luke xxiv. 27. [2] St. Luke xxiv. 44.

hardly doubt that He showed them, as He had already shown the two disciples, the historical connection in which, from Moses onwards, the several parts of the portraiture of Himself had been given. This points to the necessity of an adequate comprehension of the historical connection of the gradually developed Christology of the Old Testament in order to a due appreciation of its spiritual meaning. This necessity has been already touched upon; but here we see it recognized by our Lord in His teaching of His disciples; how, then, can we possibly doubt that He Himself possessed in full perfection all knowledge of that kind which He employed as a key, or at any rate as a help, to admit His disciples to a right understanding of all that was written?

The sum is this. The Gospel narrative shows that, as regards spiritual knowledge of the Old Testament, our Lord was on a level immeasurably above that of any of those amongst whom He moved. Of this there cannot be the smallest doubt. We have, then, to consider whether such knowledge as this was compatible with ignorance of the historical facts relating to the composition and authorship of the Books of the Old Testament, and the order of the development of the revealed picture of the Christ. If we had in view the mind of an ordinary student of Scripture, we should certainly say that a full knowledge of the historical kind was essential, and nothing less than essential, to a really perfect spiritual understanding of its contents. Why, then, should we deem otherwise when we have in contemplation the human mind of our Blessed Lord? Clearly there can no reason be given why we should. No mind but His has ever really comprehended the Old Testament Scriptures, both according to their full purpose and scope and in their minutest particularity of detail. Shall we, then, say that with this wonderful fulness of spiritual knowledge there was joined ignorance of the manner and of the times in which the Scriptures were given? It could not be. If there were no indications of His transcending His age in such historical knowledge—and we have seen that such indications are by no means wanting—we

should still say that standing as He did so far above His age as regards knowledge of the Scriptures generally, this elevation of spiritual knowledge must have carried with it a corresponding elevation in regard to that historical knowledge which stands in such intimate association with that which is spiritual, and without which, as far as we can see, the latter cannot attain to full perfection.

II.

In the conviction, then, that with such direct and indirect evidence before us in the Gospels, we cannot be wrong in concluding that our Lord's human mind was furnished with every kind of knowledge which was either necessary or helpful towards perfect comprehension of the Old Testament Scriptures, let us now consider what bearings this conclusion has upon the issues which have been lately raised respecting those Scriptures. Two questions especially present themselves. First, there is the great reversal, involving an entire reconstruction of views hitherto held, not only respecting the literary history of the Old Testament, but also respecting the history of Israel as a People, for which the School of Wellhausen contends. Secondly, there are certain minor historical particulars in which the conclusions of higher critics are at variance, apparently at any rate, with statements made by our Lord. Critical discussion of the details of these questions would be out of place here, and is not necessary for our present purpose. We have now to consider them simply in themselves, apart from special details, in the light in which the discussion which has occupied us in this chapter enables us to place them.

1. Let us take, in the first place, that far-reaching scheme of reconstruction of the Old Testament on which the genius of Wellhausen has poured such brilliant but painfully lurid light. It will be sufficient to present the theory of the German critic in the careful summary which the Bishop of

Gloucester and Bristol[1] has given of its leading features. After describing briefly, but with more reference to critical details than is here necessary, the mode in which the theory deals with particular Books of the Old Testament, the bishop proceeds to sketch it as a whole in the following paragraph: "That thus,—to sum up a few leading results to which we are led by the foregoing statements,—we are to regard the Book of Deuteronomy as a fiction, founded, it may be, on traditions, and of no earlier date probably than the eighteenth year of Josiah; that the Tabernacle of Witness, or, as it is now commonly called, the Tent of Meeting, and everything connected with it, had never any existence except in the fabricated history composed in the days of the Exile, and that, far from the Tabernacle being the prototype of the Temple, it was the Temple that suggested the deliberate and elaborate fiction of the Tabernacle;[2] and further, that the older books were remodelled according to the Mosaic form,[3] and that Chronicles, especially, was falsified by Priests and Levites to sustain the belief that the tribe of Levi had been set apart from the days of Moses, and that the Priesthood dated from that time,[4]—such a belief being, it is alleged, utterly inconsistent with the truth."

We are not now concerned, at least not primarily, with the truth or falsehood of the theory thus summarized; nor is it needful to dwell upon the astounding character of fiction which it fastens upon a large portion of what the Church at least regards as the Word of God. The point to which attention is now invited is a different one, viz., the remarkable and undeniable fact that this theory presents an entire reversal of all views which have been hitherto entertained respecting the Old Testament—not only of those which the Christian Church has continuously received and held, but also of those which were currently held by the Jews in the

[1] *Christus Comprobator*, pp. 54, 55.

[2] Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Israel* (transl.), pp. 37, 39. Edinburgh, 1885.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 294. [4] *Ib.*, p. 126 note, pp. 221, 222.

time of our Lord. It is a fact which, as far as the present writer is aware, has not been disputed by any critic, that the Jews of the time of Christ held views respecting the history and composition of the Old Testament which were practically identical with those which have been always traditionally entertained in the Christian Church. The authority and grounds upon which the views held by the Jews were based have been called in question; but not the fact that they did hold them. This may, therefore, be regarded as indisputable.

The theory of Wellhausen, is, then, a reversal not only of views now held, but of those which the Jews held respecting their own Scriptures in the first century of the Christian era. This is the point on which it is now proposed to offer some comments.

Let it be clearly kept in mind that the views which the Jews held in the time of Christ were substantially the same as those which are now generally held, and that, according to the School of Wellhausen, they were views which diverged very widely indeed from the actual facts of the case.

Now the question naturally arises—How came there to be this remarkable divergence of the views of the Jews of the first Christian century from those of their forefathers of the time of the Exile and the Return? For the higher critics claim to have brought to light the true facts of the Old Testament literary history. They maintain that the composition of no small portion of the Scriptures actually took place in the period of the Exile. Those Jews who were then living, and those who returned from the Captivity must have been, therefore, well acquainted with these things. They were for them not matters of theory or of tradition, but matters of fact, matters transacted in their very midst, and, as it were, before their eyes. The school of Wellhausen boasts of having placed before us what actually took place during the Exile and, in part, after the Return.

The Jews of the Exile and of the Return, then, looked upon the history of their Scriptures in one way: the Jews of the time of Christ looked upon that history in quite

another way. How did this remarkable change come about? When did it take place? How is it that amongst a people of so conservative a temperament—and more particularly so in everything relating to the Scriptures—as the Jews, no record remains of a change of view so momentous? How came it to be altogether forgotten by the generation amongst whom Jesus Christ was born, that their forefathers gave an account of those Scriptures which their Rabbis guarded with such jealous care, which was quite different from that which they themselves had to give to their children?

This is one question—to which as yet, as far as the present writer is aware, no answer has been given.

There is another question, more strictly belonging to the point which is under consideration, which also waits for an answer. It is this. Why did our Lord permit those views of the Old Testament which He found current among the Jews of that generation, and which, according to our higher critics, were so far from representing the true facts of the case, to pass into the Christian Church? Why did He, indeed, not only permit them to be adopted by His Church, but even place upon them as they were passing the sanction of a more than merely silent approval? For when it is pointedly stated that in His teaching He "began at Moses," and from him proceeded to "all the Prophets"—and it must be remembered that the Jews gave the name of "Earlier Prophets" to Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings—and, further, that He employed the description of the whole Old Testament as "the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms" in a similar manner, it cannot be denied that in such definite statements must be recognized something more than a merely tacit approval. Our Lord did, then, actually commend these views, rather more than indirectly, to His Church. He altogether abstained from contradicting or even correcting them. And yet, according to the critics, they were thoroughly erroneous. We are now speaking, it will be remembered, of views such as those of Wellhausen, involving an entire reconstruction of the literary history of the Old Testament.

Had the Jews of our Lord's time known the very truth—so the School of Wellhausen must, if they hold their own views to be correct, maintain—they would have taught as the modern School is now teaching. What they did teach was something quite different. And it was the latter, not the former, teaching which our Lord adopted and transmitted to His Church.

Why, then, did our Lord do this? There would seem to be only two answers which it is possible for the critics to give. One is that our Lord's knowledge in these matters did not go beyond that of His age—that, in fact, He was as ignorant as they were of the real facts of the case. The other is that He regarded the points in question as unimportant.

As regards the first answer it must, in the first place, not be forgotten that the ignorance of the Jews of that time—if it was ignorance—has to be accounted for; and as yet it has not been shown how they could have come to be ignorant of what, on the hypothesis of the critics, must have been matters of common knowledge with their forefathers not many generations earlier. That our Lord should have shared this extraordinary ignorance with them must, in any possible view of it, be regarded as an astounding phenomenon. On any possible view of the relation between our Lord's Divine and Human Natures, or between His Omniscience and His human consciousness, the knowledge of these facts respecting the Old Testament, which were unknown to the Jews of His age, but were well known to their forefathers, might have been communicated to His human mind. What reason, then, can be imagined for its being withheld? Still more—with what shadow of reason can it be suggested that it was withheld when we consider what the Gospels convincingly show respecting His knowledge of the Old Testament as regards its substance and spiritual contents? Is it credible that He Who was so very far above those about Him, or any of their Doctors of the Law, as regards what the Old Testament revealed, should have been merely on a level

with them as regards their knowledge or their ignorance of the real form and manner in which the Revelation was given? It is, surely, utterly incredible.

Let us look at the other answer—that the points in question were not of sufficient importance for it to be necessary for our Lord to say anything about them. If this answer is suggested—and, whether it has been or not, it seems to be the only alternative to that which has just been spoken of—those who are inclined to adopt it should, before doing so, look well at the propositions which the Wellhausen theory actually contains. Is it—to mention one particular only—a matter of little or no importance whether the history which the Pentateuch contains of the building of the Tabernacle under the direction of Moses, according to a pattern expressly given by God, is veracious and reliable history of what actually took place, or nothing better than a fiction? According to Wellhausen, the Jews who returned from the Captivity knew that large portions of the Old Testament were "mythical," that large portions were "fabricated history," and that the prophecies were not much more than shrewd guesses at the future: whereas the Jews of the time of Christ believed the history to be true history, the Prophecies to be inspired revelations, and the whole to be the very Word of God. Is it, then, possible to regard the difference between views of the former kind and views of the latter kind as unimportant? Plainly, it is not possible.

But, if neither of these answers can be given with any show of reason, what remains? It is for the critics to say. If they cannot argue with any show of probability that our Lord did not know those historical facts which, on their hypothesis, were facts of common knowledge at the time of the Return from the Captivity—facts which, as represented by themselves, had highly important bearings in many ways upon the Scriptures and the teaching contained in them, and therefore, could not have been passed over by Him as being unimportant—it is clearly necessary for them either to show that these apparently insuperable difficulties are not fatal to

the theory for which they contend, or to admit frankly that it is impossible to maintain it.

One other remark relating to this part of the subject must be added. It is this. The difficulties which have been pointed out strike with chief force at any theory which, like that of Wellhausen, would involve a complete reconstruction of the literary history of the Old Testament Scriptures—and, it may be added, of the history of the People also—and which, in consequence, could not but place them in a position in which their spiritual authority and teaching would be seriously compromised. But they also offer weighty obstacles to less thorough-going theories, if those theories should include propositions which could not be received without at the same time in a manner dethroning the Divine Word, and bringing it down to the level of merely human writings.

2. We now turn to the second question, concerning minor historical particulars—minor at least as compared with the wholesale theory of which we have been speaking—in which the opinion of higher critics appears to be at variance with statements made by our Lord. It must here be once more observed that we have not now to deal with the critical discussion of the matters in question. We have only to look at them from a particular point of view, which is this. It has been shown in the present chapter that the hypothesis that our Lord was ignorant of any kind of knowledge relating to the Old Testament Scriptures is an hypothesis entirely destitute of any show of reason or of probability. It is impossible, therefore, to regard any statements which He made as having been made under a misapprehension of the historical facts. Statements were made by Him, for example, respecting Moses, David, Jonah, Daniel. The higher critics are inclined to traverse these statements as being, in their view, incorrect. They would account for this supposed incorrectness on the ground that our Lord need not have been acquainted with the actual facts. When, however, we recall that the knowledge which our Lord virtually declared that He possessed was a knowledge extending to every jot

and tittle of the Scriptures—not to mention so much besides which has been already brought forward, and which seems to show clearly that His knowledge of them could not have been less complete than this—it is manifest that, for us at least, this account is altogether inadmissible. Is, then, everything which is urged by the critics to be at once dismissed without a hearing? Surely not. We dare not, indeed, set aside any statement of our Lord. We dare not adopt the suggestion that any statement of His could have been made in ignorance. But we are not in the least precluded from re-examining what we may have hitherto taken without question to be the meaning of His statements. A meaning may have been assumed which was not really His meaning. Such assumptions respecting the meaning of passages which may have been long and generally thought too plain to admit of question, are far too common for it to be very unlikely that something of the kind has happened in this case. Nothing ought, then, to be taken for granted. Our duty would seem to be to apply all the aids which comparative exegesis can furnish, in order to ascertain with scientific precision the exact meaning of our Lord's statements and their exact extent and limits.

It will not be going out of our way, or entering into details of criticism for which this is not the proper place, if we take an example in illustration. The use of proper names in the New Testament will serve this purpose. Proper names are not always used solely for the purpose of designating a particular person. This is of course a familiar fact, and on that account this example may be all the better for our purpose. Take two statements in which the name of David occurs. There is our Lord's statement[1] in connection with His quotation from Psalm cx. There is the statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews[2] respecting Psalm xcv. Our Lord's statement is, "David himself saith in the Book of

[1] St. Luke xx. 42. Cf. St. Matt. xxii. 43, 44, and especially St. Mark xii. 36.

[2] Heb. iv. 7.

Psalms, The Lord said unto my Lord," etc. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the statement is, "Saying in David 'To-day' after so long a time." It would clearly be deserting the principles of comparative exegesis if, in the first of these passages, the terms "David himself" were not regarded as determining our Lord's meaning to be that David was personally the inspired author of the words quoted; whereas, in the second passage, the terms "in David" do not by any means oblige us to regard David as being thereby designated as the author of Psalm xcv. "David" may in this instance very well mean "the Psalter." But to make the illustration complete we must add something more. It is this. Our Lord's statement does not definitely assign the whole of Psalm cx. to David as its author, but only the words which He quotes from it. His words do not therefore exclude the possibility of additions having been made to the Psalm after the time of David, nor do they even exclude a recasting of it, provided that the recasting included the words which our Lord states to have been uttered by David. The additions or the recasting may be improbable, or they may be probable. On that point nothing can be said here. But, whether probable or improbable in themselves, there is nothing in our Lord's words to preclude us from considering the suggestion.

The principle which is thus brought into view — the principle of determining, by the use of all the aids afforded by comparative exegesis, the precise meaning and contents of statements and their exact limits, and of doing so with a resolute and patient abstinence from violent methods of cutting knots which are hard to untie, or from having recourse to unwarrantable hypotheses — appears to the present writer to offer the true key to the solution of much of the difficulty and stress attending the present controversy respecting the Old Testament, and to give promise, if it were followed, of results of permanent value being obtained from it. It is altogether probable, not to say certain, that we have much to learn on some points relating to the literary history of the Bible. It is far from unlikely that some views which

habit has stereotyped, but of which the rationale has never been thoroughly gone into and ascertained, will be found on examination to require remodelling. Criticism, inasmuch as it is necessary in order to let light in upon such matters, is here wholly to be welcomed. It is not "higher" criticism, or criticism of any kind, to which exception ought to be taken. But against the violent and really uncritical methods adopted by some higher critics, and against the assumptions which they press us to accept, it does seem right, in the name both of Truth itself and of true science, to offer a protest. Truth cannot be served by such means as these. To assume ignorance in the human mind of Him Who, being what He was, certainly might have had His human mind furnished with all knowledge which a human mind is capable of receiving, and to assume this without any proof of the assumption, but, on the contrary, in the face of all probability and of much evidence that the case was otherwise, in order to get rid of a difficulty, seems, not to say more, thoroughly unscientific. Do we not want a little more patience? When Newton[1] found an error of three feet only in his first calculation of an important point on which much depended in relation to the theory of universal gravitation, he acquiesced in this as disproving his conjecture, and "laid aside at that time any further thoughts of this matter." This was the spirit of the true philosopher, whose aim is simply truth, and who knows that unless or until his theory can be shown to correspond accurately with the facts, and with all of them, it has no claim to be put forward as a true one; and that far less can it be right to make the facts bend to the theory. If the same spirit could be applied in the investigation of the difficult and complicated facts in which the history of the Old Testament is involved, it might reasonably be expected that, though the investigation must be a long one, it would in the end bring clearly into view much which is now obscure, and, what is no less to be desired, it would do this in a manner befitting the Sacred Volume which forms the subject of the investigation.

[1] See Whewell, *Hist. of the Ind. Sc.*, Bk. VII. ch. ii. sect. 3.

CONCLUSION.

No good purpose would be served by attempting to summarize the arguments which have presented themselves in the course of the investigation which has now at length been brought to a close; but it may not be without use to indicate briefly the limits which our inquiry appears to have marked out as those within which the principle of the Incarnation must assuredly be sought for.

The Gospels do not in direct terms explain the principle of the Incarnation; they do not actually describe the manner in which Godhead and Manhood became related to one another in the Word made flesh. But, from the evidence which has been passed in review, we seem to be fully justified in saying that they testify unequivocally to each of the following primary facts. They testify, on the one hand, to the presence in our Lord of perfect Godhead with all Its internal, essential, attributes—veiled, indeed, under the *μορφὴ δούλου*, and manifested of necessity only through that veil to the perceptions of men, but present in all their ever-living and unchangeable power and activity. On the other hand, they testify no less distinctly to the strictly human character of His Manhood. They show us—to mention only that feature in which lies especially that which to our apprehensions is so difficult to realize—that the consciousness belonging to His Manhood did not become *more* than human by reason of its association in Him with Omniscience, but remained throughout within the proper limits of human consciousness, receiving, moreover, from His Omniscience into itself nothing which could either destroy or modify the veritably human character of His temptations and sufferings.

This is the picture which the Gospels present to us, a picture to which not a few touches are added by passages scattered throughout the New Testament. Looking at the subject from a point of view more exclusively theological, we find that there is again placed before us a picture having the very same outlines. The offices of the Revealer and the Redeemer, when we look closely into them, disclose the necessity of the same apparently incompatible elements being combined in the Person of Him Who, in fulfilment of the design of the Incarnation—a design multiform in purpose, though single in execution—took upon Him the functions of both. As Revealer it was requisite that He should bring with Him, whilst He veiled, His Omniscience, in order that, by quiet, unobtrusive manifestations of it, He might win a way with power into the hearts and minds of those to whom He came, and that thus His blessed Revelation of Himself in all the truth of His Godhead, and all the fulness of His salvation, might be thoroughly received. As Redeemer it was requisite that He should be in a condition to meet trial, suffering, and death, simply as Man, with no other aids than those which, had He not been God as well as Man, it would have been of necessity that He should seek from God.

From whichever point of view we contemplate the mystery of the Being of our Incarnate Lord, we find these lines drawn around it. We find that it holds, as it were, in one embrace the Godhead in Its infinite perfection of Power and Omniscience, and the Manhood in its absolute verity of human finiteness, weakness, and dependence. If, therefore, we are to be faithful to the Gospels, we cannot accept any conception as representing truly the principle of the Incarnation which does not include, without reserve or alteration, *both* of these primary facts to which they so emphatically testify. Difficult it may be to find; difficult, when it is found, to grasp a conception bringing together Omniscience in Its infinitude, and the consciousness of man not essentially changed by contact with Omniscience. But surely it is clear that we ought by no means to allow ourselves, because of

this difficulty, to tamper, either on the one side or on the other, with what is presented to us. In mediæval times men were tempted, by their half-realized consciousness of the pressure of this difficulty, to tamper with the verity of the Manhood. More lately, perceptions having been quickened with regard to the necessities attaching to the Manhood and its part in our Saviour's redeeming work, the temptation has been to tamper with the verity of the Godhead. Faithfulness forbids us to tamper with either. If it is possible to find a conception including, without curtailment and without essential change, both the one and the other, it will be well: we shall be thereby guarded against some dangers which now threaten us; we shall obtain a fuller and more restful sight of Him Who is our Life. But if this may not be, our duty is plain: we can still be faithful to the Truth; we can wait in patience until, if so it should be, God shall be pleased to "reveal even this" unto us.

But there can be no reason why we should not use our best efforts to find a solution of the difficulty. And, in regard to the conception which has been tested and scrutinized in these pages, the fact that it should have been arrived at by an entirely independent path, apart from all purely theological or Scriptural considerations, and yet should be found capable of reconciling and bringing into harmonious unity the apparently opposed elements of the picture which the Gospels place before us, cannot but give us confidence that it may indeed be accepted as true. Had it been possible not only to obtain, by analyzing our faculties of knowledge, a distinct view of the restricted and finite character of that manner of knowing which has been assigned to us men, but also to gain anything like a similar view of Omniscience and comprehension of its nature, what may now be fairly called a very probable conclusion might have been raised to something like certainty. This probably is unattainable. Certainly we can never hope to comprehend Omniscience or the manner of the Divine Knowing. Glimpses we can catch of it and partial views, and from these, when we compare them with

what we can be sure of as regards the working of our own faculties, it seems most reasonable to conclude (as we have done) that Divine Knowing stands altogether apart from Human Knowing. This puts into our hands a clue to the solution of the mystery which we desire to penetrate. Following up this clue, we discover that, in the conception to which it conducts us, those opposite facts to which the Gospels testify, and which it seemed so hard to reconcile, do find reconciliation. If this is not the truth, it looks very like it. Until, therefore, a conception can be found capable not only of embracing the facts, but of explaining them more perfectly, we may well be satisfied—so at least the present writer feels—with a view which certainly contributes not a little towards removing difficulties and allaying the perplexities of thought.

The sense of satisfaction and restfulness which is experienced in contemplating the mystery of the Incarnation as this conception enables us to contemplate it, contrasts in a noteworthy manner with the feelings of uneasiness which the advocates of the Kenotic theory cannot help betraying. How could they help being uneasy? For they find it impossible to accept frankly *all* the facts presented in the Gospels. Some they ignore; others they are obliged to suggest forced explanations of; and, as regards the main point of all, they are constrained to cut the knot by violence, since they would have us believe that our Lord could not have been with us as Very Man unless He had for the time ceased—if not in His Essential Being, yet in Omniscience and Power—to be Very God.

These remarks apply, it will be observed, in not quite the same way to the several advocates of different forms of the Kenotic theory. Some have dealt far more reverently and carefully with what was before them than others have done. But, as regards the feeling of uneasiness, probably those who have walked in the steps of this theory with most caution have felt it most keenly. For such feelings must be an inevitable accompaniment of such a theory as this, whatever

form it may take. And why? Because, in the case of all of its forms, there is the same inability to accept the facts as they stand, there is the same necessity of mutilating in one way or another in order to bring the elements which seem to be contradictory into some sort of combination and union—and how can such a mode of dealing ever be accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction or of rest?

Something of the same kind of contrast is presented when we look at these two different modes of conceiving the principle of the Incarnation, in a practical and moral light. We are invited by the advocates of the Kenotic theory to regard it with more favour on account of the wealth of self-sacrifice which was displayed (according to their view) in the abandonment of the Divine Attributes, and the depth of sympathy which was shown in the nearer approach thereby made by our Lord to identity with the thoughts and feelings of us men. But, before we accept the view which we are thus invited to take, must we not ask, How far is this line of thought to be carried? Of course the more entire the abandonment, the greater, in appearance at least, must be the self-sacrifice. Godet[1] even hints at the Lord's love urging Him to strip Himself of His "Divinity"! Does not this suggest that in this whole view there is something strained, extravagant, and false? St. Paul put before the Philippian Church a picture of self-renunciation in which successive generations of Christians have found no abandonment of Godhead or of Its Attributes, and have certainly not felt that the moral glory of that Example would have been heightened by any such abandonment. Are we to reject as insufficient that picture on which the devout admiration of the disciples of Christ has rested with full satisfaction during more than eighteen centuries, in order that our feelings may find fitter sustenance in the contemplation of Godhead defaced? Surely, when we find that the path which we are invited to take leads, when followed to an end, to such pitfalls of horror as this, we must needs conclude that at its

[1] *New Test. Studies*, p. 137.

first diverging from the track in which Christian thought and feeling have moved hitherto, it was in reality no less a path of error than when, at a greater distance from it, its true character is clearly revealed. Here, again, it is very difficult to believe that Kenoticists can cherish feelings of admiration for such a form of self-sacrifice, without any accompaniment of misgiving and uneasy thoughts.

In another respect the Kenotic theory inflicts a wound upon Christian sentiment. It severs at a stroke the continuity of those feelings of reverent and adoring love which have been blended throughout the centuries with the contemplation of our Redeemer's manifested Godhead. The Kenotic theory does not deny that our Lord was "God in the flesh," but—sometimes in louder, sometimes in more hesitating tones—it does deny that He was "God *manifest* in the flesh." If this should ever come to be a generally accepted theory of the Incarnation, there would at the same time necessarily take place a remoulding of those thoughts and feelings of Christians which centre round the Person of our Lord. The point just now to be noted about this is the breach which it would make with the Past. The sentiments which Christians have felt for our Lord's unchangeable Divinity may at times have been mixed with something of exaggeration not far removed from error—exaggeration, not because their thoughts about His Divinity itself were too high, which, indeed, they could not be; but because there was a tendency to regard His Manhood as having come actually to be, not in dignity only, but in its very nature, divinized by its union in Him with the Godhead. But, in respect of the actual Divinity of our Lord, the instinctive feeling of Christian believers cannot be regarded as having been untrue in itself because at certain times and in certain quarters an element of error was blended with it. This feeling that in Christ God was verily *manifested* has assuredly been as universal as it has been instinctive: and yet it is this which the Kenoticists would cast aside; it is from this that they would sever themselves and all who follow them. To do this with a

light heart, with no feeling of doubt or uneasiness at the course which was being taken, could not but be, one would think, utterly impossible.

What, it may be asked, is the outcome of these remarks? It is this. They show that there is, together with other differences, a great practical difference between these two modes of regarding the mystery of the Incarnation—between the Kenotic theory and that which, as the present writer ventures to think, may with far greater reason be regarded as expressing correctly the manner according to which the Word was pleased to be made flesh and dwell among us. What is this difference? It is that the latter mode of viewing the mystery places us in a position in which we find both intellectual and moral satisfaction and rest—satisfaction of the heart, because we are able to adopt or retain completely all the holy and reverent feelings which have gathered round both our Lord's manifestation of Godhead, and also His manifestation (often in past ages less perfectly realized) of the very truth of Manhood; satisfaction of the mind, because *all* the facts which are presented to us in the Gospel narrative find place in our conception of the mystery, without curtailment, without distortion, without violence. Our contemplation of it is full of rest and peace. In the case of the Kenotic theory, all this is reversed. Considerations such as these are not formally demonstrative; to the purely logical proof they perhaps contribute nothing: nevertheless it cannot be doubted that they have a real, substantial, independent value of their own.

INDEX

I.—HOLY SCRIPTURE.

Texts more particularly discussed or referred to have an asterisk prefixed.

			PAGE
Genesis.			
vi. 1–4	Bk. III.	ch. iii.	401
xiii. 10, 12, 13	„ III.	„ iii.	401
Exodus.			
xxiii. 20, 21	Bk. II.	ch. i.	211
*xxxiii. 11, v. 20	III.	„ i.	347
Deuteronomy.			
*vi. 4	Bk. II.	ch. ii.	266
*xviii. 15–18	„ II.	„ i.	209
xviii. 19	„ II.	„ i.	210
xxxiv. 10	„ II.	„ i.	210
Numbers.			
xii. 8	Bk. II.	ch. i.	210
1 Samuel.			
x. 3, 4, 7	Bk. III.	ch. iii.	400
*xxiii. 10, 12	„ III.	„ i.	373
1 Kings.			
viii. 39	Bk. III.	ch. i.	134, 360
2 Kings.			
v. 26	Bk. III.	ch. iii.	398
viii. 7–15	„ III.	„ i.	367
iv. 27	„ III.	„ iii.	398
xiii. 19	„ III.	„ i.	375
Job.			
xxxiii. 23	Bk. II.	ch. i.	209
Psalms.			
*ii. 7, 12	Bk. III.	ch. iv.	411
*xxii. 19	„ II.	„ i.	227
cii. 27	„ II.	„ ii.	266
cxxxix. 6, P.B.V.	I.	„ iv.	134
Isaiah.			
*ix. 6, LXX.	Bk. II.	ch. i.	208, 211
Jeremiah.			
xiv. 2, LXX.	Bk. II.	ch. ii.	242
xv. 9, LXX.	„ II.	„ ii.	242
Daniel.			
*vii. 15	Bk. I.	ch. iii.	120
ix. 3	„ I.	„ iii.	122
x. 2, 3	„ I.	„ iii.	122
Hosea.			
*xii. 5	Bk. II.	ch. ii.	266
Zechariah.			
xiv. 9	Bk. II.	ch. ii.	266
Malachi.			
iii. 1	Bk. II.	ch. i.	211
*iii. 6	„ II.	„ ii.	266
Wisdom.			
xi. 20	Bk. III.	ch. iii.	392
Ecclesiasticus.			
xxiii. 20	Bk. I.	ch. iv.	128
St. Matthew.			
i. 21, 23	Bk. III.	ch. iv.	412
ii. 15	„ III.	„ iv.	412
iii. 17	„ III.	„ iv.	412
v. 8	„ III.	„ i.	348
*v. 18	„ III.	„ v.	447
vii. 29	„ III.	„ iv.	446
*viii. 10	„ III.	„ iii.	379
ix. 2–8	„ III.	„ ii.	364
xi. 9	„ II.	„ i.	210
*xi. 21–23	„ III.	„ ii.	371
*xi. 27	„ II.	„ i.	213
*xi. 27	„ III.	„ i.	341
*xi. 27	„ III.	„ iv.	412
xii. 4	„ III.	„ iv.	417
xiv. 28	„ III.	„ iii.	389
xvi. 16	„ III.	„ iv.	411

					PAGE
xvi. 21	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	391
*xvii. 27	„	III.	„	iii.	398
xxii. 43, 44	„	III.	„	v.	457
xxiv. 22	„	III.	„	iii.	403
*xxiv. 36	„	III.	„	iv.	408
*xxiv. 38	„	III.	„	iii.	401
*xxiv. 15, 30	„	III.	„	iii.	405
*xxvi. 39	„	III.	„	iii.	388
xxvi. 63	„	III.	„	iv.	411
xxvii. 46	„	II.	„	i.	227
xxviii. 19	„	III.	„	iv.	412

ST. MARK.

i. 11	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	412
ii. 1–12	„	III.	„	i.	364
*ii. 8	„	I.	„	vi.	192
*ii. 8	„	III.	„	ii.	364
iv. 40	„	III.	„	iii.	377
*vi. 6	„	III.	„	iii.	377
*vi. 38	„	III.	„	iii.	394
vii. 18	„	III.	„	iii.	377
*viii. 5	„	III.	„	iii.	394
viii. 21	„	III.	„	iii.	378
ix. 7	„	III.	„	iv.	412
*ix. 21	„	III.	„	iii.	394
*xi. 13	„	III.	„	iii.	377
xii. 29, 30	„	II.	„	iii.	266
xii. 36	„	III.	„	iv.	457
xiii. 20	„	III.	„	iii.	403
*xiii. 32	„	III.	„	iv.	408
xiv. 37	„	III.		iii.	379, 393
*xiv. 35, 36, 37	„	III.	„	iii.	389

ST. LUKE.

i. 32, 35	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	412
ii. 40, 52	„	I.	„	vi.	186
ii. 46–52	„	II.	„	iii.	288
ii. 49	„	III.	„	iii.	377
iii. 22	„	III.	„	iv.	411
v. 17–26	„	III.	„	ii.	364
v. 17	„	III.	„	iii.	394
*vii. 9	„	III.	„	iii.	379
*viii. 30	„	III.	„	ii.	394
ix. 35	„	III.	„	iv.	412
*x. 13	„	III.	„	ii.	371
*x. 22	„	III.	„	iv.	412
xi. 13	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xii. 26	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xvi. 15	„	III.	„	iii.	364
*xvii. 26, 28	„	III.	„	iii.	401
*xix. 30–32	„	III.	„	iii.	399
*xx. 42	„	III.	„	v.	457
xvi. 15	„	III.	„	ii.	364
*xxii. 8–12	„	III.	„	iii.	400
*xxii. 37	„	III.	„	iv.	447
*xxii. 42	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xxiii. 31	„	III.	„	iii.	389
*xxiv. 27, 44	„	III.	„	v.	448

ST. JOHN.

i. 3	Bk.	II.	ch.	i.	207
*i. 14, Introd.					26
*i. 14	Bk.	II.	ch.	ii.	259
*i. 18	„	II.	„	i.	210
*i. 18	„	III.	„	i.	344
i. 43, Introd.					27
*i. 49	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	411
*ii. 11, Introd.					23
*ii. 19	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	391
ii. 22	„	II.	„	ii.	258
*ii. 23–25	„	III.	„	ii.	361
ii. 25, Introd.					27
*iii. 12, 13, 31, 32, 35, ch. i.	Bk.	III.			343, 344
iii. 16, Introd.					26
iii. 17, 35, 36	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	412
iii. 16–18	„	III.	„	iv.	412
*iv. 5	„	III.	„	ii.	371
iv. 16, Introd.					27
*iv. 21–23	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	417
v. 9	„	III.	„	iii.	382
v. 17–30	„	III.	„	iv.	414
*v. 19, 20	„	II.	„	i.	213
*v. 19, 20	„	III.	„	i.	344
v. 19, 30	„	III.	„	i.	352
vi. 6	„	III.	„	i.	395
*vi. 40	„	III.		iii.	412, 413
vi. 46	„	II.		iv.	213, 346
vi. 46, 62	„	III.	„	i.	344
*vi. 61	„	III.	„	ii.	362
*vi. 64	„	I.	„	vi.	192
vi. 64	„	III.	„	ii.	363, 366
vi. 64	„	III.	„	iii.	378
vi. 69	„	III.	„	iv.	411
vii. 16	„	II.	„	i.	213
*vii. 21	„	III.	„	iii.	382
vii. 23	„	III.	„	iii.	389
vii. 29	„	III.	„	i.	343
*viii. 1–11	„	III.	„	ii.	370
viii. 28, 38, 58	„	III.	„	i.	344
viii. 35, 36	„	III.	„	iv.	412
viii. 55	„	III.	„	i.	343
*viii. 58	„	II.	„	i.	218
ix. 5	„	II.	„	i.	212
*x. 15	„	III.	„	i.	343
x. 30	„	II.	„	i.	218
x. 36	„	III.	„	iv.	412
xi. 17	„	III.	„	iii.	393
xi. 4, 6	„	III.	„	iii.	392
*xi. 34	„	III.	„	iii.	394
xii. 16	„	III.	„	iii.	399
xii. 49, 50	„	III.	„	i.	344
xii. 49	„	II.	„	i.	213
xiii. 3	„	III.	„	i.	344
xiii. 11	„	III.	„	i.	363
xiii. 1–3, 18	„	III.	„	iii.	387
xiii. 19, 21–27	„	III.	„	iii.	388
xiii. 36–38	„	III.	„	iii.	388

					PAGE
*xiv. 3	Bk.	III.	ch.	i.	354
xiv. 9	„	II.	„ i.	208,	218
xiv. 9–11	„	III.	„	i.	344
xiv. 2, 3, 30	„	III.	„	iii.	388
xiv. 13	„	III.	„	iv.	412
xv. 15	„	III.	„	i.	345
xv. 18–21	„	III.	„	iii.	388
xv. 27	„	III.	„	ii.	366
xvi. 4	„	III.	„	i.	366
xvi. 16, 20–22, 32		III.	„	iii.	388
xvi. 28	„	II.	„	i.	218
xvi. 19, 30	„	III.	„	ii.	369
xvi. 30	„	III.	„	iv.	419
xvii. 3	„	II.	„	i.	205
xvii. 5	„	III.	„	iii.	401
xvii. 7, 8	„	II.	„ i.	213,	217
xvii. 7, 8, 10, 14, 24–26, Book III. chap. i.					345
xviii. 4	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	386
xviii. 8	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xix. 30	„	III.	„	iv.	447
xxi. 17	„	III.	„	ii.	368
xxi. 18	„	III.	„	iii.	388

ACTS.

*i. 7	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	403
iii. 23	„	III.	„	i.	210
iv. 9	„	III.	„	iii.	389
iv. 25	„	III.	„	iv.	411
v. 20	„	I.	„	iii.	107
v. 38, 39	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xiii. 5	„	III.	„	iii.	389
xiii. 29	„	III.	„	v.	442
xiii. 33	„	III.	„	iv.	411
xiv. 19, 20	„	II.	„	ii.	258

ROMANS.

*i. 1–4	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	413
i. 3, 9	„	III.	„	iv.	412
iv. 14	„	II.	„	ii.	241
v. 10	„	III.	„	iv.	412
vii. 19	„	II.	„	i.	223
viii. 3, 29, 32	„	III.	„	iv.	412

1 CORINTHIANS.

i. 3	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	418
i. 9	„	III.	„	iv.	412
i. 25	„	II.	„	iii.	285
ii. 10	„	I.	„	iv.	127
ii. 11	„	I.	„	iii.	117
iii. 23	„	III.	„	iii.	418
vi. 18	„	I.	„	iii.	117
vii. 17	„	III.	„	iii.	417
*viii. 6	„	III.	„	iv.	417
ix. 15	„	II.	„	ii.	242
*xii. 10	„	III.	„	ii.	361
xii. 12	„	III.	„	iii.	418

					PAGE
*xiii. 9	Bk.	I.	ch.	i.	44
xiii. 12	„	III.	„	i.	348
xiv. 13, 2, 27	„	I.	„ iii.	120,	121
xiv. 14	„	I.	„	iii.	120
*xv. 28	„	III.	„	iv.	412

2 CORINTHIANS.

v. 13	Bk.	I.	ch.	iii.	120
*viii. 9	„	II.	„	ii.	238
ix. 3	„	II.	„	ii.	242
xii. 10	„	II.	„	i.	228

GALATIANS.

*i. 6	Bk.	III.	ch.	iii.	382
i. 7, 19	„	III.	„	iv.	417
i. 16	„	III.	„	iv.	412
ii. 11–14	„	III.	„	ii.	361
iv. 4, 6	„	III.	„	iv.	412

EPHESIANS.

i. 10	Bk.	II.	ch.	i.	203
i. 11	„	I.	„	iv.	127

PHILIPPIANS.

ii. 6, Introd.					27
*ii. 5–9	Bk.	II.	ch.	ii.	*passim*
ii. 5–9	„	II.	„	iii.	*passim*

COLOSSIANS.

i. 13	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	412
*i. 15–20	„	II.	„	ii.	239

1 THESSALONIANS.

i. 10	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	412
*iii. 11	„	III.	„	iv.	418

2 THESSALONIANS.

*ii. 16, 17	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	418

1 TIMOTHY.

ii. 5	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	418
ii. 14	„	II.	„	i.	224
iii. 16	„	II.	„	i.	207
*vi. 16	„	III.	„	i.	348

TITUS.

ii. 13	Bk.	III.	ch.	iv.	418

HEBREWS.

i. 1	Bk.	II.	ch.	i.	206
i. 1–4	„	II.	„	i.	204
*i. 1–3	„	II.	„	ii.	238
i. 2, 5, LXX.	„	III.	„	iv.	412
i. 5	„	III.	„	iv.	411
i. 8	„	III.	„	iv.	412

				PAGE
i. 10–12	Bk. II.	ch.	ii.	266
ii. 2, 3	„ II.	„	i.	210
ii. 17	„ I.	„	i.	42
iii. 1	„ II.	„	i.	211
iii. 5, 6	„ II.	„	i.	210
iii. 6	„ III.	„	iv.	412
*iv. 7	„ III.	„	v.	457
iv. 13	„ I.	„	iv.	129
v. 5	„ III.	„	iv.	411
v. 7	„ II.	„	i.	227
v. 8.	„ III.	„	iv.	412
vii. 16	„ I.	„	iii.	107
vii. 28	„ III.	„	iv.	412
xii. 14	„ III.	„	i.	348
xiii. 8	„ II.	„	ii.	266

ST. JAMES.

i. 14	Bk. II.	ch.	i.	223
*i. 17	„ II.	„	ii.	266

1 ST. PETER.

i. 11	Bk. II.	ch.	i.	212
i. 11	„ III.	„	iii.	403

2 ST. PETER.

i. 1	Bk. III.	ch.	iv.	418
i. 17	„ II.	„	i.	208
i. 17	„ III.	„	iv.	412

1 ST. JOHN.

				PAGE
i. 2	Bk. II.	ch.	i.	208
i. 3, 7	„ III.	„	iv.	412
ii. 7, 24	„ III.	„	ii.	366
ii. 22–24	„ III.	„	iv.	412
*iii. 2	„ III.	„	i.	348
iii. 5	„ II.	„	i.	211
iii. 11	„ III.	„	ii.	366
iv. 1	„ III.	„	ii.	363
iv. 9, 10	„ III.	„	iv.	412
iv. 14	„ III.	„	iv.	412
v. 9–11, 20	„ III.	„	iv.	412
v. 12	„ III.	„	iv.	412

2 ST. JOHN.

3	Bk. III.	ch.	iv.	412
9	„ III.	„	iv.	412

ST. JUDE.

16	Bk. III.	ch.	iii.	382

REVELATION.

i. 1	Bk. II.	ch.	i.	213
i. 10	„ I.	„	iii.	119,122
ii. 27	„ III.	„	iv.	411
*xi. 15	„ III.	„	iv.	414
xii. 5	„ III.	„	iv.	411
xix. 15	„ III.	„	iv.	411
xxii. 4	„ III.	„	iv.	348

II.—AUTHORS.

Abercrombie, *Intell. Powers*, pp. 313; 149–152; 324, 357 . . . I. iii. 118
Æschylus, *Sept. c. Theb.* 772 . . . . . III. iii. 380
Alcuin, *De Fid. S. Trin.* II. xii.; *Adv. Felic.* v. ix. . . . . III. iv. 430
Alford, Dean, *Gr. Test.* St. Luke ii. 52 . . . . . I. v. 191
„ „ Phil. ii. 7 . . . . . II. ii. 253
Ambrose, St., *De Fid.* V. cc. xvi.—xviii. . . . . III. iv. 429
Ambrosiaster, *Patrol. Lat.* xvii. 408, on Phil. ii. 7 . . . . . II. ii. 250
Amphilochius, St., *Sent. et Excerpt.* vi. . . . . III. iv. 424
Andrewes, Bp., *Serm.* i. 93; i. 52; i. 206; i. 91 . . . . . II. iii. 320
Aquinas, St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I. Q. xiv. . . . . I. iv. 125
„ „ „ „ I. Q. xxix. . . . . I. v. 148
„ „ „ „ III. Q. xxi. . . . . II. ii. 260
„ „ „ „ I. Q. ix. 1; I. Q. xl. 1 . . II. ii. 268
„ „ „ „ I. Q. xii. 6 . . . . . III. i. 348
„ „ „ „ III. Q. x. ii. 1 . . III. iv. 428, 429, 431
Aristotle, *Met.* iii. 3; *De An.* II. i. 12; I. iv. 12 . . . . . I. i. 37
„ *Met.* xi. 6, 7, 8, 9 . . . . . II. ii. 267
Athanasius, St., *Ad Epict.* § 12 . . . . . Introd. 11
„ *Or. III. c. Ar.* § 51 . . . . . Introd. 11
„ *De Incarn.* . . . . . II. i. 204
„ *Or. III. c. Ar.* § 43 . . . . . III iv. 425
Augustine, St., *Op. Imp.* V. c. i.; iv. 75 . . . . . Introd. 29
„ *De Div. Qu.* II. ii. 3 . . . . . I. i. 44
„ *De Civ. Dei*, xi. 10; *De Trin.* xv. 13. . . . . I. iv. 130

PAGE

Augustine, St., *De Trin.* v. 8; viii. 6 . . . . . I. v. 148
„ *De Trin.* v. 9; vii. 4, 6 . . . . . I. v. 149
„ *De Trin.* vii. 6 . . . . . I. v. 154
„ *Epist.* cxxxvii. 12 . . . . . II. i. 204
„ *Quæst.* lxxiii. *in Exod.* . . . . . II. i. 215
„ *De Civ. Dei*, xi. 10; *De Trin.* vi. 6, 7; *De Trin.* xv. 5 . . . . . II. ii. 267
„ *Ad Volus.* c. ii. 6 . . . . . II. iii. 277
„ *In Ioan.* Tr. xlix. 18; *C. Faust.* xxvi. 8; *De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 9 . . . . . III. i. 279
„ *Epist.* cxlvii. 13 . . . . . III. i. 347
„ *Reff.* on St. Mark, xiii. 32 . . . . . III. iv. 429
Augusti, *Lib. Symb. Eccl. Ref.* pp. 386–410 . . . . . II. iii. 310
„ „ „ p. 393 . . . . . II. iii. 311
„ „ „ p. 640 . . . . . II. iii. 312
Bain, "Psychology," *Enc. Br.* 9th ed. xx. 49 . . . . . I. i. 52
Basil, St., *Epist.* ccxxxvi. 6; xxxviii. 3; 4, 5 . . . . . I. v. 147, 152
„ „ ccxxxvi. 1 . . . . . III. iv. 424
„ *Adv. Eunom.* iv. in Matt. xxiv. 36 . . . . . III. iv. 429
„ *Epist.* Class. I. viii. 6, 7 . . . . . III. iv. 432
Bartholomèss, *Hist. des doctr. relig.* i. 23 . . . . . II. ii. 267
Beaven, *Irenæus*, p. 40 . . . . . II. iii. 284
Bede, Ven., *In Matt.* xxiv. 36; *Marc.* xiii. 32 . . . . . III. iv. 430
Bengel, *Gnom.* ii. 292; Phil. ii. 8 . . . . . II. ii. 246
Berkeley, Bp., Vol. i. 99, 100, 117 . . . . . I. v. 163
„ Vol. i. 204 . . . . . I. v. 165
Bernard, St., *Serm. in Cant.* 80, n. 6 . . . . . I. iv. 131
„ *De Consid.* v. 7 . . . . . II. ii. 266
„ *De Grad. Hum.* iii. 10; *Retract.* . . . . . III. iv. 431
Beron, *Fragm. Tr. c. Ber., P. G.* x. 832, *sq.* . . . . . II. iii. 297, 298
Beveridge, Bp., *Works*, Vol. vii. 85 note . . . . . II. iii. 325
„ „ Vol. viii. 168, 170 . . . . . II. iii. 10, 325
Boethius, *D. C. B.* i. 320 . . . . . I. v. 147
„ *De Duab. Nat. et Una Pers. Chr.* . . . . . I. v. 154
Bright, Canon, *Waymarks*, Appendix G. . . . . Pref. xvi
„ *Flav. Lett. at Chalc.* . . . . . Introd. 9
„ *Inc. as Motive Power*, p. 56 . . . . . II. i. 205
„ *Waymarks*, pp. 392, 393 . . . . . II. ii. 234
„ *Cyril's 3rd Lett. and Art.* . . . . . II. ii. 262
„ *Less. fr. Lives*, pp. 246–251 . . . . . II. iii. 288
„ *Waymarks*, p. 179 . . . . . II. iii. 290
„ *Inc. as Mot. Power*, p. 291 note . . . . . II. iii. 293
Bruno Ast., *In Matt.* xxiv. 36, P. L. cxlv. 247 . . . . . III. iv. 427
Bull, Bp., *Works*, ii. 114, *State of Man* . . . . . Introd. 28
„ „ v. 22, 23, *D. F. N.* I. i. 10, 11 . . . . . II. i. 207
„ „ vi. 349, *Pr. Trad.* vi. 21 . . . . . II. ii. 245
„ „ v. 271, *sqq. D. F. N.* II. viii. 3, 4, 5 . . . . . II. iii. 297
„ „ v. 137, *D. F. N.* II. iii. 4 . . . . . II. iii. 323
„ „ v. 191, *D. F. N.* II. iv. 7 . . . . . II. iii. 324
„ „ vi. 347, *Pr. Trad.* vi. 19 . . . . . II. iii. 324
Butler, Bp., *Works*, Vol. i. 304, 307 . . . . . I. v. 157, 158
„ „ Vol. i. 104 . . . . . II. i. 225
Cassiodorus, *In Ps.* ix. 40 . . . . . III. iv. 430
Cave, *Hist. Lit.* ii. 36 . . . . . II. ii. 251
Cæsarius, *Dial. Quat.* Qu. xv.–xxi. . . . . III. iv. 431
Cesca, *Dottr. Kant. dell' A Priori*, Introd. pp. 2, 3 . . . . . I. i. 40
„ „ „ „ pp. 157–173 . . . . . I. i. 60, 61, 62
Chrysostom, St., *Hom. vii. in Phil.* (ii. 7) . . . . . II. ii. 247
„ *In Matt.* xxiv. 36 . . . . . III. iv. 430

		PAGE
Church, Dean, *Disc. of Chr. Char.* p. 10, *sqq.*	I. v.	144
„ „ "*Hooker*," B. i. p. 109	II. ii.	266
Churton, Archdn., *Pref. to N. T. Illust.*	II. ii.	246
Ch. Quart. Rev., Oct., 1891, Art. i.	Pref.	xvi
„ „ Oct., 1875, Art. v. p. 120, *sqq.*	Introd.	8
„ „ Oct., 1891, Art, i. p. 21	I. i.	48
„ „ „ „ p. 22	I. v.	176
„ „ „ „ p. 23	I. vi.	190
„ „ „ „ p. 9	II. ii.	234
Clem. Rom., St., *Epist. ad Cor.* c. xvi.	II. iii.	323
Clem. Alex., St., *Strom.* vi. 9	II. iii.	279
„ vii. 2	II. iii.	286
Coustant, Dom, *Præf. Gen. in S. Hil. Op.* § 173	II. iii.	282
„ *De Trin.* ix. 14, 38, 51, notes	II. iii.	293
Cyril Lucar, *Conf.* Art. vii.	II. iii.	313–315
Cyril Alex., St., *Epist. i. ad Successum*	Introd.	9
„ *Explic. xii. capp.* Anath. ix.	II. ii.	261
„ *Quod Unus*, p. 753, Ben.	II. iii.	274
„ „ p. 760 „	II. iii.	290
„ *Apol. c. Theod. pro xii. capp.* p. 234	II. iii.	290
„ *Quod Unus*, p. 770; 753; 742; 736	II. iii.	291
„ *De Trin.* Dial. v. p. 571	II. iii.	314
„ *Thes.* Assert. xxii.; *Adv. Anthrop.* c. xiv.	III. iv.	426
„ *Ad Reg. Or. Alt.* § 17; *De Trin.* Dial. vi. fin.	III. iv.	426
„ *Apol. c. Theod. pro xii. capp.* c. iv.	III. iv.	430
Damascenus, S. Joan, *Dialect.* c. 43	I. v.	152, 153
„ „ *De Fid. Orthod.* iii. 5	II. iii.	316
„ „ *Hær.* 85; *De Fid. Orth.* iii. 21	III. iv.	430
Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychol.* p. 384	II. iii.	331
Denison, Archdn., *Speech in Convoc.* pp. 33–39	III. v.	446
De Romestin, Rev. H., *Letter to Canon Carter* (1891)	III. iv.	424
Descartes, *Cogito, ergo sum*	II. ii.	267
De Wette, *Handbuch*, Phil. ii. 7	II. ii.	243
„ „ „	II. ii.	253
Didymus, *De Trin.* III. xxii.	III. iv.	424, 429
„ *Enarr. in Joan.* ii. 3, 4	III. iv.	431
Döllinger, *Hippol. u. Kall.* pp. 318–324	II. iii.	297
Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* § 502 (*εἰ*)	III. iii.	389
Dorner, *Pers. of Chr.* E. T. L. ii. 510	I. v.	145
„ *Jahr. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, 2; 1857, 2; 1858, 3	II. ii.	268
„ *Pers. of Chr.* I. ii. 33, 30	II. iii.	300
„ „ II. ii. 93; 92 note	II. iii.	301
„ „ „ 93; 94 note	II. iii.	301
„ „ „ 133; 248	II. iii.	302
„ „ „ 431 note; 391 note 8	II. iii.	302
„ „ „ 95, 96, 391	II. iii.	303
„ „ „ 390 note 7; 95, 96	II. iii.	303
„ „ „ 79; 99; 134	II. iii.	304–306
„ „ „ 425; 281; 298	II. iii.	307
„ *Jahr. f. Deut. Theol.* 1856, 1858	II. iii.	332
„ *Pers. of Chr.* I. i. Introd. p. 84	II. iii.	332
Dorner, Dr. A., *Augustinus*, p. 17	I. iv.	131
„ „	II. ii.	267
Ellicott, Bp., 1st *Epist to the Cor.* pp. 267, 268	I. iii.	120
„ *on* Phil. ii. 7	II. ii.	243, 245, 253
„ *on* 1 Cor. xii. 10	III. ii.	361
„ *Life of Christ*, p. 253	III. ii.	370
„ *on* Phil. i. 22	III. iii.	417
„ *on* Gal. i. 7	III. iii.	389

	PAGE
Ellicott, Bp., *Christus Comprobator*, p. 91	III. v. 446
,, ,, ,, pp. 54, 55	III. v. 451
Encycl. Brit., 8th ed. Vol. xiv. p. 552	I. i. 37
,, ,, ,, 586	I. i. 50, 59
,, ,, ,, 612	I. v. 163
,, ,, ,, 616	I. v. 164
,, ,, ,, 584	I. v. 170
,, ,, ,, 636	I. ii. 86
,, 9th ed. Vol. i. 515	I. ii. 85
Ephrem. Syr., St., *Select Works*, Rhythm, lxxvii. 5, 6	III. iv. 429
,, ,, ,, lxxviii. 4	III. iv. 429
Epiphanius, St., *Hær.* xxxiii. 2	II. ii. 266
,, *Hær.* ii. §§ 43–47; *Ancor.* §§ 19–22	III. iv. 431
Eulogius Alex., *ap. Phot. Bibl.* Cod. 230	III. iv. 428
,, ,, ,, ,,	III. iv. 430
Euripides, *Med.* 1144	III. iii. 380
Eusebius, *H. E.* iii. 5	III. iii. 405
Eustatbius, *ap. Fac. Def. Tr. Capp.* xi. 1	III. iv. 425
Euthymius Zig., *In S. Pauli Epist.* ed. Calogeras, Phil. ii. 6, 7	II. ii. 249
,, 2 Cor. viii. 9	II. ii. 249
Evans, *Speak. Com.* 1 Cor. xiv. 2	I. iii. 121
,, ,, ,, 1 Cor. vii. 17 (εἰ μή)	III. iv. 417
Field, *on Chrys. in Matt.* xxiv. 36	III. iv. 430
Flavian, *Epist. ad Theodos.*	Introd. 9
Form. Concord. § 49	II. iii. 306
,, ,, §§ 13, 26	II. iii. 307
,, ,, Epit. Affirm. xi. p. 767	II. iii. 307
Frank, *Sermons*, pp. 111, 114, 2 Cor. viii. 9	II. iii. 322
Franke, *on* οὔτε	III. iv. 417
Franzelin, Card., *De Verb. Inc.* pp. 311–323	Introd. 10
,, ,, ,, Thesis xxix.	I. v. 148
,, ,, ,, p. 261 note; p. 170 note	I. v. 156
,, ,, ,, p. 173	II. ii. 263
,, ,, ,, p. 426	III. iv. 421
Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* xiii. 32	III. iv. 430
Garnier, *note on Bas. Epist.* xxxviii.	I. v. 147
,, *note on* "Capitula," *P. G.* lxxvi. 314	II. ii. 261
Gennadius, *Confession*	II. iii. 316
Gerhard, *Loc. Theol.* De Nat. Dei, c. vi.; viii. 3, 5	II. ii. 266
,, ,, Vol. i. 592, 597	II. iii. 309, 310
Gess, *Pers. Chr.* p. 304 (κένωσις)	II. ii. 252
Gerhohus, *In Ps.* ix. 1	III. iv. 431
Gizycki, *Viertelj. f. Wiss. Phil.* p. 500	I. i. 40
Godet, *N. T. Stud.* "Jesus Christ"	Introd. 3–16
,, *St. John's Gospel*, i. 160	Introd. 2
,, ,, ,, ii. 35	II. ii. 258
,, ,, ,, iii. 26	II. ii. 260
,, ,, ,, ii. 39	III. ii. 362
,, ,, ,, ii. 41	III. ii. 363
,, *N. T. Stud.* p. 137	Conclus. 464
Gore, Canon, *Lux Mundi*, p. 360	Introd. 32, 440
,, *B. L.* Lect. v. vi.	Introd. 17–33
,, *R. C. Claims*, pp. 2–6	Introd. 14, 15
,, *B. L.* p. 115	I. ii. 75
,, *Dissertations*, p. 105	II. ii. 233
,, *B. L.* p. 111	II. ii. 244
,, *D. C. B.* iv. 1129	II. ii. 250
,, *B. L.* pp. 163, 267, 146, 147, 266, 267, 162	II. iii. 272–290
,, *Dissert.* p. 84 note	III. iv. 409

		PAGE
Grant, Sir A., *Ethics of Arist.* i. 168	I. i.	37
„ „ „ „ i. 297	I. i.	38
Greg. Naz., St., *Or.* xxxviii. 2; *Epist.* ci.	II. iii.	275
„ *Or. Theol.* iv. 15, 16	III. iv.	424
Greg. Nyss., St., *Adv. Apoll.* xx.	II. iii.	314
„ „ „ xxiv. xxviii.	III. iv.	426
„ „ *De Deit. Fil. et Spir.* P. G. xlvi. 564	III. iv.	426
Greg. Magn., S., *Ep.* Lib. x. 39, *ad Eulog.*	III. iv.	424
„ „ *Id. ib.*	III. iv.	428
Greg. Turon, S., *Prol. ad Hist. Eccl. Franc.*	III. iv.	428
Günther, *on Personality of Christ*	I. v.	156
Gwynn, Dean, *Sp. Com.* Phil. ii. 7	II. ii.	254
Hall, Bp., *Works*, iv. 403; vi. 407; 427	II. iii.	321
Hammond, *Works* (Fol.) iii. 638, 640	II. iii.	322
Harduin, *Conc.* ix. 202	I. v.	147
Harnack, *Altchr. Litt.* i. 246	II. iii.	276
„ „ i. 644	II. iii.	297
Haymo, *In* 1 *Thess.* v. 1	III. iv.	431
Heinrich, *Christus*, Wetz. u. Welte, iii. 241	Introd.	15
„ „ „ „ iii. 258	II. ii.	262
Herodotus, iii. 80	III. iii.	380
Herschel, Sir J., *Astronomy*, p. 291	I. ii.	80
„ „ "Meteorology," *Enc. Br.*, 8th ed. Vol. xiv. 636	I. ii.	86
Hil. Pict., S., *De Trin.* ix. 9; *Ps.* cxxxix. § 2	Introd.	11
„ „ iii. 22	II. i.	206
„ „ *In Matt.* iv. 2	II. iii.	279
„ „ *In Ps.* lxviii. 4	II. iii.	293
„ „ *De Syn.* 48; *De Trin.* ix. 14; 38	II. iii.	294
„ „ *De Trin.* vii. 21; ix. 20; 45; x. 54	II. iii.	294
„ „ *De Trin.* x. 16, 37; ix. 58–75	II. iii.	294
„ „ *De Trin.* ix. fin.; x. 8	III. iv.	425
„ „ *De Trin.* ix. 58–75	III. iv.	429
Hobbes, *Elem. Philos.* iv. 25	I. i.	47
Hooker, *E. P.* I. ii. 2	I. iv.	131
„ *Id. ib.*	II. ii.	266
„ *Id.* V. liv. 6	II. iii.	282
„ *Id. ib.*	II. iii.	304
„ *Id.* V. liv. 4, 5	II. iii.	318
„ Vol. ii. 234 n. 17 Keble	II. iii.	319
„ *E. P.* V. liv. 6	II. iii.	319
„ Vol. ii. 562	III. ii.	373
Hort, *on Theod. Mops.*	II. ii.	248
Huet, *Origen.* Lib. II. ii. Qu. iii. 8	II. iii.	288
Hume, *Phil. Works*, i. 319 (Hum. Nat.)	I. v.	157
„ „ i. 312; ii. 548, App.	I. v.	159, 160
Hurter, *Theol. Dogm. Comp.* ii. 276	Introd.	29
„ „ „ ii. 32	II. ii.	266
Huxley, *Hume*, Ch. ii. ix. and p. 171	I. v.	160
„ „ pp. 166–172	I. v.	162
„ „ p. 63	I. v.	164
Huxtable, *Sp. Com.* Hos. xii. 5	II. ii.	266
Ignatius, St., *Ephes.* vii.	II. iii.	274
„ *Polycarp.* iii.	II. iii.	274
Illingworth, *B. L.* p. 234	I. v.	161
Irenæus, St., *Hær.* III. xix. 3	Introd.	5
„ „ V. xv. 2	II. ii.	259
„ „ I. xii. 2	II. ii.	266
„ „ III. xvi. 6	II. iii.	275
„ „ III. xix. 3	II. iii.	284

		PAGE
Irenæus, St., *Hær.* II. xxviii., 6, 8	III. iv.	424
Isidor. Pelus., *Epist.* Lib. i. 117	III. iv.	430
Jackson, Dr. Thomas, *Works* (fol.) iii. 320–324	II. iii.	309
„ „ „ ii. 764	II. iii.	320
„ „ „ iii. 319	II. iii.	321
James, *Psychology*, p. 220	I. i.	48
Jerome, St., *on Is.* ix. 6	II. i.	211
„ *Adv. Pelag.* ii. 14	III. iv.	426
„ *In Matt.* xxiv. 36	III. iv.	429
„ *In Hos.* iii. 4, 5	III. iv.	429
Jevons, *Elem. Logic.* pp. 53–60	I. iii.	91
Jewel, Bp., *Treat. of H. Script.* p. 42	II. iii.	328
„ *Sermons*, p. 257 (fol. 1611)	II. iii.	328
Johnson, Dean, *Sp. Com.* Ps. ii.	III. iv.	411
Julianus Toled., *Prognost.* Lib. iii. 1	III. iv.	430
Just. Mart., St., Apol. i. 63	II. i.	211
„ „ Trypho, 88	II. iii.	279
„ „ Ad Diogn. § 7	II. iii.	324
Kay, *Sp. Com.* Is. ix. 6	II. i.	211
Kaye, *Clem. Alex.* p. 345	II. iii.	279
Keble, *Præl. Acad.* p. 808	I. iii.	107
„ „ p. 12	I. iii.	112
Kimmel, *Lib. Symb. Eccl. Or.* p. 56; 425	II. iii.	313
„ „ „ p. 28	II. iii.	314
„ „ „ pp. 409, 433	II. iii.	315
„ „ „ p. 105	II. iii.	315
„ „ „ Pt. ii. p. 68	II. iii.	316
Kirkpatrick, Prof., *Psalms*, i. 7	III. iv.	411
Klee, *Dogmatik*, p. 272	I. iv.	131
Knoodt, *Anton Günther*	I. v.	156
Knox, A., *Remains*, Vol. iv. pp. 360–364	III. ii.	370
Latimer, Bp., *Remains*, p. 45	II. iii.	329
Lee, Archdn., *Sp. Com.* Rev. i. 10	I. iii.	119
„ *Inspir.* pp. 175, 176	I. iii.	121
„ „ pp. 120, 124	II. i.	206
„ „ pp. 118, 124, 127	II. i.	207
„ *Sp. Com.* Rev. i. 1	II. i.	213
„ *Inspir.* p. 137 and note 3	II. i.	213
Leo Magn., S., *Epist.* xxviii. 4	Introd.	5, 25
„ *Serm.* lxv. 14, 2	II. iii.	282
„ „ lxviii. 17, 2	II. iii.	282
Leontius Byz., *De Sectis*, Act x. 3	III. iv.	427
Leporius, *Libell. Emend.* § 3	II. iii.	276
„ „ „ § 10	III. iv.	429
Le Quien, *notes*, 22, 30 *to Joan. Dam. Dial.*	I. v.	147
Liddell and Scott, *s. v.* θαῦμα	III. iii.	381
Liddon, Canon, *B. L.* p. 98	II. i.	202
„ „ „ p. 56	II. i.	207
„ „ „ p. 87	II. i.	208
„ „ „ p. 231	II. i.	211
„ „ „ p. 156	II. ii.	263
Lightfoot, Bp., *Phil.* (ii. 7), p. 110	II. ii.	245
„ „ p. 134	II. ii.	248
„ *Gal.* p. 231, *sq.*	II. ii.	250
„ *Phil.* pp. 110, 132	II. ii.	254
„ *Apost. Fath.* Pt. ii. Vol. ii. pp. 48, 343	II. ii.	274
„ „ Vol. ii. p. 403	II. ii.	297
„ *Cont. Rev.* Feb. '76, pp. 475, 481	II. ii.	276
„ *Gal.* (i. 7, 19), εἰ μή	III. iv.	417

		PAGE
Littlejohn, Bp., *Individualism*, pp. 5–7	I. v.	145
Lock, *Life of Keble*, p. 31	I. iii.	112
Locke, *Essay*, Epist. to Reader, p. 2 (1753)	I. i.	39
„ „ Vol. ii. 165	I. v.	159
„ „ Vol. i. 331, 337	I. v.	158, 159
„ „ Vol. ii. 162 note; Vol. i. 324, 335	I. v.	159
Lombard, Pet., *In Rom.* viii. 26	III. iv.	431
Luther, *Werke*, ed. Walch, t. xviii. 622, 656	II. iii.	303
Macaire, *Théol. Dogm. Orthod.* ii. 94	II. ii.	263
„ „ „ Introd. § 6, p. 43	II. iii.	312
„ „ „ ii. 110	III. iv. 424,	434
Maine, Sir H., *Anc. Law*, pp. 168, 126, 183	I. v.	144
Malchion, *Conc. Ant.* A.D. 269, *ap.* Routh, *Rell. Sacr.* iii. 298	II. iii.	277
Maldonatus, on St. Matt. xxiv. 36	III. iv.	425
Mansel, Dean, "Met." *Enc. Br.* xiv. 552	I. i.	37
„ *B. L.* p. 223	I. ii.	76
„ "Met." *Enc. Br.* xiv. 612	I. v.	163
„ „ xiv. 616	I. v.	164
„ *Letters, Lect. and Rev.* p. 177	I. v.	164
„ „ „ *ib.* note †	I. v.	164
„ „ „ p. 199	I. v.	164
„ "Met." *Enc. Br.* xiv. 584	I. v.	170
„ *B. L.* p. 345, note 25	II. ii.	267
Max Müller, *Trans. Kant's Critique*, i. 117	I. v.	144
Mayor, Dr. J. B., *Epistle of St. James*, pp. xii, xiii	III. iv.	417
Melancthon, *Oper.* i. 156	II. iii.	305
„ „ i. 442	II. iii.	306
Melito, *Fragm.* 13, 14	II. ii.	274
Metrophanes Critopulus, *Confession*	II. iii.	315
Meyer, H. A. W., *Philipper*, p. 80	II. ii.	244
„ „ p. 86, 87 (ii. 7)	II. ii.	252
„ „ p. 69	II. iii.	300
„ 1 Cor. xii. 10	III. ii.	361
„ *on Phil.* i. 22	III. iii.	389
„ *on* εἰ μή	III. iv.	417
„ üb. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	431
Meyer, J. B., *Kant's Psychologie*	I. i.	39
Miller, *Bamp. Lect.* p. 121	III. ii.	370
Mill, Dr. W. H., *Myth. Interp.* p. 353, 354	II. i.	211
Mill, J. S., *Logic* (People's ed.) p. 546	I. iii.	98
„ *Exam. of Ham. Phil.* p. 212	I. v.	162
Milligan, Prof., *Lect. on Apoc.* p. 42, *sqq.*	III. iii.	404
Milton, *on Spenser*	I. iii.	106
"Mind," Vol. viii. 467	I. v.	162
„ „ 469	I. v.	165
Mozley, Dr. J. B., *Development*, p. 41	Introd.	14
„ *B. L.* p. 70	I. iii.	106
„ *Ruling Ideas*, p. 37	I. v.	144
Newman, Card., *Tracts Theol.* p. 287	Introd.	10
„ „ *Arians*, App. n. iv.	I. v.	147
„ „ „ p. 160	I. v.	149
„ „ *Tracts Th.* Diss. iv.	I. v.	147
„ „ *Hymns A. and M.*, 172	II. i.	229
Noiré, *Max Müller's Kant*, i. 117	I. v.	144
Œcumenius, *on Phil.* ii. 7	II. ii.	248
„ *on 2 Cor.* viii. 9	II. ii.	249
Origen, *De Princ.* i. 4	II. iii.	276
„ *In Joan.* t. i. 27; *C. Cels.* iv. 5	II. iii.	286
De Princ. i. 4; i. 8	II. iii.	287

		PAGE
Origen, *De Princ.* I. ii. 8	II. iii.	287
„ *C. Cels.* iv. 15	II. iii.	287
„ *Hom. in S. Luc.* xviii. xix. xx.	II. iii.	288
„ *C. Cels.* iv. 18	II. iii.	289
„ *Hom. in Jer.* viii. 8	II. iii.	285
„ *Hom. in St. Matt.* § 55	III. iv.	425
„ *Hom. in St. Matt.* xxiv. 36	III. iv.	428
Pearson, Bp., *Min. Works*, I. 149	I. iv.	126
„ *Creed*, Art. ii. p. 85	II. i.	209
„ „ p. 122	II. ii.	244
„ *Min. Works*, i. 39, *sqq.*	II. ii.	268
„ *Creed*, p. 122, 187, 188	II. iii.	323
„ „ p. 283, 284 note	III. iv.	414
„ *Min. Works*, i. 119	III. i.	347
„ „ i. 198, *sqq.*	III. ii.	372
Pelagius, *P. L.* xxx. 842 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	250
Petavius, *De Inc.* Lib. IV. vi. 3	Introd.	8
„ „ IV. vi. vii. viii.	Introd.	10
„ *De Deo*, Lib. IV. cc. i.–xi.	I. iv.	125
„ *De Inc.* Lib. II. vi. 10	II. i.	204
„ *De Deo*, Lib. II. ii.	II. ii.	266
„ „ VII. i. 1, *sq.*; vi. vii.	III. i.	348
Petrus Comestor, *Hist. Schol. in Evang.* c. 142	III. iv.	426
Petrus Diac., *De Inc. et Grat.* c. iii. 78	II. iii.	277
Photius, *Ad Amphil.* Qu. 145	III. iv.	424
„ „ Qu. 114	III. iv.	427
„ „ Qu. 114	III. iv.	432
Plato, *Rep.* viii. p. 560, D. E.	II. ii.	243
„ „ II. p. 380, C.	II. ii.	268
„ *Tim.* p. 37, D., *sqq.*	I. vi.	182
Primasius, *P. L.* lxviii. 630 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	250
Pusey, Dr., *Min. Proph.* p. 77 (Hos. xii. 5)	II. ii.	266
p. 613 (Mal. iii. 6)	II. ii.	266
Rabanus Maurus, *P. L.* cxii. 489 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	251
„ „ „ „ 488 (Theod. Mops.)	II. ii.	248
„ „ „ cvii. 1078c. (Matt. xxiv. 36)	III. iv.	428
Rawlinson, *Hdt.* ii. 477 (trans. iii. 80)	III. iii.	380
Reed, *Lect. on Eng. Poetry*, p. 56	I. iii.	102
„ „ *Brit. Poets*, p. 80	I. iii.	106
Reuss, *Théol. Johan.* p. 120 (La Bible)	Introd.	26
„ „ Intr. p. 16	Introd.	27
Ribot, *Psychol. Anglaise*, p. 232	I. i.	54
Rickaby, *Gen. Metaph.* pp. 239, 240	I. v.	162
„ „ p. 293	I. v.	165
Riehl, *Der Philos. Krit.* Erst. Band, p. 294, *sq.*	I. i.	40
Rivista di Filos., Novembre, 1891	I. i.	54
Robertson, *Trans. S. Athan. De Inc.*, Synopsis	II. i.	204
Robertson Smith, *O. T. in Jewish Ch.* Lect. i.	III. v.	445
Rost u. Palm, *s. v.* θαυμάζω.	III. iii.	382
Routh, *Rell. Sacr.* iii. 298	II. iii. 243,	277
Rufinus, *P. L.* xlviii. 247a	III. iv.	426
Ruskin, *Mod. Paint.* ii. 148	I. iii.	100
„ „ ii. 184	I. iii.	101
Schaff, *Schaff-Herz. Enc.* i. 461	II. iii.	308
„ „ i. 463	II. iii.	330
Seth, *Hegelianism and Person.* i. 11	I. v.	161
Shairp, *Aspects of Poetry*, p. 4	I. iii.	101
Skeffington, *Sinless Sufferer*, p. 99, *sq.*	Introd.	25
Sophocles, *Ajax*, 1093	III. iii.	380

		PAGE
Sozomen, *H. E.* vii. 17	III. iv.	430
Spencer, *Princ. of Psychol.* i. 145	I. ii.	81
„ „ „ Pt. vii. c. ix. § 220	I. v.	165
Strabo, Wal., *P. L.* (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	251
„ *In Marc.* xiii. 32	III. iv.	425
„ *In Matt.* xxiv. 36	III. iv.	431
Suicer, *Thes. s. v.* κένωσις	II. iii.	314
Sully, *Psychology*, i. 26	I. i.	53
„ *Outlines of Psychol.* p. 311	I. iii.	110
Swayne, *Our Lord's Know. as Man*, p. 48	II. iii.	285
Swete, Prof., *D. C. B.* iv. 947 (Theod. Mops.)	II. ii.	248
Taylor, Bp., *Expos. of Ap. Cr.* Works, vii. 601	Introd.	11
Temple, Bp., *B. L.* pp. 43–45	I. v.	165
Tennyson, *Poet. Works*, p. 274	I. ii.	78
„ „ p. 579	I. iii.	113
Tertullian, *De Carn. Chr.* c. v.	II. iii.	275
„ *Adv. Prax.* c. xxvii.	II. iii.	275
„ *De Carn. Chr.* c. iii.	II. iii.	276
„ *Adv. Prax.* c. xxvi.	III. iv.	425
Theodor. Mops., *P. G.* lxvi. 924 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	248
„ *P. L.* cxii. 207 (2 Cor. viii. 9)	II. ii.	248
Theodoret, *P. G.* lxxxiii. 72, *Dial.* i.	Introd.	24
„ „ „ *Dial.* iii. p. 232	Introd.	5
„ *P. G.* lxxxii. 569 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	248
„ *Dial.* iii. p. 232	II. iii.	284
„ *Repr. xii. Capp. Cyr.* c. iv.	III. iv.	427
„ *In Ps.* xv. 7	III. iv.	427
Theophilus Alex., *Epist. Syn.* A.D. 401	II. iii.	288
„ *Alt. Pasch.* A.D. 402	II. iii.	288
Theophylact, *on Phil.* ii. 7	II. ii. 241,	249
„ *on St. Matt.* xxiv. 36	III. iv.	431
Thirty-nine Art., Art. i.	I. iv.	130
Tillotson, Abp., *Works*, p. 525	II. iii.	329
Thomasius, *Dogm.* ii. 391–450	II. iii. 252,	331
Thucydides, i. 38.	III. iii.	380
Trench, Abp., *Miracles*, p. 205	III. ii.	364
„ „ p. 436	III. iii.	379
„ „ p. 170	III. iii.	394
Tyndall, *Presid. Address*, 1874	I. iii.	110
„ *Sc. Limit of Imag.* p. 65	I. iii.	124
Ueberweg, *Hist. Phil.* ii. 331, E. T.	I. i.	39
„ „ ii. 202	I. i.	39
„ „ ii. 432	I. v.	165
Vaughan, H., *Silex Scint.* p. 96	I. v.	182
Victor Ant., *on S. Mark* xiii. 32	III. iv.	431
Victorinus, *on Phil.* ii. 7	II. ii.	250
„ *Adv. Ar.* Lib. i. xxii.	II. ii.	250
„ „ iv. xxxi. xxxii.	II. ii.	250
Vitringa, *In Jesaiam* (ix. 6)	II. i.	208
Waite, *Sp. Com.* 2 Cor. viii. 9.	II. ii.	254
Wallace, *Psychol. of Arist.* Intr. ch. ii.	I. i.	38
„ „ „ p. 126	I. v.	144
Ward, J., *Enc. Brit.* 9th ed. Vol. xx. 49	I. i.	52
„ "Mind" Vol. viii. 467	I. v.	162
„ „ Vol. viii. 469	I. v.	165
Waterland, *Works*, ii. 109	II. iii.	288
„ „ ii. 111, 112	II. iii.	326
„ „ i. 332, note m.	II. iii.	327
„ „ i. 332–337	III. iv.	424

		PAGE
Waterland, *Works*, i. 516	III. iv.	425
Wellhausen, *Proleg. to Hist. Israel*, p. 37, 30, 294	III. v.	451
,, ,, ,, p. 126 note, 221, 222	III. v.	451
Westcott, Bp., *Hebrews*, p. 74 (iii. 1)	II. i.	210
,, *Epp. of St. John*, p. 121 (πέμπω)	II. i.	211
,, *Gospel of St. John*, p. 89 (v. 35)	II. i.	211
,, ,, ,, p. 144 (ix. 5)	II. i.	212
,, *Hebrews*, p. 7	II. i.	215
,, *Gospel of St. John*, pp. 53, 65 (iii. 13)	III. i.	344
,, ,, ,, p. 135 (viii. 38)	III. i.	344
,, ,, ,, p. 61 (iii. 32)	III. i.	354
,, ,, ,, pp. 126, 141, 142 (viii. 1–11)	III. ii.	370
,, ,, ,, p. 165 (xi. 6)	III. iii.	391
,, ,, ,, p. 171 (xi. 34)	III. iii.	396
,, *Epp. of St. John*, p. 74 (1 S. J. ii. 22)	III. iv.	411
,, ,, ,, p. 30 ("My Father")	III. iv.	418
Wetzer u. Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*, iii. 266	I. v.	148
,, ,, iii. 258	II. ii.	262
Whewell, *Hist. Sc. Id.* ii. 195, 207	I. ii.	78
,, *Nov. Org. Renov.* p. 54	I. iii.	101
,, *Hist. Ind. Sc.* B. V. c. iv. § 1	I. iii.	110
,, *Philos. of Discov.* pp. 119–122	I. iii.	110
,, *Hist. Ind. Sc.* B. vii. c. ii. § 3	III. v.	459
Wilberforce, *Incarn.* p. 222	II. i.	225
Winer, *Gr. N. T.* p. 430	II. ii.	244
,, ,, p. 190 (pronouns)	III. iv.	410
,, ,, p. 551 (ἀλλά)	III. iv.	416
,, ,, p. 566 (εἰ μή)	III. iv.	417
,, ,, p. 613 (οὔτε)	III. iv.	417
Wordsworth, W., *Poet. Works*, vi. 15, ed. Moxon	I. iii.	104
Wordsworth, Bp. Chr., *Gr. Test.* ii. 350 (Phil. ii. 7)	II. ii.	253
,, ,, ,, i. 272 (St. John i. 14)	II. ii.	254
Wordsworth, Bp. J., Pref. to Swayne's *Our Lord's Know.* p. xx.	II. iii.	309
Xenophon, *Memor.* I. iv. 2, 3	III. iii.	381
Young, Rev. E. M., *D. C. B.* i. 320	I. v.	147

III.—SUBJECTS.

(Supplementary to Table of Contents.)

Adam, intellectual position of, before the Fall	Introd.	29
Adjutorium and *Magisterium*	II. i.	204
Agnostics, their view of Personality	I. v.	162
ἀλλά	III. iv.	416
Anglican Church, View of St. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	433
Attention, psychological import of	I. i.	46
,, root of all human, perhaps of all finite, knowing	I. i.	66
Attributes, Divine, essentially one	II. ii.	256
Augustine, St., on distinction between Divine and human knowing	I. i.	44
Augustine, St., on Personal distinctions in the Holy Trinity	I. v. 149,	154
,, on man's vision of God in this life and the next	III. i.	347
,, on the Divine Unchangeableness	II. ii.	267
,, on St. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	429
Aristotle, remarkable neglect of Psychology by	I. i.	37
,, his omission to define Personality	I. v.	144
,, on Immutability of the First Cause	II. ii.	267

		PAGE
Aquinas, on the Divine Unchangeableness	II. ii.	268
„ on our Lord's Prayers	II. ii.	260
„ on man's vision of God	III. i.	348
Bacon, Lord, on man being strengthened in dependence on God	II. i.	226
Beron, or Veron, heretic of probably sixth or seventh century	II. iii.	297
Bible, The, why addressed so largely to the Imagination and the Affections	I. iii.	107
Boethius, probably not author of treatise *De Duab. Nat.*	I. v.	147
Bright, Canon, on Flavian's Letter read at Chalcedon	Introd.	9
„ on St. Cyril's Third Letter	II. ii.	262
Berkeley, Bp., on Personality	I. v.	165
Butler, Bp., on Locke's "Wonderful Mistake"	I. v.	158
Calogeras, Abp., on Euthym. Zigab. as Commentator	II. ii.	249
Carlyle, Thos., Imagination and "arithmetical understanding"	I. iii.	102
Causation, demands a beginning, which might be supposed but cannot be conceived	I. ii.	70
Cesca, "La Dottrina Kantiana dell' A Priori"	I. i.	61
Chalcedon, Gen. Council of	III. iv.	437
Church, Dean, on Hooker's "Very Oneness"	II. ii.	266
Churton, Archdn., on Fathers and Moderns as Commentators	II. ii.	246
Christ, His Humanity *structurally* identical with ours	I. i.	42
„ not exactly like us as regards needs of body	II. iii.	279
„ like and unlike Moses as Prophet	II. i.	200
„ the "Wonder-Counsellor"	II. i.	208
„ significance of His Titles—"Apostle," "Angel," "Light"	II. i.	211
„ nature of Temptation in His case	II. i.	224
„ His Obedience	II. i.	225
„ His Prayers	II. i. 227,	280
„ „ in Gethsemane	III. iii.	388
„ His Questions	III. iii.	393
Consciousness, an ultimate fact, beyond which analysis cannot be carried	I. i.	46
Consciousness, can only be exercised in form of attention	I. i.	45
Cyril, St., his Formula *μία φύσις κ.τ.λ.*	Introd.	8
Comparison, progress of thought only possible by	I. ii.	76
"Deification" of our Lord's Humanity, its meaning	III. ii.	304
Docetism, no place for in view maintained in Treatise	I. vi.	198
Döllinger, on authorship of Treatise against Beron	II. iii.	297
Dorner, on the Divine Unchangeableness	II. ii. 269,	332
„ on the views of Beron	II. iii.	298
„ on the Personality of Christ	II. iii.	332
Early Fathers, on "restraint" of our Lord's Godhead	II. iii.	281
„ on "permission" accorded by our Lord's Godhead to His Manhood	II. iii.	279
Eastern Church, views on St. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	434
Ego, "the starting-point of all philosophy"	I. v.	157
εἰ, force of with indicative	III. iv.	389
εἰ μή not equivalent to *ἀλλά*	III. iv.	416
Elisha, and Hazael	III. ii.	367
„ and Joash	III. ii.	375
Ellicott, Bp., on *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*	III. ii.	361
„ on St. John viii. 1–11	III. ii.	370
„ on Wellhausen's views of O. T.	III. v.	451
Eternity and Time	I. v.	182
Extension	I. ii.	72
"Father, The," sense of in N. T.	III. iv.	417
"Father, My," sense of as used by our Lord	III. iv.	418
Field, on St. Chrys. interp. of St. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	430
Force, an ultimate fact and indefinable	I. ii.	79

		PAGE
"Formula Concordiæ," its purpose and its failure	II. iii.	306
Fuseli, aphorism on Imagination	I. iii.	100
Gess, his view of the κένωσις	II. ii. 252,	331
Glory, Divine, Reuss' definition of	Introd.	26
God, Unchangeableness of, what it is	II. ii.	265
Grant, Sir A., on Aristotle's non-psychological treatment of Ethics	I. i.	38
Growth, an essential principle of human life, material, moral, and spiritual	I. v.	187
Günther, his view of Christ's Personality	I. v.	156
Hamilton, Sir W., on Attention	I. i.	48
Hegel, on finite and infinite thinking	I. ii.	73
Herschel, Sir J., on Force the result of Will	I. ii.	79
Hilary, St., "naturæ suæ hominem dereliquit"	II. iii.	279
Höffding, on Attention as root of thought and knowledge	I. i.	51
Hooker, on what our Lord's Manhood received	III. iii.	304
Imagination, penetrative power of	I. iii.	100
„ alliance of with feeling	I. iii.	101
„ moral not material truth sought by	I. iii.	104
„ visualizing power of	I. iii.	110
„ requires aid in giving expression to what she sees	I. iii.	111
„ cannot lend her special power of intuition	I. iii.	109
Incarnation, The, purposes of	II. i.	202
Indivisibility of matter	I. ii.	71
Intuitions of Space and Time accounted for by Law of Attention	I. i.	61
Irenæus, St., on "Quiescence of the Logos"	II. iii.	283
Kant, did not found his Critical Philosophy on Psychology	I. i.	40
„ did not go below the "intuitions" and the "categories"	I. i.	60
„ established that all our knowing is relative to the constitution of our faculties	I. i.	56
Keilah, David's inquiry concerning the people of	III. ii.	373
κενοῦν, usage of in Classics, N. T., and LXX.	II. ii.	242
Kepler, his scientific use of Imagination	I. iii.	110
Knowledge, different senses of term	I. iii.	103
Keble, on the poetical character of the O. T. Scriptures	I. iii.	107
Knox, Alex., on St. John viii. 1-11	III. ii.	370
Knoodt, his "Anton Günther"	I. v.	156
Leibnitz, his rules for thinking clearly	I. iii.	91
Life, various definitions of	I. ii.	78
Leipzig Conference, its endeavours to unite Calvinists and Lutherans	II. iii.	311
Luther, on Christ's Humanity	II. iii.	301
„ interpretation of Phil. ii. 7	II. iii.	302
„ his theory respecting our Lord's Person	II. iii.	303
„ on the Fathers	II. iii.	303
„ his doctrine of Consubstantiation	II. iii.	303
„ his doctrine of a gradual communication of the Divine Attributes to our Lord's humanity	II. iii. 303,	306
Mansel, Dean, on Laws of Thought	I. i.	49
„ reduced Kant's twelve "categories" to three	I. i.	60
„ on the knowledge of God which is possible for man	I. ii.	75
„ on Berkeley's dogmatising in negation	I. v.	163
„ on Kant's inconsistencies	I. v.	164
„ on Personality	I. v.	170
Melancthon, on Phil. ii. 7	II. iii.	305
Melito, his probable date	II. iii.	276
„ possibly author of canon μένων ὃ ἦν κ.τ.λ.	II. iii.	276

		PAGE
Milton, on Spenser as ethical teacher	I. iii.	106
Miracles, our Lord's, not "so many answered prayers	II. ii.	260
„ „ "flowing forth from the majestic Life resident in him"	II. ii.	263
Mozley, J. B., on danger of being illogically logical	Introd.	14
Newman, Card., on Personality	I. v.	148
Nicene Creed, leads us to study our Lord's Person from above	Introd.	12
One and many, a problem insoluble	I. ii.	71
οὐσία and *ὑπόστασις*	I. v.	147
Origen, two lines of thought respecting the *κένωσις*	II. iii.	287
„ did not teach a "self-limitation in communication of the Logos"	II. iii.	285
„ his tenet of the pre-existence of the Soul of Christ	II. iii.	287
οὐδαμοῦ, force of, in Chalcedonian Def. of Faith	III. iv.	437
Pearson, Bp., on the Divine knowing	I. iv.	126
„ on the Messias promised as Prophet	II. i.	209
„ on the Oneness of God	II. ii.	268
„ on man's power of seeing God in this life	III. i.	347
„ on Socinian interpretations of St. Matt. xi. 21–23	III. ii.	372
Petavius, on the Divine Knowing	I. iv.	125
„ on the Vision of God	III. i.	348
Plato, on the immutability of God	II. ii.	268
Pusey, Dr., on Hos. xii. 5	II. ii.	266
Psychology, neglect of, in ancient times	I. i.	36
„ study of, "indicated rather than commenced by Descartes"	I. i.	39
„ influence of Locke upon study of	I. i.	39
Rainbow, illustration used by St. Basil of relations of Persons of Holy Trinity	I. v.	153
Roman Church, views of St. Mark xiii. 32	III. iv.	434
Seth, on Personality	I. v.	161
Schelling, his "intellectual intuition"	I. ii.	73
Shakespeare, Imaginative power of	I. iii.	100
"Sign of Son of Man"	III. iii.	405
Sinaitic Palimpsest	III. iv.	409
"Son, The," in Ps. ii. 12	III. iv.	411
Space, succession of parts indefinitely prolonged makes conception of	I. ii.	69
Spirit, The human, not dependent on bodily organisation	I. iii.	115
„ „ held in check by the body	I. iii.	115
„ „ unquiet in its "sheath"	I. iii.	120
„ „ dependent on moral conditions	I. iii.	122
"Suspension" of Omniscience a self-contradictory notion	II. ii.	235
Temptation, different conditions of in our case and in the case of the Second Adam	II. i.	222
θαυμάζω, does not always indicate surprise	III. iii.	383
Theodor. Mops., his teaching the source of Nestorianism and Pelagianism	Introd.	8
Thomasius, account of Giessen and Tübingen Controversy	II. iii.	308
Thought, developed comparison	I. i.	51
Time, beginning and end of and no beginning or end of equally inconceivable	I. ii.	69
Trench, Abp., on "perceived in His Spirit"	III. iii.	364
„ on our Lord's question to the Gadarene demoniac	III. iii.	394
„ on the barren fig tree	III. iii.	379
Truth, material apprehended by the Understanding, moral by the Imagination, Divine by the Spirit of man	I. iii.	123
Understanding, The subjective perfection of the work of	I. iii.	92

		PAGE
Understanding, objective aim of, to ascertain the constitution of objects and their relations	I. iii.	94
„ character of conquests of	I. iii.	96
Understand, to, and to know not equivalent terms	I. iii.	99
Waterland, on the views of "a late writer" respecting the kenosis	II. iii.	327
„ on St. Irenæus' interpretation of the Saying respecting the Day	III. iv.	424
„ on Tertullian's probable view of the Saying	III. iv.	425
Westcott, Bp., on ὅταν in St. John	II. i.	212
„ on the "newness" of the N.T. and its relation to the O. T.	II. i.	215
„ on the revelation made by Christ as resting upon an immediate vision of God	III. i.	344
„ on our Lord's question about the grave of Lazarus	III. iii.	396
„ on "My Father"	III. iv.	418
Whewell, on definitions of Life	I. ii.	78
„ on the intellectual character of Kepler	I. iii.	110
„ on the patience of Newton	III. v.	459
Wordsworth, W., on Man and Nature as Philosopher and as Poet	I. iii.	104
Wundt, his "Attention" experiment	I. i.	48

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.

DATE DUE

THE KING'S LIBRARY
3000037997